DocketNumber: No. CV97 005 82 13
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 499
Judges: CURRAN, J.
Filed Date: 1/21/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Practice Book § 4046, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 61-11, provides in relevant part that "In all actions, . . . proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment shall be automatically stayed until the time to take an appeal has CT Page 500 expired; if an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause. . . ." (Quoting from revised edition, amended 1999.) This section stays the enforceability of a foreclosure judgment provided a timely appeal is taken from that judgment. See Farmers Mechanics Savings Bankv. Sullivan,
On December 14, 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to terminate the automatic stay of execution. In its motion, the plaintiff argues that the appeal has been taken only for delay and that the due administration of justice requires the stay be terminated. The requisite hearing for the termination of the automatic stay of execution was heard before this court on January 11, 1999. Aside from his original statement of appeal, it does not appear that the defendant has offered any other objection or any memorandum supporting the continuance of the automatic stay.
For the reasons set forth below, this court finds that defendant's appeal is taken to delay the execution of the deficiency judgment against him.
The defendant offers the following five grounds for appeal: "1. Did the court err in finding that the fair market value of the real estate in question was $115,000.00? 2. Did the court err in granting a deficiency judgment in the Plaintiff's favor despite the Plaintiff's actions from the entry of the foreclosure proceedings and the judgment of strict foreclosure to the law date? 3. Did the court err in accepting the debt as $146,582.09? 4. Did the court err in not allowing defendant to get full disclosure of debt? 5. Did the court err in not allowing additional time and testimony which is in conflict with the Code of Judicial Conduct, according to the Practice Book, Cannon 2 (A), cannon 2(B), Cannon 3(A) 3, 4?" (Preliminary Statement of Issues, November 30, 1998.)
The court will address each ground in turn.
In the present case, the fair market value of the property at the time of foreclosure was found to be $126,000. This fair market value was based on the appraisal of the plaintiff's expert. At that time, the defendant did not offer any evidence disputing that the property had a fair market value other than $126,000.
During the hearing on the deficiency judgment, the plaintiff submitted a more recent appraisal conducted by the same expert who conducted the prior appraisal. According to this expert, a more thorough inspection, including the interior of the premises, revealed that the premises was in a condition that was far more deteriorated than previously estimated. The plaintiff's expert also testified that the premises had an inadequate driveway for which the market would penalize the property some $3,000. As a result, the plaintiff's appraiser revalued the fair market value of the property, at the time title vested in the plaintiff on February 18, 1998, at $110,000.
At this time, the defendant, for the first time, presented evidence as to the fair market value of the property. According to the defendant's expert, the property, at the time of the deficiency judgment in October, 1998, was properly valued at $145,000.
"When considering a motion for deficiency judgment, the trial court may make an independent determination as to the valuation of the property. . . ." Bank of Southeastern Conn. v. NazarkoRealty Group, (Citations omitted.)
In the present case, property appraised at $126,000 at the time of the foreclose was re-appraised as having a fair market value of $110,000 when title vested in the plaintiff. There was conflicting testimony as to that value. The conflicting testimony, however, exceeded the original fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure by some $20,000 and stated the fair market value for the property some seven months after title had already vested in the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the court considered that testimony and reached a compromise fair market value of $115,000.
The court believes that such a compromise and fair market value estimation was just and fair and supported by the evidence offered at the time of the hearing on the deficiency judgment.
In the present case, the plaintiff offered the affidavit of Edward Wong, the foreclosure specialist of Wilshire Credit Corp., who attested that the defendant's debt to the plaintiff was, as of September 17, 1997, in the amount of $145,113.07. On November 10, 1997, the plaintiff offered an amendment to that affidavit that included an additional $1,469.02 in interest that had accumulated since September 17, 1997.
During the foreclosure hearings, the defendant did not offer any evidence to suggest that the debt was other than what was calculated by the plaintiff. The court, accordingly, found that the debt was established by the plaintiff in the amount of $146,582.09. This amount was fair and accurate in light of the evidence presented at the time of strict foreclosure. As an action for deficiency judgment presumes the amount of the debt as established by the foreclosure judgment; First Federal Bank, FSBv. Gallup, supra,
On October 27, 1997, the plaintiff filed a motion for order, stating that the plaintiff has "provided the Defendant with all requested documents and has contacted the Defendant's counsel in an attempt to comply with all requests. Counsel for the Defendant has not been able to clarify what documents are missing in regards to their request for production and Counsel for the Plaintiff has complied with all requests filed." From a review of the file, it does not appear that the defendant filed any objection to this motion for order concerning compliance or any CT Page 504 other sort of request for additional production or disclosure.
Accordingly, the court believes that the defendant was allowed full disclosure of the debt.
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the defendant's appeal is taken only for reasons of delay and does not provide likely grounds for appeal. The plaintiff's motion to terminate the stay of execution is granted.
THE COURT
CURRAN, J.