DocketNumber: No. CV00 0071634S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12769
Judges: ARNOLD, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 9/14/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Essentially, the plaintiff claims that the City of Shelton negligently oversaw the construction and development by the defendants, BBC Corporation and Sunset Development, of residential lots neighboring the plaintiff's property.
The defendant, City of Shelton, has filed a motion to strike claiming general governmental immunity from liability; specific statutory immunity; and that the plaintiff's action against the City of Shelton is time-barred pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations for a negligence action.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [pleading]", including a cross claim." Novarnetrix Med. Sys. v. BOC Group, Inc.,
Ordinarily, expiration of the statute of limitations must be raised as CT Page 12771 a special defense, but where the complaint contains all facts pertinent to the issue, it may be raised by a motion to strike. Morrisette v.Archambault,
"When it is apparent from the facts of the complaint that the municipality was engaging in a governmental function while performing the acts and omissions complained of by the plaintiffs, the defendant [is] not required to plead governmental immunity as a special defense and [may] attack the legal sufficiency of the complaint through a motion to strike." Dube v. Bye,
The court agrees with the defendant City of Shelton's argument that Count 13 is time-barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's only allegation of breach of duty to the plaintiff is that the defendant, City of Shelton, negligently approved the developer's project and issued certificates of occupancy. The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the offending approval was granted on July 7, 1997. The present action was commenced on August 20, 2000. The plaintiff was obligated to bring the present action against the defendant, City of Shelton, no later than July 7, 1999 pursuant to1 General Statute §
The plaintiff argues that the City's negligence is a continuing course of conduct as the defendant City still fails to prevent surface water from draining onto the plaintiff's property. Thus, claims the plaintiff, the statute of limitations is tolled. Tucker v. Bitonti,
Plaintiff argues further that as the developer did not begin construction until 1998. Therefore, the plaintiff could not have CT Page 12772 discovered the water runoff problem until sometime after 1998. Thus, argues the plaintiff, the City, in its motion to strike, has not established the date on which the plaintiff knew of the problem; the event that would constitute the date of discovery of actionable harm. See, Lambert v. Stovall,
The plaintiff is making an argument which does not appear in its complaint against the defendant, City of Shelton. The plaintiff has not alleged a continuing course of conduct. The only allegations against this defendant pertain to negligent, in the issuance of the permits. The permits were issued; they are not in a continuous state of issuance.
The court agrees with the defendant that if, as the plaintiff argues, the proper statute of limitations is2 General Statute §
In this case, the principal conduct complained of as it pertains to the defendant City, is the issuance of permits on July 7, 1997.
"To support a finding of a "continuous course of conduct' that may toll the statute of limitations, there must be evidence of a breach of duty that remained in existence after the commission of the original wrong. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong.
To uphold a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the "act or omission' relied upon, there must be evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to a prior act."
Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp.,
In this case, neither the requirement of a continuing course of conduct CT Page 12773 nor "special relationship" between the plaintiff and the City of Shelton, such as a physician-patient or lawyer-client relationship, has been established. There also is no evidence of some later "wrongful conduct" on the part of the City of Shelton.
As stated previously, "in ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the [pleading] and cannot be aided by the assumption of facts not alleged." Novarnetrix Medical Systems v. BOCGroup, Inc.,
Accordingly, the motion to strike Count Thirteen as to the defendant, City of Shelton, is granted. As the granting of this motion to strike the plaintiff's action against the City of Shelton is dispositive, the court does not address the issues of governmental immunity raised by the defendant.
The Court
Arnold, J.
Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank , 188 Conn. 281 ( 1982 )
Handler v. Remington Arms Co. , 144 Conn. 316 ( 1957 )
Morrisette v. Archambault , 31 Conn. Super. Ct. 302 ( 1974 )
Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc. , 27 Conn. Super. Ct. 46 ( 1967 )