DocketNumber: No. CV 90-0440919S
Citation Numbers: 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 951
Judges: ARONSON, JUDGE
Filed Date: 1/30/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In the first count, plaintiff alleges that the "defendant Kenneth Herman, aided and abetted by the defendants Todd Herman and Jeffrey Herman, willfully and maliciously assaulted and beat the plaintiff. . . .
Count two alleges negligent and careless assault.
Count three incorporates the allegations in count one, that the defendants willfully and maliciously assaulted the plaintiff. Count three also incorporates the allegation in count two which alleges negligent and careless assault. Count three goes on to claim that "[t]he foregoing constitutes a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. sec.
Paragraph 9 of the third count alleges that "[t]he defendant, Kenneth Herman, assaulted the plaintiff because the plaintiff paid him by check, instead of cash as requested for towing services of a vehicle to the plaintiff's place of business."
The defendant Kenneth Herman moves, in his amended motion to strike the third count of the plaintiff's complaint, and for attorney's fees under the CUTPA claim. The defendant Kenneth Herman claims that the alleged assault and battery set forth in the plaintiff's third count does not constitute an actionable claim under CUTPA even though it arose out of a business transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The gist of the defendant's argument is that the plaintiff's injury did not arise out of the demand for payment in cash, but rather the alleged assault and battery.
In ruling upon a motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those necessarily implied thereby, are deemed to be true. Norwich v. Silverberg,
The issue becomes whether an assault pursuant to a demand for payment in a business transaction can rise to the level of constituting a violation of CUTPA. We hold that it can rise to the level of CUTPA.
Whatever the purpose was of demanding cash and following through with an assault pursuant to this demand comes within the criteria set forth in Sportsmen's Boating Corporation, Id. at 756.
The standard for a tort claims is a higher standard than that for a CUTPA claim. Id. at 755. "Conduct that might be actionable under CUTPA may not rise to a level sufficient to invoke tort liability. The reverse of that proposition, however, is seldom true." Id. at 756.
Conn. Gen. Stat. sec.
(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise whether, in other words it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous;
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)].
Sportsmen's Boating,
Conn. Gen. Stat. sec.
In the present case the loss could be the injury sustained caused by the assault in enforcing a trade practice.
The Connecticut Supreme Court in A.G. Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm Inc. noted the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") four primary categories of practices which have been prohibited as unfair: (1) withholding material information; (2) making unsubstantial advertising claims; (3) using high-pressure sales techniques; and (4) depriving consumers of various CT Page 954 post-purchase remedies." A.G. Foods,
The Connecticut legislature broadly defined the scope of CUTPA to allow judicial interpretation, but specifically authorized the courts to follow the interpretations of the FTC in construing CUTPA. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec.
Two Superior Court cases support the conclusion that this assault pursuant to a demand for payment in a business context may constitute a CUTPA violation.
In Wolf v. Cho,
In Halloran v. Spillane's Service Center, Inc., 1 CT Page 955 CTLR 491 (July 16, 1990, Maloney, J.), the superior court held that a corporation in the business of removing and towing vehicles violated CUTPA by engaging in certain business practices which were executed by the defendant's employees, who used abusive language, violence, and threats. In addition to holding that the defendant's practice of detaining the vehicle, despite the demand for its release by the owner, constituted a conversion violating CUTPA, the court also considered the conduct of the employees in carrying out these practices as a second factor in concluding that the conversion of the vehicle was oppressive and injurious to the plaintiff. Id. at 495.
Unlike the plaintiff in Wolf who failed to allege status as a consumer or any business relationship with the defendants, the present plaintiff has alleged the assault pursuant to the demand for payment occurred within a business context sufficient to constitute conduct of "any trade or commerce," as defined as "the distribution of services." See Conn. Gen. Stat. sec.
Accordingly, defendants' motion to strike is denied.
ARNOLD W. ARONSON JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT