DocketNumber: No. CV96-0134087
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1786
Judges: KULAWIZ, J.
Filed Date: 2/10/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Pursuant to the issuance of the permit, plaintiff's contractor commenced making interior alterations to said premises. By March, 1996 the work was completed. After inspection by City officials, plaintiff was issued a Certificate of Occupancy presumably for a storage room and new bathroom as requested on the building permit. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff commenced business operating as a restaurant/deli/grocery store, sending out flyers advertising the same and indicating that the restaurant could accommodate 40 people. (Record #18).
Once the restaurant was opened, neighbors began to complain. On May 2, 1996, the appellant was notified by the City that he could not operate a restaurant at said property because such operation was not in compliance with-the City of Waterbury Zoning Regulations. Appellant acting without an attorney applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals for "variances" requesting a variation of "Section 6.3 change in use from an existing delicatessen to a delicatessen/restaurant and Section 6.5 structural expansion from an existing storage area to a seating area and restroom in the RL zone [Residential Light]. Although the application states that a request for any variance must be accompanied by a Class A-2 survey map, none was submitted by the applicant.
Section 6.3 reads as follows:
6.3 Change in use.
A nonconforming use may be changed to another nonconforming use in the same zoning district providing that the new use will have a lesser impact upon the CT Page 1788 surrounding area than the old one and subject to the granting of a special exception by the zoning board of appeals.
Whenever a nonconforming use has been changed to a conforming use or to a use permitted in the same zoning classification, it shall not thereafter be changed to a nonconforming use.
Section 6.5 reads as follows:
6.5 Structural expansion
Any existing legal nonconforming use of a building or structure may be expanded to not more than fifty (50) per cent of its gross floor area on the existing lot area at the date of the adoption of this ordinance, (June 20, 1979), provided that the proposed extension does not violate height yard, parking, and lot coverage requirements of the existing zoning district and subject to the approval of the Zoning Board of Appeals as a special Exception. These conditions are mandatory and not subject to variance. (Emphasis added)
Nevertheless, appellant acting without an attorney, applied for a variance of these two zoning regulations. A duly noticed public hearing was held on May 20, 1996 attended by Commissioners Caiazzo, Palermo, Marage and Chairman Russell and Alternate Commissioner Terienzo. Commissioner Jaynes was absent. After an extensive public hearing at which applicant D'Amelio was heard and several neighbors spoke in opposition and a petition was received and placed on record signed by many people, not all of whom live in Waterbury, in favor of appellant's application. The Commission voted to table for 30 days appellant D'Amelio's request. It was also voted to request a review of the file by the Corporation Counsel's office.
Thereafter a special meeting of the Zoning Board of Appeals was held on July 1, 1996. Present were Chairman Russell, Commissioners Caiazzo, Palermo, Jaynes, Marages and Alternates Terienzo and Noqueiro (who left shortly after the start of the meeting). Although a response had not been received from the Corporation Counsel's Office, most of the members participated in discussion of D'Amelio's application. No finding of hardship was made by the Board. Discussion took place of the case of CT Page 1789Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
From the action of the Board denying the variance, the appellant D'Amelio appealed to this court.
First, the court will find that Guiseppe D'Amelio is aggrieved by the Board's action. D'Amelio has been a tenant for approximately 14 years operating a grocery/delicatessen on premises owned by Nicholas Martone of New York. A plaintiff has standing to challenge the decision of a zoning board if that person is aggrieved by its decision. Primerica v. Planning andZoning Commission,
Courts must not disturb the decision of the Zoning commission unless the party aggrieved by the decision establishes that the Commission acted arbitrarily or illegally.First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Town Planning and ZoningCommission,
The first issue to be decided concerns the legality of the voting of the Zoning Board of Appeals. Appellant asserts that the vote was improper and illegal and that therefore the board acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of discretion. Connecticut General Statutes § 8.7 requires the concurring votes of four members of the zoning board of appeals . . . to vary the application of a zoning bylaw, ordinance, rule or regulation. The plaintiff argues that since a variance could be granted by four concurring votes, that four votes are necessary to deny a variance also. The plaintiff relies on S.I.S. Enterprises. Inc.v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
In the instant case, there were all five members present but two chose to abstain, while three voted to deny the application for a variance. All of the members participated in discussion. While there is a split of authority at the trial court level as to whether an abstention counts as a vote, U Haulv. Planning Zoning Comm., 12 Conn. L. Rptr., 367 (1994) (Fuller, J.) holding that votes of members of a zoning agency who abstain from voting are counted as being with the majority and Biasucci v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Ansonia,
Appellant's application was one for a variance of Sections 6.3 and 6.5 as spelled out earlier in this decision. In regard, first to 6.5 that section states "these conditions are mandatory and not subject to variance." Therefore this court holds that the Board could make no other decision then denying a variance of that section. The next issue is that of the characterization of appellants's application. In denying appellant's application, the Board did not set forth on the record the reason for its decision. The court, therefore, is obligated to search the entire record in order to ascertain if there was a basis for the Board's decision. Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
Section 7.2 et seq. sets forth the powers and duties of the zoning board of appeals. Section 7.21 sets forth requirements for granting variances and reads as follows.
7.21-3. Authorize variance. Authorize upon appeal in specific cases variance from the terms of these regulations where by reason of exceptional shape, size, or topography of the lot or other exceptional situation or condition of the building or land, exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship would result to the owners of said property from a strict enforcement of the regulations; provided that such relief or variance can be granted without substantial impairment of the intent, purpose and integrity of this ordinance and of the comprehensive plan for the City of Waterbury.
A Class A-2 survey map made by a Connecticut registered land surveyor shall be required for any variance.
It is further provided that this provision shall not permit the board to permit a use of land not authorized by the provisions of this ordinance for a specific zoning district or to increase the height or volume of a building or CT Page 1792 structure or to increase the density of development beyond that permitted by this ordinance for any particular zoning district. Before granting a variance on the basis of unusual difficulty or unreasonable hardship, the zoning board of appeals must make a written finding in its minutes as part of the record in the case that all of the following conditions exist:
(a) That if the owner complied with the provisions of this ordinance he would not be able to make any reasonable use of his property.
(b) That the difficulties or hardship relate to the physical characteristics of the land and are peculiar to the property in question in contrast with those of other properties in the same district.
(c) That the hardship was not the result of the applicant's own action.
(d) That the hardship is not merely financial or pecuniary.
(e) Any variance which is not executed within a period of six (6) months shall become null and void, unless an extension of time is applied for and granted by the Zoning Board of Appeals.
Appellant submitted no Class A-2 survey map as required for any variance. Also, the board made no written findings in its minutes as part of the record concerning hardship as per Section 7.21-3. A finding of hardship would be necessary and such hardship cannot be a result of applicant's own action or merely financial or pecuniary. In order to obtain a variance the applicant also must show that if he complied with the provisions of the zoning ordinance he would not be able to make any reasonable use of his property. This was not shown by applicant or found by the Board.
Most of the discussion of the Board centered around Section 6.3 which is for a change of use. This section reads in part that "a nonconforming use may be changed to another nonconforming use in the same zoning district providing the new use will have a lesser impact upon the surrounding area than the old one and subject to a special exception by the zoning board of appeals." Appellant who applied for a variance of this CT Page 1793 section claims that the board was unclear in its discussion and decision. This, the court does not doubt. The Appellant acknowledges that there was no attempt to show that the new use would have a lesser impact because it was not applying for a special exception but for a variance.
This court finds that on a review of the record a denial of either variance or a special exception was justified by the Board.
The remaining issue is that of equitable estoppel. Appellant claims that the Board is equitably estopped from denying his request for variances.
Although estoppel is generally not invoked against a public agency in the exercise of its governmental functions, an exception exists where the party claiming the doctrine of estoppel would be subjected to a substantial loss if the municipality were permitted to negate the acts of its agents.Dornfried v. October Twenty-Four. Inc., supra 635 (1994); Dupuisv. Submarine Base Credit Union. Inc., supra 354 (1976).
Estoppel generally requires proof of two essential elements: (1) "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; " and (2) "the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury". Id. At 634-35; Bozzi v. Bozzi,
This is an equitable claim and he who seeks equity must do equity. Kilbourne v. City of New Britain,
This court fails to find that appellant was induced by the City to believe that he had the approval to operate a restaurant. A municipality is not estopped merely because it issued a building permit and the property is used for a purpose not described to its officials. Zoning Comm. Of the Town of Shermanv. Lesczinski,
Although the Supreme Court of Connecticut has not yet had the opportunity to determine whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be specifically invoked to support the issuance of a variance, the Supreme Court has clearly upheld the doctrine's invocation in cases involving the enforcement of the zoning laws. Dornfried v. October Twenty-Four, Inc.,
In a recent case, the trial court held that although no traditional legally cognizable hardship justified a variance that owners of property on which a building permit had been issued and work performed demonstrated a hardship under principles of equitable estoppel. The Supreme Court held that this decision was erroneous because it was not raised before the Board or in the trial court and the court had not held an evidentiary hearing thereon. Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
supra,
Further, the court has not found that appellant, based on the estimated cost of renovations of $1500 and the claimed costs alleged at the public hearing that appellant spent $13,000 on renovation. The investment for a bathroom and dining room with table and chairs would not be rendered completely useless. Appellant can still use his premises as a delicatessen/grocery with an area for customers to wait. The premises are not rendered useless by the denial of the application for variance.
The standard of review on appeal from a zoning board's decision to grant or deny a variance is well established. The trial court, after a review of the record before it does not find that the board's act was arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion. Schwartz v. Planning Zoning Commission,
Therefore, the court dismisses the appeal. Judgment shall enter accordingly.
KULAWIZ, J.
Zoning Commission v. Lescynski , 188 Conn. 724 ( 1982 )
Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission , 156 Conn. 505 ( 1968 )
Bozzi v. Bozzi , 177 Conn. 232 ( 1979 )
Calandro v. Zoning Commission , 176 Conn. 439 ( 1979 )
New Britain v. Kilbourne , 109 Conn. 422 ( 1929 )
Whittaker v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 179 Conn. 650 ( 1980 )