DocketNumber: No. 374594
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 9676, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 621
Judges: LEVIN, J.
Filed Date: 7/31/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The following material facts are not in dispute. On October 20, 1987, the defendant, Area Cooperative Educational Services (ACES), hired the plaintiff, Joan Krajewski, to work in the defendant's Multiple Handicapped Unit. Krajewski is a certified special education teacher in the state of Connecticut, and ACES provides special education services to students in approximately twenty-six Connecticut School districts. At the times relevant to this action, the defendant Peter Young was the executive director of ACES.
The defendants ACES Educational Association (ACESEA) and its statewide parent organization, Connecticut Educational Association (CEA), are employee representative organizations within the meaning of General Statutes §§
From the date of her hiring, through June, 1992, the plaintiff worked for ACES in her capacity as a special education teacher. In of 1992, the plaintiff was transferred, involuntarily, to another ACES program. The plaintiff was assigned to the Severe Communication and Behavior Disorder section, a position that required more intensive interaction with the students. Shortly after beginning her new assignment, the plaintiff came into conflict with her supervisor, Joy St. Ledger. The plaintiff allegedly was directed by St. Ledger to use corporal punishment to discipline and control severely handicapped students.2 Ultimately, plaintiff refused to use physical force and, on May 27, 1993, she was sent a notice of pending termination.
On June 22, 1993, the plaintiff, though a tenured teacher, was informed by ACES, in accordance with a "seniority override" provision in her collective bargaining agreement, that she would not be offered a new employment contract. The plaintiff was also told that ACES had informed ACESEA that she would not be considered any future positions. In response, the plaintiff filed grievances in accordance with the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff also requested a formal public hearing pursuant to General Statutes §
Soon thereafter, on July 23, 1993, the plaintiff's termination revoked and she was transferred to a different school CT Page 9678 and teaching unit. Nonetheless, the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Board of Labor Relations (SBLR) against ACES and the Connecticut Educational Association (CEA), alleging that both parties breached their duty of fair representation. After an extensive hearing, the SBLR found that the plaintiff's claims against ACESEA and CEA to be unsupported by the evidence.
The plaintiff then filed a ten count complaint against ACES, ACESEA and the CEA. As contained in the plaintiff's revised complaint, the relevant counts for purposes of the defendants, motion for summary judgment are eight, nine and ten. These counts allege respectively, civil conspiracy against all three defendants; negligence against ACESEA and CEA; and a Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) violation against ACESEA and CEA.
Specifically, count eight against ACESEA and CEA alleges that "the defendant's [sic] CEA and[ACESEA] did not adequately represent or properly assist the plaintiff with respect to three separate grievances which the plaintiff filed." Count nine alleges the defendants ACESEA and CEA "breached their duty of reasonable care by negligently representing plaintiff in the enforcement of the [collective bargaining agreement] on behalf of the plaintiff." In count ten, the plaintiff alleges that "[t]hrough their actions and inactions in improperly representing the plaintiff, as an agency fee payer, defendants [ACESEA] and CEA violated [General Statutes §
The defendants ACESEA and CEA (defendants) have moved for summary judgment on counts eight, nine and ten on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and (2) the plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The defendants argue that since General Statutes §
Preliminarily, the plaintiff argues in her memorandum of law that since the court (Gray, J.) determined, in denying the defendants' earlier motion to dismiss, that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies against the defendants, this court is precluded from deciding otherwise. This clearly is not the law.
"`The law of the case [doctrine] expresses the practice of judges generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided and it is not a limitation on their power. . . . Where a matter has previously been ruled upon interlocutory, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided . . .'" Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board,
Nevertheless, "[t]he law of the case is not written in stone but is a flexible principle of many facets adaptable to the exigencies of the different situations in which it may be invoked." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carothers v.Capozziello,
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer,
Pursuant to General Statutes §
The legislature has provided for judicial review of final decisions of the SBLR. General Statutes §
The plaintiff, however, argues that because she seeks damages from the defendants, the remedies provided in General Statutes §
The SBLR has broad remedial powers. Board of Education v.State Board of Labor Relations,
Here, the remedies available to the plaintiff through the SBLR are adequate. "It is not the plaintiff's preference for a particular remedy that determines whether the remedy . . . is adequate; see e.g., Connecticut Life Health Ins. Guaranty Assn.v. Jackson, [
Next, the plaintiff argues that she could not have exhausted her administrative appellate remedies because any such appeal was mooted by her reinstatement. "Mootness applies to situations where events have occurred during the pendency of an appeal that make an appellate court incapable of granting practical relief through a disposition on the merits. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HousingAuthority v. Lamothe,
A court may retain jurisdiction, however, where the matter CT Page 9682 being appealed creates collateral consequences prejudicial to the interests that of the appellant, even though developments during the pendency of the appeal would otherwise render it moot.Housing Authority v. Lamothe, supra,
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the language of General Statutes §
Because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, this court lacks jurisdiction not only over the CT Page 9683 negligence count, but also over the counts alleging a conspiracy between ACESEA and the CEA and alleging a violation of CUTPA. SeeMcNish v. American Brass Co.,
A lack of jurisdiction is generally raised by a motion to dismiss rather than a motion for summary judgment. In a case such as this, however, this court may treat the defendants' motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss. Paul v. New Haven,
The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the eighth, ninth and tenth counts of the plaintiff's complaint. Treating the defendants' motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss, the motion is granted.
Bruce L. LevinJudge of the Superior Court
Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v. Jensen's, Inc. , 178 Conn. 586 ( 1979 )
Connecticut Life & Health Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. ... , 173 Conn. 352 ( 1977 )
Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton , 151 Conn. 27 ( 1963 )
McNish v. American Brass Co. , 139 Conn. 44 ( 1952 )