DocketNumber: No. CV 00 0082383S
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 1291, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 305
Judges: CREMINS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/31/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Based on the testimony, the exhibits admitted and the credibility of the witnesses, the court could reasonably find the following facts as CT Page 1292 proven. On September 1, 1998, Steponaitis was the owner of approximately 200 tons of cut granite stone (the "stone"), which was stored on property owned by his spouse located on Norfolk Road in Torrington, Connecticut (the "property").
Steponaitis had salvaged the stone over a period of years from demolition sites and had stored the stone on the property.
Steponaitis intended to use the stone in the construction of a dwelling on the property.
In August of 1998, one Stuart Ormsby ("Ormsby") represented to Stoughton that he, Ormsby, was the owner of Steponaitis's stone.
Ormsby offered to sell some of Steponaitis's stone to Stoughton.
Stoughton believed that the stone belonged to Ormsby and agreed to purchase 100 tons of the stone at a price of $25 per ton.
Stoughton paid Ormsby $2500 on August 31, 1998, as per their oral agreement.
On September 1, 1998, Stoughton removed eighty tons of Steponaitis's stone from from the property and brought it to a property located at 179 Colebrook River Road in Winsted, Connecticut (the "Winsted property"). Stoughton removed forty-eight tons of "pink granite" stone and thirty-two tons of "black and white granite" stone.
Later on September 1, 1998, Stoughton learned from the Torrington police department that there was a question regarding the ownership of the stone.
The Torrington police department then advised Stoughton that the stone was to remain on the Winsted property and was not to be touched or moved.
The Torrington police considered the stone evidence for the state's criminal case against Ormsby.
On December 15, 1999, the court entered an order to return the stone to its owner. Steponaitis was advised of the December 15 order by letter on April 4, 2000.
Steponaitis had no reasonable means at his disposal to transfer the stone from the Winsted property. CT Page 1293
The December 15, 1999 order was amended on October 16, 2000, turning the stone over to Stoughton.
"Conversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises the right of ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Luciani v. Stop Shop Cos.,
The facts of this case demonstrate that Steponaitis has meet his burden of proof as to his claim of conversation against Stoughton. The finding that there was a conversion obviates the need to address the claims raised by Stoughton's special defense under General Statutes §
In order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights. Collens v. New Canaan Water Co.,
155 Conn. 477 ,489 ,234 A.2d 825 (1967). In fact, the flavor of the basic requirement to justify an award of punitive damages is described in terms of wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence. Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver,154 Conn. 116 ,128 ,222 A.2d 220 (1966).
Venturi v. Savitt, Inc.,
The court finds that the facts in this case do not rise to a level which would satisfy the test to award punitive damages.
"It is generally acknowledged that the measure of damages in a conversion matter is the value of the goods at the time they were converted, with interest from the date of the wrongful act." Barron v.Benton Auto Body, Inc., Superior court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. 573293 (December 21, 2000, Rubinow, J.); see Plikusv. Plikus,
The remaining issue, perhaps the most difficult, is determining the amount of damages to be awarded. The party claiming damages has the burden of proving them. Gargano v. Heyman,
Based on the full record and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, and acknowledging the varying evidence relating to the stone, the court finds that Stoughton is responsible to Steponaitis for damages resulting from the conversion. Michael DeCorso, Steponaitis's expert, testified that the cost to hand finish a tone of stone would be "three, $400 per ton." He also testified that the cost of the unfinished "pink stone" is between $450 and $500 a ton." He further testified that the cost of the "black and white" stone "could be anywhere from $200 to $400 per ton unfinished." Stoughton then places a value of $8,000 on the stone, which is based on a doubling of the costs of "buying it and bringing it in." Based on the more credible evidence, the court finds that Steponaitis's figure is high and Stoughton's figure is low. The court finds that the value of the stone at the time of the conversion is $26,000.
The court finds that the most appropriate way to determine the value of the stone is to first determine the market value of the stone at the time it was removed. Then reduce that amount by a factor (which the court finds from the evidence should be 50%) to provide for the actual CT Page 1296 condition of the stone on September 1, 1998 and the issue as to the amount of the stone that was actually finished on the conversion date. The calculation of the value set out above is as follows:
— pink stone 60% of 80 tons = 48 tons x $750/ton ($300 finishing cost + $450.00 for raw material) = $36,000
— black and white stone 40% of 80 tons = 32 tons x $500/ton ($300 finishing cost = $200 for raw materials) = $16,000
— reduction factor = 50%
— Total damages = $26,000
CONCLUSION
Judgment shall enter for Steponaitis on his complaint in the total amount of $26,000.
Cremins, J. CT Page 1297
Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver , 154 Conn. 116 ( 1966 )
Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co. , 187 Conn. 405 ( 1982 )
Collens v. New Canaan Water Co. , 155 Conn. 477 ( 1967 )
Atlas Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Gibbs , 121 Conn. 188 ( 1936 )
Coleman v. Francis , 102 Conn. 612 ( 1925 )
Barker v. Lewis Storage Transfer Co. , 78 Conn. 198 ( 1905 )
Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotten , 245 N.Y. 102 ( 1927 )