DocketNumber: No. CV95-0247755S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 7336
Judges: SILBERT, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/9/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The burden of proof with respect to jurisdictional issues is upon the party raising the alleged jurisdictional defect. A presumption of proof is given to the facts stated in the officer's return. Standard Tallow Corporation v. Jowdy,
In his affidavit, the defendant has alleged that he was not, at the time of service, living at the Diamond Street address. The question before the court is thus whether this factual statement by the defendant in his affidavit, a statement which is not contradicted by the plaintiff, justifies the legal conclusion that the Diamond Street address was not the defendant's "usual place of abode" within the meaning of General Statutes §
"Temporary absence does not destroy what would otherwise be a `usual place of abode' if there is an intent to return to that abode, whether the absence be due to a search for work, actual employment out of state, hospitalization, imprisonment, or unknown reasons." Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure, Sec. 24 at 79. One of the earliest definitions of "place of abode" was "the place in which a married man's family resides, with his consent, and where he has voluntarily resided with them, as his home, and which he has never abandoned . . . unless such residence has been, and was intended to be, temporary and for transient purposes." Uyen Phan v. Delgado,
Defendant's affidavit reveals only that he has obeyed a pendente lite Superior Court order, which, by definition, is temporary in nature. He has not provided the court with a copy of said order, but assuming, for purposes of this discussion, that such exists, he has given the court no reason to believe that his absence from the home is other than temporary, pending some kind of resolution of the pending dissolution of marriage action.
The defendant cites American Bankers Insurance Co. v. Leist,
In several out-of-state cases where the defendant's leaving the family home was also not so clearly permanent, courts have been inclined to construe the marital residence as constituting the "usual place of abode" even when the defendant was absent from that location for a period of weeks or months. See, e.g.,Galvin v. Dailey,
The defendant's affidavit establishes only that he was not living at the family home at the time the process was served. It gives the court no reason to conclude that his absence was anything other than temporary during the pendency of dissolution of marriage proceedings. It does not overcome the presumption of the validity of the sheriff's return to the effect that he made service upon the defendant at his usual place of abode.
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
Jonathan E. Silbert, Judge