DocketNumber: No. 390686
Citation Numbers: 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 9777
Judges: MALONEY, J. CT Page 9778
Filed Date: 11/25/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Certain essential preliminary facts are not in dispute. On July 6, 1988, the Union filed a complaint pursuant to the Municipal Employee Relations Act, (the Act), General Statutes Chapter 113,
A hearing was held before the Board on November 13, 1989. The Board rendered a decision dated January 18, 1991 which was transmitted to the parties and received on or about January 22, 1991. It is this decision which the City appeals.
The history of events leading up to the Agreement which is the subject of this case is as follows: In June 1986, the City's Civil Service Commission voted that future appointments to the position of Detective within the Police Department would be made on the basis of a competitive examination. In November 1986, the Union filed complaints with the Board alleging that the City had violated the Act in the manner in which it had made some temporary assignments to the VI Division. In January 1987, an informal conference was held between the parties and the Board, and a tentative settlement was reached. This was eventually ratified in the form of the Agreement on February 4, 1987. The Agreement provides as follows:
The Union will withdraw the Complaint on the condition that the City implements the following: CT Page 9779
(a) If the three temporary Detective "slots" in the Vice and Intelligence Division are to be filled by Detectives who will be appointed on a permanent basis, then the City will appoint, in a timely fashion, the top three candidates from the detective examination list and will displace the incumbent temporary occupants to [sic] the three Detective "slots" if none of the incumbents is among the top three on the list. [It is the understanding of the undersigned that the oral portion of the Civil Service examination for detective (Plainclothesman) will be graded on the basis of a definite mark or grade to be awarded to the candidates who pass the written examination. Thus there will be a ranking of successful candidates for the eligibility list. It is our further understanding that if there is a written portion of the examination that it may be graded on a "pass-fail" basis; if there is to be a written portion, it will be administered prior to the oral portion].
(b) If none or only one or only two of the "temporary" detective slots are to be made permanent, and if the City wishes to continue the temporary detective assignments, then it shall do so by making temporary appointments from the said detective (plainclothesman) eligibility list. (Emphasis in original).
Between October 21, 1987, and December 2, 1987, the City conducted an examination and compiled a list of candidates for Detective.
On June 6, 1988, the Department transferred Detective Edward Stephens from the Criminal Investigation Bureau to the VI Division. Stephens had placed 40th on the detective eligibility list. On April 3, 1989, the Department transferred Detectives James Egan and Francis Dabbo from the Criminal Investigation Bureau to the VI Division. Egan and Dabbo had placed 16th and 18th, respectively, on the detective eligibility list. None of these men is a member of a racial minority, nor is any member of a racial minority a party to this action. The significance of these facts will be discussed later. CT Page 9780
At the hearing before the Board, Superintendent Lamb testified for the City that the transfers of Stephens, Eagan and Dabbo were permanent assignments to the VI Division. He also testified that he did not follow the detective eligibility list in making these assignments but, rather, he followed a federal court order. This order, which the Board agreed to take judicial notice of, is set forth in Cicero Booker, Jr., et al. v. Waterbury Police Department, et al., Civil Action No. N-84-257 (D.Conn. 1985) (the Booker Order)). The Board found certain parts of the Booker Order pertinent to this action but did not find the order to be inconsistent with the agreement. Rather, the Board, in its final decision, concluded as follows:
1. The refusal and failure to comply with a negotiated settlement of a prohibited practice case constitutes a violation of Section
7-470 (a)(4) of the Act and a prohibited practice.2. The City's actions of appointing Officer Stephens on June 6, 1988, and Officers Egan and Dabbo on April 3, 1989, constituted a refusal and failure to comply with the negotiated settlement of prohibited practice . . . .
The Board ordered the City to appoint detectives to the VI Division in accordance with the Agreement and to pay them whatever salary differentials they would have earned had they been originally appointed to these positions. In addition, the Board found that the City's defenses were wholly frivolous and raised no debatable issue, and, therefore, ordered the City to pay the Union's expenses incurred in the investigation, preparation, presentation and conduct of the case.
Although the Municipal Employee Relations Act, General Statutes
Essentially, the only issue in contention with respect to the alleged violation of the Agreement is whether it applies to permanent assignments to the VI Division. The Board found that it does so apply and that the failure of the City to choose the top three candidates from the examination list for the three permanent appointments constituted a violation. The City argues that the Agreement applies only to temporary appointments and that, therefore, the failure to comply with it in making permanent appointments did not violate it.
The City's arguments in support of its position that the Agreement covers only temporary appointments are the same ones that it made in defense of the complaint filed by the Union with the Board. They may be summarized as follows:
(1) The disputes that originally led to the signing of the Agreement involved only temporary appointments.
(2) The City was represented by highly competent counsel at the time it signed the Agreement, and it is unlikely that it would have given way on the subject of permanent appointments when that was not even in dispute.
(3) The Agreement, if applied to permanent appointments, would conflict with the "rule" that only police officers who are already detectives are eligible for such appointments.
(4) If applied to permanent appointments, the Agreement would conflict with the Booker order.
Familiar rules of contract interpretation dispose of arguments (1), (2), and (3), above. "Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms." Leonard Concrete Pipe Co. v. C. W. Blakeslee Sons, Inc.,
In reaching the conclusion that the specific language of the Agreement should control, the Board relied in part on the rule of Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co.,
The court agrees with the City that the Board was not entitled to draw the inference it did under the Secondino rule. Although Attorney Phelan was a witness whom the City would naturally have produced to support its position, there is no evidence in the record that he was available, nor does the Board's decision indicate any finding in that regard. The City had no burden of proof on the issue of availability; rather, the burden was on the Union to show that Attorney Phelan was available. Shelnitz v. Greenberg,
The court's conclusion that the Board erred in applying CT Page 9783 the Secondino rule does not mean, however, that the Board's ultimate decision was so detective as to require a remand. The Board found that the language of the Agreement was clear and unambiguous. The court agrees. "The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . The circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the purposes which the parties sought to accomplish and their motives cannot prove an intent contrary to the plain meaning of the language used." Zullo v. Smith,
The City's final claim concerning the applicability of the Agreement to permanent appointments is that such an interpretation would bring the Agreement into conflict with the Booker order. The court disagrees. The Booker order incorporated an agreement between various plaintiffs and the Waterbury Police Department as to procedures for ensuring that members of racial minorities would have fair and equal access to special assignments within the Police Department. One of the special assignments covered by the order was the VI Division. As indicated in the Board's decision in this case, there are some sections of the Booker order which pertain to permanent appointments in the VI Division; in particular, there are provisions with respect to the posting of notices of vacancies and training opportunities. There is a provision requiring the City to "make every reasonable effort to maintain the percentage of minorities in . . . special assignments . . . at not less than the percentage of minorities among all sworn members of the Department." There is a provision requiring the City to "maintain a system pursuant to which sworn personnel shall have equal access to each special, temporary or emergency assignment . . . regardless of race or national origin." The Board found and the court, after careful examination of the Booker order, agrees that no provision of the Agreement concerning permanent appointments to the VI Division is in conflict with the Booker order. Furthermore, the City in its brief and oral argument has not pointed to any such conflict. Finally, Section II. 6. of the Booker order provides that "[t]he Waterbury Police Department and the Waterbury Superintendent of Police shall only be required to comply with the provisions of this [order] relating to special CT Page 9784 assignments if one or more minority police officer applies for any given special assignment, thereby making compliance possible." As indicated above, none of the officers whose appointment is in dispute is a member of a minority race. The Superintendent of the Police Department testified without contradiction that the racial composition of the VI Division at the time the disputed appointments were made did not require the appointment of a racial minority member under the terms of the Booker order. There was no evidence that any member of a racial minority applied for appointment to the VI Division, thereby triggering the provisions of the Booker order. Under these circumstances, the City's contention that provisions of the Booker order prevented it from complying with the Agreement cannot be sustained.
For all of the above reasons, the court concludes that the Board's decision finding the City in violation of the Agreement was correct. It follows that the Board was likewise correct in finding the City in violation of the Act, specifically General Statutes
The first three remedies are explicitly permitted by General Statutes
General Statutes
Maloney, J.
Powel v. Burke , 178 Conn. 384 ( 1979 )
Leonard Concrete Pipe Co. v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc. , 178 Conn. 594 ( 1979 )
Local Union No. 1522 v. Conn. St. Bd. of Labor Rel. , 31 Conn. Super. Ct. 15 ( 1973 )
Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co. , 147 Conn. 672 ( 1960 )
Zullo v. Smith , 179 Conn. 596 ( 1980 )