DocketNumber: No. CV 95 0551489
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 9587
Judges: SULLIVAN, J.
Filed Date: 11/21/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The first count claims that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for said costs, pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes
The second count of the complaint is a claim for unjust enrichment in that the abatement activity of the Commissioner has directly increased the value of the property.
The defendant denies the claims of the Commissioner, including the Commissioner's allegation that there was an emergency, and denies all of the factual allegations as concerns hazardous wastes or the necessity for engaging in the activity claimed by the Commissioner to have taken place to CT Page 9588 deal with the alleged circumstances.
The defendant, in his first special defense alleges that "neither of the foregoing conditions constituted pollution, contamination, emergency or hazardous waste and that the Commissioner exceeded his authority pursuant to General Statutes
The second special defense raises a question of statutory construction. The Commissioner moves to strike this special defense. General Statutes
The Commissioner asserts that he, the Commissioner is not bound by the general proposition of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Commissioner is generally correct in this contention. However, the second special defense is not based upon a general claim of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Rather it seeks an interpretation ofthese specific statutes, claiming that proper interpretation of the statutes, read together, would require notice and the right to a hearing and an appeal.
To the extent that the Commissioner asserts that to impose the requirement of notice and a hearing in an emergency situation is contrary to the emergency provisions of General Statutes
The motion to strike the second special defense is denied.
The third special defense is allied to, but is not identical to the second special defense. It claims, in effect, that even if General Statutes
The motion to strike the third special defense is denied.
The fourth special defense asserts that General Statutes
The motion to strike the fourth special defense is denied.
The fifth special defense asserts that the application of General Statutes
The sixth special defense sets forth a defense of innocent landowner" under the provisions of General Statutes
There may well be merit to the Commissioner's claims, first that the count does not assert facts which are consistent with the complaint. (PB 164) And second that the defendant has failed to plead facts sufficient to support the proposition of innocent landowner
Paragraph 3a and 3b reiterates the defendant's denial of ownership of the land and causation of any condition which was remediated. These denials have already been set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the answer to the complaint. Hence it is possible that paragraphs 3a and 3b may be surplusage as concerns this sixth special defense.
Paragraph 3c sets forth a claim of the defense of "innocent landowner" under General Statutes
The plaintiff's remedy, if it contends that paragraph 3a and 3b are irrelevant or unnecessary would be a request to revise, per Practice Book § 147(2). As to paragraph 3c, if the plaintiff feels that facts need to be pleaded to completely set forth the defense of innocent landowner the plaintiffs's remedy would be a request to revise per Practice Book § 147(1). A motion to strike tests the sufficiency of the entire count. The motion to strike cannot be granted on the grounds of irrelevancy or immaterality of part of the allegations of the count. Regal Steel, Inc. v. Farmington Ready Mix,
The motion to strike is not the proper method to attack the alleged imperfections of the sixth special defense.
The motion to strike the sixth special defense is denied.
L. Paul Sullivan, J. CT Page 9591