DocketNumber: No. CV-98-0579968-S
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 3349, 24 Conn. L. Rptr. 241
Judges: WAGNER, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 3/9/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The defendants move to strike the plaintiffs' complaint, which seeks, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief under General Statutes §
General Statutes §
"any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the superior court . . . for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any-political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any CT Page 3350 person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction . . ."
It would appear that timber rattlesnakes and whippoorwill, although concomitantly classified as species which are "endangered" and "of special concern," are "wildlife," which has been recognized as a natural resource in Paige v. Town Plan Zoning Commission,
While the defendants are correct that, in Fund for Animals,Inc. v. Town Plan Zoning Commission of the Town of Glastonbury,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 396816 (February 1, 1993, Norko, J.) the Superior Court determined that the timber rattlesnake was not a natural resource as defined under CEPA, that case was decided prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Paige, and relied exclusively on Red Hill. A recent Superior Court decision has held that a plaintiff seeking a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from "causing, permitting, participating in or sanctioning actions which . . . are likely to result in the killing of fawn deer" had standing under General Statute §
Because it is evident that the timber rattlesnake and the whippoorwill are wildlife, and, thus, natural resources under our Supreme Court's interpretation of that term in Paige, there is little merit to the defendants' argument that the existence of the Endangered Species Act precludes the present suit under CEPA.
Motion to strike is denied.
Wagner, J. Trial Judge Referee