DocketNumber: No. 31 29 22
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 2808, 9 Conn. Super. Ct. 385
Judges: MORAGHAN, J. CT Page 2809
Filed Date: 3/15/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The defendant has filed two "defenses," alleging that (1) the statements made by the defendant are true; and (2) the statements allegedly made by the defendant are not alleged by the plaintiff to be defamatory. She also asserts in three special defenses that (1) the statements made by the defendant are constitutionally protected because they relate to an employer's sexual harassment of an employee; (2) the statements made by the defendant are absolutely privileged as they were made in connection with a quasijudicial proceeding to enforce the legal rights of the defendant; and (3) the statements made by the defendant are conditionally privileged in that they were made to people with a common interest and were made in good faith to persons connected with a quasi-judicial proceeding designed to enforce the legal rights of the defendant.1
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "`if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Connell v. Colwell,
The defendant argues in her memorandum that the statements at issue are absolutely privileged because she filed her complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") CT Page 2810 which is given certain powers pursuant to Sec.
Conversely, the plaintiff urges that his affidavits in opposition, together with the allegations contained in his complaint and the defendant's answers show the existence of a material fact, i.e., whether the statements made by the defendant both in her letter to the Commissioner and to other persons concerning the contents of the letter were false and malicious. He continues his argument by reciting that the defendant's supporting documentation does not meet the criteria of Sec. 380 of the Practice Book in that the two affidavits in support of the defendant's motion do not aver personal knowledge and are hearsay. He concludes by asserting that summary judgment cannot be granted based on special defenses.
The plaintiff is correct in his assertion that summary judgment as to a special defense is improper. In the present action, however, the defendant is moving for summary judgment on the revised complaint based on the facts alleged in her special defense. Under this rare circumstance, the motion for summary judgment is proper.
The effect of absolute privilege in a defamation action is that damages cannot be recovered for a defamatory statement even if it is published falsely and maliciously. Kelley v. Bonney,
In Bieluch v. Smith, Superior Court, Judicial District of Litchfield, No. 56050 (May 26, 1993, Pickett, J.), the court considered whether the policy of requiring that complaints about state troopers be submitted in writing to the Commissioner of Public Safety was part of a quasi judicial proceeding. It found that when the defendants submitted the subject letter to the Commissioner, they were following department policy and thus submitting the letter was the first step in initiating an investigation in accordance with the powers vested in the Commissioner of Public Safety. The court then held that the letter in this case containing the alleged CT Page 2811 defamatory statement relied upon by the plaintiff serves the same function in the administrative proceeding before the Commissioner of Public Safety as that of pleadings and similar documents in court proceedings. The defendant therefore should be accorded the same absolute privilege whether she testifies in person or submits in writing her testimony at the request of the administrative agency. Therefore, since the defendant's letter had set in motion the trial procedure as if the defendants had been called to testify as witnesses, the quasi judicial character of the proceeding warrants the application of the rule of absolute privilege.
The judicial proceeding to which absolute immunity attaches has not been exactly defined. It includes any hearing before a tribunal which performs a judicial function, ex parte or otherwise, and whether the hearing is public or not. It includes for example, lunacy, bankruptcy, or naturalization proceedings, and an election contests. It extends also to the proceedings of many administrative officers such as boards and commissions so far as they have powers of discretion in applying the law to the facts which are regarded as judicial or quasi-judicial, in character.
Other jurisdictions have also outlined a number of factors that assist in determining whether a proceeding is quasi judicial in nature. Among them are whether the body has the power to (1) exercise judgment and discretion; (2) hear and determine or to ascertain facts and decide; (3) make binding orders and judgments; (4) affect the personal or property rights of private persons; (5) examine witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or' impose penalties. Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 566-567, citing Thomas v. Petrulis,
Section
The defendant in a contra argument contends that "[o]n December 2, 1992, I visited the offices of Attorney John Lino Ponzini for the purpose of discussing a claim of sexual harassment against my supervisor and my former employer, Air Express International. . . . That I wrote this letter with the assistance of my attorneys and I sent copies to the Vice-President of Air Express International, its General Counsel, the Director of Personnel, Terry Zullo of the Department of Human Rights (CHRO), my attorney Louis Galgano III and my attorney John L. Ponzini." (Simko affidavit paragraphs 2 and 6, dated November 1, 1993.)
A second affidavit filed in support is that of Terry Zullo, an investigator with the CHRO. "I spoke with John Lino Ponzini on December 2, 1992 regarding Meredith Simko. That during the conversation I asked Mr. Ponzini whether Ms. Simko had written any kind of letter to her employer concerning the circumstances surrounding her resignation. That I, then, as is my custom with all claims such as Ms. Simko's, advised Mr. Ponzini to have his client submit a letter to her employer, detailing the reason for the termination of her employment. That I did so because in essence she appeared to be claiming that she was constructively discharged as a result of being sexually harassed. That also, it is our general policy to advise all claimants to document their cases and this includes, of course, writing letters to an employer outlining their claims, problems or issues." (Zullo affidavit, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.)
The hypothesis that because neither of the defendant's supporting affidavits swear to personal knowledge and contain hearsay statements the affidavits should not be considered by the court, falls under its own weight at least in part. There can be no serious argument that affidavits must aver or affirmatively show personal knowledge of the matters stated. (Emphasis added.) Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Building Supply, Inc.,
This court will not consider that the portion of the affidavit of the defendant containing hearsay statements should not be considered by the court. See Farrell v. Farrell,
It must also be acknowledged that the plaintiff's assertion in both counts that the statements allegedly published and/or made by the defendant were "malicious" is conclusory. "If the plaintiff is a private individual . . . she is required to prove actual malice, in order to rebut the defense of privilege and recover general damages, merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Miles v. Perry,
The plaintiff's claim that his affidavits in opposition, together with his complaint and the answer of the defendant to the claim, clearly show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is unpersuasive, for "[a] party seeking to resist summary judgment may not rely on underlying pleadings containing only general denials . . . to establish the existence of a `genuine issue' as to a material fact." Citizens CT Page 2814 National Bank v. Hubney,
In count two, the plaintiff merely realleges the facts contained in count one, and instead of alleging that the defendant published defamatory statements in a letter, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant "stated to various and diverse persons that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual harassment of the defendant. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 575. The plaintiff does not allege, through his opposition memorandum or affidavits, the identity of this "various and diverse" person. Indeed, his memorandum in opposition is devoid of any law whatsoever addressing the issue of privilege. "`In order to oppose successfully a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must recite facts in accordance with Practice Book, Sec. 300 [now Sec. 381] of the Practice Book which contradict those offered by the moving party.'" Citizens National Bank v. Hubney, supra, 312. The allegation that the defendant "stated to various and diverse persons, that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual harassment of the defendant," without more, is conclusory in nature and is not a recited fact which contradicts those offered by the defendant. Summary judgment should be granted as to count two as well:
Judgment may enter in accordance with the foregoing.
Moraghan, J.
Dougherty v. Graham , 161 Conn. 248 ( 1971 )
Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Building Supply, Inc. , 174 Conn. 512 ( 1978 )
Thomas v. Petrulis , 125 Ill. App. 3d 415 ( 1984 )
Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc. , 178 Conn. 262 ( 1979 )
Citizens National Bank v. Hubney , 182 Conn. 310 ( 1980 )