DocketNumber: No. 538146
Citation Numbers: 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 6682, 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 30
Judges: HANDY, J.
Filed Date: 6/25/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The following facts are not in dispute. On September 6, 1988, Brian Vining and May Vining (hereinafter the "defendants") executed a promissory note (hereinafter "note") in favor of Housatonic Bank Trust Company (hereinafter "Housatonic") in the amount of $20,733.53. The note was secured by a piece of equipment known as a "New Holland Backhoe" (hereinafter "backhoe"). On April 21, 1989, Housatonic repossessed the backhoe, and subsequently sold the piece of equipment to the successful bid tender on June 5, 1989.1 On July 26, 1991, Housatonic was declared insolvent, and on July 26, 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter the "FDIC") was appointed receiver of said institution. At an unspecified later date, the FDIC assigned said note to Georgia Receivables, Inc. (hereinafter the "plaintiff"). The plaintiff subsequently made demand upon the defendants for payment of the outstanding balance; however the defendants refused to pay. On April 25, 1996, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants to recover $14,733.53 due and owing on the note.
On November 8, 1996, the defendants filed an answer and two special defenses. The first special defense asserted that Housatonic failed to give the defendants proper notice of either the repossession of the backhoe or its subsequent sale. The second special defense asserted that the plaintiff's action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
On January 14, 1997, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations defense. On February 10, 1997, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On May 19, 1997 the court, Handy J., heard oral argument on the defendants' motion.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment, Legal Standard
"[S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the CT Page 6684 pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Miller v. United Technologies Corp.,
III. Discussion
In their motion, the defendants argue that the present action is barred by the statute of limitations as contained in either General Statutes §
Generally,
In Federal Deposit Insurance Co. v. Bledsoe,
In August 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act8 (hereinafter "FIRREA") which abolished the FSLIC and transferred all of its assets to the FDIC. The FDIC subsequently became the holder of the note in question, and brought an action seeking recovery of the deficiency. The defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that the state statute of limitations controlled and that the cause of action had expired. Id., 807. The FDIC claimed that the action was timely filed in that the applicable statute of limitations was the six-year federal statute of limitations and that this six-year limitations period was not, as defendant claimed, lost as a result of the note being previously assigned to a private party.
In reaching its conclusion that assignees of the FDIC are entitled to the six-year federal statute of limitations, the Circuit Court noted that the statutory scheme was silent as to CT Page 6686 the rights of FDIC assignees. In order to fill this perceived "gap", the Court of Appeals applied the common law of assignments and determined that assignees of the FDIC stood in the same shoes as the FDIC. Id., 810. The Circuit Court concluded that "[t]ransferring the federal six-year statute of limitations from the FDIC . . . to its assignees is consistent with the common law of assignments, furthers Congressional policy, and is supported by the cases extending the D'Oench Duhme doctrine to private assignees." Id., 811. A number of state courts have also so held. See White v. Moriarty,
However, In Wamco, III. LTD. v. First Piedmont MortgageCorp.,
The district court, while acknowledging the Fifth Circuit's holding in Bledsoe, rejected Wamco's argument that the six-year federal statute of limitations applied. TheWamco III court, while not faulting the Fifth Circuit generally for using common law principles to fill in perceived "gaps" in federal law, observed that "resort[ing] to that approach first necessitates a judgment that the statute does not address the issue. That fundamental prerequisite is not present here because, although FIRREA does not bespeak the rights of assignees, it is not silent on the scope of the remedial benefit it confers." Id., 1086. The district court CT Page 6687 concluded that the six-year statute of limitations was "personal" to the RTC and that rights created for it by FIRREA were not transferrable to assignees of the RTC. Id., 1087.
This split of authority in the federal courts serves to demonstrate that this case is not appropriate for disposition by summary judgment. Georgia Receivables is an assignee of the FDIC. A number of federal and state courts, Wamco, III
not withstanding, have held that, as such, the plaintiff is entitled to the six-year statute of limitations period provided in
IV. CONCLUSION
The defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied on the ground that there remains a material issue of fact as to the timeliness of the plaintiff's action and the defendants cannot prevail as a matter of law.
HANDY, J.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Plaintiff-Counter v. ... , 989 F.2d 805 ( 1993 )
White v. Moriarty , 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 ( 1993 )
Cadle Company II, Inc. v. Lewis , 254 Kan. 158 ( 1993 )
Central States Resources, Corp. v. First National Bank , 243 Neb. 538 ( 1993 )