DocketNumber: No. CR 97-134066
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1852
Judges: RONAN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/13/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
I. The relevant factual and procedural background of this matter is as follows. On May 19, 1988, the defendant was arrested and charged with the crimes of murder, attempt to commit murder and assault in the first degree. The offenses were alleged to have occurred on October 30, 1987 in the parking lot of the Frog Pond Restaurant at 257 East Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut. The defendant was accused of shooting two victims. One victim, Donna Kalson, died later that day while the other victim, George Kavulich, sustained a wound which was not fatal. Immediately after these shootings, the defendant, Kenneth Curtis, shot himself in the head, causing an extensive organic brain injury. As a result of his self-inflicted brain injury, the defendant underwent brain surgery followed by a prolonged period of CT Page 1853 intensive rehabilitation therapy.
Thereafter several competency hearings were held pursuant to General Statutes §
The defendant appealed from the trial court's imposition of the annual examination condition. In State v. Curtis,
Since that time the defendant has continued to reside in this state. During October 1997, Captain Michael Imbro, Commanding Officer of the Stratford Police Department, received information that the defendant was attending college. Captain Imbro's investigation verified this information, determining that Kenneth Curtis was in fact a part-time student attending classes at Southern Connecticut State University (SCSU) in New Haven. He also learned that the accused was at that time enrolled in two sophomore level courses.
On November 3, 1997, and again on November 7, 1997, a Stratford Police Department Detective and an Inspector from the State's Attorney's office obtained search warrants for scholastic records of the accused. The records which were obtained substantiated the enrollment of Kenneth Curtis at Middlesex Community Technical College from 1992-1995. At Middlesex he earned over 48 college credits while attaining a Grade Point Average (G.P.A.) of 3.3 or higher. During the summer of 1995 Kenneth Curtis attended Gateway Community Technical College where CT Page 1854 he also maintained a G.P.A. of 3.3. Upon his enrollment and transfer of credits to SCSU, Kenneth Curtis submitted an application indicating that his intended major was Pre-medical-Psychiatry.
As a result of the foregoing factual information, the defendant was again charged with the murder of Donna Kalson (General Statutes §
In this motion the defendant seeks dismissal of the pending charge premised on the argument that the state's attempt to proceed with further competency hearings against the defendant is a violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Specifically, the defendant argues that previous court decisions have already litigated the issue of competency and firmly established that the defendant would not be able to regain competency within the statutory time period. Thus, the defendant asserts that any new hearings would merely be an attempt to relitigate an issue already decided and thus violate the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
II. In Ashe v. Swenson,
The Ashe court's application of collateral estoppel has been the reference point for numerous discussions in a number of CT Page 1855 decisions of Connecticut's appellate courts. These decisions have generally held that collateral estoppel applies in either one of two ways: 1) it may bar prosecution or argumentation of facts necessarily established in a prior proceeding; or 2) it may completely bar subsequent prosecution where one of the facts necessarily determined in the former trial is an essential element of the conviction the government seeks. State v. Hope,
Though the defendant does not specify which prong of collateral estoppel he relies on, the specific facts of this case indicate that the defendant must necessarily rely on the first prong.2 In particular, the defendant points to two prior findings — the original finding by the court that the defendant would not be able to regain his competency within the statutory time period; and the subsequent decision of the appellate court as indicating that the defendant's competency has already been determined and this determination permanently bars this prosecution for murder.
In the context of collateral estoppel, issue preclusion generally arises only when "an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment and that determination is essential to the judgment. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McDowell,
The court which held the competency hearings determined that the defendant would not be able to regain competency within the statutorily proscribed period. That court's decision to impose conditions of annual exams to determine if competency was regained demonstrates that the court did not feel that the issue of the defendant's competency was resolved with any definite finality. Similarly, the Appellate Court's decision in State v.Curtis, supra,
CT Page 1856 Indeed, as this court has previously observed, such a finality would be inconsistent with the intent of the legislature in leaving the possibility open that the defendant may one day become competent to stand trial. See State v. Curtis, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 134066.
In Ashe, the court cautioned that the "rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality. . . . The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceeding. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ashe v. Swenson, supra,
The appellate courts in Connecticut have been especially wary of applying collateral estoppel in criminal cases where a previous issue was "established" during an administrative-type hearing. In the criminal context, the decisions from such hearings may often be incompatible with the interest of the state in determining guilt or innocence. In State v. Fritz,
III. The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in State v.McDowell, supra,
Thus, the McDowell court refused to apply collateral estoppel even though the "formal prerequisites" were met. Id., 656, citingPeople v. Fagan,
The logic and reasoning of both the Fritz and McDowell courts in refusing to apply collateral estoppel as a bar to further criminal proceedings is equally applicable to the competency hearings in the present case. While the competency hearings were held before the court instead of an administrative agency-type board, the concerns in precluding further criminal proceedings are equally valid.
In addressing the defendant's original motion to dismiss, the court stressed the "important principle that finality must be balanced against the needs of criminal justice and the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence." State v. Curtis, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 134066. This principle is equally important here. Thus, even if there was a final determination as to the incompetency of the defendant and the "formal prerequisites" of collateral estoppel CT Page 1858 were met, the principles of finality in a criminal proceeding — the determination of guilt or innocence — outweigh any benefits that collateral estoppel might afford the defendant. This is especially true where, as in the present case, the defendant has not been forced "to run the gauntlet" a second time following acquittal. Ashe v. Swenson, supra,
The motion to dismiss is denied.
Ronan, J.