DocketNumber: No. CV97 060362
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 8972, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 94
Judges: FLYNN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 7/12/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
A procedural background is helpful for the purposes of the present motion. CT Page 8973
On October 29, 1997, the plaintiff filed the original three-count complaint against the defendant. On March 30, 1998, the complaint was amended, increasing the total of counts in the complaint to five. After the court, Corradino, J., granted a motion to strike all five counts, the plaintiff filed a revised two-count complaint. After one more revision, the plaintiff filed another two-count complaint with causes of action based on breach of lease and trespass.
On February 24, 1999, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to both counts of the complaint. At oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, April 5, 1999, the plaintiff indicated that he was withdrawing the second count of the revised complaint. At this time, however, the plaintiff requested leave to file an amended complaint which contained the original breach of lease count and substituted a new second count seeking reimbursement under General Statutes § 22A-452. After stating that the motion for request to leave the complaint was not before the court, and receiving assurances from the plaintiff's counsel that the first count was not changed in a way that would affect the motion for summary judgment, the court, Corradino, J., heard argument on the matter. On April 21, 1999, the court, Corradino, J., entered a partial summary judgment as to the first count only in favor of the defendant. On April 26, 1999, the plaintiff officially withdrew the second count of the complaint.
The issue before this court concerns the status of the plaintiff's motion to amend filed on the date of oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. The defendant objects to the request for leave to amend on the grounds that the motion to amend is untimely, is impermissible under the doctrine of laches, and is also impermissible under the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the amendment is not untimely, that the doctrine of laches does not apply and that there was no final judgment and, therefore, there can be no claim for res judicata.
"The grant or denial of a motion to amend the pleadings is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. . . . In the interest of justice, our courts have generally been most liberal in allowing amendments." Moore v. Sergi,
"While a trial court may be well-advised to exercise leniency when amendments are proffered in response to a motion for summary judgment, rather than on the eve of trial, [the Supreme Court has] affirmed as discretionary the denial of permission to amend under such circumstances. . . ." Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC,
In the present case, the plaintiff has not offered a sound reason why the court should grant leave to amend the complaint when the requested amendment was filed the very morning of argument on the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff has previously revised and amended his complaint numerous times and has offered no explanation why he has previously failed to join a cause of action based on §
In any event, it appears that the request for leave to amend the complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a former judgment may serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving claims which were actually made or might have been made in the original cause of action. See Connecticut Water Co. v. Beausoleil,
In the present case, the decision of the court, Corradino, J., concerning the summary judgment on the breach of lease count, was a final judgment as to that count and cannot be litigated again.1 See DeLaurentis v. New Haven,
The determining factor in whether a judicial determination is a final judgment for purposes of res judicata is whether it is also a final judgment for purposes of appeal. CFM of Connecticutv. Chowdhury, supra,
In the present case, however, the issue is convoluted by the fact that during oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff stated his intention to withdraw his second count of trespass, and, following the rendering of the court's decision, ultimately did so. Even though the plaintiff technically did not withdraw his second count until after the decision, his abandonment of the second count during argument had the effect of creating an appealable final judgment on both counts within the complaint. See Zamstein v. Marvasti,
That a request for leave to amend the complaint was still pending should not change this analysis. As previously noted, a request for leave to amend lies in the sound discretion of the court. Denying the proposed amendment would ultimately have the same effect as if the proposed amendment had never existed. While granting the proposed amendment prior to the summary judgment would have had prolonged an appealable judgment in that the second proposed count, the §
Since the plaintiff has failed to offer a sound reason why the court should grant its untimely motion to amend, and since it appears that the doctrine of res judicata bars any subsequent amendment, the court denies the plaintiff's motion for request for leave to amend the complaint.
FLYNN, J.