DocketNumber: No. CV-98-0067269
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 13705
Judges: STENGEL, J.
Filed Date: 10/14/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
This appeal, dated June 12, 1998, concerns a parcel of property located in Vernon, Connecticut known as Vernon Assessor's Map 46, Block 71, Parcel 19. The applicants sought permission to construct a travel plaza on a portion of their property. CT Page 13706
Public hearings commenced on March 24, 1998, and continued, and concluded, on April 28, 1998. (Return of Record [ROR]: Public Hearing Transcript from 3/24/98; Town of Vernon Inland Wetlands Commission Minutes from 3/24/98; Public Hearing Transcript from 4/28/98; Town of Vernon Inland Wetlands Commission Minutes from 4/28/98). At its May 26, 1998 meeting, the commission voted to deny the application on the basis that it failed to meet the tests of Section 4.5.4.4. of Vernon's inland wetlands regulations. (ROR: 5/27/98 letter from commission chairman William Campbell to applicants' attorney Leonard Jacobs). The applicants now appeal from the decision of the commission to the superior court.
"[I]n order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person or entity must be aggrieved. . . ." WaterPollution Control Authority v. Keeney,
"The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. . . ." (Citations omitted; CT Page 13707 internal quotation marks omitted.) Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency,
In the present case, the plaintiffs allege in the appeal that "it was the applicant and owner of the Property, and the denial of its application will prevent it from developing the property as proposed, to its economic loss and damage." In addition, during the hearing on this appeal the plaintiffs testified as to their legal ownership of the parcel of land and the defendant conceded to the facts as presented by the plaintiffs. As such the plaintiffs have demonstrated a specific legal interest in the subject matter which has been injuriously affected by the decision by the Commission. Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency, supra,
Accordingly, aggrievement is found.
"In challenging an administrative agency action, the plaintiff has the burden of proof. . . . The plaintiff must do more than simply show that another decision maker, such as the trial court, might have reached a different conclusion. Rather CT Page 13708 than asking the reviewing court to retry the case de novo . . . the plaintiff must establish that substantial evidence does not exist in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Samperi v. Inland WetlandsAgency,
"In granting, denying or limiting any permit for a regulated activity the inland wetlands agency, or its agent, shall consider the factors set forth in section
"In reviewing an inland wetlands agency decision made pursuant to the act, the reviewing court must sustain the agency's determination if `an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any one of the reasons given. . . . The evidence, however, to support any such reason must be substantial; [t]he credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual issues are matters within the province of the administrative agency. . . . This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . [I]t imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . and to provide a more restrictive standard of review than standards embodying review of weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous action. . . . The United States Supreme Court, in defining substantial evidence in the directed verdict formulation, has said that it is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from CT Page 13709 the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. . . . The reviewing court must take into account [that there is] contradictory evidence in the record . . . but the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. . . .'" (Citations omitted.) Samperi v.Inland Wetlands Agency, supra,
In the present case, the defendant denied the plaintiffs application on the ground that "the proposal did not meet the tests of Section 4.5.4.4 of the regulations." According to the commission, "[t]he risk to the Gages brook, Walker's reservoir and the Tankerhosen River was too great in the event of a failure of the 87,000 gallon fuel storage system and containment facilities." Also "[t]he Tankerhosen River is a prime cold water trout fishery and thus [t]he tests of 4.5.1.9, 4.5.1.10 and 4.5.2.5 were not met since the risk of "injury to" "reasonable use of" as well as the possibility of chemical thermal changes to on site and off site water courses is significant." (ROR: letter of 5/27/98 from commission chairman William Campbell to applicants' attorney Leonard Jacobs.)
A. Whether § 4.5.4.4 of the Town of Vernon Regulations Creates a Standard For Evaluating Applications Which is Not Authorized by the Connecticut General Statutes4
"The legislature has found that `the inland wetlands and watercourses of the state of Connecticut are an indispensable and irreplaceable but fragile natural resource with which the citizens of the state have been endowed' and that `the preservation and protection of the wetlands and watercourses from random, unnecessary, undesirable and unregulated uses, disturbance or destruction is in the public interest and is essential to the health, welfare and safety of the citizens of the state.' General Statutes §
"In order to carry out these objectives, the legislature has required each municipality in this state either to `establish an inland wetlands agency or authorize an existing board or commission to carry out the provisions of the IWWA [Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act].' General Statutes §
Vernon's Inland Wetlands Regulation § 4.5.4.4 states that if the commission is to grant a permit, with or without any restrictions it must find that "the public benefit of the proposed activity justifies any possible degradation of the wetlands and/or watercourses." (ROR: Town of Vernon, Connecticut Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Regulations, p. 16.). In their appeal, the plaintiffs claim that regulation § 4.5.4.4 is not in conformity with Connecticut statutory provisions and creates an unauthorized standard because it requires "a comparison between the public benefit of a project and the possibledegradation of the wetlands, whereas §
In support of their claim that regulation § 4.5.4.4 conflicts with the IWWA, the plaintiffs rely on the "substantial evidence" standard for reviewing commission decisions. The plaintiffs argue that because Connecticut law requires a commission's decision to be supported by substantial evidence if the decision is to be upheld in superior court; Huck v. InlandWetlands Watercourses Agency, supra,
"In Aaron [v. Conservation Commission,
The court finds that regulation § 4.5.4.4 does not create an unauthorized standard for evaluating applications to conduct regulated activities. General Statutes §
B. Whether the Commission's Decision Denying the Plaintiffs' Application for Failure to Meet the Requirements of Regulation 4.5.4.4 Supported by Substantial Evidence?
The plaintiffs claim that the only reason cited by the defendant in support of its denial of the plaintiffs' application was that "failure of the 87,000 gallon full [sic] storage or containment system would result in degradation to the Tankerhosen River and Walkers Reservoir, and that would outweigh any public benefit of the project." Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 16. The plaintiffs further claim that the only evidence regarding the fuel containment system was favorable, and was introduced by the applicants themselves. Id., 16. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's denial of their application based upon the possible degradation of the wetlands resulting from a failure of the fuel storage containment system. Id., 18.
"Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires the court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . In short a court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the commission. Rather, the court is limited to determining whether the commissions conclusions of fact were `unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.'" Sweetman v. State ElectionsEnforcement Commission,
It is found that the commission's denial of the plaintiffs' application was not based solely upon the basis that a "failure CT Page 13713 of the 87,000 gallon [fuel] storage containment system would result in degradation to the Tankerhosen River and Walkers Reservoir, and that would outweigh and public benefit of the project." In making this claim, the plaintiffs rely on the commission's minutes of June 23, 1998. (ROR: 6/23/98, commission minutes).5 However, they only rely on one paragraph of those minutes and overlook two other paragraphs. One of the other two relevant paragraphs states that "Mr. Campbell [the commission's chairman] cited sections 4.5.1.9, 4.5.1.10 and the last sentence of 4.5.2.5 in support of the motion [to deny the application] and expanded upon the potential environmental damage downstream, as well as on-site damage, from a fuel spill." (ROR: 6/23/98, commission minutes). The second paragraph states that "Ms. Wiley [of the commission stated that the Tankerhosen River downstream from the project is a prime cold water trout fishery." (ROR: 6/23/98, commission minutes). These two paragraphs appear with the paragraph cited by the plaintiffs in the decision published by the commission denying the plaintiffs' application. (ROR: 5/27/98 letter from commission to plaintiffs' attorney). Moreover, the June 23, 1998, minutes contain corrections to the May 26, 1998, minutes, not substantive changes. (ROR: 5/27/98 letter from commission to plaintiffs' attorney; 6/2/98 letter from George Russel, Town Planner, to the Inland Wetlands Commission; 6/23/98 commission minutes, p. 2.). Thus, it is found that the plaintiffs' interpretation of the importance of the June 23, 1998, minutes is not complete and it is held that the record does support a finding that the commission's decision is based upon substantial evidence.
The record also reveals the following. At the hearing the following people supported the plaintiffs' application: Bob Arsenault from Design Professionals, Inc., the engineering and surveying firm that drafted the plaintiffs' plans; John Ianni, the plaintiffs' soil scientist; Michael Klein, the plaintiffs' environmentalist; Daryl Hicks, an engineer from Pilot Oil, the plaintiffs' proposed tenant; Rachel Rosen and Sherry Hardmin from Environmental Services. Bob Arsenault specifically addressed the issue of the fuel storage containment system. (ROR: 3/24/98 hearing transcript). Mr. Arsenault testified that 87,000 gallons of fuel would be stored above ground in a system employing four different levels of protection against incidental spillage as well as catastrophic spillage. (ROR: 3/24/98 hearing transcript, p. 12). The four levels of containment would include a shell surrounding the fuel tanks, a coated monorific combination curb and slab coated facility, an interseptic tank and a lined CT Page 13714 containment pond. In total, the system would provide 178% protection in containment of fuel in case of a spill, leak or rupture. According to Arsenault, "with this particular proposal, everything [would be] done that should be done for a site like this when you have wetlands in close proximity." (ROR: 3/24/98 hearing transcript, p. 13).
The plaintiffs claim that this testimony and some minimal unreported testimony by Daryl Hicks is the only evidence that was introduced relevant to the fuel containment system. Plaintiffs'Brief, pp. 3-5, 17. The plaintiffs acknowledge that opponents did speak out against their application, but they claim that because none of the criticisms had to do with the fuel containment system, the "commission should not have denied the application based upon any concern for possible degradation to wetlands resulting from a failure of the fuel storage containment system." Id.,
In opposition to the plaintiffs' claim, the defendant argues that although the applicants presented the testimony of several experts in support of the application, "there were experts who testified and presented evidence contrary to that of the Plaintiff Applicants." Defendant Commission's Brief, p. 5. Specifically, the defendants point to the testimony of Robert Jontos, Attorney Burke and Attorney Oland. Id., 5-6. Therefore, because there was substantial evidence presented in opposition to the plaintiffs' application, the defendant claims pursuant toHuck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency, there is "a substantial basis that supports the Commission's denial of the application." Id., 6.
The court's function in reviewing the record in an administrative appeal is "to determine on the basis of the record whether substantial evidence has been presented to the board to support its finding." Jaser v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
However, during the public hearings, there were opinions expressed concerning the fuel storage containment system. Attorney Burke, on behalf of his client, Gary Jackopsic,7 testified that "the important factors here are 87,000 gallons of pure oil. I don't care whether they are raised or subsurface or whatever they are. They're over an aquifer. . . . Notwithstanding all of the 187% [sic] excess capacity that the Pilot engineer talked to you about, the potential for spillage is immense. You have an environmentally sensitive parcel and there is new evidence tonight that it's a habitat for native not only trout but black-nosed dice and a certain type of minnow." (ROR: 3/24/98 hearing transcript, p. 27). Attorney Burke also pointed out that the Tolland Inland Wetlands Commission, in a letter to the Vernon Inland Wetlands Commission, described the proposal to be "environmentally unsound." (ROR: 3/24/98 hearing transcript, p. 26). The letter, which was before the commission stated in relevant part: "We recognize that there have been some additional steps taken to collect fuel spills in the vicinity of the fuel tanks and the pump islands, however, we feel that the entire parking lot is subject to innumerable small leaks of gasoline, oil, antifreeze and other automotive liquids which will be concentrated in the retention basin. The oil separator chambers will be maintained, but what will become of the parking lot wash off? There is some indication that the retention ponds are drained below surface (although this is not entirely clear), will the ponds be periodically cleaned? or will these hazardous materials be allowed to concentrate until some unfortunate, inevitable accident allows them to spill into Gages Brook? . . . Overall the Tolland Inland Wetlands Commission still finds the Conyers-Hayes proposal to be environmentally unsound for the same reasons as before: . . . 2. The approval of this proposal would allow the storage and transfer of hazardous material in and near CT Page 13716 a wetland area which will pose a very real hazard to this particular wetland and all areas down stream; and 3. This particular use, a Travel Park, is unsuitable to be located in an area of wetlands because in addition to the amount of hazardous material which is stored and transferred on the site, the use itself will tend to draw additional traffic to the site with an attendant increase in hazardous materials and the potential for accidental spills which may pollute the wetland." (ROR: 3/18/98 letter from Tolland Inland Wetlands Commission to Vernon Inland Wetlands Commission, pp. 1-2).
Chairman Campbell also expressed concern over leakage and spillage associated with the presence of the oil tanks. He stated on the record: "It is my understanding that there is a fishery in the Tancanhosett [sic] that there is a breeding or a responding area in the Tancanhosett. Why wouldn't you be concerned about runoff from the pavement of this project under the interstate through the reservoir into the Tancanhosett and potentially with oil and fuel from the parking lot alone. It seems to be that the tanks. [sic] A lot of good engineering has gone into that, but even just runoff for whatever reasons. Why wouldn't that be a problem downstream in the Tancanhosett?" (ROR: 4/28/98 hearing transcript, p. 53). Evidence was received by the commission verifying that there is a cold water fishery in Gages Brook. (ROR: Exh. 19, p. 1).
Finally, although the plaintiffs claim that all of the testimony provided by their experts supported the reliability of the fuel containment system, a comment by Daryl Hicks could have been taken by the commission as evidence of the system's fallibility. When asked about keeping the containment pond clear of sedimentation, Mr. Hicks conceded that "if in fact, sedimentation does get through into that area it would decrease the capacity of the pond." (ROR: 3/24/98 hearing transcript, pp. 34-45.) He added, however, that such an occurrence would be "highly unlikely." Id.
Based upon this evidence, the record contains substantial evidence to support the commission's decision. Though there was testimony from the plaintiffs' experts that the fuel containment system was reliable and safe, "[t]he credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual issues are matters within the province of the administrative agency." Sweetman v. StateElections Enforcement Commission, supra,
Accordingly, the court finds that there is substantial record evidence to support the finding of the defendant that the public benefits of the project did not justify the risk to the Gages Brook, Walkers Reservoir and the Tankerhosen River, in the event that the 87,000 gallon fuel containment system failed.
Therefore, the appeal is hereby dismissed.
Stengel, J.