In re Agwumezie

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 21-BG-88
IN RE CHARLES C. AGWUMEZIE, RESPONDENT.
A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 990751)
On Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional
Responsibility Ad Hoc Hearing Committee
Approving Petition for Negotiated Discipline
(DDNs 174-18 & 89-19)
(Decided: February 3, 2022)
Before BECKWITH and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and FISHER, Senior
Judge.
PER CURIAM: “An opinion imposing negotiated discipline may not be cited
as precedent in contested-discipline cases except as provided in” D.C. App. R. 28(g).
See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d). This opinion may, however, be cited as precedent in
negotiated-discipline cases.
This appeal presents issues very similar to those that were recently addressed
by this court in In re Mensah, 262 A.3d 1100 (D.C. 2021). Although we consider
Respondent’s misconduct to be more extensive than Mensah’s, and do not forget our
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holding that “in virtually all cases of [intentional or reckless] misappropriation,
disbarment will be the only appropriate sanction,” In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 191
(D.C. 1990) (en banc), we approve the petition for negotiated discipline and impose
a three-year suspension with a requirement that Respondent demonstrate his fitness
to practice law before he may be reinstated.
Disciplinary Counsel and Respondent Charles Agwumezie filed an amended
petition for negotiated discipline wherein Respondent admitted that he recklessly
misappropriated entrusted client funds and violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b)
(written statement of fees, scope of representation, and expenses), 1.7(b)(4) (conflict
of interest), 1.15(a) (commingling, reckless misappropriation, and record-keeping),
8.1(b) (knowingly failing to respond reasonably to Disciplinary Counsel’s lawful
demands for information), and 8.4(d) (serious interference with the administration
of justice). Respondent and Disciplinary Counsel agreed to the proposed three-year
suspension with a fitness requirement.
The Committee reviewed the petition as required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1.
It highlighted, among other things, Respondent’s lack of prior discipline; the fact
that no client or third party had complained to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel;
and Disciplinary Counsel’s determinations that: (1) “the evidence supports the
conclusion that Respondent’s misappropriations were not dishonest and did not
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involve improper gains,” (2) it “could not show that Respondent had retained or
failed to return the funds owed to clients or third parties,” and (3) Respondent had
“taken remedial measures by attending a practice management class and by adopting
accounting procedures to keep better track of funds in his trust account.”
The parties agreed that “these ‘usual’ mitigating circumstances” would be
“unlikely to overcome the presumption of disbarment for reckless misappropriation
in a contested matter.” Nevertheless, they submitted that a three-year suspension
with a fitness requirement “provide[d] the parties a certain outcome without the need
for a prolonged and expensive adjudicative process.” The Committee emphasized
that the agreed-upon sanction was “the most serious sanction other than disbarment,
and the fitness requirement protects the public, the courts, and the integrity of the
profession by ensuring that Respondent will not resume the practice of law in the
District of Columbia until the Court determines that he is fit to do so.” The
Committee concluded that the negotiated discipline was justified and not unduly
lenient and recommended that the court impose it.
Upon receipt of the Committee’s Report and Recommendation, this court
requested the views of the Board on the appropriateness of the proposed sanction.
See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d). The Board filed its own Report and Recommendation
acknowledging that “there is no question whether the stipulated misconduct would
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warrant disbarment in a contested case[;] it would.” Nevertheless, a majority of the
Board opined that “Respondent’s willingness to immediately accept a sanction —
the most severe sanction saved for disbarment — that may very well result in him
never practicing law again is substantial mitigation,” and further that “acceptance of
the proposed disposition reflects sound policy as it presents the combined benefits
of more quickly removing Respondent from practice while conserving disciplinary
resources.” The Board majority concluded that the proposed sanction was
“justified” under the circumstances and recommended that we approve the petition
for negotiated discipline. 1
If the Committee recommends approval of a petition for negotiated
discipline, this court reviews “in accordance with its procedures for the imposition
of uncontested discipline.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d). Under those procedures, “if
no exceptions are filed to the Board’s report, the [c]ourt will enter an order imposing
the discipline recommended by the Board upon the expiration of the time permitted
for filing exceptions.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(2). “This rule is not absolute — we
would not impose discipline that is clearly against the law or the public interest, for
1
The dissenters thought that Respondent’s misconduct was too serious to
permit a sanction less than disbarment. We agree that the nature and seriousness of
the misconduct must be considered when determining whether the proposed sanction
is justified. Those factors must be considered again if Respondent seeks
reinstatement. See In re Yum, 187 A.3d 1289, 1292 (D.C. 2018).
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example, merely because no party took exception to it . . . .” In re Stephens, 247
A.3d 698, 701 (D.C. 2021) (per curiam). Nevertheless, if “there are no exceptions
to the Board’s report and recommendation, our deferential standard of review
becomes even more deferential.” In re Viehe, 762 A.2d 542, 543 (D.C. 2000) (per
curiam).
As numerous opinions illustrate, the procedures for imposing attorney
discipline in contested matters can be very lengthy and costly to both sides. Such
lengthy delay does not serve the interests of anyone — clients, respondents, or the
public at large. In 2008, this court established procedures to govern negotiated
discipline. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1. This new process, which did not exist when
Addams was decided, was intended “to encourage efficient and timely resolution of
attorney-discipline matters.” In re Mensah, 262 A.3d at 1103. We will not reiterate
the considerations that persuaded us to allow more flexibility with respect to sanction
in Mensah, except to recognize once again “the mitigating nature of an attorney’s
willingness to acknowledge misconduct and accept an appropriate sanction.” Id. at
1104.
In Mensah we held that the negotiated discipline process provides flexibility
that “may in certain circumstances permit a sanction of less than disbarment in
negotiated-discipline cases involving reckless misappropriation.” Mensah, 262
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A.3d at 1105. For the reasons stated by the Committee and the Board, we determine
that the proposed sanction is justified under the circumstances of this case. We do
not suggest, however, that a sanction short of disbarment for reckless
misappropriation will always be justified in a case of negotiated discipline.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Respondent Charles C. Agwumezie is hereby suspended
from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for three years with
reinstatement conditioned on his demonstrating fitness to practice law. We direct
Respondent’s attention to the provisions of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g); he will not be
eligible to apply for reinstatement until three years after he files an affidavit that
complies with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 and Board Rule 9.
So ordered.