In re Joseph

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 22-BG-420
IN RE JOEL D. JOSEPH, RESPONDENT.
A Disbarred Member of the Bar
of the District of Columbia
(Bar Registration No. 183830)
On Report and Recommendation
of Hearing Committee Number Six
(Disciplinary Docket No. 2021-D104)
(Board Docket No. 21-BD-029)
(Argued December 13, 2022 Decided January 19, 2023)
Joel D. Joseph, pro se.
William R. Ross, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton P.
Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, was on the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and DEAHL and ALIKHAN,
Associate Judges.
PER CURIAM: The Court of Appeals of Maryland disbarred Joel D. Joseph in
2011 after he misrepresented his residency in applications for pro hac vice admission
in California state and federal court. Our court reciprocally disbarred him in 2015.
Mr. Joseph now petitions for reinstatement in our bar. We adopt the Hearing
Committee’s recommendation and deny his petition.
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I. The Process for Seeking Reinstatement in the D.C. Bar
An attorney who has been disbarred in the District of Columbia may seek
reinstatement after “five years from the effective date of the disbarment.” D.C. Bar.
R. XI, § 16(a). The disbarred attorney initiates the process by filing a petition with
the Executive Attorney of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility alleging
his eligibility and fitness to be reinstated. Id. § 16(d); Board Prof. Resp. R. 9.1(c).
The Board then refers the petition to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which
conducts an investigation and determines whether it will contest the petition. D.C.
Bar. R. XI, § 16(e); see Board Prof. Resp. R. 9.5.1
If Disciplinary Counsel does not contest the petition, it submits a report to this
court stating “why [it] is satisfied that the attorney meets the criteria for
reinstatement,” accompanied by the reinstatement petition and the court order that
disbarred the attorney. D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 16(e); Board Prof. Resp. R. 9.6(a). We
then grant the petition, deny the petition, or request a recommendation from the
Board concerning reinstatement. D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 16(e); see In re Sabo, 49 A.3d
1219, 1222 (D.C. 2012) (describing the process for an uncontested petition).
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The Board, either sua sponte or on the recommendation of Disciplinary
Counsel, can dismiss the petition if “the attorney is not eligible for reinstatement” or
if “the petition is insufficient or defective on its face.” D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 16(d)(1);
see Board Prof. Resp. R. 9.4.
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If Disciplinary Counsel contests the petition, the Executive Attorney
schedules a hearing at which the attorney seeking reinstatement must show by “clear
and convincing evidence” that he “has the moral qualifications, competency, and
learning in law required for readmission,” and that his “resumption of the practice
of law . . . will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the
administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.” D.C. Bar. R. XI,
§ 16(d)(1). To determine whether an attorney meets those requirements, the Hearing
Committee considers “(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which
the attorney was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of
the misconduct”; (3) the attorney’s post-discipline conduct, “including the steps
taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present
character; and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to practice
law.” In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985). These are known as the
“Roundtree factors.”
The Hearing Committee then submits its findings of fact and recommendation
on the petition to this court, D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 16(d)(2); see Board Prof. Resp.
R. 9.7(e), and we “schedule the matter for consideration,” D.C. Bar. R. XI,
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§ 16(d)(2). 2 We apply the same test as the Hearing Committee and determine, using
the Roundtree factors, whether the petitioner has carried his burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that reinstatement is warranted under D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 16(d)(1). In so doing, we defer to the Hearing Committee’s findings “unless they
are unsupported by substantial evidence [in the] record.” In re Mba-Jonas, 118 A.3d
785, 787 (D.C. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting In re Samid, 51 A.3d 486, 495
(D.C. 2012)). And while the ultimate decision on the petition rests “entirely with
this court,” we place “great weight” on the Hearing Committee’s recommendation.
In re Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1224 (internal quotation marks omitted).
II. Factual Background and Procedural History
In 2007, Mr. Joseph sought pro hac vice admission in both California state
and federal court. In his applications, he stated, under penalty of perjury, that he
lived in Maryland when he actually lived in California. Att’y Grievance Comm’n of
Md. v. Joseph, 31 A.3d 137, 139-40 (Md. 2011). The Maryland Attorney Grievance
Commission initiated disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Joseph for these
misrepresentations. Id. In 2011, the Maryland Court of Appeals disbarred him after
concluding that he had violated multiple Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
and that his behavior “lacked candor, was dishonest, misleading, prejudicial to the
2
As with an uncontested petition, at our discretion, we may ask the Board for
its recommendation on the petition. D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 16(d)(2).
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administration of justice, and beyond excuse.” Id. at 159. Our court, in turn,
imposed reciprocal discipline and disbarred Mr. Joseph from the practice of law in
the District of Columbia in 2015. In re Joseph, 128 A.3d 643, 643-44 (D.C. 2015)
(per curiam).
In 2021, Mr. Joseph filed a petition for reinstatement in the D.C. Bar, which
he later revised. Disciplinary Counsel moved to dismiss the revised petition, arguing
that Mr. Joseph had failed to “allege material facts specifically addressing the
Roundtree factors,” but the Board denied the motion. Disciplinary Counsel then
opposed Mr. Joseph’s petition, rendering it a “contested petition” under D.C. Bar.
R. XI, § 16(d). The Board’s Hearing Committee Number Six convened for a hearing
on the petition in February 2022. After considering the testimony and exhibits
presented, the Hearing Committee filed a comprehensive report and recommended
that our court deny the petition because Mr. Joseph had not satisfied the fitness
qualifications as set forth in D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 16(d)(1)(a) and in In re Roundtree.
Mr. Joseph filed exceptions to the Hearing Committee’s report and recommendation,
and he briefed and argued the case before our court.
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III. Discussion
We adopt the Hearing Committee’s findings of fact and conclude that
Mr. Joseph has not shown, under D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 16(d) and the Roundtree factors,
that he should be reinstated. We address each Roundtree factor in turn.
First, we consider the nature and circumstances of Mr. Joseph’s misconduct.
In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d at 1217. When misconduct is “closely bound up with [a
petitioner’s] role and responsibilities as an attorney,” we “apply heightened
scrutiny” to the other Roundtree factors. In re Yum, 187 A.3d 1289, 1292
(D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Joseph was disbarred for
misrepresenting himself in applications for pro hac vice admission in California state
and federal court. The Hearing Committee found that Mr. Joseph had lied about his
residency under penalty of perjury and had made knowingly false statements to the
California Bar, to California courts, and to those sponsoring his pro hac vice
applications—findings that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Joseph, 31 A.3d at 148-49. The Hearing Committee considered this conduct
“serious and troubling” because it directly related to Mr. Joseph’s “honesty,
integrity, and judgment—foundational qualities in the practice of law.” We agree
and accordingly view the remaining Roundtree factors with heightened scrutiny.
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Second, Mr. Joseph has not provided “examples of post-discipline conduct
from which his personal growth can be reasonably inferred.” In re Yum, 187 A.3d
at 1292; see In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d at 1217. In fact, the record is quite to the
contrary. After his disbarment, Mr. Joseph filed vexatious lawsuits, including two
against the California Bar after he failed the state’s bar exam. See, e.g., Joseph v.
CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. B288641, 2019 WL 2498400, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 17, 2019) (declining to review the trial court’s “declar[ation that] Joseph was a
vexatious litigant”); Joseph v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 16-2252, 2016 WL 10988675,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016) (denying Mr. Joseph’s fourth motion for being “just
as implausible” as his first motion and forbidding additional motions); Joseph v.
State Bar of Cal., No. B221236, 2010 WL 3566643, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 15, 2010) (affirming the trial court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over
Mr. Joseph’s claim that he was unfairly graded by California bar examiners and
noting “distaste of his inflammatory and unsubstantiated comments”). He also
continued to make false or misleading statements, including representing to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that he was in good standing with our court
despite knowing that he had not been reinstated. Most troublingly, Mr. Joseph held
himself out as an attorney and represented a couple, Robert Francis and Marta
Ortega, in a legal matter in Ohio while not authorized to practice law in either
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California or Ohio. 3 Mr. Francis then filed a complaint for the unauthorized practice
of law with the D.C. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Disciplinary Counsel
dismissed the petition only because Mr. Joseph “ha[d] already received the most
severe discipline that can be imposed against an attorney”—disbarment—and it
noted that Mr. Joseph would need to address the alleged misconduct if he were to
seek reinstatement. That time has come. In the District of Columbia, a person who
holds himself out as authorized to practice law when he is not a member of the bar
engages in the unauthorized practice of law and may be subject to civil contempt
proceedings. D.C. App. R. 49(a), (e)(1); see In re Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 995
(D.C. 2002). The fact that Mr. Joseph’s misconduct occurred outside of the District
does not lessen its severity as we consider his petition for reinstatement. We thus
agree with the Hearing Committee that Mr. Joseph has not demonstrated the
requisite personal growth under this Roundtree factor.
Third, Mr. Joseph does not recognize the seriousness of his misconduct. In re
Roundtree, 503 A.2d at 1217. Instead, he disputes the conduct for which he was
disbarred in Maryland, ignoring our warning that reciprocal-discipline proceedings
3
At oral argument, Mr. Joseph claimed that he had never held himself out as
an attorney to the couple who had hired him. But he testified before the Hearing
Committee that he had told the couple, “I am an attorney.” This inconsistency leaves
us with little confidence in Mr. Joseph’s candor.
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are not a forum to relitigate the foreign discipline. In re Joseph, 128 A.3d at 643-44.
To be sure, “requiring admission of guilt and repentance” when a petitioner earnestly
believes that he is innocent would “create a cruel quandary.” In re Sabo, 49 A.3d at
1226 (alterations omitted). But a “claim of innocence will not relieve [a] petitioner
of his . . . burden to demonstrate recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct.”
Id. He may do so and “at the same time, deny his culpability.” Id. For example, we
reinstated a disbarred attorney who had accepted responsibility for his role in a
“chain of events leading to his conviction” but maintained his innocence of the crime
at issue. Id. at 1227 (citing In re Spilman, 104 P.3d 576, 579 (Okla. 2004) (allowing
reinstatement after a petitioner acknowledged that her actions gave the appearance
of “serious impropriety”)). Mr. Joseph has done nothing of the sort. His failure to
acknowledge his long disciplinary record and, at the very least, the appearance of
serious dishonesty is a “predictor of [his] future conduct.” In re Reynolds, 867 A.2d
977, 984 (D.C. 2005) (per curiam). This denial weighs against his reinstatement. In
re Roundtree, 503 A.2d at 1217.
Fourth, Mr. Joseph has not shown that the “traits which led to [his] disbarment
no longer exist.” In re Brown, 617 A.2d 194, 197 n.11 (D.C. 1992) (quoting In re
Barton, 432 A.2d 1335, 1336 (Md. 1981)). Mr. Joseph did not put on any “live
witnesses familiar with the underlying conduct who c[ould] provide credible
evidence of [his] present good character.” In re Yum, 187 A.3d at 1292 (quoting In
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re Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232). Instead, he submitted an undated Corporate Counsel
Award Certificate that says nothing about his character, a letter from former New
Jersey Congressman Andrew Maguire dated before his disbarment in the District of
Columbia, and letters from Reverend Jesse Jackson and California legislator Brian
Jones that do not address his present character or the nature of his disciplinary
infractions. We agree with the Hearing Committee that these materials do not
“suggest any meaningful understanding of the serious ethical problems that led to
[Mr. Joseph’s] disbarment.”
Fifth and finally, Mr. Joseph must demonstrate his present qualifications and
competence to practice law. In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d at 1217. Mr. Joseph has
established, through the books and articles he has authored, that he is intellectually
curious and stays abreast of developments in the law. See In re Harrison, 511 A.2d
16, 19 (D.C. 1986) (finding petitioner competent where he presented evidence that
he had kept up with developments in the law by reading and maintaining
professional contacts). However, we also consider his arguments and written
submissions before the Hearing Committee and before this court. In re Stanton, 860
A.2d 369, 384 (D.C. 2004). Mr. Joseph did not address the Roundtree factors before
the Hearing Committee or before our court, choosing to argue instead that he was
“disbarred wrongfully” and that “the finding that [he] was vexatious was erroneous.”
“[R]eiteration of arguments that have already been rejected many times by the Court
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suggest[s] a lack of judgment and competence.” Id. But even if the evidence about
Mr. Joseph’s competence all pointed in one direction, it would not overcome his
failure to satisfy the other Roundtree factors.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Joseph’s petition for reinstatement.
So ordered.