Adrienne Johnson v. United States

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 17-CM-1117
ADRIENNE JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(DVM-625-17)
(Hon. Judith A. Smith, Trial Judge)
(Submitted January 29, 2019 Decided May 9, 2019)
Sweta Patel was on the brief for appellant.
Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Nicholas P.
Coleman, Janani Iyengar, and Kristina L. Ament, Assistant United States
Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
Before BECKWITH and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior
Judge.
NEBEKER, Senior Judge: Following a bench trial in the Criminal Division of
the Superior Court, appellant Adrienne Johnson was found guilty of attempted
second-degree cruelty to children and attempted possession of a prohibited weapon
(PPW). Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to
2
suppress her statements to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to
support her convictions. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
On May 14, 2017, appellant beat her thirteen-year-old son A.J. with a
wooden stick about the size of a broomstick. Appellant repeatedly hit A.J. with the
stick while he sat on the floor in the corner of his room and raised his left arm to
block his face. The stick broke during the beating, and appellant continued to
strike A.J. with the two broken pieces. As a result of the beating, A.J. sustained
bruises and marks to his arms, shoulder, and legs, and had a mark behind his left
ear.
On May 15, 2017, Ricky Clayton, a social worker for the Child and Family
Services Agency (CFSA), called appellant to follow up on her case that was
already open with CFSA. 1 During that phone call, appellant stated that she beat
1
Before the incident, appellant went to CFSA with her three sons, including
A.J., indicating that she wanted to relinquish her care of them because they had
been misbehaving and A.J. especially had not been taking her seriously, and CFSA
agreed to provide her with assistance in taking care of her children.
3
A.J. because he “broke into her room” and retrieved his Kindle Fire tablet that
appellant kept in her room as a punishment. That same day, Metropolitan Police
Department Detective Karane Williams-Thomas was assigned to appellant’s case
as a “hot case,” and she went to appellant’s home with her partner Detective Aaron
Mackinoff and social worker Kimberly Hayes to interview appellant and her two
younger sons. Appellant answered the front door, and Detective Williams-Thomas
introduced herself, stating that she was investigating an allegation of physical
abuse. At appellant’s home, individuals from CFSA’s Homebuilders program
were already present. Appellant admitted the detectives and social worker into her
home and gave them permission to interview her two younger sons while she
spoke with the individuals from the Homebuilders program. Detective Williams-
Thomas’s service revolver was underneath her jacket, and she was not with any
uniformed police officer. After the detective interviewed appellant’s sons, she
interviewed appellant in her living room for about thirty minutes. During the
interview, Detective Williams-Thomas was just standing off the stairwell while
appellant was at a desk, and Detective Mackinoff was outside of the house, making
phone calls near the front door. Detective Williams-Thomas testified that she
never took handcuffs out, she never touched appellant, she never threatened
appellant, and she never told appellant that she was under arrest.
4
On May 16, 2017, appellant was charged with two counts of attempted
second-degree cruelty to children, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-1101(b) (2012
Repl.), and two counts of attempted PPW, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4514(b)
(2012 Repl.), one set of counts involving a stick and the other set involving a belt.
On June 26, 2017, appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress her statements to
the police at her home, alleging that the statements were obtained in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. A bench trial was held on September 8, 14, and 18, 2017.
During the trial, the court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, and, on October
2, 2017, the court found appellant guilty of one count of attempted second-degree
cruelty to children and one count of attempted PPW, each involving the stick, and
not guilty of the remaining counts involving the belt. Appellant was sentenced to
ninety days’ imprisonment on each count, with the execution of the sentence
suspended, and was placed on one year of supervised probation. This appeal
followed.
II.
1. Motion to Suppress
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress her statements to the police because she was subject to custodial
5
interrogation but was not advised of her Miranda rights. 2 Appellant contends that
she was in custody because both detectives were armed, she was never informed
that she was free to leave or that she could refuse questioning, she was interrogated
about a crime, and Detective Mackinoff’s presence near the door created an
impression that she could not leave her house. The government acknowledges that
appellant was interrogated but disputes that appellant was in custody.
“An individual is in custody for Miranda purposes only where there is a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.” Morales v. United States, 866 A.2d 67, 71 (D.C. 2005) (quoting
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). “Whether the curtailment of freedom rises to that level is to be assessed
by reference to how a reasonable man or woman in the suspect’s position would
have understood his or her situation.” Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 442 (1984) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). To make this
determination, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the
interrogation. Id. at 71-72.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress on Miranda
grounds, we defer to its factual findings. Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277,
281 (D.C. 2001) (en banc). Moreover, we view the facts and all reasonable
inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at
trial. Id. However, we review the ultimate question of law de novo, and whether,
on the established facts, appellant was under custodial interrogation without
Miranda warnings is a question of law. Id.
Here, the trial court found that Detective Williams-Thomas’s weapon was
concealed; during appellant’s interview, Detective Mackinoff was outside the front
door making phone calls, not standing or guarding at the door; the interview took
place in appellant’s living room, where Detective Williams-Thomas was just
standing off the stairwell while appellant was at a desk; and the tone of the
interview was conversational. The trial court’s factual findings are supported by
the record. Therefore, the question before us is whether, on these facts, appellant
was in custody within the meaning of Miranda. Based on our case law, and
particularly on our decision in Morales v. United States, 866 A.2d 67 (D.C. 2005),
we conclude that the record does not show that the police created an atmosphere of
coercion that amounts to custody.
7
Appellant was questioned in “the familiar surroundings of her own home”
for a “comparatively brief” duration of about half an hour. Morales, 866 A.2d at
72. The tone of the interview was conversational and “neither menacing nor
belligerent.” Id. Although “the police did not tell [appellant] that she was free to
terminate the interview, they did not threaten her with arrest or tell her that she had
no choice but to cooperate with them.” Id. Appellant was neither handcuffed nor
physically restrained, and Detective Williams-Thomas did not brandish her
weapon. Id. Finally, Detective Mackinoff was not standing or guarding at the
door, but even if his presence created an impression that appellant could not leave
the house, “the question in a custody inquiry is not whether a reasonable person
would believe he was not free to leave, but rather whether such a person would
believe he was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Id.
at 73 (brackets and citation omitted). The manner in which the interrogation
occurred here did not amount to a restraint on liberty that is comparable to a formal
arrest. Id. Therefore, we conclude that there was no Miranda violation because
appellant was not in custody when she was questioned by the police at her home.
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2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, appellant argues that the government’s evidence was insufficient to
support her convictions. In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of evidence, “we must
review all evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give
deference to the right of the fact finder to weigh the evidence, determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and draw all justifiable inferences of fact, making no
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.” Dorsey v. United States,
902 A.2d 107, 111 (D.C. 2006) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted). We can reverse a conviction “only where the government has produced
no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Florence v. United States, 906 A.2d 889, 893 (D.C. 2006)
(citation omitted).
a. Second-Degree Cruelty to Children
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction of second-degree cruelty to children because the government failed to
rebut appellant’s defense that she was acting under the parental discipline
privilege. “A person commits the crime of cruelty to children in the second degree
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if that person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly . . . [m]altreats a child or
engages in conduct which causes a grave risk of bodily injury to a child.” D.C.
Code § 22-1101(b)(1). However, this jurisdiction does not outlaw physical
discipline of children, and a parent charged with cruelty to children may claim the
privilege of parental discipline. Lee v. United States, 831 A.2d 378, 380 (D.C.
2003). If the parent raises this defense, then the government has the burden of
refuting it by proving beyond a reasonable doubt either that the parent’s purpose in
resorting to force was not disciplinary or that the force was unreasonable. Id. at
380-81. “The circumstances to be considered when determining whether the
punishment was unreasonable include the child’s age, health, mental and emotional
development, alleged misconduct on this and earlier occasions, the kind of
punishment used, the nature and location of the injuries inflicted, and any other
evidence that may be relevant.” Id. at 381 (brackets, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court found that A.J.’s actions warranted punishment and
appellant intended to discipline him, but her use of force was excessive. We
conclude that the government adduced sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that appellant’s behavior was excessive and unreasonable. The
record shows that appellant struck A.J. with a wooden stick that was as thick as a
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broomstick, that she used force hard enough to break the stick and cause bruises
and marks on A.J.’s body, and that she repeatedly struck A.J., even after the stick
broke. The record also shows that appellant’s behavior was not controlled or
measured. She stood over A.J. while he was sitting on the floor in the corner of his
room and beat him indiscriminately, resulting in marks and bruises on his arms,
shoulder, and legs, and even a mark on his left ear.
Appellant relies on our decision in Florence v. United States, 906 A.2d 889
(D.C. 2006), to argue that her use of force was reasonable. However, in Florence,
we found that the mother’s discipline was “measured” when she hit her eleven-
year-old daughter with an unheated curling iron once on her leg and at most twice
on her hand, resulting in the child’s hand being swollen but no other injury. Id. at
891-92, 895. Also, the child, who was five feet, five inches tall and 269 pounds,
had a history of hitting and pushing her mother and engaged in a physical struggle
to take the curling iron before her mother hit her. Id. at 890 n.2, 891-92. By
contrast, in this case, appellant repeatedly, forcefully, and indiscriminately beat
A.J. with a broomstick-like stick while he was sitting on the floor in the corner of
his room with his arm over his head. On this record, we perceive no error in the
trial court’s determination that appellant’s behavior went beyond reasonable
parental discipline.
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b. Attempted Possession of a Prohibited Weapon (PPW)
Finally, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction of attempted PPW. To establish the offense of attempted PPW, the
government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant attempted to
possess a “dangerous weapon” with “intent to use [it] unlawfully against another.”
D.C. Code § 22-4514(b). Because we affirm appellant’s conviction for second-
degree cruelty to children, we find that there was sufficient evidence that appellant
had intent to use the wooden stick unlawfully against A.J. Therefore, the question
before us is whether the wooden stick was a dangerous weapon.
An object is a dangerous weapon if it is “known to be likely to produce
death or great bodily injury in the manner it is used, intended to be used, or
threatened to be used.” Harper v. United States, 811 A.2d 808, 810 (D.C. 2002)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have defined “great bodily
injury” as “bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness,
extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental facility.”
Stroman v. United States, 878 A.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. 2005) (quoting Alfaro v.
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United States, 859 A.2d 149, 161-62 (D.C. 2004)). An ordinary object that is not
dangerous per se may become a dangerous weapon if the object is used in a way
that is likely to produce death or great bodily injury. Alfaro, 859 A.2d at 160-61;
Arthur v. United States, 602 A.2d 174, 177 (D.C. 1992). The actual injury inflicted
by the object is an important factor in deciding whether the object is dangerous.
Stroman, 878 A.2d at 1245.
Here, the government presented sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that the wooden stick was a dangerous weapon within the meaning
of D.C. Code § 22-4514(b). As noted above, the record shows that appellant
struck A.J. with a wooden stick that was as thick as a broomstick, she used force
hard enough to break the stick and cause bruises and marks on A.J.’s body, and she
repeatedly struck A.J., even after the stick broke. The record also shows that
appellant struck A.J. indiscriminately without taking any precaution to avoid
striking parts of A.J.’s body that would cause serious injury, such as his head or
face. She repeatedly beat A.J. while standing over him as he sat on the floor, and
even though A.J. blocked his face with his left arm, he sustained a mark on his left
ear, in addition to having marks and bruises on his arms, shoulder, and legs. We
find that appellant’s use of the wooden stick in this manner was likely to produce
great bodily injury.
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Appellant argues that the stick was not a dangerous weapon because it did
not actually produce great bodily injury, noting that there were no open wounds,
swelling, broken bones, bleeding, black or busted eyes, or purple bruising, but our
legal standard is whether such injury is likely to occur. Alfaro, 859 A.2d at 161.
Hence, while the actual injury inflicted by the object in question is an important
factor in establishing its dangerousness (and in some cases the determining factor),
Stroman, 878 A.2d at 1245, the absence of such injury does not necessarily
indicate that the object was not dangerous. Here, the record viewed in the light
most favorable to the government indicates that appellant repeatedly and forcefully
beat A.J. with a broomstick-like wooden stick in an indiscriminate manner, without
avoiding hitting areas like his face or head, and this is sufficient evidence to
support a finding that appellant used a dangerous weapon within the meaning of
D.C. Code § 22-4514(b).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s convictions are affirmed.
So ordered.