Brian Keith Waugh v. Medstar Georgetown University Hospital

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 18-CV-329
BRIAN KEITH WAUGH, APPELLANT,
v.
MEDSTAR GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(CAM-7831-17)
(Hon. Robert R. Rigsby, Trial Judge)
(Submitted January 7, 2019 Decided March 14, 2019)
Brian Keith Waugh, pro se.
Crystal S. Deese and Diona F. Howard-Nicolas were on the brief for
appellee.
Before THOMPSON and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior
Judge.
RUIZ, Senior Judge: This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice action
filed by pro se appellant Brian Keith Waugh against appellee MedStar Georgetown
University Hospital (the “Hospital”). The trial court dismissed appellant’s
amended complaint on the alternative grounds that it was filed outside of the
2
statutory three-year limitations period governing medical malpractice claims, and
that appellant did not provide appellee with ninety days’ pre-suit notice as required
by statute. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Appellant alleges that he received improper treatment at the Hospital
between September 7-8, 2014, when two nurses went “fishing” for a vein in his
right arm. The first nurse’s attempt to insert the intravenous needle caused
appellant’s arm to “bleed[] significantly from the needle hole.” And when a
second nurse inserted the needle, appellant’s “thumb felt funny.” A radiology
technician then “took out the needle in [appellant’s] right arm and put one in the
back of [his] right hand without a problem,” but it “caused the back of [appellant’s]
hand to sting intensely,” and appellant “screamed out, Ahhhhhh!” Appellant
subsequently sought medical care related to the injury. His hand sometimes
“feel[s] like it is going to sleep,” and he occasionally experiences “prickly pains, or
sharp pains in the back of [his] wrist.”
3
Appellant filed his complaint on November 22, 2017. 1 After the Hospital
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, appellant filed both a brief in opposition
and an amended complaint. The Hospital filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, and appellant filed a motion to amend his brief in opposition to the
Hospital’s motion to dismiss the original complaint. Then, appellant filed a brief
in opposition to the Hospital’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
The trial court issued an omnibus order resolving all outstanding motions on
February 23, 2018. As relevant here, the trial court: (1) denied the Hospital’s
motion to dismiss the initial complaint as mooted by the amended complaint, (2)
denied appellant’s motion to amend his brief in opposition to that motion as also
mooted by the amended complaint, 2 and (3) granted the Hospital’s motion to
dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that appellant did not file his
1
The complaint alleged six causes of action: (1) discrimination by
disparagement of healthcare; (2) unnecessary pain, suffering, and bodily injury; (3)
negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (5) loss of the sense of freedom in seeking healthcare; and (6) loss of
sense of safety and wellbeing in seeking healthcare.
2
The trial court alternatively stated that there was no opposition brief to
amend. This is not supported by the record. Appellant did file a brief in
opposition to the Hospital’s first motion to dismiss, but it was improperly docketed
as part of his motion for an extension of time to file an opposition brief, rather than
as a separate filing. However, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s
misstatement, given its alternative holding that appellant’s motion to amend his
opposition to the Hospital’s motion to dismiss the initial complaint was moot.
4
complaint within the three-year limitations period established by D.C. Code § 12-
301(8) (2012 Repl.), and did not provide the Hospital with ninety days’ pre-suit
notice as required by D.C. Code § 16-2802 (2012 Repl.). This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
The trial court may dismiss a claim for failure to comply with the applicable
statute of limitations under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) if “the claim is time-barred
on the face of the complaint.” Logan v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 A.3d 1014,
1020 (D.C. 2013). “We review de novo the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint
under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).” Id. at 1019.
III. Analysis
Before bringing a medical malpractice action in the District of Columbia, a
plaintiff must satisfy two procedural requirements. First, the plaintiff must serve
the defendant with notice of intention to file suit “not less than 90 days prior to
filing the action.” D.C. Code § 16-2802(a) (2012 Repl.).3 This requirement serves
3
D.C. Code § 16-2802 provides that:
(continued . . . )
5
to “encourage early settlements and facilitate the parties’ ability to reach a
settlement,” which in turn “lower[s] each party’s individual costs,” and
“promote[s] judicial economy by decreasing the time and money spent on these
complicated and contentious issues.” Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 2006,
D.C. Council, Report on Bill 16-418 at 1-2 (Apr. 28, 2006); see also Lacek v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr. Corp., 978 A.2d 1194, 1198 (D.C. 2009). In the event the
parties are unable to resolve their dispute outside of the judicial process, the
______________________
(. . . continued)
(a) Any person who intends to file an action in the court
alleging medical malpractice against a healthcare
provider shall notify the intended defendant of his or her
action not less than 90 days prior to filing the action.
Notice may be given by service on an intended defendant
at his or her last known address registered with the
appropriate licensing authority. Upon a showing of a
good faith effort to give the required notice, the court
may excuse the failure to give notice within the time
prescribed.
(b) The notice required in subsection (a) of this section
shall include sufficient information to put the defendant
on notice of the legal basis for the claim and the type and
extent of the loss sustained, including information
regarding the injuries suffered. Nothing herein shall
preclude the person giving notice from adding additional
theories of liability based upon information obtained in
court-conducted discovery or adding injuries or loss
which become known at a later time.
(c) A legal action alleging medical malpractice shall not
be commenced in the court unless the requirements of
this section have been satisfied.
6
plaintiff must satisfy a second requirement: filing the complaint within the District
of Columbia’s three-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. D.C.
Code § 12-301(8) (2012 Repl.).
These two requirements interact with one another. If the pre-suit notice
required by D.C. Code § 16-2802(a) “is served within 90 days of the expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action
shall be extended 90 days from the date of the service of the notice.” D.C. Code
§ 16-2803 (2012 Repl.) (emphasis added).
This case centers on the “within 90 days” requirement to trigger the statute-
of-limitations extension. Appellant concedes that the three-year limitations period
applicable to his claims began to run when his alleged injuries occurred on
September 7-8, 2014, 4 and that his complaint was not filed within three years of
that date. However, he contends that because his complaint was filed “within 90
days” after the limitations period expired, it is eligible for the statute-of-limitations
extension provided by D.C. Code § 16-2803, and should be deemed timely. We
disagree.
4
See Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1994) (“Where
the fact of an injury can be readily determined, a claim accrues for purpose of the
statute of limitations at the time the injury actually occurs.”).
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A. Statute of Limitations
In construing the statute-of-limitations extension provided by D.C. Code
§ 16-2803, “we must first look at the language of the statute by itself to see if the
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning.” Peoples Drug Stores,
Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc) (citation and
alteration omitted). As appellant notes, the phrase “within 90 days of the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations” admits of more than one
meaning, as it could mean within 90 days before the expiration of the applicable
statute of limitations period, or within 90 days after the expiration of the
limitations period.5 Accordingly, because statutory interpretation is a “holistic
endeavor,” Washington Gas Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 982 A.2d 691, 716
(D.C. 2009) (citation omitted), we must search beyond the text of this isolated
provision to ascertain its meaning, Gondelman v. District of Columbia Dep’t of
Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 789 A.2d 1238, 1245 (D.C. 2002). We are guided
in this inquiry by the underlying policies and objectives of the statute as a whole,
5
See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2627 (1993) (defining “within”
as meaning, among other things, “before the end or since the beginning of” a
period of time, and providing “troops would be withdrawn . . . within two years
after the end of the war” as an illustration of the latter usage) (emphases added).
8
and the interaction between the statute-of-limitations extension and related
statutory provisions. Id.The statutory provision that is most obviously related to the statute-of-
limitations extension is the three-year statute of limitations itself. Such statutes are
designed to “protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in
which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence,”
Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. 1984) (citation
omitted), and are to be “strictly construed in accordance with their terms,” Atiba v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 43 A.3d 940, 941 (D.C. 2012).
Appellant’s construction of the statute-of-limitations extension provision
would undermine these policies by reading an implicit ninety-day exception into
the statute of limitations based solely on the phrase “within 90 days of the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.”6 If appellant’s view that
“within 90 days of the expiration” means “within 90 days after the expiration”
were to prevail, medical malpractice defendants could receive notice of a claim for
the first time more than three years after the right to bring the lawsuit accrued, in
6
Cf. D.C. Code § 16-2802(a) (requiring that notice of intent to file suit must
be given “not less than 90 days prior to filing the action”).
9
contravention of the policy decision the District of Columbia Council reached in
enacting the three-year statute of limitations. Interpreting “within 90 days of the
expiration” to mean “within 90 days before the expiration,” by contrast, accords
with the policies underlying the statute of limitations, as defendants would in all
cases have notice of the claims that may be asserted against them no more than
three years after the right to bring the claims arose.
Moreover, the statute-of-limitations extension serves an understandable
policy objective when applied to plaintiffs who serve notice of their claims before
the three-year limitations period expires that is absent when it is applied to
plaintiffs who serve notice of their claims only after the limitations period expires.
If the ninety-day pre-suit notice requirement were not accompanied by a
corresponding extension to the limitations period, it would effectively move up the
statute-of-limitations deadline by ninety days, barring plaintiffs who served notice
with less than ninety days remaining in the limitations period from bringing an
action. The statute-of-limitations extension ameliorates this concern for plaintiffs
who serve pre-suit notice within 90 days before the limitations period expires by
extending that deadline by “90 days from the date of the service of the notice.”
D.C. Code § 16-2803. It serves no similar purpose for plaintiffs who serve pre-suit
10
notice for the first time only after the limitations period has already expired, as
they face no possible hardship from an impending statute-of-limitations deadline.
Therefore, we conclude that, to be eligible for the ninety-day statute-of-
limitations extension set forth in D.C. Code § 16-2803, a plaintiff must serve pre-
suit notice within ninety days before the limitations period expires. As explained
in the following section, there is no evidence that appellant did so here. As a
result, appellant was required to file his action no more than three years after “the
time the right to maintain the action accrue[d],” D.C. Code § 12-301(8), with no
extension. Because it is clear from the face of appellant’s amended complaint that
he did not do so, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
B. Pre-Suit Notice
Providing ninety-days’ pre-suit notice is a condition precedent to filing a
medical malpractice action. See D.C. Code § 16-2802(c) (“A legal action alleging
medical malpractice shall not be commenced in the court unless the requirements
of this section have been satisfied.”). Appellant argues that he satisfied this
requirement for two reasons.
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First, appellant contends that the filing of the complaint itself serves as the
notice required by D.C. Code § 16-2802(a). We see no merit in this argument.
Deeming the filing of a complaint to be sufficient would be inconsistent with the
text of the pre-suit notice requirement, D.C. Code § 16-2802(a) (requiring that
notice must be served “not less than 90 days prior to filing the action”) (emphasis
added), and would subvert its purpose, see Lacek, 978 A.2d at 1198 (explaining
that the filing of a complaint “force[s] the Hospital to incur the expense of either
answering or filing a motion to dismiss,” whereas the pre-suit notice period allows
for the possibility that “a settlement could [be] achieved and litigation costs
avoided”). We have deemed the filing of a complaint to be insufficient to satisfy a
similar pre-suit notice requirement, see Campbell v. District of Columbia, 568
A.2d 1076, 1078 (D.C. 1990) (rejecting “appellants’ argument that the statutory
purpose of [D.C. Code] § 12-309 can be served just as well by a complaint that is
filed within the six-month period for giving notice”),7 and see no reason a different
7
D.C. Code § 12-309(a) provides that, with limited exceptions:
[A]n action may not be maintained against the District of
Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property
unless, within six months after the injury or damage was
sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given
notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia
(continued . . . )
12
result should obtain here. We thus reject appellant’s first argument that the pre-
suit notice requirement was satisfied.
Second, appellant contends that he satisfied the notice requirement because
“the acts in the Amended Complaint were filed by fax with the D.C. Department of
Health in October 2014.” If appellant had provided pre-suit notice in October
2014, it would have been more than ninety days before the September 2017
expiration of the limitations period, and timely under D.C. Code § 16-2802(a). But
appellant’s allegation that he sent a fax to the D.C. Department of Health outlining
the facts underlying his complaint is wholly insufficient to establish that he served
“the intended defendant” (i.e., the Hospital in this case) with pre-suit notice at its
“last known address registered with the appropriate licensing authority.” D.C.
Code § 16-2802(a). Similarly, appellant’s claim that he was unable to ascertain the
identities of the nurses or radiology technician who allegedly provided the
improper care provides no basis to excuse his failure to notify the Hospital within
ninety days before filing suit. Therefore, we reject appellant’s second argument
that the pre-suit notice argument was satisfied as well.
______________________
(. . . continued)
of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances
of the injury or damage.
13
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant did not file his complaint within the
applicable limitations period and failed to provide the Hospital with the required
pre-suit notice. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s
amended complaint is
Affirmed.