Villatoro Claros v. Cowan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MIRIAN JETZABEL VILLATORO
CLAROS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 21-609 (JEB)
ROBERT M. COWAN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Mirian Jetzabel Villatoro Claros, a lawful permanent resident who lives in
Maryland, has been trying to obtain derivative asylee status for her 16-year-old daughter,
Plaintiff Justine Andree Villatoro Claros, for over three years. Frustrated that U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services has not acted, they brought this suit, asking the Court to order
Defendants to adjudicate their Form I-730, Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition. Defendants —
senior officials at USCIS — now move to transfer this case to the District of Maryland. As the
relevant factors favor transfer, the Court will grant the Motion.
I. Legal Standard
Even if a plaintiff has brought its case in a proper venue, a district court may, “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice . . . transfer [it] . . . to any other
district . . . where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). District courts have
“discretion . . . to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case
consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29
(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
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This Court has previously explained the standard for a transfer of venue under § 1404(a):
To warrant transfer under § 1404(a), the movant must first show that
the plaintiff could originally have brought the case in the transferee
district. Treppel v. Reason, 793 F. Supp. 2d 429, 435 (D.D.C. 2011).
The movant must also show that “considerations of convenience and
the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer . . . .” Sierra Club
v. Flowers, 276 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65 (D.D.C. 2003). This second
inquiry “calls on the district court to weigh in the balance a number
of case-specific factors,” related to both the public and private
interests at stake. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29. The burden is on
the moving party to establish that transfer is proper. Trout
Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C.
1996).
Douglas v. Chariots for Hire, 918 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2013). Although Plaintiffs and
Defendants disagree about whether venue is proper in this District, the Court need not wade into
that controversy today. Instead, it will proceed with the § 1404(a) transfer framework outlined
above, first examining whether this case could have been brought in the District of Maryland and
next looking at the private- and public-interest factors relevant to transfer.
III. Analysis
A. Propriety of New Venue
As Plaintiffs have filed suit against federal officers and employees acting in their official
capacity, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Under that section, venue is proper in any
district in which “(A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . .[,] or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is
involved in the action.” As Plaintiffs currently reside in Maryland, see ECF No. 1 (Complaint)
at 1, this preliminary hurdle is easily cleared.
B. Private- and Public-Interest Factors
The “private-interest factors include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the
defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the
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parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.”
Douglas, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (citation omitted). “The public-interest factors include: (1) the
transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of
the transferor and transferee courts; and (3) the local interest in having local controversies
decided at home.” Id. (citation omitted).
1. Private-Interest Factors
To streamline its analysis, the Court collapses the six aforementioned private-interest
factors into four.
a. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
While a plaintiff’s choice of forum is usually given deference, this deference is “not
always warranted where the plaintiff’s choice of forum has no meaningful ties to the
controversy, and where transfer is sought to a forum with which plaintiffs have substantial ties
and where the subject matter of the lawsuit is connected.” Jimenez v. R&D Masonry, Inc., 2015
WL 7428533, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2015) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks
omitted). “Indeed, when the forum preferred by the plaintiff is not his home forum, and the
defendant prefers the plaintiff’s home forum, then there is little reason to defer to the plaintiff’s
preference.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The only meaningful tie Plaintiffs cite to the District of Columbia is that “USCIS still
requests that all service of process be effected” here. See ECF No. 7 (Pl. Opp.) at 3. Yet they
also acknowledge that USCIS headquarters moved to Maryland last year, id., and the
Government further notes that the asylee petition is currently pending at the USCIS office in
Baltimore. See ECF No. 5 (Def. Mot. to Transfer) at 1 n.1. Given that Maryland is Plaintiffs’
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home, the site of Defendants’ office, and the place where the petition is being handled, Plaintiffs’
choice of forum receives no deference.
b. Defendants’ Choice of Forum
While a defendant’s choice of forum is relevant to deciding a § 1404(a) motion, it is “not
ordinarily entitled to deference.” Tower Labs, Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 3d 321,
326 (D.D.C. 2018). As Defendants have moved to transfer, “they must establish that the added
convenience and justice of litigating in their chosen forum overcomes” any deference to the
Plaintiffs’ choice of venue. Id. Since, as just discussed, Plaintiffs receive no deference, and as
the aforementioned other interests favor transfer, Defendants receive some deference for their
choice of forum.
c. Whether Claim Arose Elsewhere
“When the material events that form the factual predicate of a plaintiff’s claim did not
occur in his chosen forum, transfer is favored.” Id. “In cases brought under the APA, courts
generally focus on where the decisionmaking process occurred to determine where the claims
arose.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 675 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (D.D.C. 2009). As
previously discussed, the case is being handled in the Baltimore office of USCIS, which is itself
headquartered in Maryland. As a result, the “decisionmaking process” that forms the “factual
predicate” of Plaintiffs’ claim is occurring in Maryland.
d. Convenience of Parties, Convenience of Witnesses, and Ease of Access to
Sources of Proof
The final three factors, which relate to convenience, “do not weigh heavily in favor of
either venue, given the close proximity of the District of Columbia and the . . . District of
[Maryland].” Douglas, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33. This is particularly so in an APA case in
which no trial or hearing is likely to occur. To the extent Plaintiffs complain that their counsel is
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not admitted in the District of Maryland, courts have held that “the location of counsel is not a
consideration.” Wolfram Alpha LLC v. Cuccinelli, 490 F. Supp. 3d 324, 333 (D.D.C. 2020)
(citing cases). Even if bar membership were, this would still not overcome the other private-
interest factors favoring transfer.
2. Public-Interest Factors
The public-interest factors are not quite as dispositive as the private-interest ones, but
they similarly point in the direction of transfer. To repeat, the three are the transferee court’s
familiarity with governing laws, the relative congestion of the courts, and the local interest in
local controversies.
First, neither party mentions the District of Maryland’s familiarity with governing law,
and for good reason; as the case solely involves federal statutes, that court can more than capably
handle this case. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey, 437 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (D.D.C. 2006)
(where “both courts are competent to interpret the federal statutes involved[,] . . . there is no
reason to transfer or not transfer based on this factor”). This factor, therefore, does not point
either way.
Second, as Plaintiffs do not contend that the current caseloads of either district would
have a bearing on the disposition of this action, the Court finds this factor would typically be
neutral as well. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 178. Yet, as Defendants
point out, by transferring many of these application-specific immigration cases (as opposed to
ones attacking a policy) to the plaintiffs’ home district, the district court here in Washington —
which is home to USCIS’s parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Justice — will not become overwhelmed with these cases. See Def. Mot. at 6–7;
Wolfram Alpha, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 335 (noting problem of deluge of such cases filed here).
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Spreading them out across the country makes eminent sense and tips the scales on this factor
toward transfer.
Third, “[c]ontroversies should be resolved in the locale where they arise,” a “policy
rationale [that] applies equally to the judicial review of an administrative decision which will be
limited to the administrative record.” Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. 13 at 19. As the decision
on Plaintiffs’ challenge will occur in Maryland, which is their home state, the Court finds that the
final factor favors transfer.
In sum, the public-interest factors similarly favor transfer.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will issue a contemporaneous Order granting the
Motion and transferring the case to the District of Maryland.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: May 6, 2021
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