Straw v. United States

FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JAN. 21, 2022
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Columbia
ANDREW U.D. STRAW, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00104 (UNA)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a prolific filer in this court and others, has filed a complaint, ECF No. 1, motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, and request for CM/ECF password,
ECF No. 3. His complaint faces several insurmountable hurdles, and the court will thus grant his
IFP motion and dismiss the complaint based on immunity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and
for want of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff, who states that he is as an attorney “licensed at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
4th Circuit,” Compl. ¶ 4, sues the United States, alleging that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights by (1) allegedly dismissing his
appeals for baseless procedural reasons, rather than on the merits, see id. ¶¶ 6–8, 17–19, 21–3, 28,
(2) committing legal error by denying him leave to proceed as an attorney, rather than granting
him leave to proceed pro se and IFP, see id. ¶¶ 9–16, 18, 24, 28–9, and (3) myriad other alleged
Clerk docketing errors, see id. ¶¶ 14–15, 17–18, 20, 25, 29. He demands $1 million in damages.
First, Plaintiff has essentially sued the United States for damages, but Congress has not
waived the United States’ immunity from suit, see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1994),
and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
allows damages only when a defendant is sued in an individual capacity. See Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979); Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (“Bivens actions are for damages . . . if the [ ] defendant is found liable, he becomes
personally responsible for satisfying the judgment[.]”). Plaintiff has not sued anyone in an
individual capacity, and his claims against the United States for damages are simply not
cognizable. See Meyer, 510 at 483–85.
Second, courts are absolutely immune from suits for damages for “all actions taken in the
judge's judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that a long line of Supreme Court precedents have
found that a “judge is immune from a suit for money damages”); Caldwell v. Kagan, 865 F. Supp.
2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have absolute immunity for any actions taken in a judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity.”). And “will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was
in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356 (1978); see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice.”).
Court staff are also subject to the same immunity. Staff, “like judges, are immune from
damage suits for performance of tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Sindram,
986 F.2d at 1460; see also Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“It is well
established that judicial immunity ‘extends to other officers of government whose duties are
related to the judicial process.’”) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959)); Hester v.
Dickerson, 576 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2008) (absolute judicial immunity extends to clerks of
the court) (citations omitted). Without immunity for judicial staff performing work related tasks,
“courts would face the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute
immunity from suing the judge directly would vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other
judicial adjuncts.” Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1461 (citations omitted); see also Reddy v. O'Connor,
520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 130 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that a “deputy clerk's alleged refusal to file
documents [the] plaintiff submitted” was an action “quintessentially ‘judicial’ in nature because
[it was] an integral part of the judicial process.”). Plaintiff’s allegations against the Second Circuit
and its staff fail to overcome this immunity.
Finally, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of other federal
courts. See In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Panko v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6
(7th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t it seems axiomatic that a lower court may not order the judges or officers of
a higher court to take an action.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Choi, 818
F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate
jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”)
(citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming v. United States, 847 F.
Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)), aff’d, No.
94-5079, 1994 WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995).
Accordingly, this case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Federal
Rule 12(h)(3). Plaintiff’s request for a CM/ECF password is denied as moot. A separate order
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Date: January 21, 2022 Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge