National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 189

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
National Railroad Passenger
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 14-cv-678(GK)
Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge 189 Labor Committee,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff National Railroad Passenger Corporation, best known
as Amtrak ("Plaintiff" or "Amtrak"), brought this action to vacate
an arbitration award under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151et seq. ("RLA"), and the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.
App. 3 § 1 et seq. ("IG Act").
After a labor dispute between Amtrak and Defendant, the
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 189 Labor Committee ("Defendant"
or "the FOP") involving one of the FOP's members, on March 24,
2014, an Arbitrator issued a Decision and Award in favor of the
FOP. See Arbitrator's Decision [Dkt. No. 22-1]. On April 22, 2014,
Amtrak filed its Complaint and Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award
under the Railway Labor Act [ Dkt. No. 1] , contending that the
Arbitrator's Decision exceeded the scope of her jurisdiction and
violated public policy with respect to Amtrak Inspector General
investigations and Amtrak police officer discipline.
On July 10, 2015, and August 14, 2015, the Parties filed
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. See Amtrak's Mot. for Summ. J.
[Dkt. No. 23]; FOP's Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. No. 25]. At the
heart of the Parties' Cross-Motions was a single legal question:
are procedural limitations on the conduct of internal
investigations contained in a collective bargaining agreement
between Amtrak and the FOP binding on the Amtrak Off ice of
Inspector General? The Court concluded that they are not, and on
November 2, 2015, issued a Memorandum Opinion 1 [Dkt. No. 31] and
Order [Dkt. No. 30] granting Amtrak's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denying the FOP's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
On November 25, 2015, the FOP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration ("Def.'s Mot.") [Dkt. No. 32], contending that the
"Court's November 2, 2015 Memorandum Opinion [Dkt. No. 31] contains
a number of legal errors which, if not corrected, will result in
a manifest injustice to not only the FOP, but to any federal labor
union subject to the investigatory powers of their respective
inspectors general." Def.'s Mot. at 1. On December 8, 2015, Amtrak
1 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge
189, No. 14-CV-678 (GK), 2015 WL 6692104, at *l (D.D.C. Nov. 2,
2015).
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filed its Opposition ("Pl.'s Opp'n") [Dkt. No. 33], and on December
14, 2015, the FOP filed its Reply ("Def.' s Reply") [Dkt. No. 34].
Upon consideration of the FOP's Motion for Reconsideration,
Amtrak's Opposition, the FOP's Reply, and the entire record herein,
and for the reasons stated below, the Court finds the FOP's Motion
to be without merit, and accordingly, the Motion shall be denied.
I . BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with its previous Memorandum
Opinion in this case and therefore summarizes only the most
relevant facts.
On April 9, 2013, pursuant to the grievance procedure set
forth in the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between
Amtrak and the' FOP, a former employee of the Amtrak Police
Department ("APD") appealed her termination to an Arbitrator.
On March 24, 2014, the Arbitrator issued her Decision, holding
that Amtrak did not have just cause to discharge the former officer
because Amtrak's Off ice of Inspector General ( "OIG") failed to
abide by certain procedural requirements contained in Rule 50 of
the Amtrak-FOP CBA during an investigatory interview of the APD
officer.
Although Rule 50 does not specifically mention the OIG, the
Arbitrator reasoned that its terms applied to OIG investigations
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because Amtrak agreed to the CBA containing Rule 50, and the OIG
is part of Amtrak's workforce.
As a remedy for the officer's wrongful termination, the
Arbitrator ordered Amtrak to reinstate the officer to her prior
position with her previous level of seniority, back pay, and
retroactive payment of benefits. Arbitrator's Decision at 22 [Dkt.
No. 22-1].
The Arbitrator did not reach any other issues raised by the
Parties and rested her Decision and Award entirely upon the OIG's
failure to comply with Rule 50. Id. ("[Amtrak] did not have just
cause to discharge Grievant Sarah Bryant because the procedural
safeguards guaranteed to employees by Rule 50 were not
afforded her during the . . . Amtrak OIG interrogation.").
Upon review of the Arbitrator's Decision, the Court held that
application of Rule 50 to the OIG is contrary to the explicit,
well-defined, and dominant public policy of Inspector General
independence. Mem. Op. at 14 (citing the Inspector General Act, 5
U.S.C. App. 3 § 8G(d) (1)). The Court noted that
Our Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit have spoken directly to the question the
parties present: "[P]roposals concerning Inspector
General-investigation procedures are not appropriately
the subject of [collective] bargaining, because to allow
such bargaining would impinge on the statutory
independence of the I [nspector] G [eneral]." See U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth. ("DHS"), 751 F. 3d 665, 668
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(D.C. Cir. 2014); accord U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornm'n
v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. ("NRC"), 25 F.3d 229, 234
(4th Cir. 1994).
Mem. Op. at 14.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
is "discretionary and need not be granted unless the district
court finds that there is an intervening change in controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct
a clear error or to prevent manifest injustice." Ciralsky v.
CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Importantly,
"Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at reconsideration, not initial
consideration." GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680 F.3d
805, 812 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal citations, quotation
marks, and ellipses omitted) . "Accordingly, a Rule 5 9 ( e)
motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence
that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment."
Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and ellipses
omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The FOP contends that the Court's Memorandum Opinion in
this case contains a number of legal errors that require
correction. According to the FOP, these errors include the
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Court's failure 1) to address the FOP's argument that sources
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of law beyond the CBA limited the OIG's investigative powers
in the same manner as Rule 50, 2) to balance the policy goals
of the Railway Labor Act and the Inspector General Act, and
3) to prevent Amtrak from outsourcing internal investigations
to its OIG instead of conducting them through the APD's Office
of Internal Affairs ("OIA"). The Court finds none of the FOP's
contentions to be compelling.
A. Other Limitations on OIG Investigative Powers
In its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant
relied on Quality Standards of Investigations ("QSis"), which
are issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency ("CIGIE"), to show that the CBA did
nothing more than reassert limitations that were already
binding on the OIG. Def.' s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 27
("Given that Amtrak's OIG incontrovertibly follows the
standards set forth in the Council's QSI [sic], it is as
disingenuous as it is hypocritical for Amtrak to suggest that
its OIG is somehow immune from the strictures of Rule 50[.]").
According to the FOP, "in demanding that Amtrak's OIG
honor the due-process protections guaranteed under Rule 50,
the FOP is not imposing any further restrictions upon Amtrak
OIG' s independence than those which Congress has already
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imposed via the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008." Def.'s
Reply at 13 (section heading written in all caps in original).
The FOP contends that "[t]he Court erred by ignoring
altogether the FOP's argument concerning the statutory
restrictions that Congress -- not Amtrak or the FOP -- placed on
Amtrak's- inspector general when Congress created the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency[.]" Def.'s Mot.
at 1. According to the FOP, "the Court failed to make even a
passing reference to the CIGIE or the [QSis] the CIGIE promulgates
standards by which Amtrak's [OIG] was statutorily bound to abide
as a member of CIGIE[.J" Def.'s Mot. at 2.
The FOP continues, "The Court was and is obligated to address
in at least some fashion all of the arguments that the FOP raised
in its briefs in defense against Amtrak's lawsuit. To refuse to do
so invites an unnecessary remand on appeal." Def.' s Mot. at 2
(emphasis in original) . It reasons, "[h] ad this Court performed
even a cursory review of those standards in its Memorandum Opinion,
it would have been hard-pressed to deny that the CIGIE imposes
almost identical restrictions upon its OIG members in conducting
their respective investigations as those set forth in Rule 50 of
the collective negotiations agreement between Amtrak and the FOP."
Def.'s Mot. at 6.
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Defendant's argument, however, ignores the Court's discussion
on page 20 of its Memorandum Opinion, where the Court stated:
The FOP also contends that Amtrak has failed to
specifically show how .Rule 50 would interfere with OIG's
investigative authority. This argument misses the mark.
As the OHS court explained, "[t]he important point [] is
not that particular negotiated procedures interfere with
specific aspects of OIG authority under the Inspector
General Act but, rather, that negotiation in and of
itself is antithetical to OIG independence established
by the Inspector General Act." OHS, 751 F.3d at 672
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) . Thus, Amtrak need not show precisely how Rule
50 would burden the OIG. It is enough to nullify the
Arbitrator's Decision that, if the Decision were
enforced, Rule 50 would regulate the OIG's conduct
during employee interviews.
Mem. Op. at 20 (emphasis added in the Memorandum Opinion).
The FOP's contention that the Arbitrator correctly enforced
Rule 50 of the CBA because it imposed no additional restrictions
on the OIG is not convincing because it relies on an inquiry into
which negotiated procedures interfere with OIG authorities and
which do not. Our Court of Appeals had stated squarely that such
an inquiry conflicts with the OIG Act. OHS, 751 F.3d at 672.
It is true that the Court does not discuss the intricacies of
the QSis or the CIGIE or any other pre-existing 'restrictions on
the OIG's authority. No discussion is necessary -- indeed, such an
inquiry would conflict with OHS, in which our Court of Appeals
ruled that "negotiation in and of itself is antithetical to OIG
independence established by the Inspector General Act." OHS, 751
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F.3d at 672. Even if a CBA included negotiated procedures mirroring
restrictions already incumbent on the OIG, the terms of the CBA
would not be directly binding on the OIG. 2
B. The IG Act and the Railway Labor Act
The FOP next claims that "[t]he Court also failed to perform
any analysis whatsoever of the interplay between the statutory
independence afforded to inspectors general under the Inspector
General Act [] and the equal if not superior -- statutory
importance of free and uninhibited labor relations promoted by the
Railway Labor Act ("RLA") ." Def.'s Mot. at 2. "Because Rule 50 of
the parties' collective negotiations agreement imposes no further
restrictions upon the independence of Amtrak's inspector general
to conduct investigations than those restrictions set forth by the
CIGIE in the QSI, this Court erroneously concluded that the public
policy goals of the [IG Act] trump the [RLA's] longstanding aim of
promoting and ensuring labor stability through collective
negotiations." Id.
2 The FOP claims that Congress itself has imposed restrictions on
OIG's authority similar to those of Rule 50. Def.'s Mot. at 1. The
FOP is incorrect. 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § ll(c) (2) requires Inspectors
General to "adhere to professional standards developed by the
Council" "[t]o the extent permitted under law[.]" The FOP believes
that those standards, the QSis, mirror the provisions of Rule 50.
But as § 11 (c) (2) makes clear, the QSis are not established by
Congress but by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency. Moreover, if the QSis, which are merely "professional
standards developed by the [CIGIE]," conflict with a Congressional
command, clearly, the QSis must yield. Id.
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To a large extent, this argument merely restates the last,
and so the Court again refers the FOP to our Court of Appeals'
holding in DHS that "proposals concerning Inspector General-
investigation procedures are not appropriately the subject of
[collective] bargaining, because to allow such bargaining would
impinge on the statutory independence of the I[nspector]
G[eneral] ." DHS, 751 F.3d at 668 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It does not matter whether "Rule 50 of the parties'
collective negotiations agreement imposes no further restrictions
upon the independence of Amtrak's inspector general to conduct
investigations." Def.'s Mot. at 2. Negotiation itself is what is
not allowed. Moreover, the DHS court's unambiguous statement makes
clear that the policy of OIG independence takes precedence over
"the Railway Labor Act's longstanding aim of promoting and ensuring
labor stability through collective negotiations," Def.'s Mot. at 2
(emphasis added). See Memorandum Opinion at 14-17 (section titled
"Collective Bargaining and the Inspector General") .
True, the labor-relations statute at issue in DHS was the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute ("FSLMRS"),
5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., rather than the Railway Labor Act, but
the FOP has provided no reason why the two analogous regimes should
receive different treatment. Indeed, the FOP cites another case
considering the FSLMRS -- not the Railway Labor Act -- to support
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its arguments. Def.' s Mot. at 8 (citing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. ("NRC"), 25 F.3d 229, 236-37
(4th Cir. 1994) (Murnaghan, J. dissenting) for the proposition
that the policies underlying labor-relations statutes and the
Inspector General Act are deserving of equal consideration) . 3
For these reasons, the Court concludes, as it did in its
Memorandum Opinion, that the principle of Inspector General
independence underlying the IG Act prevails over the collective
bargaining rights established by the federal labor relations
statutes. Consequently, the FOP's second ground for
reconsideration is without merit.
C. Internal Investigations and the OIG
The FOP' s final argument is that "the Court failed [] to
appreciate the consequences of its decision to vacate [the]
Arbitrator['s] March 24, 2014 [Decision] and Award -- namely, the
tacit endorsement of Amtrak's calculated effort to make a complete
end-run around the due process protections that unmistakably
govern APO [Office of Internal Affairs ("OIA")] investigations and
to instead rely solely upon the poisoned fruits of Amtrak OIG
3 The Court also notes that the FOP cites a dissent for the core
of its argument. Def.'s Mot. at 8 ("This fundamental truth mirrors
Circuit Judge Murnaghan's dissent in [NRC], 25 F.3d [at 236-37]").
The NRC majority, which our Court of Appeals favorably cites in
OHS, held that Inspector General independence does, indeed, take
precedence over collective-bargaining rights. See NRC, 25 F.3d at
234-35; DHs·, 751 F.3d at 668.
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investigations in meting out discipline to its employees." Def.'s
Mot. at 9. The FOP fears that the Court's decision will lead to "a
systemic practice of outsourcing all future APD OIA investigations
to Amtrak's inspector general -- or, at the very least, those
select investigations for which Amtrak has a vested, tactical
interest in shirking its contractual obligation to afford due-
process protections prior to their commencement." Id. at 9-10.
"Such a role[,]" the FOP concludes, "is not what either Congress
or President Carter envisioned for OIGs nationwide when those two
co-equal branches of government enacted the Inspector General Act
in 1978." Id. at 10.
The FOP's final argument is that it is a violation of the IG
Act itself for Amtrak to use the findings from an OIG investigation
("poisoned fruit") to "met[e] out discipline to its employees[.]"
Def.'s Mot. at 9. This is a new argument which the FOP failed to
raise in its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The FOP points to
language from its initial briefs indicating its fear that Amtrak
would outsource internal investigations to its OIG. See Def.' s
Reply at 41. However, there is no hint in its initial briefs that
such a course of action would violate the IG Act. Since Defendant
could have raised this argument in its Cross-Motion and failed to
do so, the argument shall not be considered at this late date. GSS
Grp. Ltd, 680 F.3d at 812.
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Finally, to the extent that the FOP is simply voicing its
policy concerns about the practical effects of the IG Act on agency
operations, it must direct those concerns to Congress. This Court
cannot provide the remedy that the FOP seeks.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the FOP's Motion for
Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 32] shall be denied.
December 3...1;2_, 2015 Glady~ler
United States District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
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