United States v. Reed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Criminal No. 15-188 (APM)
)
JAMES MARVIN REED, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant James Marvin Reed is charged in a two-count indictment that alleges he engaged
in illicit sexual conduct with two different minors while in a foreign country. In Count One,
Defendant is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), between January and December 2007,
by traveling to the Philippines and exchanging money for sex with a minor child. In Count Two,
Defendant is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(c) and 2423(e), between January and
August 2016, by residing in the Philippines and molesting and attempting to molest his own minor
child.
Defendant moves the court to dismiss the indictment against him as unconstitutional for
several reasons. First, he claims that prosecuting him for a crime purportedly committed more
than eight years prior to when he was formally charged constitutes impermissible pre-indictment
delay. Second, he argues that the law under which he is charged in Count Two was enacted after
part of his alleged conduct took place, making it retroactive legislation that violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Third, Defendant submits that Congress did not have constitutional authority to
enact 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). Fourth, he moves to sever the Counts and proceed with separate trials
if both Counts in the indictment are to stand. Lastly, Defendant asserts that the indictment must
be dismissed because the District of Columbia is the wrong venue in which to try him.
After thorough review of the parties’ submissions and applicable law, the court will allow
trial to proceed on Count One of the indictment, but not on Count Two. As to Count One, the
court concludes that Congress has authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause to criminalize
the conduct alleged therein, and Defendant’s Due Process Clause rights were not violated by the
Government obtaining an indictment years after the events in question. As to Count Two, the
court concludes that the charges do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, but will dismiss Count
Two because Section 2423(c) is unconstitutional as applied to the conduct alleged. Congress does
not possess authority under either the Foreign Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper
Clause to criminalize Defendant’s alleged act of sexually molesting and attempting to sexually
molest his four-year-old daughter while residing in the Philippines. In light of that conclusion, the
court denies Defendant’s Motion to Sever as moot. The court also rejects, at this juncture,
Defendant’s challenge to venue in the District of Columbia.
I. BACKGROUND
When ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment, the district court assumes the truth of
the factual allegations in the indictment and the Government’s proffered facts. United States v.
Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Accordingly, in order to resolve the motions to
dismiss presently before the court, the court accepts as true the following facts.
Defendant James Marvin Reed, a citizen of the United States, is a United States Navy
veteran who has resided abroad for several years, with occasional trips to the United States. See
Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment, ECF No. 25 [hereinafter Gov’t’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 25], at 2 & n.2, 5; Status Conf. Tr. (draft), May 5, 2017, at 9. In particular, Defendant
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traveled to the Philippines from the United States in January 2007 and remained there until at least
2008. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 25, at 5. On December 15, 2015, a grand jury indicted
Defendant on one count of traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in illicit sexual conduct
with a minor child (Minor A), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2007). See Indictment,
ECF No. 1; Arrest Warrant, ECF No. 9. The grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment on
May 4, 2017. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 26. The new indictment repeats the original
charge (Count One) and adds a second count against Defendant for residing in a foreign country
and engaging and attempting to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a different minor victim
(Minor B), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), (e) (2016) (Count Two). See Superseding
Indictment, ECF No. 26.1
The original Indictment arose from a years-long investigation both in the Philippines and
the United States. According to the Government, the department of Homeland Security
Investigations (“HSI”) in Manila, Philippines (“HSI Manila”) first received information about the
events giving rise to original Indictment in November 2008. See Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss Indictment Due to Pre-Indictment Delay, ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF
No. 24], at 1. HSI Manila began a covert operation to locate Defendant a few weeks later, but
those efforts proved unsuccessful and investigative efforts waned when the original case agent
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Although Count One and Count Two both charge Defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), the language in
each count differs in light of the version of the statute in effect at the time of the conduct charged. In 2007, Section
2423(c) prohibited “[a]ny United States citizen . . . who travels in foreign commerce . . . [from] engag[ing] in any
illicit sexual conduct with another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2007). In 2013, Congress amended Section 2423(c)
to include, as an alternative element to “travel[ing] in foreign commerce,” the element of “resid[ing] . . . in a foreign
country.” See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1211, 127 Stat. 54, 142
(2013) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423). Thus, since 2013, Section 2423(c) has made it unlawful for “[a]ny
United States citizen . . . who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either temporarily or permanently, in a foreign
country” to “engage[] in any illicit sexual conduct with another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). Because Count One
concerns conduct that occurred before 2013, it charges Defendant under the prior version of Section 2423(c). Count
Two, by contrast, charges Defendant under the current version of Section 2323(c) for conduct that allegedly occurred
in 2016.
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retired between 2010 and 2012. See id. at 2. In November 2012, after learning the case remained
open, HSI agents in Manila and Washington, D.C., re-interviewed Minor A and began actively
pursuing Defendant again. Id. Initial efforts to obtain Defendant’s DNA from the United States
military and when he passed through airport security in San Francisco, California, in December
2012, proved unsuccessful. Id. 2 In the early months of 2013, the Government subpoenaed Camber
Corporation—believed to be Defendant’s former employer—as well as Citibank and Delta
Airlines to provide materials to a grand jury. Id. at 3. In late 2013, investigators successfully
obtained DNA samples from Minor A and her child. Id. In April 2014, the Government requested
statistical records of live births in the Philippines from the Government of the Philippines, which
produced those records in September 2015. Id. Also in 2014, HSI pursued a lead in Guam,
believing Defendant might be living there, and made a summons request to Facebook in a further
attempt to locate Defendant. Id. Investigators were only able to determine Defendant’s general
location in 2015, after they identified the internet protocol address affiliated with his e-mail
account, which placed him in the Philippines. Id. Defendant was taken into custody in the
Philippines in August 2016, at which point he provided HSI Manila agents with a DNA sample
and his address in Butuan, Philippines. Id. at 4. He was deported to the United States in September
2016. Id.
The Government asserts that the evidence pertaining to Count One will show that
Defendant traveled from the United States to the Philippines and subsequently engaged in a
commercial, sexual relationship with Minor A. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 25, at 5–6. According
to the Government, on January 17, 2007, Defendant boarded a flight in Hartford, Connecticut, to
2
Investigators mistakenly believed Defendant was a retired member of the United States Army, rather than the United
States Navy, thus making their request for a DNA sample from the Army unproductive. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No.
24, at 2 & n.2.
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Minneapolis, Minnesota; traveled onward to Narita, Japan; and reached his final destination—
Manila, Philippines—on January 18, 2007. Id. at 5. In September 2007, while in the Philippines,
a mutual acquaintance introduced Defendant to Minor A and told Defendant that Minor A was 15
years old (though, in reality, she was 14 years old). Id. Defendant gave Minor A his business card
and, a few days later, invited her to his residence at the Castle Peak Tower condominium complex,
in Cebu City, Philippines. Id. Minor A visited Defendant at his home approximately ten times
between September and December 2007 and engaged in sexual intercourse with Defendant during
each visit. Id. at 5–6. The first time Minor A visited Defendant at his residence, Defendant gave
her a glass of wine, took nude photographs of her, engaged in sexual intercourse with her, and
offered her 2,000 pesos and to pay for her school expenses. Id. at 6. On each visit that followed,
Defendant paid Minor A 1,000 pesos. Id. Minor A gave birth to a child the following year, when
she was 15 years old. Id. According to DNA testing, there is a 99.9999% probability that
Defendant is the father of Minor A’s child. Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 24, at 4.
With respect to Count Two, the Government submits that its evidence will show Defendant
resided in the Philippines in 2016 and sexually assaulted his four-year-old daughter, Minor B.
See Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No. 37, at 2; Status Conf. Tr. (draft), May 5, 2017, at 4 (explaining that
Defendant is biologically related to Minor B); Hr’g Tr. (draft), June 15, 2017, at 20. 3 The
Government proffers that from January to August 2016, Minor B was in Defendant’s care, control,
and custody in the Philippines and, during those periods of custody, Defendant contacted and
attempted to contact his penis with Minor B’s vulva, as well as digitally penetrated Minor B’s
vaginal opening. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Sever, ECF No. 36 [hereinafter Gov’t’s Opp’n,
3
The Government has represented that there is no biological relationship between Minor A and Minor B. See Status
Conf. Tr. (draft), May 5, 2017, at 8.
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ECF No. 36], at 3; Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No. 37, at 2. Minor B eventually disclosed Defendant’s
conduct to her mother and grandmother. Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 36, at 3.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant has moved to dismiss the Superseding Indictment on the grounds that
(1) Count One violates his rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the
Government waited more than eight years to prosecute him; (2) Count Two violates his rights
under the Ex Post Facto Clause because it retroactively criminalizes his lawful residency in the
Philippines; and (3) both Counts allege violations of a statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c),
that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Indictment Due
to Pre-Indictment Delay, ECF No. 18 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18]; Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. 19 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 19]. With
respect to the last argument, Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statute both on its
face and as applied to the allegations against him. Hr’g Tr. (draft), June 15, 2017, at 4. He asserts
that Congress can rely upon neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause to
create the criminal offenses with which he is charged. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 19, at
6–11; Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Indictment & Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Superseding
Indictment, ECF No. 29 [hereinafter Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29], at 7–16. In the event the court
finds both Counts rest on constitutional applications of Section 2423(c), Defendant moves to sever
the charges and proceed in two separate trials. See Def.’s Mot. to Sever, ECF No. 34. Finally,
Defendant urges the court to dismiss the Superseding Indictment in its entirety because venue is
not proper in the District of Columbia.
The court addresses each argument in turn.
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A. Pre-Indictment Delay
Defendant first moves to dismiss Count One of the Superseding Indictment on the ground
that the United States violated his due process rights by waiting until December 2015 to file
charges against him for conduct that allegedly occurred in 2007. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 18.
The statutory period of limitations and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution guard
against the imposition of stale charges against a criminal defendant. United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 789 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1971). While a defendant’s
primary protection against a delayed prosecution is the limitations period, a defendant can show
that a pre-indictment delay that does not violate the statute of limitations nonetheless violates his
rights under the Due Process Clause by demonstrating that the delay (1) substantially prejudiced
his right to a fair trial and (2) was used to gain tactical advantage over him. Marion, 404 U.S. at
324; accord United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1111–12 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see United
States v. Kilroy, 769 F. Supp. 6, 7 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining that the defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating both elements), aff’d on other ground, 27 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A
prosecutor’s decision to delay indictment in order to investigate further does not offend the
Constitution. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 796. Instead, the defendant must demonstrate that delay
was a “deliberate prosecution tactic.” Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1112.
Defendant contends that the eight-year period between the conduct alleged in Count One
and the charges brought against him has prejudiced his ability to defend himself in this case
because a substantial number of witnesses are now unavailable, and those that are available have
faded memories. Specifically, Defendant notes that two restaurants in which he and Minor A
purportedly were seen together have now closed and, as a result, their former employees and
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patrons are unavailable to aid in his defense. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18, at 3. Similarly,
in light of the substantial gap in time between the alleged conduct and return of the original
Indictment, the employees and residents of the Castle Peak Tower condominium complex are no
longer available to be interviewed. Id. Additionally, Defendant states that discovery revealed that
his driver has “first hand knowledge of the alleged conduct,” but Defendant cannot locate the
driver for an interview in light of the passage of time. Id. at 3–4. Lastly, Defendant notes that the
few witnesses he has been able to locate and contact can only provide diminished assistance
because the lapse in time since the alleged events has affected their memories. Id. at 4.
Collectively, Defendant concludes, the pre-indictment delay fatally undermines his ability to put
on an effective defense.
Defendant has failed to establish both the substantial prejudice and government
misconduct necessary to prove that pre-indictment delay violated his due process rights.
Although Defendant points to some prejudice resulting from the delay between the events alleged
and return of the original Indictment, that prejudice falls short of constituting “substantial
prejudice.” See Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. Defendant makes generalized statements about prejudice
stemming from witnesses’ loss of memory over time and only speculates that unavailable
witnesses would be able to contribute to his defense, rather than make a specific claim that any
one witness could offer exculpatory evidence. See United States v. Brodie, 326 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88
(D.D.C. 2004); Kilroy, 769 F. Supp. at 8. Additionally, Defendant has made no effort to
demonstrate that the Government intentionally delayed seeking an indictment in order to gain a
tactical advantage in his prosecution. On the record presented, the court sees no evidence of
strategic intent on the part of the Government. The Government represents that it first learned of
the conduct giving rise to the charge in Count One a year after it allegedly occurred and that there
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was insufficient or incomplete evidence at that time to pursue criminal charges. See Gov’t’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 24, at 1–2 (explaining inability to locate Defendant). Although the Government
could have been more diligent in pursuing the case despite changes in personnel, cf. id. at 3, that
delay does not evidence bad faith. Indeed, the fact that the Government did not believe it had
enough evidence to indict Defendant in 2008, or even 2014, and needed to investigate further
reflects appropriate prosecutorial restraint, not an effort to take tactical advantage of Defendant.
Accordingly, the court concludes Defendant did not suffer a violation of his rights under
the Due Process Clause due to pre-indictment delay.
B. Ex Post Facto Clause
Defendant next moves to dismiss Count Two of the Superseding Indictment on the ground
that Section 2423(c), as applied to the conduct alleged in that Count, violates his constitutional
right to be free from retroactive legislation. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, at 18–19. Count Two
alleges: “Between on or about January 3, 2016, and on or about August 2, 2016, [Defendant] . . .
did reside, temporarily and permanently, in the Philippines, a foreign country, and engage and
attempt to engage in illicit sexual conduct . . . with another person under 18 years of age (MINOR
B).” Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 26, at 2. Defendant submits that he has “resided” in the
Philippines since long before 2013, when Congress amended Section 2423(c) to include, as an
alternative element to “travel[] in foreign commerce,” the act of “resid[ing], either temporarily or
permanently, in a foreign country.” See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, at 19; see also Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1211, 127 Stat. 54, 142 (2013)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423); supra, at note 1. Consequently, Defendant concludes,
to file charges against him in 2016 for a crime that depends on lawful conduct occurring prior to
2013—his residency in the Philippines—violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Def.’s Reply, ECF
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No. 29, at 19.
The Constitution prohibits Congress from passing any “ex post facto Law,” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3, which means, in part, that Congress may not punish an individual for committing
an act that, at the time, was lawful to commit, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798); Al
Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). The court assesses whether
a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by determining if the statute “attach[es] new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Bartko v. SEC, 845 F.3d 1217, 1223
(D.C. Cir. 2017). “New legal consequences” include (1) “impair[ment] [of] rights a party
possessed when he acted”; (2) “increase[] [of] a party’s liability for past conduct”; (3)
“impos[ition] [of] new duties with respect to transactions already completed”; or (4) “material
adjustments to the extent of a party’s liability.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
“[a] statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.”
Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922); accord United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594 (7th
Cir. 2001) (applying Cox, 260 U.S. 427, to the Ex Post Facto Clause).
Section 2423(c) does not qualify as an ex post facto law, as applied in Count Two, because
the crime alleged did not occur until January 2016, after Congress amended the statute. The
charges in Count Two require the Government to prove two elements: (1) residency in a foreign
country; and (2) engaging or attempting to engage in noncommercial sexual conduct with a minor.
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), (e), (f)(1). Both elements occurred simultaneously in January 2016 when
Defendant (1) was residing in the Philippines and (2) allegedly engaged or attempted to engage in
a sexual act with his minor daughter. It follows, then, that the law does not criminalize Defendant’s
act of residing in the Philippines prior to the alleged molestation in 2016. Rather, it criminalizes
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the act of molesting a child while residing in the Philippines. Defendant’s residence in the
Philippines in 2013 is irrelevant to Count Two and, thus, poses no ex post facto concern.
Therefore, the court rejects Defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Count Two
based on the Ex Post Facto Clause.
C. Constitutionality of Counts One and Two
The heart of Defendant’s Motion is that both Counts of the Superseding Indictment are
unconstitutional because Congress did not have power to pass the statutory provision upon which
they rest: Section 2423(c). Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant in a criminal matter may challenge his or her indictment as unconstitutional at any point
prior to trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). In making such a challenge, the defendant may seek
to invalidate the indictment as unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the conduct alleged. For
the court to hold that a statute is facially unconstitutional, the defendant bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). In contrast, to succeed on an as-applied
challenge, the defendant need only show that the statute is “an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power” as applied to the conduct set forth in the indictment. United States v.
Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Here, Defendant brings both facial and as-applied
challenges to each Count in the Superseding Indictment.
To justify a piece of legislation, the Government must be able to point to an enumerated
power in the Constitution that authorized Congress to enact it. It is beyond doubt that, “lacking a
police power, ‘Congress cannot punish felonies generally.’ A criminal act committed wholly
within a State ‘cannot be made an offence against the United States, unless it [has] some relation
to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United
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States.’” United States v. Bond, 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (quoting Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 428 (1821); United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1878)).
Here, the question is not whether Congress has the authority to criminalize conduct occurring
wholly within one of the United States, but, relatedly, whether acts occurring wholly within a
foreign country can be made “an offence against the United States” pursuant to one of Congress’
enumerated powers.
The Government asserts that Section 2423(c) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’
authority to regulate international commercial activities under the Foreign Commerce Clause and
its power to enact legislation that implements a non-self-executing treaty under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. First, the Government explains that Section 2423(c), defined to reach either
commercial or noncommercial sex acts with children, is a constitutional exercise of Congress’
Foreign Commerce Clause power because it regulates conduct linked to a broad, international
market in child trafficking and sex tourism. Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No. 37, at 10–11. As a general
matter, the Government submits that Congress possesses broader authority to regulate its citizens’
conduct abroad than their activities at home. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 25, at 10. To the extent
the Interstate Commerce Clause’s familiar framework provides a helpful analytical tool, the
Government contends that it represents a floor, rather than a ceiling, on Congress’ power under
the Foreign Commerce Clause. See id. at 11. The Government believes Section 2423(c) to be a
constitutional exercise of Congress’ power on the ground that Congress had a rational basis to
conclude having sex with minors, irrespective of whether money is exchanged, is part of a class of
activities that has a substantial effect on the trafficking of children and sex tourism—commercial
markets in which Americans participate—and failing to regulate that conduct would leave a large
“gap” in Congress’ overarching regulatory scheme. See id. at 15–16; Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No.
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37, at 10–11. Second, and separately, the Government submits that the court may uphold Section
2423(c) as a proper exercise of Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass
legislation that implements a non-self-executing treaty to which the United States is a party: the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography (“the Optional Protocol”), adopted May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S.
No. 13,095, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227 [hereinafter OPTIONAL PROTOCOL]. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No.
25, at 20; Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No. 37, at 12–13; see also S. TREATY DOC. 106-37 (2000).
Whether defined to reach commercial or noncommercial sexual abuse of children, the Government
contends, Section 2423(c) is rationally related to the Optional Protocol’s broad interest in
eliminating sexual harm of children and, therefore, should be upheld as constitutional
implementing legislation. Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No. 37, at 12–13.
Defendant challenges Section 2423(c) as unsupported by either power of Congress. First,
Defendant submits that, to the extent Congress possesses broader authority to regulate its citizens’
conduct under the Foreign Commerce Clause than under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the
Foreign Commerce Clause is not an absolute, world-wide police power. See Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 19, at 4. Consequently, Defendant views the Interstate Commerce Clause’s
outer bounds as representative of the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Analyzing Section
2423(c) under the Interstate Commerce Clause framework, Defendant asserts that Section
2423(c)’s commercial application—at issue in Count One—cannot survive because it touches
neither a channel nor instrumentality of commerce, and “local, intra-national activity unconnected
to travel in foreign commerce” is beyond Congress’ power to regulate. Id. at 8, 10–11. Further,
even if Congress can reach local foreign activity that substantially affects foreign commerce,
Congress’ authority cannot be construed so broadly as to allow it to “create comprehensive global
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regulatory schemes among the nations of the world.” Id. With respect to Section 2423(c)’s
noncommercial application—at issue in Count Two—Defendant asserts that Congress may not
regulate noncommercial conduct based on the effect it might, through a series of inferences, have
on foreign commerce. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, at 8–9. And, Defendant claims, Section
2423(c)’s noncommercial application does not fill a gap in a broader regulatory scheme designed
to stop child sex trafficking because the only conduct that provision regulates is a local crime that
is inherently noneconomic in nature. See id. at 10–11. Second, as to the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Defendant pushes back against the Government’s theory that Section 2423(c) implements
the Optional Protocol on the grounds that the statute is not implementing legislation, it proscribes
conduct not mentioned in the treaty, and it is unrelated to the treaty’s objective of preventing child
trafficking and sex tourism. See id. at 12–16.
Defendant’s challenge to Section 2423(c) implicates complicated questions of
constitutional law. The court begins with his claim that Congress lacks authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause to pass Section 2423(c), as applied in Count One and Count Two. That inquiry
first requires the court to determine the framework that governs such an analysis before it can
assess whether Section 2423(c)’s commercial and noncommercial applications are constitutional,
as applied to the conduct alleged in each Count. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes
Congress can rely on the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact Section 2423(c)’s commercial
application, as relevant to Count One, but not Section 2423(c)’s noncommercial application, as
relevant to Count Two. Accordingly, the court then turns to whether Section 2423(c)’s
noncommercial application may be considered a constitutional exercise of Congress’ authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement the Optional Protocol.
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1. Foreign Commerce Clause
Article I of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Congress’ Commerce Power has developed
through reference to the three sub-clauses within the Clause—the Foreign Commerce Clause, the
Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause—such that each occupies a distinct
jurisprudential space in case law. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831)
(noting that “[t]he objects, to which the power of regulating commerce might be directed, are
divided into three distinct classes . . . . [and] [w]hen forming this article, the convention considered
them as entirely distinct”); accord Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191–92
(1989) (explaining that the Tribes and States cannot be treated interchangeably for purposes of
determining Congress’ regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause because each triggers
different structural considerations within our constitutional system); United States v. Pendleton,
658 F.3d 299, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2011) (surveying the evolution of the Commerce Power over time);
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1110–13 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). The scope of Congress’
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause—“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”—is
at issue here.
a. The Applicable Framework
Although a significant amount of ink has been spilled defining the contours of the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has yet to affirmatively state the scope of Congress’
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. There are a few guideposts. The Court has noted
that the Foreign Commerce Clause grants Congress at least the same authority as it possesses under
the Indian Commerce Clause, Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492–93 (1904), which provides
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Congress with “plenary and exclusive” power to regulate all things pertaining to the Native
American tribes, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). Additionally, the Court has
suggested that the federalism and State sovereignty concerns that it confronts when it regulates
interstate commerce do not constrain Congress in the same way when it acts to regulate
international commercial activity. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
448 n.13 (1979). Supreme Court dicta also indicates that, in the absence of those constraints, the
Foreign Commerce Clause defines a power that “may be” broader than that granted under the
Interstate Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Atl. Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S.
427, 434 (1932); Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 521 (1923); United States
v. Knowles, 197 F. Supp. 3d 143, 154 (D.D.C. 2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court “has
indicated that the foreign commerce power is at least as broad as the power to regulate interstate
commerce”). Lastly, the Court has developed an analytical framework for evaluating the negative
implications of Congress’ Foreign Commerce Clause power on a State’s ability to tax
instrumentalities of foreign commerce. In that context, the Court has grafted two additional
“foreign commerce clause factors” onto the domestic framework for evaluating the validity of state
taxes affecting interstate commerce: (1) “whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates
a substantial risk of international multiple taxation”; and (2) “whether the tax prevents the Federal
Government from speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments.” Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 451; accord Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston,
507 U.S. 60, 72 (1993).
The Foreign Commerce Clause must, like its counterparts, be subject to some limiting
principles. As one federal appellate court has noted, “an unbounded reading of the Foreign
Commerce Clause allows the Federal Government to intrude on the sovereignty of other
16
nations . . . . [and] on the liberty of individual citizens.” See United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d
784, 793 (6th Cir. 2015). Moreover, it is a bold proposition to suggest the same word in the same
Clause in our Constitution—“Commerce”—grants Congress unfettered authority to criminalize
Americans’ activities abroad that it restricts Congress from criminalizing at home. Some limits
must exist.
Given the ambiguous contours of this constitutional power and the dearth of precedent in
this jurisdiction, this court will look—as others have done—to the well-known Interstate
Commerce Clause framework to analyze whether Section 2423(c) is a constitutional exercise of
Congress’ Commerce Power. See, e.g., Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 308; United States v. Bredimus,
352 F.3d 200, 204–05 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159–60
(D.D.C. 2012); United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 806 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
The court resorts to this existing analytical tool, even if imperfect, for three reasons. First,
those cases in which the Supreme Court has intimated the Foreign Commerce Clause confers on
Congress broader power than the Interstate Commerce Clause pertain to the scope of the dormant
federal power to displace state taxes on instrumentalities of foreign commerce that interfere with
the Nation’s ability “to speak with one voice,” see, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.
of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. 434, and, therefore, do not speak to the
scope of Congress’ affirmative authority to enact legislation regulating foreign commerce. If we
are to infer that these cases stand for a principle beyond their specific fact patterns, then it is that
Congress’ power to preempt state law in the realm of international commerce is broader than its
power to do so domestically. Such a principle makes intuitive sense, given the Court’s emphasis
on the need for the United States “to speak with one voice” when interfacing with foreign
countries. This court declines to stretch those cases beyond their shape to suggest they stand for
17
the related, yet significantly broader, proposition that Congress has greater constitutional authority
to regulate its citizens’ activities abroad than at home.
Second, this court is not certain that the Foreign Commerce Clause actually confers on
Congress broader authority to regulate its citizens’ activities abroad than the Interstate Commerce
Clause allows it to regulate at home. In the absence of binding precedent, this court could look
solely to the text of the Commerce Power for guidance, and that text suggests a limited grant of
power: Congress can regulate commerce “with foreign Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. At
least one Supreme Court Justice agrees that, for purposes of interpreting the scope of Congress’
Commerce Power, the word following “with” outlines the limits of the grant of constitutional
authority. Parsing the scope of Congress’ authority to act pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause,
Justice Thomas has explained:
Congress is given the power to regulate Commerce “with the Indian
tribes.” The Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate
commerce with all Indian persons any more than the Foreign
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce
with all foreign nationals traveling within the United States. A
straightforward reading of the text, thus, confirms that Congress
may only regulate commercial interactions—“commerce”—taking
place with established Indian communities—“tribes.”
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas thus reads the Indian Commerce Clause to grant Congress authority
only to regulate commerce between the United States and the Indian tribes, rather than between
the United States and the individual members of the Indian tribes. And, the mirror structures of
the Indian Commerce Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause encourage complementary
interpretations. The Foreign Commerce Clause grants Congress authority to regulate the
commercial interactions between the United States and another sovereign nation, rather than the
power to reach into another sovereign country’s territory and regulate the activities of American
18
citizens therein. Baston v. United States, 580 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 850, 853 (2017) (Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see Clark, 435 F.3d at 1117 (Ferguson, J., dissenting); cf.
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 970–83 (2010). Even
if the Clause can be read to allow Congress to reach the extraterritorial acts of American citizens
that occur wholly within a foreign country, Congress’ authority has to be limited by consideration
of the foreign Nation’s sovereignty, in the same way that considerations of State sovereignty must
be balanced against exercises of federal power under the Interstate Commerce Clause. Given the
fact that a foreign Nation’s sovereignty is at least as broad as that of a State in the United States,
this court is uncertain whether the affirmative power Congress wields under the Foreign
Commerce Clause is necessarily broader than its power under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Third, this court declines, in the present setting, to modify the Interstate Commerce
Framework for purposes of an analysis under the Foreign Commerce Clause absent any guidance
from the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit. The fact that the Supreme Court has indicated
Congress’ power under the Foreign Commerce Clause “may be” broader than its power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause is not enough for this court to concretely define the outer bounds of
an enumerated power. Cf. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 308 (declining to decide whether the Foreign
Commerce Clause conveys constitutional authority that is broader than the Interstate Commerce
Clause absent guidance from the Supreme Court). Admittedly, at least two other federal appellate
courts have modified the Interstate Commerce Clause framework to address Foreign Commerce
Clause issues. See United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 215–16 (4th Cir. 2015) (modifying
the Interstate Commerce Clause framework for use in the Foreign Commerce Clause context by
loosening the requirement that intrastate activity have a “substantial effect” on commerce to
require that it only have a “demonstrabl[e] effect” on commerce); Clark, 435 F.2d at 1113–14
19
(asking only whether the regulated activity “implicates foreign commerce to a constitutionally
adequate degree”). This court elects not to follow those cases here. Moreover, for the reasons that
follow, the court would reach the same holding today even if it were to apply those courts’
modified frameworks.
Thus, the court tackles the constitutional question at hand by applying the well-defined
Interstate Commerce Clause framework. Congress acts pursuant to its Interstate Commerce Power
when it seeks to regulate activity that falls within one of the following categories: the channels of
commerce; the instrumentalities of commerce; or local activity that, in the aggregate, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
A piece of legislation that regulates the “channels” of commerce either facilitates or inhibits the
movement of goods or people through interstate commerce. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1964); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Congress regulates the “instrumentalities” of commerce when it
passes legislation that directs or inhibits the vehicles of economic activity—e.g., airplanes,
steamships, automobiles, trains—or interstate means of communication—e.g., mail and wires.
E.g., Hous. E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353–54 (1914); Ickes v. FAA, 299
F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Lastly, Congress acts within the bounds of its
constitutional authority when it regulates local activity that either is part of an economic “class of
activities” Congress had a rational basis to believe has a substantial effect on interstate commerce
or which it is necessary to regulate to avoid undercutting Congress’ overarching regulation of
economic activity. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–18, 22 (2005); Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 887–
90. To determine whether an activity has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce, the court
considers the “four Lopez factors”: (1) whether the activity itself “has anything to do with
20
commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms”; (2)
“whether the statute in question contains an express jurisdictional element”; (3) “whether there are
express congressional findings or legislative history regarding the effects upon interstate
commerce of the regulated activity”; and (4) “whether the relationship between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce is too attenuated to be regarded as substantial.” Rancho Viejo,
LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 181–83 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam).
b. Constitutionality of Count One under the Foreign Commerce Clause
Although the Government charged Defendant with two counts of violating
18 U.S.C. § 2423, that statute has been amended in the last decade and different versions apply to
each Count. The version of Section 2423(c) that applies to the conduct alleged in Count One
makes it criminal for “[a]ny United States citizen” to “travel[] in foreign commerce[] and engage[]
in any illicit sexual conduct with another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2007).4 “Illicit sexual
conduct” is defined in two ways: (1) “a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under
18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” 5; or (2) “any commercial sex act (as
4
Under that statutory provision, the Government is not required to prove that Defendant traveled in foreign commerce
with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. Indeed, Section 2423(c) was enacted specifically to eliminate the
mens rea requirement contained in subsection (b) because Congress thought it had become too difficult to prove that
an individual traveled with a particular motive. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 51–52 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
5
Section 2246, in turn, defines a “sexual act” as follows:
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes
of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however
slight;
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth
and the anus;
21
defined in Section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.” 6 Id. § 2423(f) (2007). For ease of
reference, the court refers to the first definition as “noncommercial sex acts” and the second as
“commercial sex acts.” The Government did not specify in the indictment which definition applies
to Count One. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 26, at 1. However, the conduct alleged in
that count reasonably implicates commercial sex acts, as the Government proffers that the evidence
will prove Defendant paid Minor A each time they engaged in sexual intercourse at his apartment. 7
Accordingly, the court must determine whether Congress has authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause to criminalize Defendant’s alleged act of traveling to the Philippines and paying
Minor A, then 14 years old, to have sex with him on ten separate occasions at his residence at the
Castle Peak Tower condominium complex.
Several courts have held that Section 2423(c), coupled with the commercial definition of
“illicit sexual conduct” found in subsection (f)(2), is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power
under the Foreign Commerce Clause. In fact, as far as this court can tell, every court to consider
the issue has found the commercial application of the statutory provision to be within Congress’
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand
or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another
person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person[.]
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). This statutory section was not amended during the time period relevant to this case.
6
Section 1591, in turn, defines a “commercial sex act” as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is
given to or received by any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3). Although that statutory section has been amended
during the time period relevant to this case, the definition of “commercial sex act” has not changed.
7
Although the Government also indicates its evidence will prove Defendant took nude photographs of Minor A on
her first visit to his residence, see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 25, at 5–6, the Government concedes that that conduct
does not violate the version of Section 2423(c) in effect at the time it allegedly occurred. Section 2423 was not
amended to include “production of child pornography” as a definition of “illicit sexual conduct” until May 2015. See
Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 111(a), 129 Stat. 227, 240 (2015) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423).
22
authority to enact, although those courts offer different justifications for their holdings. A panel
of judges on the Ninth and Third Circuits adopted a new standard under which they held Section
2423(c)’s commercial application to be constitutional. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1109–17
(developing a Foreign Commerce Clause test that inquires whether the statute at issue “implicates
foreign commerce to a constitutionally adequate degree” and holding that the commercial
application of Section 2423(c) is constitutional under that test); United States v. Bianchi, 386
F. App’x 156, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2010) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s Foreign Commerce Clause
framework and holding the commercial application of Section 2423(c) to be constitutional).
Moreover, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held Section 2423(c)’s
commercial application to be a proper regulation of the “channels” of foreign commerce. See
United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
In contrast to those courts, this court concludes that Section 2423(c), as applied to the
conduct alleged in Count One, is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Power because
Congress had a rational basis to believe that Defendant’s act of traveling to the Philippines and
paying Minor A for sex substantially affects the international market in child trafficking and sex
tourism, when such acts are considered in the aggregate. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2007); Raich,
545 U.S. at 22; Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 25, at 10–19.
Section 2423(c), as applied to the conduct alleged in Count One, easily satisfies the first
three Lopez factors. There can be no doubt that Section 2423(c), when coupled with the
“commercial sex acts” definition contained in subsection (f)(2), regulates an economic activity.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “‘[e]conomics’ refers to the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
connection with passing the legislation subsequently codified at Section 2423(c), Congress made
23
factual findings that there exists a global marketplace for sexual exploitation of children, in which
children are trafficked across borders for the purpose of prostitution, pornography production, and
other forms of sexual abuse, and in which Americans are participating as customers. See H.R.
REP. NO. 108-66, at 51–52 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2–3 (2002); see also
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 807–08. In that marketplace, the act of engaging in sexual intercourse
with a child is the “commodity” for sale. In its simplest terms, Section 2423(c) prohibits the
exchange of a thing of value for a particular commodity—a quintessential regulation of economic
activity. Additionally, Section 2423(c) contains an express jurisdictional element. Congress seeks
to regulate, in relevant part, its citizens’ activities of engaging in commercial sex acts with minors
in a foreign country and explicitly links that conduct to international commerce by making
“travel[] in foreign commerce” an element of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2007). 8
As to the fourth Lopez factor, the conduct Section 2423(c)’s commercial application seeks
to regulate is not so attenuated from the international market in child trafficking and sex tourism
as to push it beyond Congress’ reach. The basic principles of supply and demand, when applied
to this conduct in the aggregate, make the court’s conclusion self-evident. See Raich, 545 U.S. at
17, 22. Demand affects price: if sufficient numbers of American customers enter the marketplace
for sex with children, their presence will effect an increase in price for illicit sexual activity with
children. Increased price, in turn, affects supply. The trafficking of children both within individual
8
Admittedly, this is a weak link to international commerce. Nearly all cases in which the latter element is proven—
committing the commercial sexual act in a foreign country with a minor—necessitates the former element, i.e.,
Americans who commit commercial sex acts with minors in a foreign country had to cross a border to get to that
country. Indeed, the only American citizens who could avoid prosecution would be those born to an American parent
in the country where they engaged in the commercial sexual act and who never left the country, such that they never
“travel[ed] in foreign commerce.” See also United States v. Jackson, 480 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that individual who traveled abroad prior to Section 2423(c)’s enactment and did not travel again could not be
prosecuted); cf. United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Jackson, 480 F.3d 1014, with
approval). Consequently, the limiting principle that the Supreme Court envisioned an “express jurisdictional element”
might have on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Power proves of limited effect in the present case. Cf. United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000) (quoting and discussing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
24
countries and across international borders is likely to increase as the financial return on sex with
children grows and remains lucrative; so, too, will the number of children who voluntarily enter
the market, particularly in poorer countries. Moreover, that the substantive conduct at issue here—
paying for sex with a child—occurred in a single, foreign locale does not place it beyond Congress’
power. The Supreme Court has held that Congress can criminalize wholly intrastate possession of
a commodity—for example, marijuana—because prohibiting intrastate possession of a commodity
for which there is an interstate market “is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating
commerce in that product.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 26. Section 2423(c), as defined to reach the conduct
alleged in Count One, regulates the consumption of a “commodity”—sex acts with children—for
which there is “an established . . . [international] market” by prohibiting individual acts of
participation in that market. See id. Congress has the same power to prohibit traveling and
engaging in commercial sex acts with children abroad as it does to prohibit intrastate possession
and consumption of marijuana in the United States. With respect to both, there is a market
Congress seeks to stamp out, and Congress may rely on its authority under the Commerce Power
to do so. In light of these basic economic principles and Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that
the conduct Section 2423(c)’s commercial application regulates is not so attenuated from the
marketplace in child trafficking and sex tourism that Congress cannot regulate it.
In sum, the Lopez factors reflect that there is a rational basis for Congress to believe that
traveling in foreign commerce and paying a minor child for sex, when considered in the aggregate,
substantially affects foreign commerce. The court holds that Section 2423(c), insofar as it
criminalizes Defendant’s purported acts of traveling to the Philippines and paying Minor A for sex
in 2007, is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 9
9
This ruling resolves one other argument raised by Defendant and obviates the need to consider multiple other
arguments raised by the Government. Defendant also challenges Section 2423(c)’s commercial sex act prohibition as
25
c. Constitutionality of Count Two under the Foreign Commerce
Clause
Count Two of the Superseding Indictment charges Defendant with violating both
subsections (c) and (e) of Section 2423, as defined in subsection (f)(1), by contacting and
attempting to contact his penis with his four-year-old daughter’s vulva, as well as digitally
penetrating his daughter’s vaginal opening, while he resided in the Philippines in 2016.
See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 26, at 2; Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No. 37, at 2. The
Government has proffered no facts connecting this alleged conduct to a commercial motive or
exchange of a thing of value, leaving the court to assume the only motive was perverse sexual
desire and gratification. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3). Accordingly, the court must determine
whether Congress has authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause to criminalize Defendant’s
act of engaging and attempting to engage in a noncommercial sexual act with his daughter while
residing in the Philippines.
The Government submits that Section 2423(c)’s prohibition on engaging in noncommercial
sex acts with a minor child is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause because noncommercial sex acts are part of a “class of activities” that Congress must be
facially invalid. However, because the court concludes that Section 2423(c) is constitutional as applied to the alleged
conduct in Count One, the court necessarily concludes that Section 2423(c)’s commercial sex act prohibition is facially
constitutional. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (explaining that a statute is only facially unconstitutional if there is no
circumstance in which it is constitutional). The Government argues that the court could find Section 2423(c) to be a
constitutional exercise of Congress’ power to regulate the “channels” of international commerce or its power to enact
a law that implements a non-self-executing treaty. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 25, at 20–24; Hr’g Tr. (draft), June
15, 2017, at 26. The court need not reach either argument, however, in light of its conclusion that Section 2423(c) is
a proper regulation of an economic activity that Congress had a rational basis to believe substantially affects an
international commercial market. Furthermore, because the court finds that Count One survives constitutional scrutiny
insofar as it charges Defendant with traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in commercial sex acts with
Minor A—and may go to the jury on that theory—the court need not consider whether Section 2423(c) also meets
constitutional muster insofar as it charges Defendant with traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in
noncommercial sex acts with Minor A. The court need only take up that issue should the jury not credit the
Government’s evidence that something of value was given or received in connection with Defendant having sex with
Minor A.
26
able to regulate in order to effectively stamp out American citizens’ participation in child
trafficking and sex tourism. 10 According to the Government, (1) child victims pursue prostitution
as a result of the emotional harm their noncommercial sexual abuse causes, and (2) perpetrators
use noncommercial sexual abuse to “groom” child victims to participate in subsequent acts of
sexual abuse for commercial gain. Hr’g Tr. (draft), June 15, 2017, at 21–23. Thus, the
Government believes noncommercial sexual abuse of children, in the aggregate, leads to an
increase in the number of participants—both child victims and adult customers—in the market for
child trafficking and sex tourism, thereby substantially affecting that market, and Congress’
inability to reach that noncommercial conduct would cripple Congress’ ability to stamp out the
market. See id. at 28. For support, the Government points to United States v. Martinez, in which
the District Court for the Western District of Texas concluded—in the context of Section 2423(c)’s
prohibition on traveling and engaging in acts of noncommercial sexual abuse of children—that
“leaving non-commercial sex with minors outside of federal control could affect the price for child
prostitution services and other market conditions in the child prostitution industry” and would
“leave a gaping hole in . . . [Congress’] ability to regulate the commercial industry of child
prostitution.” 599 F. Supp. 2d at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government urges
this court to adopt the same reasoning.
The court cannot reach that result as applied to the facts of this case. For the reasons that
10
At the hearing on this Motion, the Government suggested for the first time that Section 2423(c), as applied to
noncommercial sex acts, also could be upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’ ability to regulate the
“instrumentalities” of international commerce. See Hr’g Tr. (draft), June 15, 2017, at 26–27. The Government’s
theory is that those who reside in foreign countries are only able to do so based on either a passport or visa; those
passports and visas are “instrumentalities” of commerce; and, by restricting the activities of American citizens residing
in foreign countries, Section 2423(c) regulates those citizens’ visas and passports. Id. The Government confirmed at
the hearing that it did not raise this argument in its brief. Accordingly, the court does not consider it.
Separately, although other federal courts have concluded that Section 2423(c)’s prohibition on noncommercial sex
acts with minor children is a valid regulation of the “channels” of interstate commerce, see Pendleton, 658 F.3d at
311; Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 956, the Government does not make that argument here, see Hr’g Tr. (draft), June 15,
2017, at 26. The court likewise does not take up that argument.
27
follow, the court concludes that there is no rational basis to believe Defendant’s act of molesting
and attempting to molest his daughter is part of an economic “class of activities” that substantially
affects the international market for child trafficking and sex tourism. Additionally, the court
concludes that Section 2423(c), as applied to reach the conduct alleged in Count Two, is not an
“essential part” of Congress’ broader efforts to eliminate that market, such that it is necessary and
proper for Congress to regulate it.
None of the Lopez factors supports the conclusion that residing in a foreign country and
molesting one’s own child has a substantial effect on the international market for child trafficking
and sex tourism. As to the first Lopez factor, the activity Congress seeks to regulate here—
engaging in a “sexual act” with a child while residing in a foreign country—is not commercial in
nature. “Sexual act”—as defined in Section 2423(f)(1) by cross-reference to Section 2246—
involves the touching of certain parts of the defendant’s body against certain parts of the victim’s
body. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2246(2), 2423(f)(1). So defined, Section 2423(c) does not concern activity
that is economic in nature. Defendant’s purported act of molesting his daughter is “noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct.” See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11, 617 (2000); see
also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (explaining that a law that made it a federal offense “for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone” did not have anything “to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms”).
Second, there is no “express jurisdictional element” connecting Section 2423(c)—as
applied in this case—to foreign commerce. Defendant is charged with residing in the Philippines
and molesting a minor child; he is not charged with “travel[ing] in foreign commerce.” See 18
U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2016); Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 26, at 2. Residency in a foreign
28
country alone does not offer a jurisdictional element that allows the courts to “ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the [sexual abuse in question] affects [foreign] commerce.” See Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561.
With respect to the third Lopez factor, Congress made no factual findings showing that
noncommercial sexual violence committed by Americans residing abroad against children,
generally, or biologically related children, in particular, has a substantial effect on foreign
commerce. The legislative history of Section 2423(c) is devoid of any reference to the
noncommercial molestation of children by American citizens residing in foreign countries, let
alone references to such heinous behavior affecting international commerce. See Al-Maliki, 787
F.3d at 793 (discussing an absence of legislative findings linking noncommercial sexual abuse of
children to the marketplace for sexual abuse of children and noting that “Congress’ failure to even
try to show the aggregate effect of noncommercial sexual activity on foreign commerce highlights
its lack of power here”).
Fourth, the link the Government wishes to draw between the noncommercial act of
molesting one’s own child while residing in a foreign country and the international market in child
trafficking and sex tourism is too attenuated to rationally qualify as “substantial.” The Government
submits that noncommercial sexual abuse could lead victims of such abuse to become
“commodities” for sale in the local market for commercial sexual abuse, and if they participate in
that local market, then those same victims, in the aggregate, will affect the economics of the
international market for child trafficking and sex tourism; and so, the original, noncommercial
sexual abuse has a substantial effect on the international market in child trafficking and sex
tourism. That rationale, however, is speculative and relies on the kind of weak chain of causation
the Supreme Court has rejected. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–17 (holding that Congress could
29
not rely on its Commerce Power to regulate gender-motivated violence on the theory that such
violence deters interstate travel, suppresses interstate employment, reduces interstate transactions,
and decreases national productivity because Congress may not “regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce”); Lopez,
514 U.S. at 563–67 (holding that Congress could not regulate mere possession of guns in school
zones on the theory that possession of guns could lead to violent crime that, in turn, affects the
national economy because a court may not “pile inference upon inference” in order to sustain a
congressional action under the Commerce Clause); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 556–58 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (explaining that Congress could not use its Commerce
Clause power to require the purchase of health insurance on the theory that every person, at some
point, participates in the health care market because Congress cannot regulate economic activity
that does not yet exist). This court is not free to sidestep those precedents and hold that Section
2423(c) is constitutional as applied to Defendant’s alleged act of molesting his daughter while
residing in the Philippines because, in the aggregate, the victims of such abuse might, perhaps,
some day, become part of the marketplace Congress seeks to stamp out. 11
Moreover, the court cannot conclude that an American citizen’s act of sexually abusing his
own child, without any evidence of commercial motive, is “an essential part” of Congress’ broader
11
Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, Martinez is not an analogous or applicable case that helps this court
determine the constitutionality of Count Two. First, the facts of Martinez present a picture of insidious conduct
materially different from the one presently before the court. There, the defendant kidnapped a minor in Texas, took
her across the border to Mexico, and then raped her in Mexico. See 599 F. Supp. 2d at 791–92. Here, in contrast, the
court must consider Defendant’s alleged act of molesting his daughter while living in the Philippines. Second, in light
of the distinguishable facts before it, the Martinez Court only considered the constitutionality of Section 2423(c) as
applied to a defendant who travels in foreign commerce and subsequently commits a noncommercial sex act; it had
no occasion to consider the constitutionality of Section 2423(c) as applied to a defendant who commits a
noncommercial act of sexual abuse while residing abroad. The court need not take the opportunity here to delve into
whether there is a constitutional difference between the acts of “traveling” versus “residing” abroad: that Martinez
involved a different construction of the statute than the one this court must analyze is enough to make it inapplicable
to the present case.
30
efforts to stamp out American citizens’ participation in the international market for child
trafficking and sex tourism, such that it is “necessary and proper” for Congress to regulate that
activity. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17–18, 22, 24–25; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. By definition, the
marketplace Congress seeks to eliminate depends on commerce and travel. Child sex tourists are
those who “travel[] to a foreign country and engage in sexual activity with a child in that country.”
See Extraterritorial Sexual Exploitation of Children, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/extraterritorial-sexual-exploitation-children. Similarly,
child trafficking involves “recuit[ing] and transfer[ing] children across international borders in
order to sexually exploit them in another country.” See Prostitution of Children, DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(June 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/prostitution-children. Section 2423’s other
subsections address these perpetrators’ crimes by prohibiting the act of “knowingly transport[ing]”
a minor in foreign commerce for the purpose of prostitution or criminal sexual activity and the act
of traveling in foreign commerce “for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct” with
a minor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), (b). Section 2423(c), as applied to Defendant’s alleged act of
residing in the Philippines and sexually abusing Minor B, stands in stark contrast. Put simply, as
alleged in Count Two, Defendant is neither a child sex tourist nor child trafficker. Understood in
that way, a conviction under Count Two brings Congress no closer to stamping out the marketplace
at which Section 2423’s prohibitions are directed. Congress’ broader regulatory effort does not
depend on being able to criminalize the act of an American father who sexually abuses his own
child and is not undermined by Congress’ inability to reach that conduct.
In sum, none of the Lopez factors supports the conclusion that Congress may rely on its
Commerce Power to criminalize Defendant’s purported act of residing in the Philippines and
sexually abusing or attempting to sexually abuse Minor B, and it is not necessary for Congress to
31
do so in order to eliminate the market in commercial exploitation of children. Section 2423(c), as
applied to the conduct alleged in Count Two, neither regulates commercial activity nor contains
an express jurisdictional link to commerce. The Supreme Court has emphasized the role these two
factors play in ensuring that the activity Congress seeks to regulate is tied in some manner to
Congress’ enumerated power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 23–24. Though their absence is
not fatal to the outcome, it is significant. Additionally, there are no legislative findings linking
noncommercial sexual abuse of children to effects on foreign commerce, and the court concludes
any relationship that may exist is simply too attenuated for it to reasonably be considered
“substantial.” The reasoning on which the Government relies involves stacking inferences to
identify potential economic effects. Lastly, Congress does not need to regulate this
noncommercial, local conduct in order to effectuate its broader effort to eliminate the market in
child trafficking and sex tourism; it is simply not an essential part of Section 2423’s overarching
regulatory scheme.
For those very reasons, the court would reach the same conclusion even if the court were
to apply a modified Interstate Commerce Clause framework, as other Circuits have done, see
Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 218–19; Bianchi, 386 F. App’x at 161–62; Clark, 435 F.3d at 1109–17, and
as the Government urges the court to do here. Relaxing the required nexus between commerce
and the activity to be regulated does not affect the court’s analysis in this case because there simply
is no nexus between the act of an American citizen molesting and attempting to molest his
daughter, without the exchange of anything of value to or from any person, while residing in the
Philippines, and the market for child trafficking and sex tourism. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(e)(3),
2423(c), (f)(1), 2246; Bianchi, 386 F. App’x at 163 (Roth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
32
part) (explaining that “there is no rational basis to conclude that an illicit sex act with a minor
undertaken on foreign soil, perhaps years after legal travel and devoid of any exchange of value,
substantially affects foreign commerce”). The activity charged in Count Two is an act of violence
disconnected from foreign travel or commerce.
In the end, the court finds itself with no persuasive answer as to why Congress can
criminalize quintessentially local conduct that occurs abroad when it lacks authority to criminalize
that exact same conduct at home. The Government does not seriously dispute that, under
Morrison, Congress cannot rely on its Commerce Power to criminalize wholly intrastate, familial
sexual abuse. Cf. Hr’g Tr. (draft), June 15, 2017, at 24. The Government offers no satisfactory
answer as to why the court should reach a different conclusion when the same act happens to occur
abroad. This court is not prepared to conclude, without further persuasion or precedential
guidance, that Congress can rely on its Foreign Commerce Clause power to regulate conduct it
cannot reach under its Interstate Commerce Clause power simply because the conduct is
perpetrated by someone who resides abroad. Cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
In sum, the court holds that Section 2423(c), as applied to the conduct alleged in Count
Two, is not a constitutional exercise of Congress’ authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
2. Necessary and Proper Clause
Next, the Government submits that the court may uphold Section 2423(c) as applied to the
facts of this case as a proper exercise of Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause
to pass legislation that implements the Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of Child
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (“the Optional Protocol”), a
non-self-executing treaty to which the United States is a party. This argument, too, raises complex
questions of constitutional law. The court reviews the legal landscape governing the relationship
33
between the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, and Treaty Power, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, before analyzing whether Section 2423(c), as applied in Count Two of
the Superseding Indictment, can be upheld as a constitutional implementation of the Optional
Protocol.
a. Congress’ Power to Enact Implementing Legislation
The Constitution bestows on Congress the authority to effectuate treaties. Although the
President possesses the power to negotiate treaties on behalf of the United States, the Legislature
determines whether the United States should ultimately join the treaty and whether it should do so
with reservations. The Senate must ratify a treaty before the United States becomes a party to it.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”).
The legal effect of ratification turns on the nature of the treaty itself and any reservations the Senate
made. If the Senate ratifies a self-executing treaty, then, upon ratification, the United States is
both a party to the treaty and the treaty becomes federal law enforceable in the United States courts.
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008). If the Senate ratifies a non-self-executing
treaty, however, then ratification only makes the United States a party to the international
agreement. Id. at 505. For that type of treaty to become enforceable federal law, the Senate must
pass additional legislation—known as “implementing legislation.” See id. at 505–06, 525–26.
Congress’ authority to enact implementing legislation has been established for nearly a
century. In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918—a federal law that made a non-self-executing treaty between the United States and Great
Britain binding on the States—did not unconstitutionally interfere with Missouri’s rights under the
Tenth Amendment. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Specifically, the Court explained that the Necessary
34
and Proper Clause provides Congress with authority to pass implementing legislation: “If the
treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8,
as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.” Id. at 432. The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 was a constitutional exercise of Congress’ authority under that
Clause because the problem at hand—deprivation of a food supply and destruction of forests and
crops—was “a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude” that could “be protected only
by national action in concert with that of another power”; “[i]t [was] not sufficient to rely upon the
States.” Id. at 435. Moreover, the Act did not upset the Constitution’s balance of powers between
the States and Federal Government because the Tenth Amendment did not generally prevent
Congress from implementing a treaty in this way. See id. at 434. Thus, Holland stands for the
principle that Congress has authority, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to pass legislation
that implements a non-self-executing treaty, and the States cannot rely on the Tenth Amendment
to avoid being subject to that law when the object of the treaty promotes a national interest that
can be protected only by action between sovereign nations.
Several federal courts have read Holland to mean the Necessary and Proper Clause also
governs whether a statute is in fact “implementing legislation,” and implementing legislation is
automatically constitutional if it implements a valid treaty. Those courts have imported the
“rational relationship” test used in other Necessary and Proper Clause cases, see, e.g., United States
v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010), to inquire whether the statute at issue constitutes a means
that is rationally related to implementation of a particular treaty to determine whether it
“implements” that treaty, e.g., United States v. Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355–59 (S.D. Fla.
2007), aff’d on other grounds, 599 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2010). Under this line of reasoning,
Congress need not reference the treaty directly or explicitly discuss the treaty in the statute’s
35
legislative history for the court to conclude the statute implements the treaty. Instead, the courts
are satisfied that a statute and treaty are “rationally related” if the statutory language parrots or
tracks the language of the treaty, e.g., United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 167 (3d Cir. 2012),
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2077; United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 804–06 (11th Cir. 2010), or the
statute and treaty express the same general purpose, e.g., United States v. Bollinger, 966 F. Supp.
2d 568, 575 (W.D.N.C. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 798 F.3d 201; United States v. Flath, No.
11-69, 2011 WL 6299941, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2011), adopted in part by 845 F. Supp. 2d
251 (E.D. Wis. 2012). If the court concludes the statute is “rationally related” to the treaty, then
the statute constitutes “implementing legislation.” Importantly, with citation to Holland’s
statement that Congress has authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass implementing
legislation, generally, these courts conclude that if the treaty is valid, then the “implementing
legislation” automatically is constitutional. See United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.
1998); Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
That analysis reads Holland too broadly. First, Holland does not speak to how to determine
whether Congress has enacted a piece of legislation to implement a non-self-executing treaty, let
alone direct the lower federal courts to apply the Necessary and Proper Clause’s “rational
relationship” test to make that determination. There was no doubt in Holland whether Congress
intended the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 to implement the non-self-executing treaty
between Great Britain and the United States—indeed, the Court noted that it was “entitled an act
to give effect to the convention.” 252 U.S. at 431. Consequently, Holland does not speak to how
the courts should determine whether an act of Congress implements a treaty when the act itself is
silent on that topic. Second, Holland does not stand for the proposition that every piece of
implementing legislation is constitutional so long as the treaty it implements is valid. If that were
36
the case, then the Court would have had no reason to address the facts of the case before it except
to say that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 was constitutional because it implemented a
valid treaty between Great Britain and the United States. Instead, the Holland Court held that the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 was necessary to remedy the harm the treaty had identified and
the United States had agreed to remedy, as well as a proper means of doing so, because it did not
tread on rights reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 435. The Necessary
and Proper Clause, then, is the source of Congress’ power to enact implementing legislation,
generally, and its outer bounds limit Congress’ authority to pass such legislation. Cf. id. at 433,
435.
In short, Holland makes clear that Congress has authority to pass implementing legislation,
but does not speak to how to determine whether a particular statute implements a certain non-self-
executing treaty. It does, however, direct courts to analyze implementing legislation under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to determine whether such legislation is within the realm of
Congress’ constitutional authority. The Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to construct
laws that are “rationally related” to the implementation of another constitutionally enumerated
power—here, the President’s power to make and execute treaties. See Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134;
Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31. A statute is “necessary” to the implementation of a treaty if it is
“plainly adapted to” the treaty, and the statute is a “proper” means of doing so if it is both “not
prohibited” by the Constitution and “consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.” See
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); accord Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134.
With these principles in mind, the court now turns to Section 2423(c), as defined in Count
Two of the Superseding Indictment, and the Optional Protocol.
37
b. Whether Section 2423(c) is a Constitutional Exercise of Congress’
Authority to Implement the Optional Protocol
The Government contends that Congress intended Section 2423(c), originally and as
amended to reach the conduct alleged in Count Two, to implement the Optional Protocol, a non-
self-executing treaty that requires implementing legislation to become domestic law in the United
States. See S. EXEC. RPT. NO. 107-4, at 15 (2002); Gov’t’s Surreply, ECF No. 37, at 12 (cross-
referencing Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 25, at 20–30). For the reasons that follow, the court disagrees.
The Optional Protocol calls on States Parties to create and enforce laws that prohibit the
exploitation of children for commercial gain. The very first Article of the treaty makes plain the
States Parties’ obligation to “prohibit the sale of children, child prostitution and child
pornography.” OPTIONAL PROTOCOL art. 1. The second Article defines those three terms
expressly. “Sale of children” refers to “any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by
any person or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration.”
Id. art. 2(a). Next, “[c]hild prostitution” is defined to mean “the use of a child in sexual activities
for remuneration or any other form of consideration.” Id. art. 2(b). Lastly, the treaty makes clear
that “[c]hild pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in real
or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for
primarily sexual purposes.” Id. art. 2(c). The third Article in the Optional Protocol makes it
incumbent on the States Parties to ensure that certain enumerated offenses or the attempt of those
offenses, whether committed abroad or at home, are covered by the States Parties’ laws. See id.
art. 3. Those offenses are: (1) “[t]he offering, delivering or accepting, by whatever means, of a
child for the purpose of” sexual exploitation, organ transfers for profit, or forced labor; (2)
“[i]mproperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the adoption of a child”; (3) “[o]ffering,
obtaining, procuring or providing a child for child prostitution”; or (4) “[p]roducing, distributing,
38
disseminating, importing, exporting, offering, selling or possessing for the above purposes child
pornography.” Id. Lastly, of relevance here, the Optional Protocol obligates States Parties to
“adopt or strengthen, implement and disseminate, laws, administrative measures, social policies
and programmes to prevent the offences referred to” therein. Id. art. 9(1).
The court accepts, for the sake of argument, that Congress passed Section 2423(c), as
applied to the conduct alleged in Count Two, to implement the Optional Protocol but concludes
that it was an overreach of Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to do so.
Section 2423(c), as defined to criminalize an American citizen’s act of molesting his child while
he resides in the Philippines, is neither a “necessary” nor “proper” means of implementing the
Optional Protocol.
Section 2423(c)’s criminalization of noncommercial sexual abuse of one’s own child by
an American residing in a foreign country is not “necessary” because the conduct it prohibits is
not plainly adapted to implementing the stated goals of the Optional Protocol and does not require
multiple nations’ involvement to prevent. The Optional Protocol’s text makes plain its goal:
bringing together multiple nations to eliminate the worldwide market in child trafficking and sex
tourism. Articles 1, 2, and 3 focus on the commercial exploitation of children and direct States
Parties to put in place criminal laws that address three of the most prevalent means of harming
children for commercial gain: sale, prostitution, and pornography. See OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
arts. 1, 2, 3. As already discussed, however, Section 2423(c)—as applied to Defendant’s alleged
molestation and attempted molestation of his daughter—criminalizes wholly local activity that is
not only itself noncommercial in nature but also disconnected from any broader market. Supra, at
28–32. As charged, Count Two does not involve the sale of children, child prostitution, or child
pornography. Prosecuting an American residing abroad who molests his own child for no
39
commercial purpose brings the States Parties to the Optional Protocol no closer to eliminating the
market in child trafficking and sex tourism. Additionally, the harm the Optional Protocol has
identified—the existence of a market for sex with children—indisputably requires multiple
participants to remedy because it is a “subject matter [that] is only transitorily within the State and
has no permanent habitat therein.” See Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. In contrast, the prosecution of
individual American citizens residing abroad who molest children without remuneration is a matter
that can be handled entirely by local law enforcement. Consequently, using Section 2423(c) to
prosecute Defendant’s act of sexually abusing his daughter while he resided in the Philippines does
not bear a rational relationship to the Optional Protocol.
Correlatively, when defined to reach Defendant’s alleged act of noncommercial sexual
abuse of his daughter, Section 2423(c) also is not a “proper” exercise of Congress’ authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement a treaty because it upsets the balance of
constitutional powers. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause to
permit Congress to implement an existing, non-self-executing treaty, as negotiated by the
President. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Holland, 252 U.S. 416. It would violate the structure
and spirit of the Constitution for Congress to pass implementing legislation that causes the treaty
to take on a shape that contradicts the Constitution, either by causing the treaty to reach a topic on
which the President himself could not have negotiated or by allowing Congress to reserve for itself
power to expand the treaty’s scope beyond what the President negotiated on the country’s behalf.
Section 2423(c), as applied to the conduct alleged in Count Two, threatens to do both.
First, allowing Section 2423(c) to stand as implementing the Optional Protocol risks
construing the treaty to reach a topic on which the President may lack authority to negotiate:
domestic matters of another country. The Supreme Court has intimated that the Treaty Power
40
reaches only “proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations.” Asakura
v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); accord Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2102–11 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (joined by Justices Scalia and Alito); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891); Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890). In particular, “[n]o court has ever said . . . that the treaty power
can be exercised without limit to affect matters which are of purely domestic concern and do not
pertain to our relations with other nations.” Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d
538, 542–43 (D.C. Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated as moot, Am. Pub. Power
Ass’n v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 355 U.S. 64 (1957) (per curiam). Indeed, in rejecting such a broad
construction, Justice Thomas recently wrote that “to interpret the Treaty Power as extending to
every conceivable domestic subject matter—even matters without any nexus to foreign relations—
would destroy the basic constitutional distinction between domestic and foreign powers.” Bond,
134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Scalia and Alito). Accepting that
there is some limitation on the President’s Treaty Power, it follows that the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which only grants Congress power to assist the President in his treaty-making powers,
cannot provide Congress with authority to assist the President in exceeding his treaty-making
powers. The Optional Protocol demands that States Parties criminalize a certain set of offenses
pertaining to the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography, as well as authorizes
States Parties to pass additional laws on those topics aimed at better effectuating the treaty’s goal
of eliminating the market for child trafficking and sex tourism. See OPTIONAL PROTOCOL arts. 1,
3, 9. In contrast, Section 2423(c), as applied to the conduct in Count Two, criminalizes local
sexual offenses, divorced from commerce or commercial implications, while residing abroad.
Allowing such a statutory provision to stand as legislation that implements the Optional Protocol
would transform the scope of the treaty to reach a matter of domestic concern—the purely local,
41
noncommercial sexual abuse of a minor—which is a topic on which the President arguably lacks
authority to negotiate. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2109 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Nothing in our
cases . . . suggests that the Treaty Power conceals a police power over domestic affairs.”); Power
Auth. of N.Y., 247 F.2d at 542–43.
Second, treating Section 2423(c) as implementing legislation would essentially permit
Congress to reserve for itself a portion of the Treaty Power by allowing it to expand the scope of
the Optional Protocol to regulate conduct the treaty neither demands nor authorizes and which
Congress lacks independent power to regulate. It is axiomatic that Congress cannot “reach beyond
the natural limit of its authority and draw within its . . . scope” a power reserved to another branch.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 561 (Roberts, C.J.); cf. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia,
J., concurring). The Constitution exclusively affords the President the role of negotiating and
entering into treaties on the United States’ behalf; Congress does not get to decide the topic of a
treaty, and Congress can only limit the scope of a treaty by making a reservation before ratification.
To allow Congress to pass “implementing legislation” that the treaty neither expressly nor
implicitly authorizes would be to give Congress a portion of the President’s authority under Article
II in the form of a treaty-editing power, allowing it to expand the scope of a treaty. The Necessary
and Proper Clause does not grant Congress such power. If the President negotiates and enters into
a non-self-executing treaty that demands or authorizes regulation of conduct Congress could not
otherwise regulate, then Congress may rely on its Necessary and Proper Clause powers to pass
implementing legislation to reach that conduct. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432–33 (explaining that
Congress may pass legislation to implement a treaty that it could not otherwise pass). But
Congress cannot rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation absent a supporting
enumerated power and which the treaty does not demand or authorize Congress to reach. As
42
discussed earlier, the Government does not seriously dispute that Congress lacks constitutional
authority to criminalize the act of residing in one of the United States and molesting one’s own
child, and the court concludes the Optional Protocol does not demand or authorize States Parties
to criminalize that conduct.12 Consequently, to allow Section 2423(c) to exist as “implementing
legislation” in this case would be to let Congress edit the Optional Protocol to provide itself with
authority to criminalize Defendant’s alleged act of abusing his daughter.
In sum, Section 2423(c), as applied to the conduct alleged in Count Two, is not a “proper”
exercise of Congress’ authority because it either would cause the Optional Protocol to encompass
a topic on which the President lacked authority to negotiate or allow Congress to reserve for itself
the power to edit the substance of the treaty to reach topics not contemplated by the President.
Viewed either way, Section 2423(c)’s noncommercial application unhinges the balance of powers
carefully crafted by the Framers. This the Constitution cannot permit.
Thus, Section 2423(c), as applied to the conduct alleged in Count Two, exceeds Congress’
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 13
D. Venue
Defendant also moves to dismiss both counts of the Superseding Indictment on the ground
that venue in the District of Columbia is not proper. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 19, at
12
Article 3’s use of the phrase “at a minimum” arguably authorizes States Parties to pass laws in furtherance of the
treaty’s objectives that are broader than those outlined in Article 3. OPTIONAL PROTOCOL art. 3(1); see Gov’t’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 25, at 22–23. Similarly, the treaty’s preamble urges States Parties “to adopt[] a holistic approach” facilitating
“the elimination of the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography” by “addressing . . . irresponsible
adult sexual behaviour.” OPTIONAL PROTOCOL pmbl. However, that “authorizing” language must be construed in
light of the Optional Protocol’s stated purpose: the international problem of commercial exploitation of children, either
by their sale or prostitution, or the creation and dissemination of pornography. See id. pmbl., arts. 1, 3. Though
Defendant’s alleged act of assaulting his daughter, without any connection to commerce, is “irresponsible adult sexual
behavior,” its prosecution through Section 2423(c)’s noncommercial definition is of no help in eliminating the
commercial exploitation of children. Consequently, the Optional Protocol does not authorize Congress to pass Section
2423(c) at least insofar as that provision is applied to reach Defendant’s conduct.
13
The court also holds that Section 2423(e), as applied to Defendant, is unconstitutional. Defendant cannot be
prosecuted for attempting to commit a crime the court has deemed to be beyond Congress’ power to create.
43
13; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, at 19–21. As the court already has dismissed Count Two, it
addresses the question of venue only as to Count One.
Section 2423 does not contain an express venue provision, so the Government must
establish venue under another statutory provision. The parties point to two venue statutes in
particular: 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3238. Section 3237(a) provides that, “[e]xcept
as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against the United States
begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be
inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or
completed,” and defines crimes involving foreign commerce as continuing offenses subject to that
provision. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Section 3238 states, as relevant here, that “an indictment or
information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender . . . , or if no
such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia,”
for any offenses committed “out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3238.
The parties disagree as to whether the Government is required to establish venue under
Section 3237(a) and, if not, whether the Government has met its burden of proof to establish venue
under Section 3238. Defendant contends that the proper venue for Count One must be governed
by Section 3237(a) because he is charged with an offense involving traveling from the United
States to the Philippines, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures direct the Government to
“prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed”—i.e., Hartford or
Minneapolis. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 18; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, at 19; Hr’g Tr. (draft),
June 15, 2017, at 46. Even if the Government is not required to establish venue under Section
3237(a), Defendant submits that he should have been indicted in the jurisdiction of his “last known
44
residence,” pursuant to Section 3238, which is not the District of Columbia and which the
Government should have known because he is a United States citizen and former member of the
United States military. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, at 19–20; Hr’g Tr. (draft), June
15, 2017, at 44, 57–58.
The court concludes that the Government may establish venue under either Section 3237(a)
or Section 3238 for Count One. Neither Section 3237(a) nor Section 3238 sets forth an exclusive
means of establishing venue for an offense—like the one charged in Count One—that allegedly
occurs abroad, in part. Section 3237(a) speaks in permissive language, and Rule 18 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires the Government to prosecute an offense in the district
where it was committed absent a statute permitting otherwise. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (stating
that continuing offenses “may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district” in which they occur
(emphasis added)); Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (“Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the
government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed . . . .”
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Government may establish venue under either Section
3237(a) or Section 3238 as to Count One.
The Government asserts venue is proper under Section 3238, but there remains a jury
question as to whether the Government knew Defendant’s last residence at the time it filed the
original Indictment. “Venue is a jury question . . . if the defendant objects to venue prior to or at
the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to
proper venue, and the defendant timely requests a jury instruction.” United States v. Nwoye, 663
F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendant has objected
to venue well in advance of trial; whether a “last known address” existed at the time the
Government filed the original Indictment is a material question of fact that goes to venue; and
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Defendant has requested a jury instruction concerning this issue. See id.; Hr’g Tr. (draft), June 15,
2017, at 43, 46, 50–51, 56–57. Accordingly, whether venue in the District of Columbia is proper
as to Count One rests on a jury determination.
The court therefore rejects Defendant’s argument that Count One of the Superseding
Indictment should be dismissed based on improper venue.
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The court shares Congress’ disgust at the conduct it aimed to punish and eliminate through
Section 2423(c), but that fact does not make Section 2423(c) constitutional in all its applications.
Today’s holding, however, should not be construed as anything other than limited: the statute is
unconstitutional only as applied to this defendant and the factual allegations underlying Count
Two of the Superseding Indictment. The court does not address Defendant’s broader facial
challenge to Section 2423(c).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s
motions to dismiss the Superseding Indictment and denies as moot his motion for severance. The
court hereby orders trial to proceed on August 14, 2017, only as to Count One of the Superseding
Indictment. Count Two of the Superseding Indictment is dismissed.
Dated: July 27, 2017 Amit P Mehta
United States District Judge
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