Grant v. Spirit Cruises, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAMEA GRANT,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action Nos. 17-1159 (JEB)
17-1410 (JEB)
ENTERTAINMENT CRUISES, INC.;
SPIRIT CRUISES, LLC,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Tamea Grant, a deckhand on a local cruise ship, brought this suit against
Entertainment Cruises, Inc., and its subsidiary Spirit Cruises, LLC, alleging that her former
captain intentionally struck her with a rope during a docking incident and then denied her
medical assistance. After two rounds of briefing, what remains of her case is a single count
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, which allows a seaman injured on a vessel in navigation
to recover from his employer. Defendants, contending that they cannot be held liable for this
intentional tort, now move for summary judgment. Because the Court finds that there are several
material facts in dispute, it will deny the Motion.
I. Background
At the summary-judgment stage, courts must consider the facts in the evidentiary record.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Here, however, the only evidence proffered by either party consists of
snippets from Plaintiff’s deposition related to the incident. To provide the reader with some
context, accordingly, the Court draws general background from the Complaint and uses the
deposition where available.
1
A. Factual History
In contrast to her 20-year career with the U.S. Navy, Grant’s time working on
Defendants’ vessels was rather abbreviated. See Second Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 4, 15. In March
2015, Spirit Cruises hired her as a deckhand, during which time her job duties included greeting
guests, docking and undocking the ship, “stand[ing] lookout,” and assisting with some
maintenance and cleaning. Id., ¶¶ 4, 16.
On April 25, 2015, Plaintiff’s assigned vessel hit a few snags when trying to embark its
passengers. First, while standing on the gangway, Grant “heard yelling and witnessed the
Captain” removing several intoxicated guests, which put him “in a bad mood.” Id., ¶ 18. The
first mate then instructed Grant to help the Captain handle the ship’s ropes — “an alarming
request,” as that was typically the first mate’s job. Id. They removed the boat lines and the
Captain began to back the vessel away from the dock, but he was then told that an employee had
been “fired and needed to leave the boat” “immediately.” Id., ¶ 19. This necessitated a trip back
to the dock, where the boat would need to be re-tied and the gangway re-set. Again, it was
usually the first mate’s responsibility to assist the Captain in these endeavors, but on this night,
Grant was told to help. Initially, Plaintiff resisted because “she could see the anger mounting in
the Captain[’]s face,” but, not wanting to be the next one told to walk the plank, she ultimately
relented and went to help. Id. In the middle of preparing to lift the gangway, the Captain
suddenly “yanked the gangway . . . [and] began slamming it back and forth in the walkway.” Id.Another officer was concerned that she had been injured, but Plaintiff informed him that she had
“moved [her] hand.” Id.Later, she was not so lucky. When Grant subsequently prepared to dock the boat again,
the line became jammed. She asked the Captain for help, at which point he attempted to
2
dislodge a stuck rope or line, but ended up swinging the rope and hitting her on the head. See
Opp., Attach. 1 (Deposition of Tamea Grant) at 82:16-22. To Grant, this assault was
“intentional[].” Id. at 82:16-22. This incident caused “severe headaches, ringing in her ears,
memory loss, visual disturbances, searing pain in [her] elbow joint, and . . . golfer’s elbow.”
SAC, ¶ 32. When she told the Captain that he had hit her, “his reaction was to smile,” and he
refused to engage in any discussion with her. Id., ¶ 23. Her effort to relay the severity of her
injuries was similarly unsuccessful, and the Captain both refused to provide her medical
assistance and forbade anyone else from doing so. See Grant Depo. at 104:12-22. Grant then
disembarked and went to her car. As she began to dial 911, another deckhand appeared in her
passenger window; fearing that the employee might have been sent to “inflict more harm,”
Plaintiff “feared for her life and fled the parking lot.” SAC, ¶ 24.
B. Procedural History
Two years later, Grant filed two separate suits against Entertainment Cruises and Spirit
Cruises in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Both actions alleged three violations
of the D.C. Human Rights Act and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See
ECF No. 1 (Notice of Removal), Exh. A. Defendants successfully removed the cases to federal
court, and this Court consolidated them. Id.; Minute Order of August 29, 2017. The cruise lines
then moved to dismiss all of her claims as time-barred. See ECF No. 10. In response, Plaintiff
requested leave to amend her Complaint, throwing the DCHRA and emotional-distress counts
overboard in favor of four counts under D.C. labor-law statutes and a Jones Act claim. See ECF
No. 21; Case No. 17-1410, ECF No. 16. The Court granted her Motion to Amend the Complaint
and, accordingly, denied Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss as moot. The cruise lines again
moved to dismiss, which the Court largely granted. It allowed her to proceed on one count for
3
unsafe working conditions and invited her to re-plead the Jones Act claim. See ECF Nos. 24, 29.
Grant took the Court up on this offer and successfully moved to file a Second Amended
Complaint. See ECF Nos. 33, 36. Again, Defendants moved to dismiss, this time arguing that
the Jones Act preempts her D.C. claim. See ECF No. 40. The Court agreed and dismissed her
state-law cause of action. See ECF No. 46. Discovery now complete, the cruise lines have filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment on the sole remaining count for liability — namely, under the
Jones Act.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell,
433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A fact is “material” if it is capable of affecting the
substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at
895. A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Holcomb, 433 F.3d at
895. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion”
by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, “[t]he evidence of the non-
movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Aka v.
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). On a motion for summary
4
judgment, the Court must “eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”
Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
The non-moving party’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere
unsupported allegations or denials, and must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other
competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The non-movant,
in other words, is required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in her
favor. See Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
III. Analysis
Defendants argue that the Jones Act does not encompass liability for the sort of assault
Grant claims that she experienced. To decide whether it can, the Court first briefly describes the
statute.
A. Jones Act
Prior to the Jones Act, general maritime law permitted only two theories of recovery for
an injured seaman: unseaworthiness — “the vessel owner’s duty to ensure that the vessel is
reasonably fit to be at sea” — or “maintenance and cure” — “the vessel owner’s obligation to
provide food, lodging, and medical services.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S.
438, 441 (2001) (citations omitted). In 1920, Congress broadened the available bases for
recovery through the Jones Act, which provides a cause of action for “[a] seaman injured in the
course of employment.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104. Because the statute states that the “[l]aws of the
United States regulating recovery for . . . a railway employee,” id., are also applicable to a Jones
Act plaintiff, the Act incorporates the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, under which an
employer can be held liable for negligence. See 45 U.S.C. § 51; Withhart v. Otto Candies, LLC,
5
431 F.3d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2005) (Jones Act provides “a negligence cause of action for ship
personnel against their employers”). Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint and Opposition do not clearly
set out her legal theories, but, construing them liberally, the Court treats Grant as asserting a
Jones Act claim against Defendants for both direct negligence and vicarious liability, and it thus
addresses each separately.
B. Direct Negligence
Vessel owners have a duty to provide safe working conditions for their employees and
may be liable for a failure to inform them about or protect them from foreseeable potential
hazards. See Thibodeaux v. Ensco Offshore Co., 2017 WL 6722811, at *4 (W.D. La. 2017);
Borges v. Seabulk Int’l, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 387, 390 (D. Conn. 2006). Because of the perils of
life at sea, see Herman Melville, Moby Dick (1851), a plaintiff asserting negligence under the
Jones Act “shoulders a lighter burden [for establishing negligence] than [her] counterpart on land
would carry.” Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 45 (2d Cir. 2004) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
The cause of action for negligence under the Act is distinct from the common-law
maritime claim for unseaworthiness, which imposes strict liability when a ship owner “fail[s] to
provide a vessel, including her equipment and crew, which is reasonably fit and safe for the
purposes for which it was intended to be used.” Boudreaux v. United States, 280 F.3d 461, 4687
(5th Cir. 2002); see Barlas v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 201, 207-208 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2014). Although
Plaintiff’s Opposition makes several mentions of the “unseaworthiness” of the ship, see Opp. at
11-12, Defendants correctly note that such a claim was not pled in her Second Amended
6
Complaint. Giving her the benefit of the doubt, however, the Court presumes these allegations
relate to her Jones Act claim.
According to Grant, Defendants were negligent by failing to (1) properly train the crew;
and (2) provide her with proper safety or protective gear. Id. at 11-12. Although Plaintiff lists
several instances that she believed constituted such unsafe working conditions, the only one
tethered to her alleged injury here is a need for protective gear, specifically a helmet, when tying
down the ropes. See Grant Dep. at 81:1. Although a ship owner must provide adequate
equipment to seamen, see Smith v. Basic Marine Servs., Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (E.D. La.
2013), in order to show that Defendants were negligent in not furnishing her a helmet, Plaintiff
must proffer some evidence from which a jury could infer that it was the industry standard or
reasonable practice to do so. See Reveron v. Tycom, Inc., 2004 WL 3186600, at *7 (D.N.J.
2004) (granting employer summary judgment when plaintiff did not produce evidence that issued
safety equipment was inadequate). She has not done so here and thus cannot, as a matter of law,
proceed on a direct-negligence claim.
C. Vicarious Liability
Plaintiff’s claim can also be interpreted as alleging that Defendants were vicariously
liable for the tortious acts of the Captain, including both the assault and subsequent refusal of
medical care. Just as under common law, an employer’s Jones Act “negligence” can extend to
intentional torts under the doctrine of respondeat superior if (1) they were committed by an
employee in furtherance of the employer’s business, see Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., L.L.C.,
691 F.3d 566, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2012), or (2) “the shipowner knew or should have known of the
crew member’s violent propensities.” Sloan v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 2d 798, 806 (E.D.
Pa. 2009). Nothing in the record suggests that Defendants knew or had reason to know of the
7
Captain’s supposed violent nature. The latter ground of foreseeability is thus inapplicable, and
the Court only addresses the former.
Defendants assert that the Captain’s “duties consisted of ensuring proper navigation of
the vessel and the safety of the passengers and crew.” Mot. at 7. An assault of a crew member,
they argue, is “so clearly contrary to [Defendants’] business interests” that no jury could find it
was “done in furtherance of his duties.” Id. at 7-8. This, the Court believes, construes the scope
of his employment too narrowly. The D.C. Circuit has not addressed respondeat superior in the
specific context of the Jones Act, but under common-law principles an employer is liable for the
intentional torts of its employee committed within the scope of employment when the conduct
“is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve” the employer and, given the job duties, was
“not unexpectable” by it. Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 228 F. Supp. 3d 28, 45 (D.D.C.
2017) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)); see also Johnson v. Weinberg,
434 A.2d 404, 408 (D.C. 1981) (employer liable “where a tort is the outgrowth of a job-related
controversy” and “conduct in question was foreseeable as being within the range of duties
entrusted to the employee”). Whether the alleged assault satisfies this definition is a question of
fact for the jury. Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 757 (D.C. 2001).
Indeed, nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court held that an employer was liable in a
similar situation. See Jamison v. Encanacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930), superseded by statute on
other grounds as recognized in McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1991).
In Jamison, a longshoreman was loading a barge when the foreman assaulted him. Id. at 637-38.
At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the foreman struck him, not due to any personal
disagreement, but to “hurry him about the work.” Id. at 638. The Supreme Court affirmed the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning that even though the assault “was in excess of the
8
authority conferred by the employer upon the foreman, it was committed in the course of the
discharge of his duties and in furtherance of the work of the employer’s business.” Id. at 641;
see also Alpha S.S. Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642, 643 (1930) (employer liable for supervisor who
struck seaman “for the purpose of reprimanding him for tardiness and compelling him to work”);
Civil v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 217 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1954) (ship owner liable when
employee fatally stabbed another employee with a “disciplinary motive”).
Grant contends that the assault here occurred while trying to dock the boat, an act that
clearly furthers Defendants’ business interests. See Grant Depo. at 81:15-22. Given the many
frustrations that attend docking (particularly on a cruise ship that frequently serves intoxicated
guests), a jury could find that it was “not unexpect[ed]” that he would get angry and lash out.
There is no evidence that the Captain and Grant had any prior relationship, such that he would
have a personal motive to hit her over the head with a rope. See Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 773 F.2d 807, 818 (7th Cir. 1985) (employer not liable “when the motive for the employee’s
intentional tort is personal”). It is thus plausible that the Captain acted “out of exasperation” or
“with an excess of zeal” in an effort to hurry up and tie down the ropes. Id. at 819.
Grant also claims that she was “denied immediate medical assistance causing her injuries
to worsen.” SAC, ¶ 32; Grant Depo. at 104:12-19; 167:4-9. Vessel owners have a non-delegable
duty under the Jones Act to provide prompt and adequate medical care to injured seamen. See
Olsen v. Am. S.S. Co., 176 F.3d 891, 895 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 314B (1965) (employer subject to liability when supervisor knows employee is hurt
while performing job duties and fails to care for him); cf. De Centeno v. Gulf Fleet Crews, Inc.,
798 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff and holding ship owner
vicariously responsible for negligence of physician it chose to treat ill seaman). If the Captain
9
did indeed refuse her medical aid and prevent others from assisting, Defendants could be held
vicariously liable, particularly since their employee was the cause of her injury. This, again, will
be for a jury to decide.
IV. Conclusion
Whether the Captain hit Grant with the rope, his motivations for doing so, and her access
to medical care after the alleged injury are all disputed issues of material fact. The Court
therefore cannot grant Defendants summary judgment. A contemporaneous Order will so state.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: April 19, 2018
10