United States v. Spann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
v. )
) Crim. Action No. 19-0252 (ABJ)
BRENDON SPANN, ) ***SEALED***
)
Defendant. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the Court is defendant Brendon Spann’s pro se motion for
compassionate release, [Dkt. # 60] (“Mot.”), and the supplemental motion filed by counsel.
[Dkt. # 62] (“Suppl.”). Defendant is currently serving a thirty-month sentence of incarceration,
Judgment [Dkt. # 58] at 2, at Federal Correctional Institute (“FCI”) Milan in Michigan. He asks
the Court to reduce his term of imprisonment to the nearly twenty-one months he has already
served and to allow him to complete the remaining portion of his sentence under supervised
release. Mot. at 1. Defendant states that he fears for his health, given his risk of serious illness
should he contract coronavirus while incarcerated, id. at 1–2, and his safety, given the March 2021
attack by his cellmate, which left him with . Suppl. at 1;
Def.’s Reply [Dkt. # 67] (“Reply”) at 1.
The government opposes this motion, Gov’t Opp. to Def.’s Mot. [Dkt. # 65] (“Opp.”),
and the motion is now fully briefed. See also Chart – Brendon J. Spann, Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot.
[Dkt. # 61-1] (SEALED) (“Def.’s Medical Chart”); Bureau of Prisons Health Services
Health Screen [Dkt. # 64] (SEALED) (“BOP Medical Records”); Exs. 1–3 to Def.’s
Medical Records [Dkt. # 69-1–3] (SEALED) (“SJMH Medical Records”). For the following
reasons, defendant’s motion for compassionate release will be denied without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The Court detailed the nature of the offense, as well as the potential risks posed to the
defendant’s health by incarceration, in its prior bond review decisions in this case, 1 and all of that
information is incorporated here as well.
Defendant has been detained since his arrest on July 23, 2019. See Arrest Warrant
[Dkt. # 2]. On February 13, 2020, he pled guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, [Dkt. # 5], which
charged him with cyberstalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), a crime punishable by
imprisonment of up to five years. See Min. Entry (Feb. 13, 2020); Plea Agreement [Dkt. # 31].
The defendant swore to the accuracy of an Agreed Statement of Facts, [Dkt. # 32] (“SOF”), which
recounted the numerous threatening text and email messages defendant sent to his ex-girlfriend
(“Victim 1”) and her family, friends, and colleagues. Judgment was entered on August 13, 2020,
when the Court sentenced the defendant to a term of thirty months incarceration to be followed by
thirty-six months of supervised release. See Judgment at 2–3; Min. Entry (Aug. 13, 2020).
LEGAL STANDARD
A court may reduce a term of imprisonment under the compassionate release statute, as
modified by the First Step Act, if after considering “the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable,” it makes two findings: first, that “extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction,” and second, “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable
1 See Order of Sept. 9, 2019 [Dkt. # 16] (“Sept. 2019 Order”) (denying defendant’s motion
to revoke order of detention); Order of May 3, 2020 [Dkt. # 44] (“May 2020 Order”)
(denying defendant’s emergency motion to reopen detention hearing).
2
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 2 The
policy statement issued by the Commission tracks the language of the statute, reiterating the need
for a defendant to show that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction[,]”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), and that the reduction would be consistent with the policy statement,
id. § 1B1.13(3), and it adds the requirement that a “defendant is not a danger to the safety of any
other person or to the community[.]” Id. § 1B1.13(2).
The Commission’s policy statement lists examples of the “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” that would satisfy the statute, including a showing that the defendant is:
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because
of the aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide
self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from
which he or she is not expected to recover.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii).
ANALYSIS
I. Defendant has not identified any extraordinary or compelling reason warranting
a modification of his sentence under the compassionate release statute.
The Court will deny defendant’s motion because he has not pointed to the necessary
extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify his sentence. Defendant first predicates his
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C) (requiring the Commission to promulgate a general policy
statement on the sentence modification provisions in section 3582(c) of title 18); id. § 994(t)
(providing that the policy statement “describe what should be considered extraordinary and
compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific
examples”).
3
motion on the coronavirus pandemic and his lifelong medical condition, . See Mot. at 2;
see also Def.’s Medical Chart at 2, 4–8. The prison health records confirm diagnosis,
and that he has been prescribed BOP Medical Records at 4–5.
But at present, as during all phases of these proceedings, the defendant’s appears to be
well-managed, and he has not demonstrated that he is seriously ill or that his
has deteriorated to the point that it affects his ability to function or his life expectancy.
Defendant argues that his primary concern is that the conditions of incarceration –
coupled with his history of make him more likely to contract COVID-19. See Mot. at 2.
It is true that guidance issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) warns
that people with
. However, none of the information submitted by defendant or published by
the CDC indicates that people with are more likely to be infected than others.
The medical records he cites do not support the assertion that he is at a particularly
increased risk of serious illness should he contract coronavirus. See Def.’s Medical Chart at 5
(describing defendant as
); see also id. at 6–8 (describing defendant’s ).
And while defendant suggests that coronavirus is running rampant at the facility, see Mot. at 2,
Suppl. at 1, there is little evidence that remains an issue at present, at least at FCI Milan. 3
3 Defendant cites a report from January 2021, with data current through December 2020.
See DOJ OIG Report [Dkt. # 62-1] at 2.
4
According to the government, there are very few cases at his facility, Opp. at 4, and the publicly
available BOP statistics report that there is only one active case among the inmates at the facility
and four involving staff. 4
The Court is respectful of the fact that the defendant is , and it does not
wish to minimize the significance of that condition and his medical history. But the latest
submissions challenging defendant’s continued detention do not provide the Court with any new
information that would suggest that his condition has worsened or increased his vulnerability to
infection, and therefore the record in this case does not show that he is in particular danger at this
time in a manner that would trigger the protections of the compassionate release provisions.
Defendant also informs the Court that he was attacked by his cellmate last month, and that
he suffered a number of injuries, . Suppl. at 1;
Reply at 1.
This is a deeply concerning incident, but the Court is required to view it through the
particular lens of the compassionate release statute. 5 The medical records reviewed by the Court
reveal that defendant was “otherwise well” when the attack occurred, see Ex. 1 to SJMH Medical
Records at 13, and he was medically cleared to return to prison Id. at 9
4 COVID-19 Cases, Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last updated
Apr. 15, 2021).
5 If defendant has claims to bring against the Bureau of Prisons related to the attack and the
conditions of his detention, they are more appropriately pursued through administrative
proceedings or through civil action brought in the district in which he is detained, rather than
through a motion for compassionate release with the sentencing court.
5
).
Given these circumstances, defendant’s showing does not rise to the level of an
“exceptional circumstance” warranting release under the First Step Act.
II. Early release of defendant would not be consistent with the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement.
Even if defendant’s circumstances could be considered compelling enough to warrant his
early release into supervision, the characteristics of defendant and the nature of his crime suggest
that he continues to pose a danger to his victims and the community at large.
6
In denying defendant’s prior emergency motion to reopen his detention hearing, the Court
discussed that he was particularly susceptible to recidivism:
The defendant points out that he desisted [from engaging in cyberstalking]
during the times that he was subject to restraining orders issued by judges,
but he returned to his campaign of harassment each time a temporary
restraining order expired. As the Court explained in detail when it denied
his previous motion to be released, the defendant’s admitted conduct was
not only annoying and harassing, but it was threatening and highly
dangerous, and the victims have attested to its ongoing effects on their
emotional well-being and the fear the prospect of his release engenders.
See [Notice of Victim Impact Statements Regarding Bond [Dkt. # 43]]
at 2–7 [(footnote omitted)]. The Court does not doubt that the defendant
has been somewhat chastened by his incarceration to date, particularly
under the current circumstances, it cannot ignore the fact that he has not yet
had the benefit of any therapeutic intervention – or even anger management
programs – that could be viewed as evidence of an improved ability to
handle his strong emotions. Therefore, given the strength of the evidence
of his dangerousness, the number of potential victims, and the difficulties
involved in ensuring that the defendant has absolutely no access to a phone
or the internet, the motion will be denied.
May 2020 Order at 13–14.
Other courts in this district have held that compassionate release is inappropriate where
the defendant was “at [a] high risk of reoffending.” United States v. Sears, No. 19-cr-21 (KBJ),
2020 WL 3250717, at *3 (D.D.C. June 16, 2020). Given defendant’s history of violating prior
restraining orders, and the fact that defendant has not proffered any new evidence to assuage the
Court’s concerns that given “his high degree of technical savvy, [defendant may] find a way to
communicate with his victims if released,” May 2020 Order at 12–13, the Court concludes that
defendant should serve out the fewer than ten months remaining of his sentence, and undergo the
gradual re-entry prescribed by the Bureau of Prisons.
7
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, defendant’s motion for compassionate release, [Dkt. # 60], is DENIED
without prejudice to a renewed motion should there be a significant change in defendant’s
circumstances.
_______________________
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge
DATE: April 21, 2021
8