Bellinger v. Bowser

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FRANCEL BELLINGER et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 17-2124 (TJK)
MURIEL BOWSER et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs have filed suit against various District of Columbia public officials, alleging
that they have unlawfully failed to provide Capitol View Library, which serves a predominantly
black neighborhood, with the same renovations and related services provided to other public
library branches that serve predominately white neighborhoods. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’
Amended Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, which requests that the Court order Defendants to
provide additional resources to Capitol View Library, make changes to its renovation plans, and
enjoin its re-opening, which is scheduled for December 18, 2017. See ECF No. 19-1 (“Am.
Mot.”). There is little doubt that Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the way in which Capitol View
Library’s renovation has proceeded. That is unfortunate, but it is not a basis to grant their
motion. The Court finds that they are not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims here, nor
will they suffer irreparable injury absent the injunctive relief sought. Moreover, the balance of
the equities and the public interest weigh against the relief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is
DENIED.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The District of Columbia Public Library (“DCPL”) is a free public library system that
was created by Congress in 1896. See ECF No. 24 (“Def. Opp.”) at 2; D.C. Code § 39-101.
DCPL is administered by a nine-member Board of Trustees, and consists of a central library and
twenty-five branch libraries in neighborhoods throughout the District of Columbia. Def. Opp. at
2; D.C. Code §§ 39-101, 39-104. The central library and all branch libraries are open to all
residents of the District of Columbia, regardless of the neighborhood in which they reside. Def.
Opp. at 30; D.C. Code § 39-103. Capitol View Library is a DCPL branch library located in
Ward 7 that serves a predominantly black neighborhood. Am. Mot. at 3; Def. Opp. at 2.
Decisions related to DCPL’s capital and operations funding are made by the Mayor and the
Council of the District of Columbia (the “Council”) through the District of Columbia’s annual
budget process. See Am. Mot. at 4; Def. Opp. at 3; D.C. Code § 39-106.
Since Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2008, this process has authorized funding for renovations at
eighteen full-service DCPL branch libraries throughout the District of Columbia. See Def. Opp.
at 3. Renovations for two additional DCPL branch libraries were separately funded through
another budget mechanism. Id. By early November 2017, renovations had been completed at
fifteen of these DCPL branch libraries. Id. Five of these projects, including the renovation of
Capitol View Library, are still in progress. Id.
In the FY 2015 budget, Capitol View Library’s renovation was initially allocated $10.5
million in funding, but that amount was reduced to $4.5 million in the FY 2016 budget due to the
overall reduction of the DCPL capital budget. Am. Mot. at 4; Def. Opp. at 5. However, in the
FY 2018 budget, the Council increased this project’s funding to $7.2 million, by adding $2
2
million for “exterior improvements” and $700,000 “to provide an interim library space.” Def.
Opp. at 6. The project’s overall budget has since increased to approximately $7.9 million, after
DCPL added $726,000 to the project from other sources. Id.
Capitol View Library closed for interior renovations on February 25, 2017. See Am.
Mot. at 3-4; Def. Opp. at 7. When libraries are closed for renovations, DCPL must determine
whether it will provide interim library services for the community during the closure. See Def.
Opp. at 4; ECF No. 27-7 (“Reyes-Gavilan Decl.”) ¶ 3. Interim library services can range from
placing DCPL librarians at other sites in the community—for example, at schools—to providing
interim facilities capable of offering basic library services on a temporary basis. Reyes-Gavilan
Decl. ¶ 4. DCPL considers the renovation’s scope and budget when deciding whether to provide
interim services, because the cost of those services comes out of the renovation’s budget. Id. ¶ 5.
When deciding whether to provide an interim facility as part of those services, DCPL also
considers the length of planned closure and the library’s proximity to other branches. Id. ¶ 6.
DCPL generally provides an interim facility for library closures lasting longer than one year and
where there is no other DCPL branch library within a mile. Id. In this case, DCPL provided
interim services by assigning Capitol View Library staff members to nearby libraries, visiting
neighborhood schools, and conducting outreach to daycare and early learning facilities. See Def.
Opp. at 7; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 7. DCPL attempted to open an interim library facility at a local
church, albeit unsuccessfully. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 7; see Am. Mot. at 7.
DCPL also commonly provides what is known as “opening day collection” funding for
DCPL branches that re-open after being closed for renovation. See Def. Opp. at 4; Reyes-
Gavilan Decl. ¶ 8. This funding is designed to cover the one-time costs associated with
“refreshing” a library’s existing collection. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 8. Generally, the shorter the
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closure, the less dated the materials are upon the library’s re-opening, and the less “refreshing”
its books and materials require. Id. ¶ 9. The amount of this funding is also tied to the number of
items the specific library circulates. Id. ¶ 10. Capitol View Library, which circulated 33,416
items in FY 2015 and was scheduled for a nine-month closure, received an allocation of $50,000
for that purpose. Id. ¶ 11; Am Mot. at 9-10.
The interior renovations at Capitol View Library are now substantially complete. See
Def. Opp. at 7. Accordingly, DCPL plans to re-open the library to the public on December 18,
2017. Id.; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13. Afterward, DCPL plans for Capitol View Library to
undergo the design phase for exterior renovations, and to close the library again in the spring of
2018 to implement those renovations. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13. When Capitol View Library
closes again, DCPL plans to open an interim library facility on the grounds of J.C. Nalle
Elementary School, pursuant to an already-executed interagency Memorandum of Agreement.
Id. ¶ 13; ECF No. 27-21.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed suit on November 6, 2017, and simultaneously filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 4. On
November 20, the Court held a teleconference with the parties and established a briefing
schedule for Plaintiffs’ anticipated amended motion for injunctive relief. On November 21,
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 20 (“Am. Compl.”). On November 22, they
filed the amended motion for a preliminary injunction, mooting their original motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Am. Mot.
On November 29, Defendants Yvette Alexander, Vincent Gray, and David Grosso (the
“Council Defendants”) filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ amended motion and moved to dismiss
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Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. See ECF No. 23-1 (“Cncl. Def. Opp.”). That same day,
Defendants Muriel Bowser, Richard Reyes-Gavilan, and Gregory McCarthy (the “Executive
Defendants”) also filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ amended motion. See Def. Opp. On
December 7, Plaintiffs filed a reply to each of these oppositions. See ECF No. 33 (“Reply to
Def. Opp.”); ECF No. 34 (“Reply to Cncl. Def. Opp.”). On December 13, Plaintiffs filed a
notice attaching supplemental exhibits in support of their motion. See ECF No. 37. On
December 14, Executive Defendants moved to file a surreply. See ECF No. 38 (“Def. Surrep.”).
That same day Council Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss, and the
Court held a hearing on the motion. See ECF No. 39. On December 15, the Court granted
Executive Defendants leave to file their surreply.
II. Legal Standard
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To warrant a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish that (1)
they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction
is in the public interest. Id. at 20. Historically, the D.C. Circuit has employed a “sliding scale”
test, whereby “[a] district court must ‘balance the strengths of the requesting party’s arguments
in each of the four required areas.’ If the showing in one area is particularly strong, an injunction
may issue even if the showings in other areas are rather weak.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel
Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office
of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (citation omitted).
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter, however, the D.C. Circuit has suggested
that a more stringent test may apply, and that the likelihood of success on the merits may be an
“independent, free-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644
F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation mark omitted). In light of the above, the
Court employs the “sliding scale” framework to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims. Because Plaintiffs
“cannot meet the less demanding ‘sliding scale’ standard, [they] cannot satisfy the more stringent
standard alluded to by the Court of Appeals.” Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 956 F. Supp.
2d 230, 241 (D.D.C. 2013).
III. Analysis
The Court finds that Plaintiffs are not at all likely to succeed on the merits of their claims,
nor will they suffer irreparable injury absent the injunctive relief sought. Moreover, the balance
of the equities and the public interest weigh against the relief.1
1
The Court acknowledges that Defendants have argued that (1) association plaintiffs Marshall
Heights Civic Association and SE – NE Friends of the Capitol View Library lack standing and
(2) all Plaintiffs lack standing for the claims against Council Defendants. See Def. Opp. at 13;
Cncl. Def. Opp. at 12 n.11. While this Court recognizes that “a party who seeks a preliminary
injunction ‘must show a substantial likelihood of standing’” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v.
Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), Defendants have
not challenged that the individual plaintiffs have standing to sue the Executive Defendants, who
are sued in their official capacities, which is the equivalent of a suit against the District of
Columbia itself, see Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F 3d. 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Thus, the Court proceeds to evaluate whether Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on
the merits. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (collecting cases),
overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); In
re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Because only one plaintiff must
have standing, we have no need to consider either the Navy’s motion to dismiss certain retired
and former chaplains from the appeal for lack of standing or whether the organizational plaintiffs
have standing to pursue their claims.”).
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A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. Budget Autonomy Act (Count I)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated D.C. Code § 1-204.46(d), which was enacted as
part of the Local Budget Autonomy Act of 2012 (the “Budget Autonomy Act”), D.C. Act 19-321
(2013), by “reprogramming” $700,000 that was allocated for interim library space for the
communities served by Capitol View Library. Am. Mot. at 8, 11-12; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-36. The
statute requires that, after the adoption of the annual budget for a fiscal year, “no reprogramming
of amounts in the budget may occur unless the Mayor submits to the Council a request for such
reprogramming and the Council approves the request” and certain other conditions are met. D.C.
Code § 1-204.46(d).
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits on this count because it is unlikely that they have a private right of action to enforce the
Budget Autonomy Act. The relevant test to determine whether a D.C. statute creates an implied
private right of action is set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See, e.g., Dial A Car, Inc.
v. Transp., Inc., 132 F.3d 743, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In Cort, the Supreme Court stated:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted—that is, does the statute create
a . . . right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third,
is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff?
422 U.S. at 78 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). When
dealing with statutes, such as this one, that do not expressly provide a private right of action,
plaintiffs must meet a “relatively heavy burden of demonstrating that [the legislature]
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affirmatively or specifically contemplated private enforcement when it passed the relevant
statute.” Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Although the issue was not briefed extensively by the parties, it does not appear that
Plaintiffs are likely to meet this burden. The Budget Autonomy Act addresses the roles and
responsibilities of the components of the District of Columbia’s government in appropriating and
spending local funds. See generally Budget Autonomy Act, D.C. Act 19-321 (2013). The law
was passed by the Council to provide greater control over local funds by the District of
Columbia, as opposed to Congress. Council of the District of Columbia, Committee of the
Whole, Report on Bill 19-993, at 1-5 (Dec. 4, 2012). The specific provision cited by Plaintiffs is
entitled “Enactment of local budget by council.” D.C. Code § 1-204.46. And it is located in a
subpart of the D.C. Code entitled “Budget and Financial Management.” D.C. Code §§ 1-204.41–
1-204.53. Plaintiffs cite nothing that suggests that the law was passed to benefit a special class
of persons, that the Council intended to create a private right of action when passing it, or that
the underlying legislative scheme is consistent with such a right. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not even
address the relevant legal standard. See Am. Mot. at 11-12; Reply to Def. Opp. at 5-6. They try
to claim that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, somehow obviates the need to
demonstrate that the statute contains a private right of action. Reply to Def. Opp. at 5. But it is
well settled that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a private right of action; it only
authorizes a form of relief. See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Even if a private right to enforce it existed, however, Plaintiffs have still not
demonstrated a likelihood that the law was in fact violated, because they fail to show that any
funds have actually been—or even will be—unlawfully reprogrammed. Plaintiffs appear to
allege that DCPL has not yet spent the $700,000 that has been allocated for interim services, Am.
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Mot. at 11-12, and may never spend it. They further allege that DCPL may spend the funds on
other community needs, citing a meeting on September 19, 2017, in which DCPL “presented a
proposal that would give the community a choice between getting an interim service modular
trailer by Jan/Feb 2018 or keeping the $700K and investing the funds in other ways,” Am. Mot.
at 8.
However, neither scenario suggests that a violation of the Budget Autonomy Act has
occurred, or is even likely. First, the provision cited by Plaintiffs prohibits the unlawful
reprogramming of funds, not failing to spend them. Second, under the law, if the referenced
proposal were accepted by the community, the Mayor could then seek Council approval to
reprogram the funds, consistent with and as contemplated by D.C. Code § 1-204.46(d), during
the nine or so months remaining in FY 2018. In any event, DCPL’s current intention is not to
reprogram the funds, but to use them consistent with the purpose for which they were allocated:
to open an interim library facility in a school in Plaintiffs’ neighborhood when Capitol View
Library closes in the spring. See Def. Opp. at 17-18; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13. The relevant
officials have executed a Memorandum of Agreement to that effect. ECF No. 27-21. On this
record, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to demonstrate a
violation of this statute.
2. Equal Protection Clause (Count II)
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution by discriminating against them on the basis of race when they failed to provide
Capitol View Library with the same renovations and related services afforded to those public
libraries serving predominantly white neighborhoods. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-45; Am. Mot. at
12-17. The Equal Protection Clause applies to the District of Columbia through the Fifth
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Amendment. See Dixon v. District of Columbia, 666 F.3d 1337, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
This claim requires a showing of intentional discrimination based on race. “[O]fficial
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.” Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-
65 (1977). Discriminatory intent “implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation
omitted).
“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands
a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that “[s]ometimes a
clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” Id. However, the Court
went on to hold that “such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick
Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.” Id. (footnote
omitted) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886)).
As part of this inquiry, the Court considers, among other things, (1) whether the impact of
the action bears more heavily on one race than another; (2) the “historical background” of the
decision, particularly if it demonstrates other actions taken for an invidious purpose; (3) any
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departures from normal procedures; (4) any “substantive departures” from factors normally
considered in reaching a decision; and (5) the administrative history of the decision. Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68; see also Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 27 F. Supp. 3d 171,
184 (D.D.C. 2014). On the entire record before the Court, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on
this claim of intentional racial discrimination.
a. Alleged Library Renovation Budget Disparities
In seeking to demonstrate that Defendants engaged in intentional discrimination,
Plaintiffs compare Capitol View Library’s renovation budget to that of a single other branch
library, Cleveland Park Library. They point out that Capitol View Library, which serves a
neighborhood “cluster” that is 95% black and 1% white, had its renovation budget reduced from
$10.5 million to $4.5 million in the FY 2016 budget. Am. Mot. at 3-4. Meanwhile, Cleveland
Park Library, which serves an area that is 80% white and 4% black, had its renovation budget
hold steady at $18.5 million. Id. But Plaintiffs fail to mention that in the FY 2018 budget, the
Council increased Capitol View Library’s renovation budget from $4.5 million to $7.2 million;
DCPL then increased it by another $726,000, bringing the current renovation budget to
approximately $7.9 million. See Def. Opp. at 6. The funding for Capitol View Library’s
renovation, then, has increased by over 75% since the time Plaintiffs seek to use as a point of
comparison.
Even using up-to-date funding totals, however, this single library-to-library comparison
selected from a larger program of many library renovations across the District of Columbia
reveals next to nothing about whether Defendants have intentionally discriminated against
Plaintiffs based on race. Moreover, expanding the library-to-library comparison beyond
Cleveland Park Library to all five branch library renovation projects currently underway
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significantly undercuts Plaintiffs’ allegations of racial discrimination. For example, the current
budget for Capitol View Library’s renovation is virtually identical to (and in fact marginally
greater than) that of Palisades Library, which Plaintiffs concede serves a neighborhood “cluster”
that is 4% black and 80% white. See Def. Opp. at 21; ECF No. 24-6; Am. Mot. at 3. In addition,
the branch library with the largest budget for an ongoing renovation—$20 million—is Lamond
Riggs Library, located in Ward 5, which the 2010 census recorded as being 77% black. See Def.
Surrep. at 6; ECF No. 24-6. Expanding the data set even further—to all branch library
renovations completed over the last decade or so—the budget for Capitol View Library’s
renovation is greater than the budget that was allocated for Chevy Chase Library located in
Ward 3, which the 2010 census recorded as being 5% black and 84% white.2 See Def. Opp. at
21.
To be sure, these additional one-to-one library comparisons are of limited analytic value,
as well. They do not, for example, account for non-racial differences among these renovation
projects—such as the size of the library to be renovated and the number of items each
circulates—that could explain funding disparities. They do, however, expose Plaintiffs’
comparison between Capitol View Library and Cleveland Park Library as a cherry-picked
example that provides scant evidence of discriminatory intent.
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that Capitol View Library’s renovation budget is well below
the average budget for a DCPL library renovation. Am. Mot. at 4. Again, standing alone, this
fact—even if accurate—does not demonstrate intentional racial discrimination. There could be
2
The Court takes judicial notice of 2010 Census results for Ward 3 maintained on the
Government of the District of Columbia’s Office of Planning website at:
https://planning.dc.gov/node/597402. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 67-68
(D.D.C. 2014) (“[J]udicial notice may be taken of public records and government documents
available from reliable sources.”); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
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many differences among these projects that explain why Capitol View Library’s renovations
have a lower-than-average budget. Plaintiffs allege nothing that would connect this departure
from the mean to racial discrimination.
Finally, Plaintiffs cite a purported comparison of certain “funding streams” between
libraries they identify as “east of the Anacostia River in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods” and libraries elsewhere in the District of Columbia. Am. Mot. at 5. In response,
Executive Defendants assert that over the course of the last decade, the District of Columbia’s
disproportionately black neighborhoods have, in the aggregate, received above-average funding
for library renovations. Def. Opp. at 21. They attach exhibits that cite publicly-available
information illustrating that libraries in Wards 7 and 8—the two wards “east of the Anacostia
River”—received more than the per-ward average of approximately $28 million during that
time.3 See ECF No. 27-5; ECF No. 27-6. Capitol View Library, as noted earlier, is located in
Ward 7. This is, once again, hard to square with intentional discrimination against them.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should adopt a “weighted average” approach
that accounts for the number of libraries in each ward. Reply to Def. Opp. at 6. However,
Plaintiffs do not indicate the source for the data they cite, and they employ an unclear and
inconsistent methodology in making their calculations. In any event, their calculations are not
illustrative of intentional racial discrimination. For example, it appears that they conclude that
the ward with the highest per-branch library renovation funding is Ward 5,4 which the 2010
3
In their supplemental exhibits, Plaintiffs appear to challenge this figure, instead calculating the
per-ward average as $31.7 million. See ECF No. 37-1. Even accepting it as accurate, the
libraries in the two wards east of the Anacostia River still would have received higher than
average funding. See id.
4
This calculation excludes the budget for the renovation of DCPL’s central library, the Martin
Luther King Jr. Library, which is located in Ward 2.
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census recorded as being 77% black. See ECF No. 33-2; Def. Surrep. at 6; ECF No. 37-2.
Plaintiffs’ calculations do not come close to illustrating a “pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or
Yick Wo” from which, without additional evidence, the Court could infer racially discriminatory
intent on the part of Defendants.5
b. Alleged Interim Library Services Disparities
Plaintiffs turn to other services connected with the Capitol View Library renovations to
demonstrate intentional racial discrimination. But Defendants supply non-discriminatory reasons
for their actions that effectively negate Plaintiffs’ assertions of discrimination.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ failure to provide interim library services while Capitol
View Library was closed for renovation is further evidence of intentional discrimination against
them. See Am. Mot. at 3, 5, 6-9, 14; Def. Opp. at 23 n.13. They also assert, in a conclusory
fashion, that “the other libraries in the northwest quadrants of the city, and with significantly
more affluence and resources, were provided prompt interim services,” including Georgetown
Library, Tenley Library, Cleveland Park Library, West End Library, and Mount Pleasant
Library. Am. Compl. ¶ 48.
In response, Executive Defendants assert that the decision to provide interim services is
affected by whether the renovation project’s budget includes sufficient funding for those
services. Def. Opp. at 23; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 5. So to some degree, Plaintiffs’ argument
about interim services simply rehashes their unpersuasive argument concerning the size of
5
For example, “[i]n Gomillion . . . a local statute altered the shape of a city from a square to a
28-sided figure, which had the effect of removing from the city all but four of its 400 African
American voters, and not a single white voter.” In re Navy Chaplaincy, 928 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34
(D.D.C.), aff’d, 738 F.3d 425 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And in “Yick Wo . . . a city board of supervisors
denied building ordinance waivers to over 200 Chinese applicants, but granted waivers to all but
one non-Chinese applicant.” Id. Plaintiffs have shown nothing of the sort here.
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various branch libraries’ renovation budgets. In any event, Executive Defendants explain that
DCPL did in fact provide interim services by assigning Capitol View Library staff members to
nearby libraries, visiting neighborhood schools, and conducting outreach to daycare and early
learning facilities. See Def. Opp. at 7; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 7.
The real thrust of Plaintiffs’ argument is that Defendants failed to provide an interim
library facility. But Executive Defendants provide non-discriminatory reasons for not providing
such a facility. They explain that whether an interim facility is provided by DCPL depends on
the length of the library’s closure and the library’s proximity to other branch locations. Reyes-
Gavilan Decl. ¶ 6. They concede that they generally provide an interim facility for library
closures lasting longer than one year and where there is no other DCPL branch library within a
mile. Id. But in this case, they assert, the budget for Capitol View Library’s renovation project
did not account for an interim facility, the library has been closed for less than ten months, and it
is within a mile of Benning Library. Def. Opp. at 23. Therefore, by their non-discriminatory
criteria, the closing of Capitol View Library would not typically qualify for an interim facility.
Even so, Executive Defendants maintain, they tried to establish an interim facility in a
nearby church, but the church turned down their proposal. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 7; see Am.
Mot. at 7. Moreover, when Capitol View Library closes again, DCPL plans to open an interim
facility on the grounds of J.C. Nalle Elementary School, pursuant to an interagency
Memorandum of Agreement that is already in place. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13; ECF No. 27-21.
Finally, Executive Defendants cite numerous examples in which neighborhoods served by
libraries in Ward 8 (Anacostia Library) and Ward 7 (Benning Library and Francis A. Gregory
Library) that were closed for more than a year received interim library facilities, further
undermining any claim of racial discrimination. Def. Opp. at 23-24.
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In their reply, Plaintiffs argue that the neighborhood served by Palisades Library, which
will be closed for a similar amount of time, will get “more” interim library services—but do not
elaborate further on the nature of these additional services. Reply to Def. at 8. And Defendants
have proffered, and Plaintiffs have not disputed, that the Palisades Library will not receive an
interim library facility—the clear focus of Plaintiffs’ concern—because it will be closed less than
a year. Def. Opp. at 24. In this critical respect, Palisades Library will be treated identically to
Capitol View Library. Plaintiffs also rehash their allegation that it is somehow improper that the
$700,000 allocated for interim services for Capitol View Library in FY 2018 has not yet been
spent, but fail to explain the relevance of this allegation to their racial-discrimination claim.
Reply to Def. at 8. Finally, they argue that Benning Library is in fact more than a mile away
from Capitol View Library and is an unacceptable substitute library for that and other reasons.
Id. Plaintiffs are clearly displeased with the interim services that DCPL has provided—and the
interim facility it plans to provide—for their neighborhood during the Capitol View Library
renovation process. But considered collectively, this evidence of record does not remotely
suggest intentional racial discrimination.
c. Alleged “Opening Day Collection” Budget Disparities
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to provide “opening day collection”
funding for Capitol View Library commensurate with such funding for branch libraries that serve
predominantly white neighborhoods. Am. Mot. at 9-10. Again, Plaintiffs rely heavily on a
comparison with a single other branch: Cleveland Park Library. Id. Plaintiffs assert that Capitol
View Library was allocated $50,000 for its “opening day collection,” yet Cleveland Park Library
was allocated $500,000. Id. Executive Defendants do not contest these funding amounts, but
explain that, in general, this funding is tied to how long the library is closed: the longer the
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closure, the more dated its materials are upon reopening, and the more “refreshing” of these
materials is necessary. See Def. Opp. at 24; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 9. In addition, the amount of
this funding is tied to the number of items the specific library circulates. See Def. Opp. at 24;
Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 10. Capitol View Library has been closed for ten months, and circulated
33,416 items in FY 2015. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 11. Cleveland Park Library will be closed for
two years, and circulated 207,376 items in FY 2015. Id. Therefore, the disparity in funding for
these two libraries’ “opening day collections” appears wholly explainable by factors other than
invidious racial discrimination.6
Moreover, Executive Defendants note that, although Capitol View Library has relatively
low circulation rates, it has a relatively high demand for computer technology. Reyes-Gavilan
Decl. ¶ 12. Therefore, post-renovation, DCPL has included funding in its budget to increase the
number of computers there to forty-four, more than double the current amount, and to hire
additional staff to manage these computer services. Id. Also, Capitol View Library is slated to
become the first renovated or rebuilt DCPL branch to feature a dedicated computer lab for public
technology training. Id. Although Plaintiffs apparently favor a different mix of resources for
Capitol View Library, it is hard to reconcile these notable improvements to their neighborhood
library with intentional racial discrimination.
6
Plaintiffs dismiss this explanation in their reply, and assert that these two libraries cannot be
compared because of disparities in their collections that predate the renovations. See Reply to
Def. Mot. at 9. But it was Plaintiffs who cited this comparison in support of their motion in the
first place. Am. Mot. at 3-4, 9-10. Moreover, this lack of context further illustrates why the
Court cannot conclude that any single library-to-library comparison cited by Plaintiffs is
evidence of intentional racial discrimination.
17
d. Other Potential Indicia of Intentional Racial Discrimination
Plaintiffs also attempt to address other criteria that the Supreme Court referenced as
being potentially probative of discriminatory intent in Arlington Heights. Am. Mot. at 14-16.
Again, they come up well short of the mark. Plaintiffs argue that library “funding patterns bear
[a] historical dimension that tracks the development and gentrification across the city.” Id. at 14.
But development and gentrification are not at issue here, and this conclusory statement says
nothing about the “historical background” related to the funding of DCPL’s branch libraries,
which, as discussed above, is not helpful to them.
Plaintiffs also contend that the “sequence of events” in securing funding for renovations
at Capitol View Library has been “sporadic and piecemeal.” Id. at 14. But Plaintiffs offer
nothing beyond this conclusory statement, and fail to explain how this “sequence” was
inconsistent with Defendants’ usual practice. For instance, they repeatedly emphasize that
Capitol View Library’s capital improvements funding was cut by $6 million in the FY 2016
budget. Id. at 4; Reply to Def. Opp. at 2. But the funding for Palisades Library was also cut by
$13.5 million in the same budget. Def. Opp. at 5-6. These reductions appear to have been made
because “[t]he library, like all district agencies, was asked to absorb some reductions to its [FY
2016] budget to address a projected citywide shortfall of close to 200 million dollars.” ECF No.
33-4, at 1.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants made a “substantial departure” from their
“procedures” by not including enlarged windows in their planned renovations of Capitol View
Library, as suggested in DCPL’s “Building Program” for Capitol View Library’s renovation.
Am. Mot. at 6, 8-9, 15. However, the program expressly provides that it is intended to be used
only “as a guide” and that the “requirements need to be adjusted to fit within the envelope of the
18
existing library while meeting the budget and adhering to all code required upgrades.” Def. Opp.
at 26 (quoting ECF No. 19, at 4) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs’ displeasure with the manner
in which Capitol View Library’s windows have been renovated is plain. But this change to the
renovation plans does not represent a procedural departure at all, let alone one that is suggestive
of discriminatory intent.7
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that “the administrative history of the project has not been
transparent and remains inconsistent with the funding and planning of other DCPL libraries.”
Am. Mot. at 15. To a large extent, here Plaintiffs simply re-state claims advanced elsewhere, as
well as recount their unhappiness with the renovation process for Capitol View Library. See id.
at 15-16. They also allege that DCPL is violating a rule that branch library closures of ten
months or more warrant interim library facilities, but they do not provide any evidence of such a
rule. See id. at 16. Finally, they allege that in renovating Capitol View Library in the manner
described, DCPL is violating its mission, as set forth in its strategic plan. Id. at 16-17. But it is
difficult to comprehend how completion of this library renovation, even in light of the ways in
which Plaintiffs are dissatisfied, is genuinely contrary to that mission.
In summary, none of these additional criteria demonstrate any evidence of racially
discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants. As a result, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed
on the merits of this claim.
3. Substantive Due Process (Count III)
Plaintiffs also allege that their substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment
were violated. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-50. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
7
Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants engaged in impropriety in connection with the
contracting process. Am. Mot. at 15-16. But this claim is so vague and conclusory that it does
not help Plaintiffs meet their burden.
19
U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” To succeed on a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must
prove “egregious government misconduct” that deprives him of a liberty or property interest.
George Wash. Univ. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Substantive
due process “prevents governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, or abuse
of government power that shocks the conscience, or action that is legally irrational [in that] it is
not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.” Wash. Teachers’ Union Local #6 v. Bd.
of Educ. of D.C., 109 F.3d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Comm. of
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The
standard also incorporates a “presumption that the administration of government programs” and
“[d]ecisions concerning the allocation of resources” are “based on a rational decisionmaking
process that takes account of competing social, political, and economic forces.” Fraternal Order
of Police Dep’t of Corr. Labor Comm. v. Williams, 375 F.3d 1141, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(alteration in original) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)).
Plaintiffs are not likely to be successful on this claim. They do not have a
constitutionally recognizable property interest in Capitol View Library’s renovations and related
services that are the focus of their lawsuit. See Boykin v. Gray, 895 F .Supp. 2d 199, 220
(D.D.C. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs had no property interest in homeless shelter slated for
closure). And even if they did, as discussed above, they have not demonstrated conduct on the
part of Defendants that comes close to the required showing of egregious government
misconduct. Rather, the conduct at issue in this case consists of run-of-the-mill decisions about
how to allocate government resources, and as such is entitled to a presumption of rationality that
Plaintiffs have not overcome.
20
4. District of Columbia Human Rights Act (Count IV)
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq., by discriminating against them on the
basis of their place of residence. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-53; Am. Mot. at 19-20. The DCHRA
states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided for by District law or when otherwise lawfully and
reasonably permitted, it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for a District
government agency or office to limit or refuse to provide any facility, service,
program, or benefit to any individual on the basis of an individual’s actual or
perceived: . . . place of residence . . . .
D.C. Code § 2-1402.73. The DCHRA’s “effects clause” states that “[a]ny practice which has the
effect or consequence of violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be an
unlawful discriminatory practice.” Id. § 2-1402.68. This “effects clause” imports into the
DCHRA “the concept of disparate impact discrimination developed by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).” Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law
Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 29 (D.C. 1987) (parallel citations omitted); see also 2922
Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, “despite the absence of any intention to discriminate, practices are unlawful if they
bear disproportionately on a protected class and are not independently justified for some
nondiscriminatory reason.” Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at 29.
On the record before the Court, Plaintiffs are no more likely to succeed on this claim than
on the others, for reasons similar to those set forth in Boykin. In that case, the district court
dismissed a place-of-residence discrimination claim under the DCHRA based on the District of
Columbia’s closure of a homeless shelter in one neighborhood, while leaving similar shelters
intact in other neighborhoods. See Boykin, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 217-218. The court concluded
that:
21
[I]t cannot be that Section 2-1402.73 is violated simply because the District closes
a public assistance facility in one part of the city while failing to close similar
facilities in a different part of the city. Under that reasoning, virtually any
decision by the District limiting or restricting services of any kind in one
quadrant, ward, or neighborhood could be challenged as discriminatory under the
DCHRA. The same logic would seemingly allow individuals to sue over a failure
to construct facilities or provide services in one part of the city where such
facilities or services are available elsewhere. This broad interpretation, which
would subject an unimaginable number of routine policy decisions to litigation,
cannot credibly be derived from a provision that bars discrimination ‘on the basis
of’ place of residence or eighteen other protected traits. . . . [T]he language of
Section 2-1402.73 signals a focus on the selective denial of benefits to certain
persons, based on their place of residence, while those benefits remain available
to other persons. The conduct challenged here by the plaintiffs simply is not
encompassed within that definition.
Boykin, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 218 (citation omitted).
The same is true here. There has been no “selective denial of benefits to certain persons”
while those benefits remain available to other persons. Id. The entire DCPL system of branch
libraries remains open to all residents of the District of Columbia, no matter the neighborhood or
ward in which they live. See Def. Opp. at 30; D.C. Code § 39-103. Plaintiffs are therefore free
to “request materials from, visit, and enjoy any library in the city,” including two in Ward 7
(where Plaintiffs reside) and three in Ward 8, each of which was recently renovated. Def. Opp.
at 30; see ECF No. 27-5. Moreover, to interpret the statute to encompass Plaintiffs’ claims here
would allow “individuals to sue over a failure to construct facilities or provide services in one
part of the city where such facilities or services are available elsewhere . . . , subject[ing] an
unimaginable number of routine policy decisions to litigation.” Boykin, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 218;
see also Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 27 F. Supp. 3d 142, 166-67 (D.D.C. 2014)
(dismissing place of residence discrimination claim under the DCHRA based on the District of
Columbia’s construction of a facility in a particular neighborhood).
22
Finally, even assuming Plaintiffs’ claims are cognizable under the statute, Defendants
actions appear to be justified by non-discriminatory reasons. As discussed at length above, it
appears that renovations of various library branches in many different neighborhoods, including
Capitol View Library, are being completed while taking into account budgetary restrictions, the
characteristics of each library, and the needs of each neighborhood. That is not to say, however,
that all residents of each neighborhood necessarily agree with each of those policy decisions.
Plaintiffs point to Mitchell v. DCX, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2003), in support of
their DCHRA argument. But in that case, a taxi company was found liable because it was
“significantly less likely to pick up a person requesting service from Anacostia than it [was] to
pick up a person requesting service from another part of the city,” resulting in a wholesale denial
of benefits to certain persons there while those benefits remained available to others. Id. at 49.
Nothing of the sort has occurred in connection with Capitol View Library’s renovation.
B. Irreparable Harm
The irreparable injury requirement sets a “very high bar” for a movant seeking a
preliminary injunction. Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. United States, 576 F.
Supp. 2d 162, 168 (D.D.C. 2008). To be entitled to such relief, a plaintiff must show injury that
is “certain, great, actual, and imminent.” Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. FDA, 910 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313
(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Wis. Gas. Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Plaintiffs
must show that the harm will “directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.”
Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674. And the harm must be “beyond remediation.” CFGC v.
England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The availability of “adequate compensatory or
other corrective relief” in the ordinary course of litigation “weighs heavily against a claim of
irreparable harm.” Va. Petrol. Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
23
Plaintiffs do not come close to demonstrating the type of harm required to obtain a
preliminary injunction. They allege that if an injunction does not issue they will suffer such
harm as a result of (1) the lack of interim library services at Capitol View Library; (2) DCPL’s
purported failure to install, or to plan for, windows at Capitol View Library that are large enough
to let in sufficient natural light; (3) the lack of funding for Capitol View Library’s “opening day
collection,” and (4) a “noise disturbance” from using Capitol View Library when the library’s
exterior renovation occurs. Am. Mot. at 20-21.
Simply put, it is self-evident that none of these allegations even approaches the
irreparable harm standard. Whatever harm might be suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of allegedly
suboptimal interim library services, the library’s window designs, or inadequate “opening day
collection” funding for Capitol View Library is speculative and not of sufficient severity to
warrant a preliminary injunction. See Comm. of 100 on Fed. City v. Foxx, 87 F. Supp. 3d 191,
203-04 (D.D.C. 2015) (declining to hold that “a temporary closure of a park or recreation area”
constituted irreparable harm). The same is true for any alleged “noise disturbance” that could
result from the renovation of the library’s exterior. See City of Tempe v. FAA, 239 F. Supp. 2d
55, 63 (D.D.C. 2003) (declining to find irreparable harm where plaintiffs did not establish that
emissions from an airport runway project were “anything more than minimal”). In addition, the
alleged lack of interim library services and concerns about noise disturbances in the library
during its renovation cannot be the basis for any imminent harm at all. If the injunction does not
issue, Capitol View Library, upon re-opening, will provide full services until the spring of next
year, and no interim services will be necessary until then. Moreover, the library’s external
renovation is not planned to begin until the spring, at which time DCPL plans to close it. Reyes-
Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13. Finally, there is no obvious reason why any of these harms, if later proven,
24
could not be the subject of adequate compensation or other corrective relief in the normal course
of this litigation.
Plaintiffs appear to argue that they will suffer irreparable harm merely because some of
these factual allegations are grounded in an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Am. Mot. at 21. But “merely raising a constitutional claim is insufficient to warrant a
presumption of irreparable injury.” Sweis v. U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Comm’n, 950 F.
Supp. 2d 44, 48 (D.D.C. 2013). And even assuming that all of Plaintiffs’ factual—as opposed to
merely conclusory—allegations are true, they do not sufficiently demonstrate irreparable injury
on the record here. See Incantalupo v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 652 F. Supp. 2d
314, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding no irreparable injury for a First Amendment claim because
the factual allegations plead were insufficient). At any rate, even assuming that every Equal
Protection Clause allegation constitutes an irreparable injury, see Mills v. District of Columbia,
571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he loss of constitutional freedoms, ‘for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’”) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)), the other factors relevant for a preliminary
injunction—the likelihood of success on the merits, balance of the equities, and public interest—
weigh so heavily against Plaintiffs that they cannot prevail.
Finally, in their reply, Plaintiffs allege a further basis for irreparable harm: a small pool
of standing water that has collected near Capitol View Library’s entrance that they allege is
dangerous for children. See Reply to Def. Opp. at 1-2; ECF No. 33-1; see also ECF No. 37-4.
At oral argument, counsel for Executive Defendants explained that this is likely the result of a
faulty sump pump, which is failing to adequately remove water from a bio-retention pond that
was built to collect stormwater runoff.
25
Again, on the record here, any harm that might be suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of this
small pool of water is highly speculative, as opposed to certain, actual, and imminent. In
addition, the requested relief will obviate little, if any, alleged harm connected to this pool. As
explained above, Plaintiffs must show that the harm will “directly result from the action which
the movant seeks to enjoin.” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674. But re-opening the Capitol View
Library building—which has been issued a Certificate of Occupancy by the District of
Columbia—will not substantially affect any speculative harm posed by the pool of water on its
grounds. See ECF No. 27-20. Finally, Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the pool were not
pleaded in the amended complaint and do not appear connected to any of Plaintiffs’ causes of
action. The Court “lacks jurisdiction over a motion when it ‘raises issues different from those
presented in the complaint.’” Sai v. TSA, 54 F. Supp. 3d 5, 9 (quoting Adair v. England, 193 F.
Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002)); accord Stewart v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
762 F.2d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1985).
C. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest
In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, “courts must balance the
competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. “In exercising their sound
discretion, courts . . . should [also] pay particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Id. In this case, the balance of the equities
and the public interest weigh strongly against injunctive relief.
In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that the public interest would be served by providing
their community with much needed library resources, including computer resources. Am. Mot.
at 21-22. But enjoining the re-opening of Capitol View Library would prevent the public from
26
having access to those resources. Indeed, upon re-opening, Capitol View Library is slated to
become the first renovated or rebuilt DCPL branch to feature a dedicated computer lab for public
technology training. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 12. To date, DCPL has spent $4.5 million to
renovate its interior. Def. Opp. at 33. And going forward, DCPL has included funding in its
budget to more than double the number of computers in the lab (to forty-four) and to hire
additional staff to manage computer services. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 12. For these reasons, the
balance of the equities and the public interest weigh strongly in favor of allowing Capitol View
Library to re-open for the benefit of the entire neighborhood it serves, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’
dissatisfaction with it.
Finally, the other relief sought by Plaintiffs, such as ordering additional resources for
Capitol View Library, mandating that its windows be renovated in a particular manner, and
requiring that Defendants incorporate Plaintiffs’ input into the renovation process, would change,
rather than maintain, the status quo, and therefore represents “an even more extraordinary
remedy.” Abdullah v. Bush, 945 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations omitted).
More importantly, ordering such relief would plunge the Court into the political process
through which the Mayor, the Council, and other public officials allocate limited resources for all
residents of the District of Columbia. Ordering this relief would likely force them to reprogram
funds designated for other projects, and could encourage piecemeal private litigation over the
District of Columbia’s budget. Especially on the record here, the balance of the equities and the
public interest weigh strongly against this course, for which the Court is especially ill-equipped.
See, e.g., Nat’l. Wildlife Fed’n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he
public interest dictates . . . restraint is necessary where, as here, [plaintiffs] ask us to intervene in
wrangling over the . . . budget and budget procedures. Such matters are the archetype of those
27
best resolved through bargaining and accommodation between the legislative and executive
branches.”) (citation omitted). And even assuming such a remedy could be justified, Plaintiffs
have utterly failed to demonstrate how the public interest would be better served by awarding
such relief now, through the extraordinary measure of preliminary equitable relief, as opposed to
at the end of the case should they prevail.
IV. Conclusion and Order
For all of the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: December 15, 2017
28