Romero Trado v. Express Home Solutions L.L.C.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BENJAMIN DAVID ROMERO TIRADO,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 21-3152 (JEB)
EXPRESS HOME SOLUTIONS L.L.C., et
al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After certain home-remodeling companies failed to pay Plaintiff Benjamin Tirado for
some of his work and related overtime pay, he sued them and their owners under the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act and assorted state wage statutes. This Court previously entered a default
judgment against two other Defendants in this case, Express Home Solutions LLC (EHS) and
Joseph Estep, in the amount of $24,800. Plaintiff now moves for a default judgment against the
remaining Defendants — Defined Construction Group LLC (DCG), Steven Fenwick, and
Sanovia Smith — for the same amount. The Court will grant the Motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff sued to recover damages for unpaid wages under the FLSA and the District of
Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law (DCWPCL). In his Complaint, Tirado
additionally sought relief under the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act
(DCMWRA), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL), and the Maryland Wage Payment
and Collection Law (MWPCL). See ECF No. 29 (Am. Compl.) at 1–2. Following the Court’s
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analysis in its prior default-judgment Opinion, see ECF No. 35 (DJ Mem. Op.) at 4, Plaintiff now
seeks default judgment under only the FLSA and DCWPCL. See ECF No. 49-1 (Mot. for DJ) at
1.
Tirado filed this action on December 1, 2021, and timely served Smith, Estep, EHS, and
DCG. See ECF Nos. 4, 6–7, 16 (Affs. of Process Server). After these Defendants failed to
answer or otherwise respond, the Clerk entered default on March 11, 2022, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). See ECF Nos. 11–13, 19 (Clerk’s Entries of Default).
In June 2022, however, Smith and DCG successfully moved to vacate the default against
them. See ECF No. 24 (Mot. to Vacate); Minute Order of June 6, 2022. On July 12, 2022,
Plaintiff amended his Complaint to include Fenwick as a Defendant, see Am. Compl. at 1, and
eventually effected service on him. See ECF No. 42 (Aff. of Process Server). The Court next
granted default judgment on July 29, 2022, against both Estep and EHS, ultimately finding them
jointly and severally liable for $24,800 in damages. See ECF No. 34 (DJ Order); ECF No. 38
(Am. J.).
Smith and DCG, meanwhile, failed to appear at two court hearings and to respond to any
discovery request. See Minute Order of Oct. 7, 2022. Additionally, Fenwick never responded to
the summons served upon him. See ECF No. 43 (Fenwick Aff. for Default). The Clerk thus
entered default against Fenwick on December 22, 2022, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a). See ECF No. 46 (Clerk’s Entry of Default). This Court later ordered the Clerk
to enter default against Smith and DCG on January 4, 2023. See ECF No. 47 (Order of Default).
Plaintiff now asks the Court to enter a default judgment in the same sum of $24,800
against Smith, DCG, and Fenwick in unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages. See Mot.
for DJ.
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II. Legal Standard
Obtaining a “[d]efault judgment is a two-step procedure.” Ventura v. L.A. Howard
Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Lanny J. Davis & Assocs., LLC v.
Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2013)). “First, the plaintiff
[must] request[] that the Clerk of the Court enter default against a party who has ‘failed to plead
or otherwise defend’” the action. Id. at 102–03 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). An entry of
“[d]efault establishes the defaulting party’s liability for the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint.” Id. at 103. Second, the plaintiff must then move the Court for a default judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
The determination of whether a default judgment is appropriate is “committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(citations omitted). A default judgment may be entered where a defendant is “totally
unresponsive” and her default is plainly willful, as reflected by her failure to respond to the
summons and complaint, the entry of default, or the motion for default judgment. Hanley-Wood
LLC v. Hanley Wood LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Gutierrez v. Berg
Contracting Inc., No. 99-3044, 2000 WL 331721, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2000)). Nevertheless,
“[m]odern courts are . . . reluctant to enter and enforce judgments unwarranted by the facts,”
Jackson, 636 F.2d at 835, and “a district court may still deny an application for default judgment
where the allegations of the complaint, even if true, are legally insufficient to make out a claim.”
Gutierrez, 2000 WL 331721, at *2 (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.
1980)).
To ensure that there is an adequate basis to determine damages, “a plaintiff must prove
[his] entitlement to the relief requested using detailed affidavits or documentary evidence on
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which the court may rely.” Ventura, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see Boland v. Providence Constr. Corp., 304 F.R.D. 31, 36 (D.D.C. 2014).
III. Analysis
The Court first looks at whether Defendants Smith, DCG, and Fenwick’s
unresponsiveness warrants a default judgment. Answering that question in the affirmative, it
next considers whether the claims brought under the FLSA and DCWPCL are appropriately
brought against these Defendants and, if so, what the proper amount of damages is. As the
underlying damages are identical to those previously set forth in the Court’s Opinion granting
default judgment against Estep and EHS, this Opinion last adopts the damages analysis outlined
there.
A. Default Judgment
The Court initially concludes that Defendants’ default here is willful and deliberate, as
they have been “totally unresponsive.” Hanley-Wood LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 150. After
successfully vacating the initial default against them, Smith and DCG failed to further defend
this action by missing two court hearings, refusing to engage in discovery, and never responding
to this Motion. Fenwick never acted on the summons timely provided to him. “Given ‘the
absence of any request to set aside the default or . . . the defendant[s’ proving] that [they have] a
meritorious defense,’ it is clear that the standard for default judgment has been satisfied.” Id. at
150 (quoting Gutierrez, 2000 WL 331721, at *1).
B. Proper Defendants
Only “employers” are proper defendants under the FLSA and DCWPCL. An employer
“includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee and includes a public agency.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); see also Thompson v. Linda & A.,
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Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 139, 146 (D.D.C 2011) (“[D]eterminations of employer . . . status under the
FLSA apply equally under the District of Columbia wage laws.”). To determine if a person or
entity is an employer under the FLSA, the Court looks to whether the alleged employer “(1) had
the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules
or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained
employment records.” Ayala v. Tito Contractors, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 279, 288 (D.D.C. 2015).
Considering these factors, each Defendant — Smith, DCG, and Fenwick — qualifies.
Smith, as the owner of DCG, had the authority to hire, fire, and discipline Tirado. See ECF No.
49-2, Exh. A (Benjamin Tirado Decl.), ¶ 6. She would regularly inspect his job site and instruct
him if the project needed adjustments. Id., ¶¶ 12, 13. Smith also monitored project expenses to
guarantee profitability. Id., ¶ 14. Fenwick, too, could hire, fire, or discipline Tirado as he was
the foreman for both DCG and EHS. Id., ¶ 7. Fenwick controlled Tirado’s work schedule,
telling him when and where he needed to arrive for the job. Id., ¶¶ 9, 10. Fenwick further set
Plaintiff’s pay rate and the method of payment, including providing him no premium for
overtime hours. Smith, meanwhile, would regularly issue the checks on behalf of both EHS and
DCG. Id., ¶¶ 9, 10, 19.
As to DCG, it (along with EHS) also operated as Tirado’s employer. Under the FLSA,
“an employee may be employed by more than one employer.” Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt.,
Inc., 300 F. Supp. 3d 234, 240 (D.D.C. 2018). Determining joint-employer status is “essentially
a fact issue” that looks at the “‘economic reality’ of the employment arrangement.” Id. at 240,
243 (quoting Morrison v. Int’l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 10–11 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
Here, Tirado was paid both by DCG and EHS throughout his employment. See Tirado Decl.,
¶ 18; ECF No. 49-3, Exh. C (Checks) (noting both DCG and EHS checks used for payment).
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These two companies controlled and managed the project together. See Tirado Decl., ¶¶ 3, 9, 11,
16. Both DCG and EHS shared the same foreman to supervise and direct Tirado. Id., ¶¶ 9–11.
The companies, therefore, often acted as one entity during the duration of Plaintiff’s employment
regarding his supervision and pay. “[I]f the facts establish that the employee is employed jointly
by two or more employers, . . . all joint employers are responsible, both individually and jointly,
for compliance with all applicable provisions” of the FLSA and DCWPCL. See Ventura v. Bebo
Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 34 (D.D.C. 2010). All Defendants are thus jointly and severally
liable for Plaintiff’s damages.
C. Wages
Tirado has previously proven the amount of damages he requested, see DJ Mem. Op. at
5–7, and he attaches the exact same documentary evidence to his latest Motion. Once again, he
has established that he was (1) underpaid for working overtime; (2) never paid for two weeks
worked; and (3) issued checks that were rejected by the bank. See Tirado Decl., ¶¶ 23, 26, 29.
Plaintiff has met his burden by providing a detailed declaration, as well as copies of checks and
documentation of checks being returned. See Tirado Decl.; Checks (including a check written
for $1,200, $100 less than required for overtime); ECF No. 49-4, Exh. C (Returned Checks); see
also DJ Mem. Op. at 5–7. In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff should recover $6,200 in unpaid
wages.
D. Liquidated Damages
In addition to this sum, Tirado again seeks a multiplier for liquidated damages. As
discussed in its prior Opinion, the Court will assess damages under the DCWPCL. See DJ Mem.
Op. at 8 (quoting Herrera v. Mitch O’Hara LLC, 257 F. Supp. 3d 37, 44 (D.D.C. 2017)).
Pursuant to that statute, a delinquent employer may be liable to an employee for the payment of
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“[l]iquidated damages equal to treble the amount of unpaid wages” in addition to the back wages.
See D.C. Code § 32-1308(a)(1)(A). The Court thus multiples Plaintiff’s actual damages of
$6,200 by three to determine liquidated damages, which yields a total of $18,600. The Court
then adds the cost of the lost wages to the liquidated damages to arrive at the total amount that
Plaintiff is owed: $24,800.
IV. Conclusion
The Court, therefore, will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and will impose
on Defendants Sanovia Smith, DCG, and Steven Fenwick the same previous default judgment in
the sum of $24,800, for which all five Defendants are jointly and severally liable. A separate
Order will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: February 1, 2023
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