United States v. Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal Case No. 15-194 (BAH)
Judge Beryl A. Howell
JARED SMITH,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by the defendant, Jared Smith, seeking
reconsideration, under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), of the Magistrate Judge’s order of detention
entered after a detention hearing. See Def.’s Mot. Set Bond (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 11;
Det. Mem., ECF No. 10; Minute Entry, dated Feb. 5, 2016. Specifically, the defendant
proposes his release pending trial on conditions that include residence with the retired parents
of his fiancé, pretrial supervision by the U.S. Probation Office of the Northern District of
California and electronic monitoring. Def.’s Mot. at 1; Rough Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 12, 2016) at 9–
10. For the reasons set forth below, this motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Jared Smith was indicted on December 17, 2015, for one count of conspiracy
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing at least 50
grams of methamphetamine, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Indictment at 1, ECF No. 1.
According to the government’s proffer during the defendant’s initial detention hearing
before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay, the defendant, who is a resident of California, allegedly
acquired methamphetamine from suppliers in California, which he then distributed via mail to
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recipients in seven states and the District of Columbia. Det. Mem. at 1. In connection with this
alleged distribution to over twenty individuals, the defendant allegedly received approximately
$250,000. Id. at 1–2.
Following his arrest in California on December 17, 2015, the defendant was ordered
temporarily detained, at the government’s request, by Magistrate Judge Deborah Robinson.
Minute Entry, dated Jan. 12, 2016. Thereafter, following the parties’ multiple requests to
continue the defendant’s subsequent detention hearing, Magistrate Judge Kay granted the
government’s oral motion to detain the defendant pending trial on February 5, 2016, see Minute
Entry, dated Feb. 5, 2016, which oral ruling was later supplemented by a written Detention
Memorandum issued on February 9, 2016, see Det. Mem. Consequently, the defendant was
ordered by Magistrate Judge Kay to be held without bond pending trial. Id. at 5.
The defendant thereafter, on February 10, 2016, filed the pending motion requesting his
release pending trial on pretrial supervision, with electronic monitoring, in the Northern District
of California. Def.’s Mot. at 1. The Court held a hearing on the motion on February 12, 2016,
at which the defendant clarified that his fiancé’s parents, both of whom are retired attorneys who
reside in San Diego, California, are prepared to assist in supervising the defendant during any
period of his release before trial. Rough Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 12, 2016) at 9–10. According to the
defendant, such supervision could be accomplished either in his hometown of Monterey,
California, or alternatively, in San Diego. Id. at 6.
At the conclusion of the hearing, at which the Court heard from both the defendant and
the government, the Court issued an oral ruling denying the defendant’s motion. See Minute
Entry, Feb. 12, 2016. This Memorandum Opinion sets forth in further detail the basis for the
Court’s ruling. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1) (requiring that detention order “include written
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findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention”); see also United States
v. Nwokoro, 651 F.3d 108, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that Bail Reform Act requires pretrial
detention order be supported by “a clear and legally sufficient basis for the court’s
determination” in written findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention
or in “the transcription of a detention hearing”) (quoting United States v. Peralta, 849 F.2d 625,
626 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (per curiam).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) for review of a Magistrate Judge’s detention order
requires that the Court review de novo whether conditions of release exist that “will reasonably
assure the defendant’s appearance in court or the safety of any other person or the community.”
United States v. Hassanshahi, 989 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e)(1)). “‘The Court is free to use in its analysis any evidence or reasons relied on by the
magistrate judge, but it may also hear additional evidence and rely on its own reasons.’” United
States v. Hubbard, 962 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting United States v. Sheffield,
799 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C. 2011)); see also United States v. Hitselberger, 909 F. Supp. 2d
4, 7 (D.D.C. 2012).
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a “regulatory device . . . to provide fair bail
procedures while protecting the safety of the public and assuring the appearance at trial of
defendants found likely to flee.” United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 719–720
(1990). Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., a judicial officer “shall order” a
defendant’s detention before trial if, after a hearing, “the judicial officer finds that no condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and
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the safety of any other person and the community.” Id. § 3142(e). The judicial officer
considering the propriety of pretrial detention must consider four factors:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the
offense . . . involves . . . a controlled substance;
(2) the weight of evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including . . . the person’s
character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial
resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past
conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record
concerning appearance at court proceedings; and . . . whether, at the time of
the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on
other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for
an offense under Federal, State, or local law;
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person’s release.
Id. § 3142(g).
The government is required to demonstrate the appropriateness of pretrial detention by
clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 3142(f). When, however, “there is probable cause to
believe that the [defendant] committed . . . an offense for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §
801 et seq.),” a rebuttable presumption is triggered “that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of
any other person and the community.” Id. § 3142(e)(3)(A). The D.C. Circuit has made clear that
the Court “may rely on a grand jury indictment to establish probable cause for the purposes of
triggering the rebuttable presumption of section 3142(e).” United States v. Williams, 903 F.2d
844, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d
1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he indictment alone would have been enough to raise the
rebuttable presumption that no condition would reasonably assure the safety of the community.”
(citing authorities)). Notwithstanding the grand jury’s finding of probable cause, the Court must
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evaluate the weight of the evidence against a defendant seeking reconsideration of a detention
order and pretrial release to determine whether pretrial detention is proper. 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g)(2).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court sets out below an evaluation of each of the four factors, under 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g), that must be considered in determining whether pretrial detention is warranted here.
First, with respect to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant is
charged in Count One of the Indictment with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of the Controlled Substances
Act, a felony that is punishable by more than ten years of imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(A)(viii), 846. This charge is predicated on the defendant’s alleged involvement in a
large-scale methamphetamine trafficking operation spanning from California to this jurisdiction,
and multiple States in between the two coasts, and involving multiple individual shipments of
narcotics. Det. Mem. at 1–2. Despite the fact that no firearms or violence has been associated
with the defendant’s alleged illegal conduct, if convicted of this serious felony offense, the
defendant faces a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ incarceration, and a maximum
sentence of life. 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Thus, the rebuttable presumption required under
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) applies here.
Second, as to the weight of the evidence against the defendant, a grand jury has returned
an indictment establishing that probable cause exists to find that the defendant committed the
charged offenses. See generally Indictment. In its proffer before the Magistrate Judge, the
government indicates that it has recovered packages containing methamphetamine allegedly sent
by the defendant to recipients in Indiana, Ohio, and the District of Columbia, and has identified
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evidence of payment in connection with over twenty illicit transactions. Det. Mem. at 4. In
response, the defendant generally has not contested the government’s representations and has
indicated instead that the parties are discussing a potential agreement to dispose of this matter.
Third, regarding the “history and characteristics of the [defendant],” the defendant has
performed significant service to his country during his two-decade career in the United States
Navy. In addition, he is currently employed in California, which employment the defendant
represents would remain available to him should he be released prior to trial. Notwithstanding
these commendable aspects of the defendant’s background, the Court finds troubling that the
conduct underlying the instant Indictment against the defendant began and persisted while the
defendant was enrolled in a diversion program in connection with a prior arrest, in California, for
methamphetamine possession. Id. Yet, despite the wake-up call of a drug arrest and being given
the opportunity to set his life straight and live within the confines of the law through the
diversion program, the defendant allegedly engaged in the serious narcotics trafficking offense
charged in this case. Moreover, although the defendant is a United States citizen, he has
negligible to no ties to the District of Columbia community. As a result, his request for
supervision in California presents the additional challenge of ensuring that the defendant appears
before this Court as required for trial. This potential challenge, together with the significant
sentence the defendant may face if convicted, poses some risk of flight that the defendant has
sought to address with his proposed conditions of release.
Finally, with respect to the last factor regarding the nature and seriousness of the
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release, the
defendant’s apparent willingness to continue to engage in illegal conduct, even while he
was otherwise gainfully employed and even after a criminal arrest in another case,
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counsels strongly against release. This aspect of the defendant’s prior criminal history
significantly reduces the Court’s confidence that he will now comply with the conditions
of his release and instead suggests that, if given an opportunity, the defendant has
difficulty refraining from engaging in further illegal conduct that endangers not only the
District of Columbia community but numerous other communities throughout the
country.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Jared Smith has failed to rebut the
presumption for detention that applies here. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for reversal of
the Magistrate Judge’s order of detention is denied and he shall remain in the custody of the
Attorney General for confinement pending a final disposition in this case.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: February 16, 2016
Digitally signed by Hon. Beryl A. Howell,
United States District Court Judge
DN: cn=Hon. Beryl A. Howell, United States
District Court Judge, o=U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia, ou,
email=Howell_Chambers@dcd.uscourts.gov,
c=US
______________________
Date: 2016.02.16 16:11:42 -05'00'
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge
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