Sadler v. U.S. Department of Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JUSTIN SADLER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 18-1695 (TJK)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Justin Sadler, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has
sued Defendants Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for allegedly
misclassifying him as a sex offender. But for the reasons below, Sadler has failed to state a
claim for some of the causes of action in his complaint, and the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the others. The Court will therefore dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Sadler alleges that Defendants have improperly classified him in prison databases as a
sex offender even though he “has not been convicted of such an offense.” ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”)
at 1. This classification is one of various Public Safety Factors (PSFs) that prison officials may
assign to an inmate whose “current offense, sentence, criminal history or institutional behavior
. . . requires additional security measures be employed to ensure the safety and protection of the
public.” BOP Program Statement P5100.08, Inmate Security Designation and Custody
Classification, ch. 5 at 7 (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf.
According to Sadler, his sex-offender PSF limits certain of his privileges and puts his safety at
risk. See Compl. at 1. Sadler alleges that he “asked [Defendants] to remove the false
classification from his files,” but they “failed to do so.” Id. at 2.
 Sadler sued Defendants in July 2018. Id. His complaint pleads causes of action under (1)
the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; (2) the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552; and (3) the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 1–2. He seeks
compensatory damages “in an amount commensurate with the Privacy Act,” an injunction
compelling Defendants to remove his sex-offender PSF, and a declaratory judgment that he “is
legally innocent of any previously charged or indicted offenses with underlying allegations of
sexual misconduct.” Id. Defendants moved to dismiss Sadler’s complaint under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No 13-1 (“Mot.”). Sadler opposed their motion,
and Defendants replied. See ECF No. 16 (“Opp’n”); ECF No. 17.
II. Legal Standards
In considering a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), a court must
“treat a complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must grant a plaintiff ‘the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216
F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d
605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, a district court must “consider his
filings as a whole before dismissing a complaint,” Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33, 38
(D.C. Cir. 2014), because pro se complaints are held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, the
Court need not draw inferences in favor of a plaintiff, pro se or otherwise, if those inferences are
not supported by the facts alleged. See Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must establish that the
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “sufficient factual
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matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. In considering whether a plaintiff
has met this standard, “the Court ‘may only consider the facts alleged in the complaint,
documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about
which the Court may take judicial notice.’” Hiligh v. Sands, 389 F. Supp. 3d 69, 72 (D.D.C.
2019) (quoting Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002)).
III. Analysis
A. Privacy Act
Sadler first alleges a cause of action under the Privacy Act. See Compl. at 2. That statute
“regulates the ‘collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information’ about individuals
by federal agencies.” Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Doe v. Chao,
540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004)). Sadler does not specify how Defendants violated the Privacy Act by
including the sex-offender PSF in his records. 1 But his claim fails for reasons other than that
lack of specificity.
BOP regulations exempt all records contained in its Inmate Central Records System from
Privacy Act obligations. 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j). And PSFs are housed within the Inmate Central
Records System. See Program Statement P5100.08, ch. 5 at 7; BOP Program Statement 5800.17,
Inmate Central File, Privacy Holder, and Parole Mini-Files, at 17 (Apr. 3, 2015),
1
Defendants suggest that Sadler may seek to invoke 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d), (e)(5), or (f). Mot. at 3
& n.1. Subsection (d) allows a plaintiff to request that an agency amend an erroneous record
about him; subsection (e)(5) allows a plaintiff to sue if the agency makes an adverse
determination based on an erroneous record; and subsection (f) allows a plaintiff to sue if he is
harmed by regulations issued under the Privacy Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A), (C), (D).
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https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5800_017.pdf. Accordingly, as numerous courts have held,
PSFs are exempted from the Privacy Act as a matter of law. See, e.g., Harrison v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 248 F. Supp. 3d 172, 180–81 (D.D.C. 2017). As the court in Harrison
explained:
“[a]ll information pertaining to a prisoner’s security level and custody classification
is maintained in the Inmate Central Records System,” and that system of records is
exempt from the provisions of the Privacy Act on which Harrison relies. Vaden v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 79 F. Supp. 3d 207, 212 (D.D.C. 2015) (quotations and
alterations omitted); see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) (authorizing the exemption); see also
28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j) (the exemption itself). The BOP’s Program Statement on
Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification explains that PSFs are
normally applied at intake on the inmate’s BP–337 form, and may then be amended
through the use of Form BP–338. See Program Statement P5100.08, ch. 5 at 7.
And the Program Statement on the Inmate Central Records System explicitly states
that forms BP–337 and BP–338 reside on that system. See Program Statement
5800.17 at 15–17. In fact, that system appears to house all inmate records related
to sentencing, PSFs, housing, custody classification, security designations, and the
like. See id. The Court, accordingly, must join numerous other courts in holding,
as a matter of law, that the Privacy Act subsections (d)(1), (e)(5), (f), and others
afford inmates and former inmates no cause of action regarding such records.
Id. Sadler argues that Defendants have produced “no evidence” showing that the relevant
records are housed within the Inmate Central Records System. Opp’n at 3. But as the Harrison
court explained, under BOP policy that is where all information pertaining to Sadler’s security
level and custody classification is kept, and Sadler suggests no reason for the Court to doubt that
is the case here. Sadler cannot state a claim under the Privacy Act because the records at issue
are exempt from its provisions as a matter of law. The Court must therefore dismiss his Privacy
Act claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
B. FOIA
Sadler also asserts a cause of action under the FOIA. See Compl. at 1. Opp’n at 3–4.
“The FOIA ‘mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within one of
nine exemptions.’” Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
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(quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011)). Relevant here, an agency must
disclose records “on request.” Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). But nowhere in Sadler’s
complaint or opposition does he directly assert that he ever filed a FOIA request. And nowhere
does he allege facts from which the Court could conclude that it is plausible that he did—for
example, when he made such a request, how he made it, to whom he directed it, or what records
he requested. The most he does is assert in his opposition that the BOP has “omit[ted]
significant details of its own knowledge of [his] FOIA request.” Opp’n at 4 (emphasis added).
On this record, the Court cannot find that Sadler has met the pleading requirements under Rule
12(b)(6), even applying the relaxed standard that his pro se status warrants. It will therefore
dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 2
C. Constitutional Claims
Finally, Sadler invokes the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. See
Compl. at 1. To the extent he seeks money damages based on these constitutional claims, the
federal government’s sovereign immunity deprives the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction,
absent an express waiver. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); see also Harrison, 248
F. Supp. 3d at 183. Sadler identifies no such waiver, nor does one appear applicable here.
To the extent Sadler seeks injunctive relief, he appears to rely on the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06. He cites Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, in which
the Tenth Circuit concluded that the APA waived sovereign immunity for nonmonetary
constitutional claims against the federal government. See Opp’n at 4; 413 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th
2
Sadler also makes a cursory request to amend his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a). Opp’n at 4. But he did not attach a proposed amended complaint as required
by Local Civil Rules 7(i) and 15.1, nor—far more importantly—did he explain why the Court
should grant him leave to amend or preview the facts he would allege in an amended complaint
to meet the pleading standard under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court will therefore deny this request as
well.
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Cir. 2005). But as the Court recognized in Harrison, that decision does not save Sadler’s
particular claims because the APA does not apply to them.
“[W]hat the APA gives, another provision—18 U.S.C. § 3625—takes away.” Harrison,
248 F. Supp. 3d at 182. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3625, the APA does not apply to any decision about
an inmate’s “imprisonment.” See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Imprisonment includes “rules
governing ‘the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment,’ id. § 3621(b), and the consideration of ‘the
history and characteristics of the prisoner’ in making that assignment, id. § 3621(b)(3).”
Harrison, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 182. PSFs, which are classifications based on a prisoner’s history
and behavior, are thus within category of imprisonment decisions exempt from APA review. Id.;
see also Burnam v. Marberry, 07–cv–97, 2008 WL 4190785, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10,
2008), aff’d, 313 F. App’x 455 (3d Cir. 2009).
For these reasons, no waiver of sovereign immunity applies to Sadler’s constitutional
claims, whether for monetary or injunctive relief. The Court thus concludes that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction over them. Accordingly, it must dismiss them under Rule 12(b)(1).
IV. Conclusion
Because Sadler has failed to state a claim under the Privacy Act or FOIA, and the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over his constitutional claims, the Court will grant Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 13, and dismiss the complaint. A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: September 23, 2019
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