Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 16-1534 (JEB)
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, et
al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
“Since the founding of this nation, the United States’ relationship with the Indian tribes
has been contentious and tragic. America’s expansionist impulse in its formative years led to the
removal and relocation of many tribes, often by treaty but also by force.” Cobell v. Norton, 240
F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This case also features what an American Indian tribe
believes is an unlawful encroachment on its heritage. More specifically, the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe has sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers to block the operation of Corps
permitting for the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). The Tribe fears that construction of the
pipeline, which runs within half a mile of its reservation in North and South Dakota, will destroy
sites of cultural and historical significance. It has now filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
asserting principally that the Corps flouted its duty to engage in tribal consultations under the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and that irreparable harm will ensue. After digging
through a substantial record on an expedited basis, the Court cannot concur. It concludes that the
Corps has likely complied with the NHPA and that the Tribe has not shown it will suffer injury
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that would be prevented by any injunction the Court could issue. The Motion will thus be
denied.
I. Background
DAPL is a domestic oil pipeline designed to move over a half-billion gallons of crude oil
across four states daily. The oil enters the pipeline in North Dakota, crosses South Dakota and
Iowa, and winds up in Patoka, Illinois, nearly 1,200 miles later. Although the route does not
actually cross the Standing Rock reservation, it runs within a half-mile of it.
A project of this magnitude often necessitates an extensive federal appraisal and
permitting process. Not so here. Domestic oil pipelines, unlike natural-gas pipelines, require no
general approval from the federal government. In fact, DAPL needs almost no federal permitting
of any kind because 99% of its route traverses private land.
One significant exception, however, concerns construction activities in federally
regulated waters at hundreds of discrete places along the pipeline route. The Corps needed to
permit this activity under the Clean Water Act or the Rivers and Harbors Act – and sometimes
both. For DAPL, accordingly, it permitted these activities under a general permit known as
Nationwide Permit 12. The Tribe alleges that the Corps violated multiple federal statutes in
doing so, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA). In its Complaint, the Tribe asserts that this DAPL permitting
threatens its environmental and economic well-being, as well as its cultural resources.
Despite this broad lawsuit, however, the Standing Rock Sioux now seek a preliminary
injunction only on the alleged violation of the NHPA. That statute encompasses sites of cultural
or religious significance to Indian tribes and requires that federal agencies consult with tribes
prior to issuing permits that might affect these historic resources. The Tribe claims that the
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Corps did not fulfill this obligation before permitting the DAPL activities. It bears noting that
the Tribe does not press its environmental claims under NEPA here. Nor does it seek a
preliminary injunction to protect itself from the potential environmental harms that might arise
from having the pipeline on its doorstep. Instead, it asserts only that pipeline-construction
activities – specifically, the grading and clearing of land – will cause irreparable injury to historic
or cultural properties of great significance.
The statutes and permitting scheme involved in this Motion are undeniably complex. The
Court first sets forth the operation of the NHPA, which the Tribe asserts was violated. It next
explains the Clean Water Act and the Rivers and Harbors Act, under which the Corps permitted
the DAPL activities. Subsequent sections lay out the factual and legal proceedings that have
taken place thus far.
A. National Historic Preservation Act
Congress enacted the NHPA in 1966 to “foster conditions under which our modern
society and our historic property can exist in productive harmony.” 54 U.S.C. § 300101(1). To
this end, Section 106 of the Act requires a federal agency to consider the effect of its
“undertakings” on property of historical significance, which includes property of cultural or
religious significance to Indian tribes. Id. §§ 306108, 302706(b). An undertaking is defined
broadly to include any “project, activity, or program” that requires a federal permit. Id.
§ 300320. Section 106, like the National Environmental Policy Act, is often described as a
“stop, look, and listen” provision. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334
F.3d 161, 166 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d
800, 805 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). The agency must also give the Advisory Council on
Historic Protection, which is charged with passing regulations to govern the implementation of
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Section 106, “a reasonable opportunity to comment on the undertaking.” 54 U.S.C. § 306108.
The agency must further consult with, inter alia, tribes “that attach religious or cultural
significance to [affected] property.” Id. § 302706(b). Once this is done, Section 106 is satisfied.
In other words, the provision does not mandate that the permitting agency take any particular
preservation measures to protect these resources. See CTIA-Wireless Ass’n v. FCC, 466 F.3d
105, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
The Advisory Council also promulgates the regulations necessary to implement Section
106, see 54 U.S.C. § 304108(a), and these regulations “command substantial judicial deference.”
McMillan Park Comm. v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, 968 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C. Cir.
1992). Under them, the permitting agency – here, the Corps – first determines “whether the
proposed Federal action is an undertaking . . . and, if so, whether it is a type of activity that has
the potential to cause effects on historic properties.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a). Where the agency
decides either that there is no undertaking or that the undertaking is not the “type of activity” that
has the “potential to cause effects on historic properties, assuming such . . . properties were
present,” the Section 106 process is complete. Id. § 800.3(a)(1). No consultation happens and
the permit may issue. Id.
Things get more complicated where the agency cannot make this determination. In such
a situation, the agency must complete a multi-step “consultation” process before it permits the
undertaking. Id. § 800.16(f). Indian tribes that “attach religious and cultural significance to
historic properties” that may be affected by the “undertaking” are a consulting party in this
process even when the properties are located outside reservation lands. Id. § 800.2(a)(4),
(c)(2)(ii). The regulations in fact instruct agencies to recognize that property of importance to
Indian tribes is “frequently” located on “ancestral, aboriginal, or ceded lands.” Id.
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§ 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(D). Once its interests are implicated, the affected tribe must be given a
reasonable opportunity: “to identify its concerns about [these] properties”; to “advise on the
identification and evaluation of” them; to “articulate its views on the undertaking’s effects”; and
to “participate in the resolution of adverse effects.” Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A). The agency is
further directed to conduct these consultations “early in the planning process,” id., in a “sensitive
manner respectful of tribal sovereignty,” and recognizing “the government-to-government
relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.” Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(B)-(C).
The regulations then put meat on these aspirational bones by laying out the step-by-step
consultative process that must occur. The process begins with initial planning, where the agency
“determine[s] the appropriate SHPO . . . to be involved.” Id. § 800.3(c). The State Historic
Preservation Officer – viz., SHPO – is designated by the governor of the state to, inter alia,
administer this national historic-preservation program at the state level. In consultation with this
Officer, an agency official then “identif[ies] any other parties entitled to be consulting parties
and invite[s] them to participate.” Id. § 800.3(f).
Such parties then assist the agency to identify potential historic properties in the first
phase. The permitting official, along with the SHPO, initially “[d]etermine[s] and document[s]
the area of potential effects,” “[r]eview[s] existing information on historic properties within the
area of potential effects,” “[s]eek[s] information, as appropriate, from consulting parties,” and
“[g]ather[s] information from any [consulting] tribe . . . to assist in identifying properties” of
potential significance to them. Id. § 800.4(a). Based on this information, the agency then “shall
take the steps necessary to identify historic properties within the area of potential effects.” Id.
§ 800.4(b). This identification effort extends to the “geographic area or areas within which an
undertaking may directly or indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic
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properties, if any such properties exist.” Id. § 800.16(d) (defining “area[s] of potential effects”).
The scope of this area is also “influenced by the scale and nature of an undertaking and may be
different for different kinds of effects caused by the undertaking.” Id. In this area, the official,
through consultations, must “make a reasonable and good faith effort,” “which may include
background research, consultation, oral history interviews, sample field investigation, and field
survey” to identify potential historic properties. Id. § 800.4(b)(1) (emphasis added). In deciding
on the “[l]evel of effort” required, the official “take[s] into account past planning, research and
studies, the magnitude and nature of the undertaking and the degree of Federal involvement, the
nature and extent of potential effects on historic properties, and the likely nature and location of
historic properties within the area of potential effects.” Id.
Once the potentially relevant historic sites are identified, the official moves on to
evaluating the historical significance of these sites in consultation with the SHPO and tribes. Id.
§ 800.4(c). This step must be taken in a manner that recognizes that the tribes “possess special
expertise in assessing the eligibility of historic properties that may possess religious and cultural
significance to them.” Id. § 800.4(c)(1). Nevertheless, where the agency official and SHPO
agree that an identified property should not be considered eligible for listing on the National
Register of Historic Places, “the property shall be considered not eligible.” Id. § 800.4(c)(2).
The permitting agency may then decide at this stage “that either there are no historic properties
present or there are historic properties present but the undertaking will have no effect upon
them,” document this finding, and notify all consulting parties. Id. § 800.4(d)(1). If neither the
SHPO nor the Advisory Council (if it has entered the consultation) “object within 30 days of
receipt of an adequately documented finding, the agency official’s responsibilities under Section
106 are fulfilled.” Id. § 800.4(d)(1)(i).
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The agency otherwise proceeds to a third stage: assessment of the adverse effects on the
identified historic properties. Id. § 800.5(a). An effect is considered adverse when the
undertaking may “alter, directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics of a historic property that
qualify it for inclusion in the National Register,” including via the “introduction of visual,
atmospheric or audible elements that diminish the integrity of the property’s significant historic
features.” Id. § 800.5(a)(1), (2)(v). At this point, the agency may determine in consultation with
the other parties that there is no qualifying adverse effect or impose modifications or conditions
that lead to the same result. Id. § 800.5(b). Alternatively, the Section 106 process may proceed
to a fourth and final stage involving resolution of the adverse effects in consultation with the
other parties. Id. § 800.6. The agency may, however, terminate this final consultation if it
becomes unproductive and then proceed to permit the undertaking despite the effects. Id.
§ 800.7(a).
A few important global rules also apply to each stage of this process. The permitting
agency is empowered to “coordinate the steps of the Section 106 process, as appropriate, with
the overall planning schedule for the undertaking and with any reviews required under” other
statutes. Id. § 800.3(b). The agency may also “use the services of applicants [or] consultants” to
prepare required “information, analyses, and recommendations” in making any of the various
determinations. Id. § 800.2(a)(3). Finally, the regulations allow agencies to “develop procedures
to implement Section 106 and substitute them” for its procedures where the Advisory Council
determines “they are consistent with the Council’s regulations.” Id. § 800.14(a).
B. Clean Water Act
The CWA makes it unlawful to discharge dredged or fill material into navigable waters
without a permit issued by the Corps. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a). The Corps grants this
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approval in one of two ways: It issues individual permits for a specific action, id. § 1344(a), or it
promulgates general permits that preauthorize a certain type of activity within a defined area. Id.
§ 1344(e)(1); see Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 38-40 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
General permitting has obvious advantages over individual permitting. Most notably,
general permits provide standing authority for an entire category of activities where those
activities, alone and together, have minimal impact on regulated waters. See Sierra Club, 803
F.3d at 38-40; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1). They consequently eliminate the need for an
arduous permit process for each minor action affecting a U.S. waterway. Indeed, a permittee
may typically rely on the general permit without even notifying the Corps of its covered activity.
See 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(e)(1). To keep things rolling, the Corps need only issue the permit
through public notice and comment every five years. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2).
But not every activity covered by a general permit receives this hands-off treatment.
Actions proceeding under nationwide general permits also must comply with what are known as
General Conditions. These GCs sometimes require that a particular covered action be subject to
pre-construction notice and verification (PCN) by the Corps before the work begins. Where a
discrete action requires a PCN, a Corps district engineer must confirm that the activity will
comply with the general permit, cause no more than minimal adverse effects to the environment,
and serve the public interest. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 330.1(e)(2)-(3), 330.6(a)(3)(i). In so doing, the
district engineer may supplement the permit’s basic rules with more project-specific ones or even
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compel a more rigorous individual permitting process for that particular work. Id. § 330.6(a)(2),
(d).
The Corps here relies on one such general permit – Nationwide Permit 12 – to authorize
“the construction, maintenance, repair, and removal” of pipelines throughout the nation, where
the activity will affect no more than a half-acre of regulated waters at any single water crossing.
See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits (NWP 12), 77 Fed Reg. 10,184, 10,271 (Feb. 12, 2012);
see also Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043, 1056 (10th Cir. 2015). Each stand-alone
crossing of a waterway is considered to be a “single and complete project” for these purposes.
See 33 C.F.R. § 330.2(i). Most pipeline work that involves minor activities in U.S. waters – i.e.,
affecting no more than half an acre – can thus proceed without any advance notice to the Corps.
Work that implicates tribal interests, however, cannot receive this laissez-faire handling.
For example, GC 17 – not at issue here – prohibits the sanctioning of any activity under NWP 12
that will impair reserved tribal rights, including reserved water rights. See NWP 12 at 10,283.
Of more relevance, GC 20 mandates a PCN for any permitted activity that “may have the
potential to cause effects to any historic properties . . . including previously unidentified
properties” of cultural or religious importance to a tribe. Id. at 10,284. This includes activities
that may cause only “visual or noise” effects to historic properties outside the project area or
reserved tribal lands. Id. at 10,251. Before such an activity can proceed, a district engineer must
verify either (1) that it will not actually affect any identified historic site or (2) that the tribal
consultations required by the NHPA are complete. Id. at 10,284. And, should a sanctioned
activity nevertheless stumble upon tribal artifacts or remains, GC 21 mandates that the permittee
“immediately notify” the Corps and, to the maximum extent possible, halt “construction
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activities that may affect” these objects until coordination with state, tribal, and federal
authorities is complete. Id.
NWP 12 also allows a district engineer to impose additional Regional Conditions where
the district engineer deems the General Conditions insufficient to protect tribal interests. See
ECF No. 6, Exh. 1 (Decision Document for NWP 12) at 10; see also 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(b)(2)(ii).
Many of these Regional Conditions restrict the scope of the Permit or expand the types of
activities requiring a PCN process before an activity may proceed under it. See, e.g., ECF No.
21, Exh. 3 (2012 NWP Regional Conditions for North Dakota). Of particular relevance to this
Motion, North Dakota’s Regional Conditions require a PCN “prior to initiating any regulated
activity in the Missouri River.” Id. at 1. Permittees also must notify the Corps of “the location
of any borrow site that will be used in conjunction with the construction of the authorized
activity so that the Corps may evaluate the site for potential impacts to . . . historic properties.”
Id. at 2.
The Corps’ more general permitting regulations further purport to assure that, in the
“processing and evaluating of [any] permit,” a district engineer give “maximum consideration
[to] historic properties within the time and jurisdictional constraints of the Corps regulatory
program.” 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. C, § 2(f). Appendix C of these regulations addresses the
Corps’ NHPA obligations and requires a district engineer to “take into account the effects, if any,
of proposed undertakings on historic properties both within and beyond the waters of the U.S.”
Id. § 2(a). The Corps considers each permitted water crossing of a linear pipeline, however, to
be its own individual undertaking because the rest of the project – i.e., the entire line – “almost
alway[s] can be undertaken without Corps authorization” of such individual crossing by a
feasible reroute. Id. § 1(g)(4)(i). In other words, the Corps does not consider each crossing to be
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the “but for” cause of the entire pipeline and thus does not consider the entire pipeline to be an
undertaking. Instead, the permitted undertaking, according to the Corps, “extend[s] in either
direction from the crossing to that point at which alternative alignments leading to reasonable
alternative locations for the crossing can be considered and evaluated.” Id. § 1(g)(4)(ii). For
these permitted actions, the district engineer must “encourage the consideration of historic
properties at the earliest practical time in [a] planning process” and engage in consultations with
tribal leaders, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and State Historic Preservation
Officers. Id. § 2(e). The regulations also specify when additional conditions should be placed
on a permit to “avoid or reduce” effects to these properties. Id. § 10(a).
C. Rivers and Harbors Act
The RHA forbids certain construction activities within the “navigable water of the United
States” without prior permission from the Corps. See 33 U.S.C. § 403. The Corps often relies
on NWP 12 to discharge this duty for pipeline construction having only a minimal impact on
regulated waters, 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a), and the same general CWA conditions apply here. Lake
Oahe is one of the waterways that falls under the jurisdiction of this Act.
***
To sum up, the NHPA requires that the Corps, prior to issuing a permit under the CWA
or the RHA, consider the potential effect of that permitted activity on places of cultural or
religious significance to Indian tribes.
D. Factual History
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe is a federally recognized American Indian Tribe with a
reservation spanning the border between North and South Dakota. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint),
¶ 1. The sweep of the Tribe’s historic and cultural connection to the Great Plains, however,
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extends beyond these modern reservation boundaries. Id., ¶¶ 7-8. A successor to the Great
Sioux Nation, the Tribe’s ancestors once lived, loved, worshipped, and mourned “[w]herever the
buffalo roamed.” ECF No. 6-2 (Declaration of Jon Eagle, Sr.), ¶ 24. These people created stone
alignments, burial cairns, and other rock features throughout the area to conduct important
spiritual rituals related to the rhythms of their daily life. See ECF No. 14-1 (Declaration of Tim
Mentz, Sr.), ¶ 3; Eagle Decl., ¶¶ 20, 25. Along the region’s waterways in particular, the
prevalence of these artifacts reflects water’s sacred role in their deeply held spiritual beliefs. See
Eagle Decl., ¶ 25. Today, the Standing Rock Sioux continue to honor these practices and cherish
the connection they have to their ancestors through these sites. Id.
One place of particular significance to the Tribe lies at the traditional confluence of the
Missouri and Cannonball Rivers. Id., ¶¶ 11-12; ECF No. 6-1 (Declaration of Dave Archambault
II), ¶ 12. The ancestors to the Standing Rock Sioux gathered in this location to peacefully trade
with other tribes. See Mentz Decl., ¶ 36. They also considered the perfectly round stones
shaped by the meeting of these two great rivers to be sacred. See Eagle Decl., ¶ 11. Mighty
natural forces, however, no longer hone these stones. Id. In 1958, the Corps dredged and altered
the course of the Cannonball River to construct a dam. Id. As a result, a large man-made lake
known as Lake Oahe now covers the confluence. Id.
The Tribe nevertheless continues to use the banks of the Missouri River for spiritual
ceremonies, and the River, as well as Lake Oahe, plays an integral role in the life and recreation
of those living on the reservation. Id. Naturally, then, the Tribe was troubled to learn in late
2014 that a new pipeline was being planned that would cross the Missouri River under Lake
Oahe about a half-mile north of the reservation. See Archambault Decl., ¶¶ 8-12. This was, of
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course, DAPL – a 1,172-mile crude-oil pipeline poised to wind its way from the Bakken oil
fields near Stanley, North Dakota, to refineries and terminals in Patoka, Illinois.
The conflict that has arisen since this revelation is, to say the least, factually complex. To
ease digestion of the relevant information, the Court first describes how Dakota Access chose the
pipeline route. It then lays out the facts surrounding the Corps’ permitting and concurrent
Section 106 process for the project. These following summaries admittedly contain significant
detail and may try the reader’s patience. The Court nonetheless believes such a narrative is
necessary because a key question here is whether the Corps engaged in sufficient consultation
with the Tribe under Section 106.
1. DAPL
In the summer of 2014, Dakota Access crafted the route that brought DAPL to Standing
Rock’s doorstep. See ECF No. 22, Exh. B (Declaration of Monica Howard), ¶¶ 2-3. The plotted
course almost exclusively tracked privately held lands and, in sensitive places like Lake Oahe,
already-existing utility lines. As only 3% of the work needed to build the pipeline would ever
require federal approval of any kind and only 1% of the pipeline was set to affect U.S.
waterways, the pipeline could proceed largely on the company’s timeline.
Dakota Access nevertheless also prominently considered another factor in crafting its
route: the potential presence of historic properties. Id. Using past cultural surveys, the company
devised DAPL’s route to account for and avoid sites that had already been identified as
potentially eligible for or listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Id., ¶¶ 2-4. With
that path in hand, in July 2014, the company purchased rights to a 400-foot corridor along its
preliminary route to conduct extensive new cultural surveys of its own. Id., ¶ 3. These surveys
eventually covered the entire length of the pipeline in North and South Dakota, and much of
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Iowa and Illinois. Id., ¶ 8. Professionally licensed archaeologists conducted Class II cultural
surveys, which are “focused on visual reconnaissance of the ground surface in settings with high
ground visibility.” Id. In some places, however, the same archaeologists carried out more
intensive Class III cultural surveys, which involve a “comprehensive archaeological survey
program” requiring both surface visual inspection and shovel-test probes of fixed grids to
“inventory, delineate, and assess” historic sites. Id. These latter surveys required coordination
with and approval by State Historic Preservation Officers. Id.
Where this surveying revealed previously unidentified historic or cultural resources that
might be affected, the company mostly chose to reroute. Id., ¶¶ 4-6. In North Dakota, for
example, the cultural surveys found 149 potentially eligible sites, 91 of which had stone features.
Id., ¶ 5. The pipeline workspace and route was modified to avoid all 91 of these stone features
and all but 9 of the other potentially eligible sites. Id. By the time the company finally settled on
a construction path, then, the pipeline route had been modified 140 times in North Dakota alone
to avoid potential cultural resources. Id., ¶ 6. Plans had also been put in place to mitigate any
effects on the other 9 sites through coordination with the North Dakota SHPO. Id., ¶ 13. All
told, the company surveyed nearly twice as many miles in North Dakota as the 357 miles that
would eventually be used for the pipeline. Id., ¶ 12.
The company also opted to build its new pipeline along well-trodden ground wherever
feasible. See ECF No. 22-1 (Declaration of Joey Mahmoud), ¶¶ 18, 24, 40. Around Lake Oahe,
for example, the pipeline will track both the Northern Border Gas Pipeline, which was placed
into service in 1982, and an existing overhead utility line. Id., ¶ 18. In fact, where it crosses
Lake Oahe, DAPL is 100% adjacent to, and within 22 to 300 feet from, the existing pipeline. Id.
Dakota Access chose this route because these locations had “been disturbed in the past – both
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above and below ground level – making it a ‘brownfield crossing location.’” Id., ¶ 19. This
made it less likely, then, that new ground disturbances would harm intact cultural or tribal
features. Id.
Around the time the cultural survey work began, Dakota Access took its plan public. See
Howard Decl., ¶ 12. On September 30, 2014, it met with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal
Council to present the pipeline project as part of a larger community-outreach effort. Id., ¶ 22.
Personnel from Dakota Access also spoke with the Tribe’s Historic Preservation Officer
(THPO), Waste’ Win Young, several times over the course of the next month. Id., ¶¶ 23-27. At
one related meeting, a DAPL archaeologist answered questions about the proposed survey work
and invited input from Young on any areas that might be of particular tribal interest. Id., ¶¶ 25-
28. The company agreed as well to send the centerline files from its cultural survey to her for
review, and did so on November 13. Id., ¶ 28. It never received any response from Young. Id.
2. Entry of Corps
Based on the current record, the Corps appears to have had little involvement in Dakota
Access’s early planning. The one exception is a June 2014 meeting between the two parties to
discuss the company’s plan to build a pipeline through the region. See ECF No. 21-18
(Declaration of Martha Chieply), ¶ 8. At this meeting, the Corps informed the company about its
permitting requirements and explained the importance of tribal coordination for any actions
taken under its jurisdiction. Id. There is no indication that the company sought to secure any
permitting or that it presented the Corps with a specific proposed route for DAPL at this time.
Id. This conclusion is consistent with the record evidence that Dakota Access was still buying
up the necessary right-of-ways for the pipeline surveys in July 2014. See Howard Decl., ¶ 3;
Mahmoud Decl., ¶ 40.
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The writing was on the wall, however, that many DAPL permitting requests would
eventually land in the Corps inbox. The Corps’ Tribal Liaison, Joel Ames, accordingly, tried to
set up a meeting with THPO Young beginning around September 17, 2014, without success. See
ECF No. 21-17 (Declaration of Joel Ames), ¶¶ 5-6; see also ECF No. 21, Exh. 9 (Corps Tribal
Consultation Spreadsheet) at 1 (documenting five attempts by Ames to coordinate a meeting
with Young in September 2014). On October 2, other Corps personnel also sought to hold an
arranged meeting with the Tribal Council and Dakota Access on the Standing Rock reservation.
See Chieply Decl., ¶ 9. But when the Corps timely arrived for the meeting, Tribal Chairman
David Archambault told them that the conclave had started earlier than planned and had already
ended. Id. Ames nevertheless continued to reach out to Young to try to schedule another
meeting throughout the month of October. See Ames Decl., ¶¶ 5-6. When the new meeting was
finally held at the reservation on November 6, though, DAPL was taken off the agenda because
Young did not attend. Id., ¶ 7.
3. Soil-Bore Testing at Lake Oahe
The Corps’ North Dakota office also received the first request for DAPL permitting
around this time and launched a formal NHPA Section 106 consultation as a result. See ECF
No. 21-19 (Declaration of Richard Harnois), ¶ 5. This solitary preconstruction request from
Dakota Access sought permitting only to conduct preliminary soil-bore testing at the Lake Oahe
site, not to actually begin any construction. Id., ¶ 12. Dakota Access needed to conduct these
tests to determine whether it could subsequently use its preferred method of Horizontal
Directional Drilling at the crossing. Id. HDD – which the company plans to use on all land
subject to the RHA or owned by the Corps – allows for “construction across a sensitive area
without excavation of a trench by installing the pipeline through a drilled hole significantly
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below the conventional depth of a pipeline.” Howard Decl., ¶ 7. This particular test involved
drilling just seven holes of 4-inch diameter with an estimated 10 feet of impact on areas around
the holes. See Harnois Decl., Exhs. 1-2. Access to and from the sites, moreover, would take
place on existing roads. Id.
As a first cut, the Corps reviewed extensive existing cultural surveys both within and
outside the Lake Oahe project area to determine whether the work might affect cultural
resources. Id. Then, on October 24, the Corps sent out a letter to tribes, including the Standing
Rock Sioux, with information about the proposed work and maps documenting the known
cultural sites that the Corps had already identified. Id., ¶ 6; see id., Exh. 1. These included sites
that the Corps considered to be outside the projected area of effect. Id., ¶ 6. In addition, the
letter requested that any party interested in consulting on the matter reply within thirty days. Id.
No response was received from the Tribe. Id. The Corps did receive responses from other tribes
and the North Dakota SHPO, which it considered. Id., ¶ 7. After granting an extra three weeks
for additional responses, on December 18 the Corps made an initial determination of “No
Historic Properties Affected” for the soil-bore testing. Id., ¶¶ 7-11.
The Corps mailed out this decision in a Determination of Effect letter to the North
Dakota SHPO and all affected tribes on the same day. Id., ¶ 11. The letter explained that the
Corps had concluded that no historic properties would be affected by the tests and clarified that a
previous “not eligible” determination had already been made for a nearby site that would also not
be affected by the work. Id. The Corps also emailed Young again the next day to seek possible
dates for a January 2015 meeting with the Tribe to discuss DAPL. See Tribal Consultation Sheet
at 1 (documenting email on December 19, 2014). No response is in the record.
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On February 12, 2015, having still heard nothing from the Tribe, Corps Senior Field
Archaeologist Richard Harnois emailed Young again to solicit comments on the narrow issue of
the soil-bore testing. See Harnois Decl., ¶¶ 13-14. Again, no reply. Id. Around this same time,
Young informed the Corps’ Tribal Liaison, Ames, at an unrelated regulatory meeting that she did
not need to consult with the Corps at the moment as she was currently working directly with
Dakota Access. See Ames Decl., ¶ 8; see also Tribal Consultation Sheet at 1 (documenting
contact). As a result, on February 18, the Corps granted the PCN authorization under NWP 12
for the limited exploratory soil-bore testing requested by Dakota Access. See Harnois Decl.,
¶¶ 13-14.
At this point, the Court should note that the Tribe has not provided a declaration from
Young about any of these early consultations (or lack thereof). This omission is problematic for
its cause because many of the facts relevant to the Tribe’s NHPA claim involve her. As a result,
the rendition of the facts in the record is largely told through documentation and affidavits
provided by the Corps, with the exception of letters from Young provided by the Tribe.
In any event, several weeks later, on March 2, 2015, the Corps finally received a letter
from Young expressing concerns over sites that might be affected by the bore testing. Id., ¶ 15.
The letter was dated on the same day that the Corps had green-lighted the work. Id. In
particular, Young mentioned the North Cannonball Village Site, which was almost a half-mile
from the closest “area of potential effect” boundary set by the Corps. Id. The letter further
requested Class III and other cultural surveys under tribal monitoring before the testing, and
tribal monitoring during both the testing and any later pipeline construction. Id. Young also sent
a similar letter on February 25 to the Corps’ Regulatory Branch Chief, Martha Chieply. See ECF
No. 6, Exh. 6 (Letter from Young to Chieply on Feb. 25, 2015).
18
Neither of these letters, contrary to representations made in the Tribe’s Motion, appears
to be an “immediate[]” response to a February invitation by the Corps to consult on PCNs related
to the actual pipeline construction. See Mot. at 10; see also Letter from Young to Chieply (Feb.
25, 2015). Indeed, the letters make no mention of that February offer, focusing instead on the
more narrow issue of the soil-bore testing. See Letter from Young to Chieply on Feb. 25, 2015.
Of course, as the Court has explained, the Corps had already permitted that limited testing under
NWP 12 by the time Young sent the letters. Ames nevertheless renewed his efforts to schedule a
meeting between Chairman Archambault and the Corps’ North Dakota District Commander,
Colonel Henderson, in response to Young’s letters, but the parties could not find a date when
both men were available to consult. See Ames Decl., ¶ 9.
4. PCN Authorizations
In the meantime, Dakota Access initiated efforts on December 29, 2014, to secure five
additional PCN authorizations under NWP 12 for pipeline-construction work in North Dakota.
See Chieply Decl., ¶ 10. (Out of these, three were later withdrawn for various reasons. Id.) In
the application, the company provided a project description, a water- and wetland-delineation
report, and a cultural-survey report for areas around the PCN sites. Id., Exh. 4 at 1, 8. Dakota
Access also requested a jurisdictional determination from the Corps for the work. Id., Exh. 4 at
1. On February 5, 2015, the Corps deemed the application incomplete and informed the
company that it would require additional information before considering it. Id., ¶ 11. At this
time, the Corps also informed Dakota Access that one of the listed sites, PCN # 1, would not
require Corps permitting because the involved waterway had previously been determined to be
an isolated waterway not subject to the CWA or RHA. Id., ¶¶ 10-11. Dakota Access responded
with a complete application for the remaining PCNs on March 25. See id., ¶ 13. The Corps,
19
accordingly, sent a letter in relation to an environmental assessment (EA) for the project to the
Tribe and other parties on March 30. See ECF No. 21-20 (Declaration of Jonathan Shelman),
¶ 7. This letter described the two proposed crossings at Lake Sakakawea and the proposed
crossing at Lake Oahe – i.e., the three North Dakota sites still thought to require PCNs at the
time – and solicited comments from the Tribe to be considered as part of the EA. Id.
While discussions between Dakota Access and the Corps were ongoing, the Corps also
sent a form letter to Young on February 17, informing her that it was now considering 55 PCN
requests across its offices for DAPL. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 5. The letter went on to explain that
the majority of the pipeline work would occur in uplands that were not subject to Corps
jurisdiction, but the Corps would need to permit crossings at the Missouri, James, Big Sioux, Des
Moines, Mississippi, and Illinois Rivers. Id. The letter, moreover, noted that Dakota Access was
conducting cultural surveys along the entire route. Id. Finally, the Corps requested that the
Tribe let it “know if you have any knowledge or concerns regarding cultural resources . . . you
would like the Corps to consider” and asked whether it wanted to consult on the project. Id. A
response was requested prior to March 30 “to help facilitate a timely Section 106 review.” Id.
The Corps also attached the current proposed alignment provided by Dakota Access for the
pipeline and contact information for various Corps staff involved in facilitating tribal
consultations. Id.
On the date of the deadline to respond, Ames and Young exchanged emails, but the
content of this exchange is not in the record. See Tribal Consultation Sheet at 8. Young did,
however, formally respond on April 8. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 7. In her response this time, she
acknowledged receipt of the Corps’ February 17 letter about the 55 construction-related PCNs.
Id. at 1. But the thrust of her letter focused again on the Corps’ failure to respond, prior to
20
permitting the soil-bore testing, to the concerns she had raised about that work. See id. at 1-2.
She further expressed her belief that the Corps’ inaction violated the Section 106 process. Id. at
2. She demanded that the Corps “clarify the proper sequencing of the Section 106 NHPA
process” before proceeding with the EA, asserted that she had not yet been contacted by Ames,
and described the placement of bore pits on private lands as an attempt to avoid federal
jurisdiction. Id. at 2-3. In conclusion, Young informed the Corps that the Tribe opposed “any
kind of oil pipeline construction through our ancestral lands,” in part because the potential
dredging would take place where “human remains of relatives of current . . . tribal members”
were present. Id. at 3. Young ultimately closed, though, by reiterating that the Tribe “look[ed]
forward to participation in a full tribal consultation process” once it commenced. Id. On the
same day, Corps personnel and Standing Rock Archaeologist Dr. Kelly Morgan discussed future
pipeline realignments over the phone. See Tribal Consultation Sheet at 7.
5. Summer of 2015
Relations between the Tribe and Corps did not improve in the summer of 2015. Ames
attempted to speak with Young about the project in June, but she informed him via email that she
was on an extended leave of absence until July 27. Id. at 8; see Ames Decl., ¶ 9. Ames was
unable to determine whether anyone was empowered to act on the Tribe’s behalf in her absence.
See Ames Decl., ¶ 9. On July 22, Corps Operations Manager Eric Stasch also sent a letter to
Standing Rock describing the planned use of HDD for the Oahe crossing. See Harnois Decl.,
¶ 16; see also id., Exh. 3. In his letter, Stasch provided details about the areas of potential effects
and explained that the Corps would consider the work a federal undertaking despite its location
on private land. See id., Exh. 3 at 1-2. The letter went on to say that Dakota Access’s cultural
surveys had identified an additional cultural site within the proposed preparation and staging area
21
for this work. Id. at 2. Finally, the letter requested a response within thirty days if the Tribe
wished to consult on this particular crossing and indicated that consultations about other pipeline
crossings would happen separately. Id. at 2-3. Attached to the letter were current and previous
survey information, as well as general and detailed project maps illustrating the location and
nature of the Lake Oahe crossing and recorded cultural resources. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 16.
In August, the Tribe responded with two letters of its own. See ECF No. 6, Exhs. 8
(Letter from Archambault to Cross on Aug. 19, 2015), 9 (Letter from Young to Stasch on Aug.
21, 2015). The first, sent on August 19 from Chairman Archambault to Colonel Cross – the
Corps’ Commander and District Engineer for the Omaha District – described the Chairman’s
frustration in not being contacted earlier in regard to DAPL. See Letter from Archambault to
Cross (Aug. 19, 2015). Archambault invited Cross to the reservation to discuss the matter and
provided contact information for his administrative assistant to arrange the visit. Id. The very
same day, Ames emailed Archambault’s assistant in an attempt to schedule a meeting, but
without success. See Ames Decl., ¶ 10; see also Tribal Consultation Sheet at 8. The second
letter responded directly to Stasch’s offer to consult on the Lake Oahe crossing. See Letter from
Young to Stasch (Aug. 21, 2015). In it, Young again reiterated that the Section 106 consultation
run by the Corps had failed to respond to concerns raised by the Tribe in their February letters
about the soil-bore testing prior to the completion of that work. Id. She further expressed her
frustration in being excluded from the Dakota Access surveying despite company promises to
include tribal monitors, and she reiterated her concern that sites might be overlooked or damaged
unless the Standing Rock Sioux participated in surveying. Id. In closing, Young again said the
Tribe looked forward to participating in “future consultation prior to any work being completed .
. . [and] to playing a primary role in any and all survey work and monitoring.” Id. at 2.
22
The Corps responded in at least three ways to the Tribe over the next month. First, on
August 27, a Corps staff archaeologist started planning an onsite visit for the Corps, the Tribe,
and the North Dakota SHPO to Lake Oahe. See Harnois Decl, ¶ 18. Second, the Corps’ District
Commander, Colonel Henderson, wrote back to Chairman Archambault. See ECF No. 6, Exh.
10 (Letter from Henderson to Archambault on Sept. 3, 2015). Most of Henderson’s letter
reiterated the form offer to consult and other general project information, but the letter also
acknowledged receipt of the Tribe’s recent letters and provided additional information about the
requested PCN locations. Id. at 2. Third, Stasch sent a letter on September 16, expressing his
willingness and desire to address the Tribe’s questions and concerns during the upcoming onsite
visit to Lake Oahe planned by the Corps. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 22.
On the same day as Stasch’s letter, Harnois also emailed Standing Rock Archaeologist
Morgan to invite her to participate in the “working level, on-the-ground site visit of the proposed
DAPL Oahe Crossing.” Id., ¶ 23. This sparked an email exchange between the two on logistics
and dates. Id. The very next day, however, Morgan emailed the Corps to back out of the visit.
Id., Exh. 4. In an attached letter, she explained that “after careful consideration the [Standing
Rock] THPO has determined that it is in the best interest of the THPO to decline participation in
the site visits and walking the project corridor’s [area of projected effects] at this time until
government-to-government consultation has occurred for this project per Section 106
requirements as requested by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.” Id. By this she seemed to mean
that the Corps needed to first hold the previously requested meeting between Chairman
Archambault and Colonel Henderson. Id. Despite the Tribe’s withdrawal, the Corps ultimately
proceeded to hold the onsite visit with the North Dakota SHPO. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 26.
23
About a week later, the Tribe sent another letter, this time from Young to Colonel
Henderson. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 11 (Letter from Young to Henderson on Sept. 28, 2015). In
this letter, Young noted her concern “about the lack of consultation prior to the start of
archaeological surveys.” Id. at 1. She further indicated that the Tribe had “received no
correspondence prior to the soil bore hole testing,” which she then characterized as evidence that
“the Corps is attempting to circumvent the Section 106 process.” Id. Citing the potential for
“irreparable damage to . . . known sites,” she complained about the Tribe’s “exclusion of tribal
participation up to this point” from the identification efforts and Section 106 process. Id. In
addition, she indicated that the Tribe believed “the entire length of the DAPL [is] one project
under the . . . [RHA], as well as” the CWA, and that the Corps was trying to avoid
“federalization.” Id. at 2.
6. Fall of 2015
In the fall, the Corps responded by redoubling its efforts to meet with the Tribe. On
September 29, 2015, Ames, in a phone conversation with Chairman Archambault, scheduled a
meeting between the Corps and the Tribe’s Vice Chair for October 28. See Ames Decl., ¶ 13.
But two days before that meeting, the Tribe canceled “because nobody from the tribe was
available to attend.” Id. On the same day, the Tribe also canceled a meeting scheduled for
November with Colonel Henderson, promising to meet with him instead “in a few months.” Id.,
¶ 14. The Corps, moreover, documented ten different attempts to contact the Tribe over the
course of the October to speak about the project. See Tribal Consultation Sheet at 14.
Then, in November, the Corps twice invited the Tribe to a general tribal meeting in Sioux
Falls, South Dakota, scheduled for December 8 to 9. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 17; see also id., Exh.
10. This invitation contained a link to the cultural surveys provided by Dakota Access. Id. Five
24
tribes attended this meeting. Id., ¶ 18. Standing Rock did not. Id. At the meeting, the Corps
made sure that the tribes had copies of the cultural surveys, and the group agreed to reconvene on
January 25, 2016, to discuss any issues they found with those surveys. Id. Around the time of
this meeting, the Corps also independently looked through these cultural surveys and other route
maps to determine whether any additional DAPL crossings might have the potential to affect
historic properties. See ECF No. 21-18, Exh. 16. The Corps concluded that only the James
River crossing (PCN #4) raised any concerns; no others triggered the need for a PCN under
General Condition 20. Id.
During this tribal gathering, Morgan sent a letter to the Corps, indicating that the Tribe
was “still interested in formal consultation on the proposed” pipeline despite its decision not to
attend. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 12 (Letter from Morgan to Chieply on Dec. 8, 2015) at 1. The
Tribe yet again noted that it had not received a response from the Corps about the concerns it had
raised in regard to the bore testing. Id. Morgan also protested that the testing should not proceed
prior to mitigation efforts and indicated that the Tribe did not concur in the “no effects”
determination for this work. Id. at 2. This, of course, makes little sense given that Young had
already acknowledged in previous letters from the Tribe that they were aware the soil-bore
testing had already taken place back in the spring. See, e.g., Letter from Young to Henderson on
Sept. 28, 2015 (recognizing “soil bore testing has already occurred despite our initial
correspondence”). In any event, Morgan further indicated that the Tribe looked forward to
playing a primary role in any surveying or monitoring and explained that it would refuse to
participate in tribal meetings until Colonel Henderson came to their reservation to meet with
them first. Letter from Morgan to Chieply (Dec. 8, 2015) at 1. Finally, she informed the Corps
25
that the Tribe thought the draft EA could not be issued prior to a full cultural-resources survey.
Id. at 2.
Again, the Corps appears to have taken action in response to the Tribe’s demands.
Henderson ordered Omaha District Deputy Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Sexton
to attempt to schedule a meeting with Plaintiff for him. See Ames Decl., ¶ 17. He did so in
response to the setbacks experienced by Ames in attempting to secure the same over the previous
months. Id. The Tribe, however, never returned Sexton’s calls about scheduling a meeting
either, and Young subsequently left her position with the Standing Rock Sioux. Id.
On December 8, the Corps released a draft EA for the project, which contained a request
for comment by January 8, 2016. See Shelman Decl., ¶ 8. In the portion of the EA describing
the Section 106 process, the draft explained that consultations began in November 2014 for
initial geotechnical explorations, which then closed in January 2015. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 13
(Draft EA, Nov. 2015) at 58. The draft next described the ongoing process, starting in July 2015,
for consultation related to the actual pipeline construction. Id. In so doing, it acknowledged the
Corps’ failure to secure onsite visits or government-to-government meetings to date. Id. at 58-
59. In the very next section, the EA indicated that Young had said in the October 2014 meeting
with Dakota Access that the Lake Oahe HDD process “appeared to avoid impacts to known sites
of tribal significance.” Id. at 59.
7. 2016
The Tribe provided timely and extensive comments to the draft EA in letters on January 8
and March 24, 2016. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 14 (Standing Rock Comments on Draft EA); id., Exh.
15 (Standing Rock Supplemental Comments). In these comments, Archambault asserted that the
Corps had failed to consult on the identification of cultural sites important to the Tribe. See
26
Standing Rock Comments on Draft EA at 2-3; see also id. at 4 (asserting Corps violated its own
policy to hold “an active and respectful dialogue. . . before decisions are made and actions are
taken”); id. (claiming bore testing violated NHPA because Corps did not include Tribe in
decisionmaking process); id. at 6 (noting Corps reliance on old surveys conducted before 1992
Amendments to NHPA). He explained the importance of such consultations by, in part,
describing tribal “oral traditions and historical records” that recorded the presence of known sites
and burials in the direct path of the pipeline. Id. (counting “at least 350 known sites within the
project corridor in North Dakota alone”); see also id. at 4 (indicating that Draft EA
misrepresented Tribe’s position in October 2014 meeting thanks to false impression from Dakota
Access). As a result, he concluded that those outside the Tribe could not properly identify these
sites. Id. He additionally criticized the 400-foot corridor used for the Dakota Access surveys as
too narrow and described the “no effects” determination by the Corps for sites within the
corridor as lacking “scientific or engineering support.” Id. at 7-8. Archambault, in his later
supplemental comments, again stressed the importance of tribal participation in the identification
of historic properties and, accordingly, decisions about potential alternative routes for the
pipeline. See Standing Rock Supplemental Comments at 23-24. He also cited the Advisory
Council’s Section 106 regulations and case law to support his assertion that form letters and
public meetings could not meet the Corps’ obligations under the NHPA to consult with the
tribes. Id. In conclusion, he implored the Corps to assure that full cultural surveys would be
done, with tribal input, on the entire pipeline. Id. at 28-29. Two other tribes also indicated at
this time that they thought they had not yet been fully consulted on the potential effects of the
pipeline. See ECF No. 6, Exhs. 22-24.
27
The Section 106 process between the Corps and Tribe finally picked up steam in the
spring of 2016. From January to May, there were no fewer than seven meetings between the two
entities. On January 22, Corps Senior Archaeologist Harnois met at the reservation with
Chairman Archambault; the Tribe’s new THPO Ron His Horse is Thunder; Morgan; and the
Tribe’s Section 106 Coordinator, LaDonna Brave Bull Allard. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 27. Three
days later, on January 25, the Tribe participated in the follow-on tribal meeting to discuss the
Dakota Access cultural surveys. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 21. Next, on March 3, Corps staff held a
meeting with the Tribe at Corps headquarters. See Ames Decl., ¶ 29. Perhaps most
significantly, Morgan met with the Corps to express specific concerns about tribal burial sites at
the James River crossing (PCN # 4). See Harnois Decl., ¶ 24. Based on the information she
provided, the Corps verified the presence of cultural resources at the site and successfully
instructed Dakota Access to move the pipeline alignment to avoid them. Id.
Colonel Henderson also attended several meetings with the Tribe. He first officiated at a
third tribal summit on February 18-19, again with Standing Rock participation. See Chieply
Decl., ¶ 22. Then, he attended meetings with Standing Rock on February 26, April 29, and May
14. See Ames Decl., ¶¶ 26, 33, 36. Through these conversations, Henderson committed the
Corps to imposing several additional conditions on DAPL, such as double-walled piping, in
response to tribal concerns about environmental safety. Id., ¶ 27. One of these summits also
included an onsite visit to the Lake Oahe crossing. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 28; see also
Archambault Decl., ¶ 19. During that visit, Chairman Archambault “pointed out areas of
concern and explained the tribe’s issues with the pipeline project.” Harnois Decl., ¶ 28. Indeed,
in March, Archambault acknowledged that the Corps had recently made strides toward righting
the Section 106 ship and indicated he felt this particular onsite visit was productive at identifying
28
new stones, graves, burial sites, and earthen lodges that needed to be considered by the Corps.
See Supplemental Comments on Draft EA at 26-27. Henderson and Archambault exchanged
letters about the project throughout the spring as well. Id., ¶ 30.
The improved relationship, however, had its limits. In the spring, the Corps worked with
Dakota Access to offer consulting tribes an opportunity to conduct cultural surveys at PCN
locations where the private landowner would permit them. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 28. This
included 7 of the 11 sites in North and South Dakota. Id. Three tribes took the opportunity, and
it paid off. See ECF No. 22, Exh. C (Declaration of Michelle Dippel) ¶ 28. The Upper Sioux
Community identified areas of tribal concern at three PCN sites, and Dakota Access agreed to
additional avoidance measures at all of them. Id. At one of these sites, the tribal surveyors and
the Iowa SHPO declared a site eligible for listing on the National Registry that had not
previously been identified on Dakota Access’s surveys. See Eagle Decl., ¶¶ 32-36; see also
Mentz Decl., ¶¶ 38-39 (describing his hiring to conduct surveys for the Upper Sioux). Dakota
Access agreed in response to this discovery to bury the pipeline 111 feet below the site to avoid
disturbing it. See Mot. Hearing Trans. at 36. Similarly, the Osage Tribe identified areas through
their surveys that they wished to monitor during construction, and the company granted that
request too. Id.
Standing Rock took a different tack. The Tribe declined to participate in the surveys
because of their limited scope. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 29. Instead, it urged the Corps to redefine
the area of potential effect to include the entire pipeline and asserted that it would send no
experts to help identify cultural resources until this occurred. Id. In a responsive email, the
Corps expressed its regret that the Tribe would not participate and welcomed any knowledge or
information regarding historic properties that it was still willing to provide. Id. The Corps went
29
on to explain that it did not “regulate or oversee the construction of pipelines, and [its] regulatory
control is limited to only a small portion of the land and waterways that the pipeline traverses.”
Id., Exh. 14. While the Corps’ regulations allowed it to consider uplands outside “waters of the
United States,” the email asserted that work in these areas had to be “directly associated [with],
integrally related [to],” and caused by the “in-water authorized activity” before the Corps could
claim authority over it. Id.
The Tribe did engage in two more visits to Lake Oahe with the Corps around this time.
See Eagle Decl., ¶¶ 13-14; Harnois Decl., ¶ 29. First, on March 8, Morgan and the Tribe’s latest
THPO, Jon Eagle, identified areas of potential cultural significance to the Corps and described
the area’s sacred importance to the Standing Rock people. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 29. Several of
the sites they identified were in areas that the Corps had determined were well outside the area of
potential impact for the project, such as a cemetery approximately 1.2 miles from the nearest
bore pit and .6 miles from the HDD preparation and construction area. Id. The group also
toured the Cannonball Village site. Id. At this site, Morgan and Eagle pointed out places in the
mole dirt where “pottery shards, pieces of bone, flint and tools used for scraping hides and
cutting” were visible. See Eagle Decl., ¶ 14. Eagle, in addition, pointed out a sacred stone in the
area that is still used for prayer. Id., ¶ 15. During the visit, Corps staff acknowledged that they
had been previously unaware of some of these cultural resources and committed to further study
of them. Id., ¶ 14. Morgan and Harnois thereafter exchanged several follow-up emails to
discuss the Tribe’s “concerns and questions” generated by the onsite visit. See Harnois Decl.,
¶¶ 30-31. The Corps nevertheless ultimately determined that the Cannonball Village site was not
in the area that would be affected by DAPL-related construction work. Id., ¶ 29.
30
The second onsite visit occurred on March 22 and went much the same as the first. Id.,
¶ 32. This time, however, Morgan asked questions about the surveying that had been done on
the area as part of the Northern Borderline Pipeline project – a pre-existing natural-gas pipeline
installed under Lake Oahe that runs parallel to DAPL’s proposed course. Id. Harnois continued
discussions with her about the adequacy of the mapping and considered requiring additional
testing on the site. Id. Ultimately, however, Harnois determined that additional testing would
not be necessary based on his later review of the site documentation and research. Id.
The Corps then sought to end the Section 106 process for the Lake Oahe crossing. On
April 22, Harnois made a Determination of Effect for the site and emailed it to the consulting
parties. Id., ¶ 33; see also ECF No. 6, Exh. 43. In it, Harnois described the project, explained
the location, and discussed data on 41 potential historic sites in detail. Id. He concluded that one
of the sites identified, 32MOx0570, was “not eligible” for listing and that the project overall had
“no historic properties subject to effect.” Id. Four days later, the North Dakota SHPO concurred
with his determination via email. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 34. Harnois then notified the Tribe of
this concurrence. Id., ¶ 35. Both Chairman Archambault and Eagle formally objected to the
determination. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 30 at 2 (“To date, none of our request for consultation or
Class III Cultural Surveys has been honored.”); id., Exh. 31. As a result, the Tribe and Corps
continued their dialogue on these issues. See Ames Decl., ¶ 36; Chieply Decl., ¶¶ 32, 35
(describing Corps response to these objections).
The Advisory Council – the agency responsible for commenting on NHPA compliance
for federal undertakings – also sent the Corps a series of letters about the adequacy of the Section
106 process around this time. After the Corps published the draft EA, the Advisory Council
requested verification from the Corps of its consultation efforts and relayed concerns expressed
31
to them by Archambault about the consultations (or lack thereof) that had occurred to date with
Standing Rock. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 20 (Advisory Council Comment on Draft EA) at 2. The
Advisory Council formally entered the Section 106 consultation process for DAPL soon
thereafter. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 27. Then, in March, the Advisory Council wrote to express its
skepticism about the Corps’ determination that the entire pipeline was not subject to its
jurisdiction. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 25 (Letter from Advisory Council to Henderson on Mar. 15,
2016). In particular, the Advisory Council felt that the PCNs required for various portions of the
pipeline transformed the entire pipeline into an undertaking. Id. In addition, the Advisory
Council described itself as “perplexed by the Corps’ apparent difficulties in consulting” with
Standing Rock. Id. Again, on May 6, the Advisory Council wrote with additional questions
relating to the DAPL permit area, tribal consultations, and federal-agency coordination. See
ECF No. 6, Exh. 26. The Advisory Council also formally objected to the Corps determination of
“no effects,” citing numerous deficiencies in the Section 106 process, including the failure of the
Corps to properly define the scope of its responsibilities. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 32. Finally, on
June 2, the Advisory Council requested that the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
Jo-Ellen Darcy, review that “no effects” determination. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 32.
The Corps responded to these letters with several of its own. On May 13, Henderson
wrote to reiterate that the Corps could not exercise control over portions of the project not
subject to its jurisdiction. See id.; see also id., Exh. 15. In his letter, Henderson contested the
Advisory Council’s conclusion that the permitted activity determined the entire right-of-way for
the pipeline, instead contending that the crossing of jurisdictional waters did not ultimately
control project alignment elsewhere. Id. He further explained that the use of HDD in many
places would avoid Corps jurisdiction altogether by eliminating any discharge of dredge or fill
32
materials into regulated waters. Id. On June 30, the Assistant Secretary of the Army also
replied. See Chieply Decl, ¶ 38; see also ECF No. 6, Exh. 39. In her letter, she reiterated the
Corps’ position on its own jurisdiction, asserted tribes were notified and invited to participate
and provide information, and contested the Advisory Council’s claim that field visits had
identified the presence of new areas within the APE for the project. Id.
The Corps then moved to close the book on the matter. On July 25, 2016, it issued an EA
finding of “no significant impact” and verified all 204 PCN locations under NWP 12. See ECF
No. 6, Exhs. 33-36; Ames Decl., ¶ 36. The PCNs, however, contained additional restrictions.
See ECF No. 6, Exhs. 33-36. Most importantly, they instituted a “Tribal Monitoring Plan” that
requires Dakota Access to allow tribal monitors at all PCN sites when construction is occurring.
Id. Dakota Access immediately notified the tribes of its intent to begin construction at the PCN
sites within five to seven days. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 49 (Letter from Dippel to Upper Sioux).
***
In summary, the Corps has documented dozens of attempts it made to consult with the
Standing Rock Sioux from the fall of 2014 through the spring of 2016 on the permitted DAPL
activities. These included at least three site visits to the Lake Oahe crossing to assess any
potential effects on historic properties and four meetings with Colonel Henderson.
E. Procedural History and Recent Activities
Two days after the Corps issued the PCN authorizations, Standing Rock filed this suit
against it under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., asserting in part that
the Corps had violated its obligation under the NHPA prior to issuing the permitting for DAPL-
related construction along the entire pipeline route. The Tribe then filed, on August 4, 2016, this
Motion for Preliminary Injunction to mandate a withdrawal of this permitting. The next day,
33
Dakota Access intervened in the action in support of the Corps. See ECF No. 7 (Dakota Access
Motion to Intervene). The Court subsequently permitted intervention by the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe on Plaintiff’s side, though it did not participate in this Motion. After a scheduling
conference on August 8, the Court ordered an expedited briefing schedule and set a hearing on
the Motion for August 24.
At the Motion hearing, Dakota Access revealed that most of the construction associated
with DAPL is, in fact, already complete. Because only 3% of the pipeline is subject to federal
permitting, Dakota Access has always been free to proceed with the vast majority of the
construction, which will occur on private land. In fact, 48% of the pipeline had already been
cleared, graded, trenched, piped, backfilled, and reclaimed. See Mot. Hearing Trans. at 24. The
company also moved fast elsewhere; this figure included all but 11 of the 204 sites that the Corps
had subjected to PCN authorization. Id. at 25. All of the necessary clearing and grading has also
been done in South Dakota, and 90% of it is complete in North Dakota. Id. at 24. One of the
few exceptions is the crossing leading up to the west side of Lake Oahe, which has not yet been
cleared or graded.
The tribal monitoring and GC 21 unexpected-discovery protocols also appeared to be in
place for the activity that was permitted by the Corps. Id. at 37-39. When construction is
ongoing for such activities, Dakota Access allows archaeological and tribal monitors onsite to
look for evidence of cultural or historic resources. Id. As of the hearing, construction had
triggered the unexpected-discovery protocol six times. Id. at 39. In each case, construction
stopped until the state, federal, and tribal representatives confirmed that the resources were not
being damaged. Id. Each one turned out to be a false alarm. Id. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court informed the parties that it would issue its decision on September 9, two
34
weeks being necessary to adequately review the voluminous record and draft this lengthy
Opinion.
Nine days after the hearing, on Friday, September 2, the Tribe filed a supplemental
declaration by Tim Mentz, the Tribe’s former Tribal Historic Preservation Officer and a member
of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. See ECF No. 29-1 (Supplemental Declaration of Tim Mentz,
Sr.). In the declaration, Mentz explained that he had been invited by a landowner to conduct
cultural surveys on private land along the DAPL route that had already been cleared for pipeline
construction. See id., ¶¶ 2-3; see also id., Exh. 1. This land was about 1.75 miles from the
construction activity that the Corps has actually permitted at Lake Oahe. Id., ¶ 3. In other
words, the area in question was entirely outside the Corps’ jurisdiction. The construction activity
on it, as a result, never required a federal permit, and neither the Corps nor any other federal
agency had any control over it. Because these activities do not require a federal permit, they are
also not necessarily subject to the attendant restrictions to protect historic properties – i.e., GC 21
and tribal monitoring – placed by the Corps on the activities that it did permit.
Mentz, over the course of several days beginning on August 30, avers that he surveyed
this private land around the pipeline right-of-way. Id., ¶ 6. During these surveys, he observed
several rock cairns and other sites of cultural significance inside the 150-foot corridor staked for
DAPL construction. Id., ¶¶ 7-11. He was, however, confined in his actual surveying to those
areas immediately adjacent to the pipeline right-of-way and did not enter the corridor itself.
Id. Mentz documented the presence of several sites that he believed to be of great cultural note
nearby, including a stone constellation used to mark the burial site of a very important tribal
leader about 75 feet from the pipeline corridor. Id., ¶ 10. Mentz did not observe any fencing or
other protective measures around these sites. Id., ¶ 9. He also observed what he believed to be
35
important stone features within the pipeline corridor. Id., ¶ 11. According to Mentz, none of
these sites was documented on the earlier cultural surveys of the area commissioned by Dakota
Access. Id., ¶ 17.
The next day, on Saturday, September 3, Dakota Access graded this area. See ECF No.
30 (Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order). On September 4, both the Tribe and
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe filed for a Temporary Restraining Order on any additional
construction work at the site described by Mentz – i.e., the length of the pipeline route for
approximately two miles west of Highway 1806 in North Dakota – and for any additional
construction work on the pipeline within 20 miles on either side of Lake Oahe, until the Court
ruled on this Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Id. The Corps responded that it would not
oppose the restraining order while awaiting this decision.
Dakota Access, not surprisingly, hotly contested Mentz’s version of events in its
opposition to the TRO motion. In a map of the area, the company sought to demonstrate that
many of the sites documented by Mentz were in fact well outside the pipeline route. See ECF
No. 34 (Response to TRO) at 6-8. The rest, according to Dakota Access, were directly over the
existing Northern Border Natural Gas Pipeline that runs through the area and thus could not have
been historic artifacts. Id. at 6. The company instead alleges that the route of the pipeline in this
area proves its point: it twists and turns to avoid the finds that Mentz documented adjacent to the
pipeline and thus demonstrates that Dakota Access did purposefully shift the route to avoid any
sites of cultural significance in its planning phase. Id. The Court acknowledges that the map
provided by the company does seem to indicate that the pipeline curves to accommodate the
cultural sites. Id. at 7.
36
This Court held a TRO hearing on September 6, the first business day after that motion
was filed. Without making factual determinations about the truth of Mentz’s observations, the
Court was able to obtain Dakota Access’s agreement not to perform any construction activities
within 20 miles east of Lake Oahe and within about two miles west of the Lake, as it had already
ceased such operations while awaiting the Court’s preliminary-injunction ruling. The Court
otherwise denied the TRO. This current Opinion now issues on a highly expedited basis.
II. Legal Standard
“[I]njunctive relief” is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Advisory Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is
in the public interest.” Id. at 20. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter, courts weighed
the preliminary-injunction factors on a sliding scale, allowing a weak showing on one factor to
be overcome by a strong showing on another factor. See, e.g., Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This Circuit, however, has suggested,
without deciding, that Winter should be read to abandon the sliding-scale analysis in favor of a
“more demanding burden” requiring plaintiffs to independently demonstrate both a likelihood of
success on the merits and irreparable harm. See Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Whether a sliding-scale analysis still exists or not, courts in our Circuit have held that “if
a party makes no showing of irreparable injury, the court may deny the motion for injunctive
relief without considering the other factors.” Dodd v. Fleming, 223 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20 (D.D.C.
37
2002) (citing CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir.
1995)). Likewise, a failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits alone is sufficient to
defeat a preliminary-injunction motion. Ark. Dairy Co-op Ass’n, Inc. v. USDA, 573 F.3d 815,
832 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). It
follows, then, that the Court may deny a motion for preliminary injunction, without further
inquiry, upon finding that a plaintiff is unable to show either irreparable injury or a likelihood of
success on the merits. Here, Standing Rock fails on both grounds.
III. Analysis
The Corps gave the go-ahead, under NWP 12, for DAPL’s construction activities in
federally regulated waters at hundreds of discrete places along its nearly 1,200-mile route. In
seeking a preliminary injunction, the Tribe contends that the Corps, in doing so, shirked its
responsibility to first engage in the tribal consultations required by the NHPA. Because DAPL
construction is ongoing, the Tribe further asserts that sites of great significance will likely be
damaged or destroyed unless this Court pumps the brakes now. It also contends that the balance
of harms and the public interest favor its position.
Defendants rejoin that preliminary-injunctive relief is inappropriate both because the
Corps has satisfied its obligations under the NHPA – in other words, the Tribe is unlikely to
succeed on the merits of its NHPA claim – and because the Tribe has failed to show that any
harm will befall it in the absence of an injunction. As the Court agrees on both points, it need
not consider the final two factors – balance of harms and the public interest – to deny the
Motion. It now discusses the merits and the harm separately.
38
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Although the Tribe’s legal theory is not entirely clear, the Court believes it can infer four
separate arguments that the Corps’ permitting of DAPL was unlawful. First, the Standing Rock
Sioux assert that the Corps violated the NHPA when it promulgated NWP 12 without a Section
106 process. Next, they contend that, even if the Corps could defer site-specific Section 106
consultations when promulgating NWP 12, it violated the NHPA by permitting DAPL-related
activities at some federally regulated waters without a Section 106 determination. Third, the
Tribe maintains that, even where the Corps did conduct a Section 106 process, it unlawfully
narrowed the scope of its review to only those areas around the permitted activity, as opposed to
the entire pipeline. Finally, the Tribe urges that the Section 106 process at the PCN sites was
inadequate because the quality of the consultations was deficient. None of these claims appears
likely to succeed on the merits at this stage.
1. NWP 12
Although many DAPL-related construction activities in federally regulated waters
occurred or will occur at places where the Corps did not require a PCN verification, such
activities nevertheless required approval from the Corps under the CWA or RHA. That approval
was provided on a general level when the Corps re-promulgated NWP 12 in 2012. Because
these activities thus were “permitted” by a federal agency, they fall within the NHPA’s definition
of a federal “undertaking.” See 54 U.S.C. § 300320; 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y). As federal
undertakings, they triggered the Corps’ NHPA duty to consider, prior to the issuance of the
permit, their effects on properties of cultural or historic significance. See 54 U.S.C. § 306108
(“[P]rior to the issuance of any license, [the federal agency] shall take into account the effect of
39
the undertaking on any historic property.”). According to the Tribe, the Corps did not fulfill this
obligation because NWP 12 was issued without any tribal consultations.
As an initial matter, the Tribe’s assertion that the Corps did not engage in any NHPA
consultations prior to promulgating NWP 12 is false. Before issuing NWP 12, the Corps, in
November 2009, sent an early notification to tribes, including Standing Rock, containing
information pertaining to its proposed NWPs. See ECF No. 21, Exh. 14 (Letter from Ruchs to
Brings Plenty on Nov. 9, 2009). The letter contained a graphic depiction of the types of
activities that were most often authorized by nationwide permits in the Omaha District. Id. In
addition, in 2010, the Corps proceeded to hold “listening sessions and workshops” with tribes to
discuss their concerns related to the proposed nationwide permits. See ECF No. 21, Exh. 13
(Tribal Information Fact Sheet). In March 2010, the Corps contacted Standing Rock personally
to discuss the permits and any additional regional conditions that the Tribe thought might need to
be included to protect their cultural resources. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 5.
Then, on February 10, 2011, the Corps sent a letter to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal
Chairman and THPO Young, notifying them of its plan to publish a proposal in the Federal
Register to reissue NWP 12. See ECF No. 21, Exh. 13 (Letter from Ruchs to Murphy on Feb.
10, 2011). Attached to the letter, the Corps provided a description of the proposed NWP 12, as
well as a draft of the current Omaha District regional conditions that would apply to the permit.
Id. The Corps requested that the Tribe “consider this letter our invitation to begin consultation
on the proposal to reissue the NWPs.” Id. It went on to say that the Corps “look[s] forward to
consulting with you on a government-to-government basis on this issue” and requested that the
Tribe notify the Corps if it was “interested in consulting.” Id. The Corps further committed to
provide a “Corps representative at consultation and fact-finding meetings” and to “fully consider
40
any information you wish to provide.” Id. In an email on March 9, 2011, the Corps followed up
on the offer. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 7. The Corps also seems to have conducted district-level
tribal listening sessions and workshops. See Tribal Information Fact Sheet at 1. There is no
indication in the record that the Tribe responded to the Corps’ invitation to consult, but was
ignored. The Tribe, in fact, concedes that it did not participate in the notice-and-comment for
NWP 12 at all. See Reply at 2. When it actually promulgated NWP 12, moreover, the Corps
included a section on its compliance with the NHPA, noting that GC 20 “requires consultation
for activities that have the potential to cause effects to historic properties” prior to those
activities’ proceeding under the general permit. See ECF No 6, Exh. 1 (Nationwide Permit 12
Decision Document) at 10 (emphasis added).
To the extent that the Tribe now seeks in this Motion to launch a belated facial attack
against NWP 12, then, it is unlikely to succeed. The Corps made a reasonable effort to discharge
its duties under the NHPA prior to promulgating NWP 12, given the nature of the general permit.
Cf. Sierra Club v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043, 1047, 1057 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding Corps
permissibly interpreted CWA “to allow partial deferral of minimal-impacts analysis” because of
“the difficulty of predicting the impact of activities allowed under nationwide permits”).
Without definite knowledge of the specific locations that would require permitting in the future,
it is hard to ascertain what else the Corps might have done, before issuing a general permit, to
discharge its NHPA duties. In other words, the Corps, when it promulgated NWP 12, had no
knowledge of DAPL or its proposed route. The CWA and RHA plainly allow the Corps to do
just what it did here: preauthorize a group of similar activities that, alone and combined, have
minimal impact on navigable waterways. This Court cannot conclude that the Corps does not
41
have the ability to promulgate these general permits at all. As a result, the Corps’ effort to speak
with those it thought might be concerned was sufficient to discharge its NHPA obligations.
This conclusion is reinforced by the limited scale and scope of the federally sanctioned
activities at issue. The Advisory Council’s regulations provide that the “agency official should
plan consultations appropriate to the scale of the undertaking and the scope of the Federal
involvement.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a). Here, the scope of the Corps’ involvement was limited. It
never had the ability, after all, to regulate the entire construction of a pipeline. Congress has
decided that no general federal regulation applies to domestic oil pipelines. In addition, the scale
of the federally permitted undertaking here is narrow. The CWA and RHA regulate, as relevant
here, only certain limited construction activities in waterways. The CWA, moreover, restricts
the use of general permits to an even narrower subset of these already limited activities in
waterways. The Corps can only authorize discharges that have a minimal impact on the
jurisdictional waterway through a general permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). In other words,
NWP 12, by definition, can authorize only that regulated conduct that will have little effect on
the regulated waterway in the first place. Given these restrictions, the Corps’ decision to
promulgate NWP 12 after the effort to consult that it made here was reasonable.
The Tribe responds that the Corps was instead required to work out a “programmatic
agreement” with any tribe that might one day be affected by the activities permitted under NWP
12. See Mot. at 22-23. A programmatic agreement is an “agreement to govern the
implementation of a particular program or the resolution of adverse effects from certain complex
project situations or multiple undertakings” that is negotiated by the Advisory Council and the
permitting agency. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(b). On this score, Standing Rock is certainly right
that the Corps could have pursued a programmatic agreement to fulfill its NHPA duties, as it did
42
in 2004 with several tribes in regard to the Missouri Basin. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 4
(Programmatic Agreement). But the Advisory Council does not make the pursuit of a
programmatic agreement mandatory. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(b) (“The Advisory Council and the
agency official may negotiate a programmatic agreement.”) (emphasis added). The Court thus
cannot conclude that a PA was the only avenue available to the Corps to fulfill its duties under
the NHPA. There is, indeed, no indication that such a requirement would even be feasible for a
nationwide permitting scheme given the sheer number of possible consulting parties. Nor could
the Corps have complied with the full Advisory Council process, which is clearly designed for
project-specific determinations. As a result, it was reasonable for the Corps to engage in a
general process at the time it promulgated NWP 12 and to defer site-specific NHPA
determinations to a later time.
2. NWP 12 Applied at Non-PCN Sites
The Tribe next argues that NWP 12’s operation is unlawful because the Corps makes no
site-specific Section 106 determination for numerous generally permitted activities – i.e., non-
PCN sites. In particular, it claims that GC 20 improperly delegates authority to the permittee to
assess whether its activities will have a potential effect on historic properties. To refresh the
reader, GC 20 requires that “[i]n cases where the district engineer determines that the activity
may affect [NHPA] properties . . . , the activity is not authorized, until the requirements of
Section 106 of the [NHPA] have been satisfied.” 77 Fed. Reg at 10,284. The Advisory Council,
too, seems to concur that, in individual cases of permitting under NWP 12, Section 106 is not
satisfied where the Corps itself does not make a site-specific determination about whether a
permitted activity has the potential to affect historic properties. See ECF No. 6, Exh. 50 at 1-2.
As the Tribe and the Advisory Council read GC 20, the Corps never considers whether an
43
individual activity will have the potential to affect historic sites unless the permittee decides that
it might and, accordingly, seeks a PCN. The Corps, in turn, responds that it does consider itself
to retain the authority and responsibility under GC 20 to determine whether permitted activity
has the potential to damage historic properties. See Corps Opp. at 13-14.
Standing Rock and the Advisory Council make a good argument. It is possible that the
Corps’ permitting under NWP 12 would be arbitrary and capricious where it relies completely on
the unilateral determination of a permittee that there is no potential cultural resource that will be
injured by its permitted activity. Fortunately, this Court need not decide that issue because that
is not how the Corps interpreted and applied GC 20 to DAPL. In this case, the Corps looked at
reports and maps of the pipeline to determine which jurisdictional crossings had the potential to
affect historic properties. See Chieply Decl., Exh. 16 at 1; see also id., Exh. 15 at 1. These
extensive maps reflected cultural surveys conducted by licensed archaeologists (sometimes with
SHPO participation). See Howard Decl., ¶¶ 4-10; see, e.g., ECF No. 6, Exh. 44. The Corps
ultimately concluded that only 204 of the jurisdictional crossings triggered either GC 20 or some
other concern that would require a PCN verification. See Chieply Decl., Exh. 16 at 1.
The Court must review that determination under the Administrative Procedure Act’s
deferential standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). Under this standard, the Tribe bears the burden
to demonstrate that the agency action was unlawful, arbitrary or capricious, or not in accordance
with the law. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976). Plaintiff has not done so
here. At no point has the Tribe clearly pointed this Court to a specific non-PCN activity – i.e.,
crossings the Corps permitted – where there is evidence that might indicate that cultural
resources would be damaged. The Tribe instead focuses on the potential impact to cultural
resources elsewhere along the pipeline. But to show the Corps’ determination was unreasonable,
44
Standing Rock needs to offer more than vague assertions that some places in the Midwest around
some bodies of water may contain some sacred sites that could be affected. For example, if the
Corps had not required a PCN verification for a site like Lake Oahe (assuming it was not subject
to the RHA), to which the Tribe has shown it has important historic and cultural connections, this
Court might well find unreasonable the Corps’ determination that construction at the site would
have no potential to cause negative effects to these resources. Without such a specific showing
involving a site within the Corps’ jurisdiction, however, the Court can find no ground at this
juncture to hold that the Corps’ considered judgment – based as it was on its expertise, the
activity involved, extensive cultural surveys, and additional research – was unreasonable. The
Tribe has had more than a year to come up with evidence that the Corps acted unreasonably in
permitting even a single jurisdictional activity without a PCN, and it has not done so. As a
result, it has not met its burden here.
3. Scope of Section 106 Process at PCN Sites
The Tribe next asserts that the Corps’ Section 106 process was deficient even at those
places where it did in fact require a PCN notification. Here, again, Standing Rock largely
focuses its efforts on a sweeping claim that the Corps was obligated in permitting this narrow
activity – i.e., certain construction activities in U.S. waterways – to consider the impact on
potential cultural resources from the construction of the entire pipeline. In particular, the Tribe
contends that the NHPA requires such an analysis because the statute defines the potential effect
of an undertaking to include the indirect effects of the permitted activity on historic properties.
This argument, however, misses the mark. In its regulations concerning compliance with
the adverse-effects analysis required by the NHPA, the Corps determined that entire pipelines
need not be considered part of the analyzed areas. Rather, only construction activity in the
45
federally regulated waterways – the direct effect of the undertaking – and in uplands around the
federally regulated waterways – the indirect effect of the undertaking – requires analysis. See 33
C.F.R. pt. 325, app. C, § 1(g)(i). This Circuit has held just such an approach to be reasonable in
the context of a challenge brought under a similar “stop, look, and listen” provision in NEPA,
and these two statutes are often treated similarly. See, e.g., Karst Envtl. Educ. & Prot., Inc. v.
EPA, 475 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Because of the ‘operational similarity’ between
NEPA and NHPA, both of which impose procedural obligations on federal agencies after a
certain threshold of federal involvement, courts treat ‘major federal actions’ under NEPA
similarly to ‘federal undertakings’ under NHPA.”). Specifically, this Circuit held that where a
federal easement and CWA permitting encompassed only five percent of the length of a pipeline,
“the federal government was not required to conduct NEPA analysis of the entirety of the . . .
pipeline, including portions not subject to federal control or permitting.” Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Other Circuits have held the same.
See Bostick, 787 F.3d at 1051-54 (holding Corps was not required to prepare NEPA analysis of
entire pipeline when verifying NWPs for 485-mile oil pipeline crossing over 2,000 waterways);
Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 272-73 (8th Cir. 1980) (concluding same for
electric utility line). The Tribe offers no persuasive argument as to why the facts here demand a
different conclusion. As a result, this Court cannot conclude here that a federal agency with
limited jurisdiction over specific activities related to a pipeline is required to consider all the
effects of the entire pipeline to be the indirectly or directly foreseeable effects of the narrower
permitted activity.
The Corps’ decision in this regard is also entitled to deference under the APA as it falls
squarely within the expertise of the Corps, not the Advisory Council, to determine the scope of
46
the effects of construction activities at U.S. waterways. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v.
Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding courts must be especially deferential to an
agency’s determination within an area in which it has “special expertise”). The Tribe, moreover,
fails to provide any evidence that would call the Corps’ technical judgment in this regard into
question. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. C, § 1(g)(i) (explaining that for linear crossings, the
“permit area shall extend in either direction from the crossing to that point at which alternative
alignments leading to a reasonable alternative locations for the crossing can be considered and
evaluated”). The Tribe contends instead, without evidence, that the entire pipeline must be the
indirect effect of the permitted activity because the pipeline cannot feasibly avoid all federally
regulated water crossings. In other words, no permitting means no pipeline. The Court cannot
say on this record, however, that the Tribe is right. In fact, as DAPL’s own construction
demonstrates, the use of technology such as HDD can at least sometimes avoid the Corps’
jurisdiction at federally regulated waters by eliminating the need for the discharge of dredge or
fill material.
The limited nature of the Corps’ jurisdiction, in fact, reinforces the reasonableness of the
its decision not to consider the effects of the entire pipeline on historic properties before issuing
the DAPL permitting. “[W]here an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its
limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency[’s action] cannot be considered a
legally relevant ‘cause’ of the effect.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770
(2004). Section 106 analysis is designed only to “discourage[e] federal agencies from ignoring
preservation values in projects they initiate, approve funds for or otherwise control.” Lee v.
Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1989). That section does not require that the Corps
consider the effects of actions over which it has no control and which are far removed from its
47
permitting activity. The Corps here ultimately determined that the route taken by the pipeline
through private lands, up to a certain point approaching a federally regulated waterway, is driven
by factors that have little to do with the discrete activities that the Corps needs to permit. The
Court cannot conclude otherwise on this record. As such, it cannot hold the Corps’ decision
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful.
4. Sufficiency of Consultations
Plaintiff’s last point on the merits is that the Corps failed to offer it a reasonable
opportunity to participate in the Section 106 process as to the narrow scope of the construction
activity that the Corps did consider to be an effect of the permitted waterway activities. The
factual proceedings recited in exhaustive detail in Section I.D., supra, tell a different story. The
Corps has documented dozens of attempts to engage Standing Rock in consultations to identify
historical resources at Lake Oahe and other PCN crossings. To the reader’s relief, the Court
need not repeat them here. Suffice it to say that the Tribe largely refused to engage in
consultations. It chose instead to hold out for more – namely, the chance to conduct its own
cultural surveys over the entire length of the pipeline.
In fact, on this record, it appears that the Corps exceeded its NHPA obligations at many
of the PCN sites. For example, in response to the Tribe’s concerns about burial sites at the James
River crossing, the Corps verified that cultural resources indeed were present and instructed
Dakota Access to move the pipeline to avoid them. Dakota Access did so. See Ames Decl.,
¶ 24. Furthermore, the Corps took numerous trips to Lake Oahe with members of the Tribe to
identify sites of cultural significance. See Summit Lake Paiute Tribe of Nevada v. U.S. Bureau
of Land Mgmt., 496 F. App’x 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2012) (not reported) (holding four visits with a
tribe to site constituted sufficient consultation for resolution of adverse effects). Colonel
48
Henderson also met with the Tribe no fewer than four times in the spring of 2016 to discuss their
concerns with the pipeline. Ultimately, the Corps concluded that no sites would be affected by
the DAPL construction at Lake Oahe, and the State Historic Preservation Officer who had visited
that site concurred. The Corps’ effort to consult the Tribe on this site – the place that most
clearly implicated the Standing Rock Sioux’s cultural interests – sufficed under the NHPA.
Contact, of course, is not consultation, and “consultation with one tribe doesn’t relieve
the [agency] of its obligation to consult with any other tribe.” Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma
Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112, 1118 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
But this is not a case about empty gestures. As noted in Section I.D., supra, and the examples
just above, the Corps and the Tribe engaged in meaningful exchanges that in some cases resulted
in concrete changes to the pipeline’s route. “This is not a case like Quechan Tribe, where a tribe
entitled to consultation actively sought to consult with an agency and was not afforded the
opportunity.” Wilderness Soc’y. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 526 F. App’x 790, 793 (9th Cir. May
28, 2013) (not reported).
The Tribe nevertheless asserts that the Corps’ failure to include it in the early cultural
surveys rendered the permitting unlawful for at least some of the PCN sites. These surveys,
however, were not conducted by the Corps or under its direction. Even setting this fact aside,
neither the NHPA nor the Advisory Council regulations require that any cultural surveys be
conducted for a federal undertaking. The regulations instead demand only that the Corps make a
“reasonable and good faith effort” to consult on identifying cultural properties, which “may
include background research, consultation, oral history interviews, sample field investigations,
and field survey.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1). It goes without saying that “‘may’ means may.”
McCreary v. Offner, 172 F.3d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1999). These regulations contain “no
49
requirement that a good faith effort include all of these things.” Summit Lake Paiute, 496 F.
App’x at 715. The Tribe, then, did not have an absolute right to participate in cultural surveying
at every permitted undertaking, as it seems to argue. The Advisory Council regulations direct
the agency to “take into account past planning, research, and studies” in making these types of
determinations, see 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1), and that is just what the Corps did here. It gave the
Tribe a reasonable and good-faith opportunity to identify sites of importance to it. As a result,
the Court must conclude that the Tribe has not shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits of
its NHPA claim at this stage.
B. Irreparable Injury
In seeking preliminary-injunctive relief here, the Standing Rock Sioux do not claim that a
potential future rupture in the pipeline could damage their reserved land or water. Instead, they
point to an entirely separate injury: the likelihood that DAPL’s ongoing construction activities –
specifically, grading and clearing of land – might damage or destroy sites of great cultural or
historical significance to the Tribe. The risk that harm might befall such sites is a matter of
unquestionable importance to the Standing Rock people. In the eloquent words of their Tribal
Chairman:
History connects the dots of our identity, and our identity was all but
obliterated. Our land was taken, our language was forbidden. Our
stories, our history, were almost forgotten. What land, language, and
identity remains is derived from our cultural and historic sites. . . .
Sites of cultural and historic significance are important to us because
they are a spiritual connection to our ancestors. Even if we do not
have access to all such sites, their existence perpetuates the
connection. When such a site is destroyed, the connection is lost.
Archambault Decl., ¶¶ 6, 15. The tragic history of the Great Sioux Nation’s repeated
dispossessions at the hands of a hungry and expanding early America is well known. See, e.g.,
Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (1970); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
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371 (1980). The threat that new injury will compound old necessarily compels great caution and
respect from this Court in considering the Tribe’s plea for intervention.
Although the potential injury may be significant, the Tribe must show that it is probable
to occur in the absence of the preliminary injunction it now seeks. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22
(“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent
with [the Court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”) (emphasis added).
This is the burden the law imposes for this form of relief. The Court must faithfully and fairly
apply that standard in all cases, regardless of how high the stakes or how worthy the cause. After
a careful review of the current record, the Court cannot conclude that the Tribe has met it.
To understand Standing Rock’s deficit in this regard, it is necessary to first consider the
nature of the relief it seeks. The Tribe has not sued Dakota Access here for any transgressions;
instead, this Motion seeks to enjoin Corps permitting of construction activities in discrete U.S.
waterways along the pipeline route. Such relief sought cannot stop the construction of DAPL on
private lands, which are not subject to any federal law. Indeed, Standing Rock does not point the
Court to any law violated by the private contracts that allow for this construction or any federal
regulation or oversight of these activities. From the outset, consequently, no federal agency had
the ability to prevent DAPL’s construction from proceeding on these private lands. At most, the
Corps could only have stopped these activities at the banks of a navigable U.S. waterway. An
injunction of any unlawful permitting now can, at most, do the same.
The facts previously recited bear this simple conclusion out. Dakota Access, as has been
explained, began its construction work on private lands long before it had even secured the Corps
permitting that the Tribe now seeks to enjoin. See Mahmoud Decl., ¶ 47. Standing Rock
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concedes as much. See Mot. at 35; see also Mot. Hearing Tran. at 46 (“They started construction
months ago, months before the permits were issued.”). In many places, this work is already
complete. See Mot. Hearing Trans. at 24. There is, moreover, no sign that Dakota Access will
pull back from this construction on private land if this Court enjoins the NWP 12 permitting
necessary for the 3% of DAPL’s route subject to federal jurisdiction. Quite the contrary; the
company has indicated that it has little choice but to push ahead in the hopes of meeting contract
obligations to deliver oil by January 2017. See, e.g., id. at 40-41; see also Mahmoud Decl., ¶ 51.
The Tribe thus cannot demonstrate that the temporary relief it seeks here – i.e., a
preliminary injunction to withdraw permitting by the Corps for dredge or fill activities in
federally regulated waters along the DAPL route – can prevent the harm to cultural sites that
might occur from this construction on private lands. In other words, Standing Rock cannot show
that any harm taking place on private lands removed from the Corps’ permitting jurisdiction
“will directly result from the action which [it now] seeks to enjoin.” Hunter v. FERC, 527 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2007) (explaining that to obtain preliminary relief, “the movant must .
. . show that ‘the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to
enjoin’”) (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added)); see also Buckingham Corp. v. Karp, 762 F.2d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The purpose of
a preliminary injunction is to protect the moving party from irreparable injury during the
pendency of the action.”). Powerless to prevent these harms given the current posture of the
case, the Court cannot consider them likely to occur in the absence of the relief sought here. Put
simply, any such harms are destined to ensue whether or not the Court grants the injunction the
Tribe desires. As Standing Rock acknowledges, Dakota Access has demonstrated that it is
determined to build its pipeline right up to the water’s edge regardless of whether it has secured a
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permit to then build across. See Mot. Hearing Trans. at 46. Like the Corps, this Court is unable
to stop it from doing so.
There is a second related problem with the Tribe’s claim to irreparable injury, both on the
private land and elsewhere along the pipeline. The risk that construction may damage or destroy
cultural resources is now moot for the 48% of the pipeline that has already been completed. Id.
at 24. As the clearing and grading are the “clearest and most obvious” cause of the harm to
cultural sites from pipeline construction, id. at 18-19, 47 (recognizing that injunction is necessary
anywhere not yet cleared “to prevent additional harm or construction until [cultural] surveys can
take place”), moreover, the damage has already occurred for the vast majority of the pipeline,
with the notable exception of 10% of the route in North Dakota, including at Lake Oahe. Here
again, then, the Tribe has not shown for this substantial segment of the pipeline that any
additional harm is likely to occur to cultural sites absent the preliminary injunction that it now
seeks.
Yet a third problem bedevils the Tribe’s efforts to enjoin permitting along the entire
pipeline route. Plaintiff never defined the boundaries of its ancestral lands vis-à-vis DAPL.
Instead, Standing Rock asserts that these lands extend “wherever the buffalo roamed.” Even
accepting this is true, to find that there is a likelihood that construction might run afoul of a site
of cultural significance to the Tribe, this Court must ultimately decide where those culturally
significant lands lie. There is at least some evidence in the record that they do not traverse the
entirety of DAPL. For example, Jon Eagle, the Tribe’s current THPO, indicated prior to this
litigation that at least some of the pipeline did not fall within the scope of what he considered
ancestral tribal lands. See Chieply Decl., Exh. 14 (Letter from Jon Eagle to Martha Chieply on
Mar. 22, 2016) (“Most of the DAPL pipeline route crosses Lakota/Dakota aboriginal land.”); see
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also ECF No. 11-7 (Declaration of H. Frazier). This Court may not enjoin an action that the
Corps has authorized by guessing at whether an interest of the Tribe might be affected. Instead,
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that the permitting it seeks to have withdrawn would, in
the absence of such relief, likely cause it harm. This it did not do for much of the pipeline.
So what activity remains subject to this Court’s injunctive powers? Any permitted DAPL
activity that the Tribe has shown will likely injure a nearby site of cultural or historic
significance to the Standing Rock people. As previously explained, 204 sites were subject to
PCN authorizations and thus were clearly permitted by the Corps. Those sites are in play. Other
discharges into jurisdictional waters at hypothetical locations along the route, however, may also
have been permitted under NWP 12 without a PCN process. But it would be pure speculation
based on the current record to determine where such permitting occurred. The Tribe points the
Court to no specific crossing of cultural significance that the Corps permitted under NWP 12
without a PCN verification. In fact, many of the pipeline crossings were not permitted by the
Corps, sometimes because Dakota Access’s use of HDD did not give rise to the dredge or fill
activities that trigger federal jurisdiction under the CWA. For example, out of the five places in
North Dakota that Dakota Access thought might require a PCN authorization, only three actually
needed permitting at all. See Chieply Decl., ¶ 10. Of course, there may be many sites that the
Corps permitted under NWP 12 that the Court has missed. But the burden is on the Tribe to
indicate why this permitting must be enjoined to prevent an injury likely to occur to it. The
Court, again, cannot guess that at some undefined locations there might be harm to the Tribe. It
was Standing Rock’s burden to point to the specific NWP 12 permitting that was likely to cause
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it injury. Standing Rock did not do so with regard to the permitting that has occurred outside of
the PCN verified locations.
Returning to the 204 PCN sites, the vast majority must be excluded right off the bat. As
previously noted, construction at 193 of the 204 PCN has already been completed. See Mot.
Hearing Trans. at 24. For those sites, the die is cast. Whatever harms may have occurred from
DAPL construction, the Court’s intervention to enjoin the permitting now can no longer avoid
them. As a result, the Court must deny the Tribe’s request for an injunction as to permitting at
those sites.
As to the other 11 PCN sites, the Tribe largely neglects to point the Court to any
resources that may be affected by permitted activity. Plaintiff seeks to avoid its responsibility to
identify a likely injury at these locations by claiming that this failure stems from the Corps’
refusal to properly consult in the first place and thus should be excused. See Mot. at 37 n.17. At
least with regard to some of these sites, however, the Corps did offer the Tribe the opportunity to
visit the sites or even conduct its own surveys, and the Tribe declined to do so. See Chieply
Decl., ¶¶ 28-29. The record contains abundant evidence that the Corps also repeatedly sought
other input on known cultural sites at these locations, and, in many cases, other tribes conducted
site visits to search for any resources likely to be affected by the DAPL work. Id. The Tribe
cannot now ask the Court to speculate that there would be a likely injury at these places by
claiming that it was prevented from assessing these sites.
These sites are also subject to several additional restrictions that make it unlikely that
construction will damage or destroy sites of cultural significance to the Tribe. First, the Corps
attached restrictions to its PCN authorizations. These restrictions mandate that tribal monitors
and archaeologists be allowed at these sites to look for any evidence of previously overlooked
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resources whenever construction is happening. See ECF No. 6, Exhs. 33-36 (PCN
authorizations). GC 21 will also require that Dakota Access stop work until any unanticipated
discovery can be evaluated for its historic and cultural significance by the Corps and the SHPO.
See NWP 12 at 10,184. Standing Rock, too, will have the right to be involved in that verification
process. Id. Given all these precautions, and the Tribe’s failure to point the Court toward any
evidence that a particular resource will be injured by this work, the Court must conclude that
Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that irreparable injury is likely to occur without an
injunction against this permitting.
And then there was one: Lake Oahe. This is the sole permitting that the Tribe might
arguably show is likely to cause harm to cultural or historic sites of significance to it. As
previously discussed, Lake Oahe is of undeniable importance to the Tribe, and the general area is
demonstrably home to important cultural resources. Even here, though, the Tribe has not met its
burden to show that DAPL-related work is likely to cause damage. The Corps and the Tribe
conducted multiple visits to the area earlier this year in an effort to identify sites that might be
harmed by DAPL’s construction. See Eagle Decl., ¶¶ 13-14; Harnois Decl., ¶ 29. While the
Tribe identified several previously undiscovered resources during those visits, these sites are
located away from the activity required for the DAPL construction. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 29.
Ultimately, the Corps considered these findings and determined that they would not be affected
by the permitted activity. Id., ¶ 33. Most importantly, the North Dakota SHPO concurred in this
opinion after having toured the site as well. See Harnois Decl., ¶ 34.
Several factors unique to the site also support this conclusion. The area around the
permitted activity has been subject to previous surveying for other utility projects. See
Mahmoud Decl., ¶¶ 18-19. DAPL likewise will run parallel, at a distance of 22 to 300 feet, to an
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already-existing natural-gas pipeline under the lake. Id.; see also Mot. Hearing Tran. at 25.
Dakota Access will also use the less-invasive HDD method to run the pipeline, which will
require less disturbance to the land around the drilling and bury the pipeline at a depth that is
unlikely to damage cultural resources. See Howard Decl., ¶ 7; see also Mahmoud Decl., ¶ 19.
Indeed, the Corps concluded that this method would not cause structural impacts at sites away
from the direct drilling, and the Tribe presents no evidence to the contrary. See ECF No. 6, Exh.
51 (Omaha District Envtl. Assessment) at 78-79. Any temporary disturbance to the atmospherics
around the site, moreover, will not be irreparable as they will be removed once the construction
is complete. Finally, like the other PCN sites, there are several protective measures in place to
assure that the Tribe and others will be able to monitor the construction activity to protect any
previously unidentified resources.
For all of the above reasons, the Tribe has not carried its burden to demonstrate that the
Court could prevent damage to important cultural resources by enjoining the Corps’ DAPL-
related permitting.
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IV. Conclusion
As it has previously mentioned, this Court does not lightly countenance any depredation
of lands that hold significance to the Standing Rock Sioux. Aware of the indignities visited upon
the Tribe over the last centuries, the Court scrutinizes the permitting process here with particular
care. Having done so, the Court must nonetheless conclude that the Tribe has not demonstrated
that an injunction is warranted here. The Court, therefore, will issue a contemporaneous Order
denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: September 9, 2016
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