Common Purpose USA, Inc. v. Obama

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Common Purpose USA, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Barack Obama, et al., Civil Action No. 16-345 {GK)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Common Purpose USA, Inc. ("Common Purpose") ,
alleges that Defendants, the United States, the District of
Columbia, and various officials of both governments, have violated
the due process rights of Plaintiff's members by allowing them to
be subject to past gun violence and the threat of future gun
violence. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, which it believes
will eliminate the threat of future gun violence against its
members.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' respective
Motions to Dismiss. Upon consideration of the Motions,
Oppositions, and Replies, and the entire record herein, it is
evident that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's
Complaint, and the Motions to Dismiss are granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Common Purpose is a domestic non-profit organization.
Complaint at 5. Its members are direct or indirect victims of gun
violence in the United States, including the District of Columbia.
Id. However, Common Purpose has not identified a single member of
the group. See Id. A paraphrased statement of its mission is
that it seeks to advance an understanding of the United States'
Constitution that reduces gun violence. Complaint at 5.
Plaintiff brings this action against President Barack Obama,
Loretta Lynch, Attorney General of the United States, Vanita Gupta,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Brandon,
Deputy Director of the U.S. Department of Justice and head of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"),
all in their official capacities, and the United States of America
(collectively "Federal Defendants"),. as well as the District of
Columbia and Cathy Lanier, in her official capacity as Chief of
the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia,
(collectively "District Defendants").
Common Purpose alleges that its members' constitutional
rights have been violated by gun violence resulting from "the
unfettered right to bear arms." Opposition to Federal Defendants'
Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 5] ("Fed. Opp'n"); Complaint at 2-5. It
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attributes this violence to the manner in which Federal Defendants
enforce and implement the various laws of the United States, Opp'n
at 10, and to the District's laws and regulations authorizing the
concealed carrying of firearms. Complaint at 3-4.
Plaintiff's Complaint presents seven claims or issues to the Court:
"Issue 1. Do the Federalist Papers and in particular
Federalist Paper No. 2 9 and the practices and use of
militias in the early years of this country's republic,
establish that the "right to bear arms" was intended to
be limited to a "well-regulated militia," subject to
both state and Congressional regulation?
Issue 2. Must interpretation of the Second Amendment
adhere to and apply the basic principle that a statute,
a fortiori, the Constitution, must be read in its
entirety?
Issue 3. If the answer to Issue 2 is affirmative, must
the interpretation of the "right to bear arms" under the
Second Amendment strike a proper balance between and
among other Articles and Amendments to the Constitution,
lest such Articles and Amendments be read out of the
Constitution?
Issue 4. In light of the presentations made and reviewed
in Issue 3, must the "right to bear arms" be balanced
against other constitutional powers and guarantees?
Issue 5 If the "right to bear arms" includes the right
to modern weapons, such as attack weapons, against what
foreign or domestic persons, entities, organizations may
the right be exercised and who decides against whom and
if and when to exercise such right?
Issue 6. If the "right to bear arms" includes the right
to use modern weapons, such as attack weapons, against
domestic persons, entities, and/or organizations, does
that create an environment conducive to anarchy?
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Issue 7: Does the District's Concealed Carry laws
interfere with the enforcement of federal laws?" 1
1 The Complaint contains several other issues, which the Court
construes to be sub-parts of Issue 7:
"(B) Whether the amendments to the Firearms Control Act
of 1975 (D.C. Official Code 16 §7-2501), as adopted by
the District of Columbia (22 D.C. Code §22-4504.01, "DC
Carry Law") must be interpreted consistent with the
interpretation of the Second Amendment made in reference
to the authorities enumerated in (A) preceding; ( C)
Whether if the provisions of the D.C. Carry Law are found
to be in conflict with the interpretation of the Second
Amendment made in reference to the authorities
enumerated in (A) preceding, such provisions would be
conflict with Constitutional guarantees and federal
regulation of guns and gun ownership (see pages 29-31
following) making them subject to preemption under the
supremacy clause of Article VI (U.S. Const. art. VI)
(hereinafter references will be made to "Article" or
"Amendment" when citing to these provisions of the
Constitution); D) Whether the rules and regulations
("Concealed Carry Rules") adopted by the Chief of Police
of the Metropolitan Police Department ("DC Chief of
Police") authorizing the issuance of permits to carry
concealed firearms (''Concealed Carry Permits") interfere
with or prevent the enforcement of federal laws
("Federal Laws"); (E) Whether, if the decision in
response to (D) preceding is in the affirmative, the
Concealed Carry Rules and Permits are subject to
preemption under the supremacy clause of Article VI of
the Constitution; (F) Whether the DC Carry Law and
Concealed Carry Rules and Permits deny United States
citizens that reside in, work in or visit the District
of Columbia due process and equal protection of the law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (G)
Whether the DC Carry Law and the Concealed Carry Rules
and Concealed Carry Permits should be enjoined from
interfering with or preventing the enforcement of
Constitutional rights and applicable Federal Laws?"
Complaint at 3-4.
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Complaint at 6-7.
In essence the Complaint raises two sets of claims. First
are the "Constitutional Claims": Issues 1-6, asking the Court to
interpret the Second Amendment; and those parts of Issue 7 that
ask the Court to declare that the District's concealed carry laws
are unconstitutional. Second are the "Preemption Claims," those
parts of Issue 7 asking the Court to declare that the District's
concealed carry laws are preempted by federal law.
Plaintiff brings these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 ("the Declaratory Judgment Act"), and the
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. See Complaint at 4-6.
Federal Defendants brought a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that,
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6),
the Court lacks jurisdiction and Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim. Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 4-1] ("Fed. Mot. to Dismiss").
Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Federal Defendants' Motion,
Fed. Opp'n, and the Federal Defendants filed a Reply. Reply in
Support of Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 8]
("Fed. Reply") .
The District Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss, in
which they joined the Federal Defendants' arguments and
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additionally argued for dismissal due to improper service of
process pursuant to Rules 12 (b) (2) and 12 (b) (5). District of
Columbia's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 9] ("District Mot. to
Dismiss"). Plaintiff filed an Opposition, Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Opposition to the District of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt.
No. 10] ("District Opp' n"), and the District Defendants filed a
Reply. District of Columbia's Reply [Dkt. No. 11] ("District
Reply") .
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12{b) (1)
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts possess
only those powers specifically granted to them by Congress or
directly by the United States Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See
Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In
deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1), the court must "accept all of
the factual allegations in [the] complaint as true." Jerome Stevens
I
i
I
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 I
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54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S.
315, 327 (1991)).
Nonetheless, " [t] he plaintiff's factual allegations in the
complaint will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b) (1) motion
than in resolving a 12(b) (6) motion for failure to state a claim."
Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp.
2d 9, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2001). The Court may also consider matters
outside the pleadings, and may rest its decision on its own
resolution of disputed facts. 2 See Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sci.,
974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff Lacks Standing
and Because There Is no Case or Controversy
1. Standing Is a Jurisdictional Requirement of Article
III
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
federal courts to certain "Cases" and "Controversies." See U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. "[N]o principle is more fundamental to the
judiciary' s proper role in our system of government than the
2 As discussed below, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
case, and therefore, resolution of the Federal Defendants'
arguments that Common Purpose has failed to state a claim and the
District Defendants' argument that the they were not properly
served are unnecessary to disposition of these Motions.
Accordingly, the relevant standard of review under Rules 12(b) (2),
12(b) (5), and 12(b) (6) have been omitted for the sake of brevity.
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constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual
cases or controversies." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct.
113 8, 114 6 ( 2 013) (internal citations omitted) . "One element of
the case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must
establish that they have standing to sue." Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) .
"[T] he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing
contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury in fact . . . which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61, (1992) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
footnotes omitted) .
Ordinarily, an organizational plaintiff may attempt to show
standing in one of two ways. First, under the theory of
"organizational standing," an organization may sue on its own
behalf in order to protect its own interests. Nat' 1 Treasury
Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427-28. (D.C.
Cir. 1996). Alternatively, under the theory of "associational
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standing," an organization may sue on behalf its members to protect
their interests. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adverti9ing
Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Reno,
80 F.3d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2. Common Purpose Lacks both Organizational and
Associational Standing
In order to establish organizational standing, a plaintiff
must show that it satisfies each of the traditional three prongs
of the standing inquiry injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. Nat' 1 Treasury Employees Union at 1427. The
alleged injury must be a "concrete and demonstrable injury to [the
organization's] activities." Id. at 1427-28 .
. Common Purpose argues that it has suffered the requisite
injury in fact because, if it is not granted standing, it will be
hindered in its future ability to attract support and membership.
Fed. Opp' n at 8. This argument is defective for many reasons.
First, the alleged harm is not an injury for purposes of Article
III because a plaintiff cannot manufacture an injury based on harms
that result from its prosecution of the lawsuit itself. See PETA
v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Additionally, Common Purpose's alleged injury "hinge [s] on
the independent choices" of third parties not before the Court,
its current and prospective members. National Wrestling Coaches
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Assn' v. Dept. of Education, 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
What these individuals might or might not do in response to a
ruling of this Court is "mere unadorned speculation," and
therefore, Common Purpose cannot establish either causation or
redressability. Id. Consequently, it lacks organizational
standing.
In order to establish associational standing a Plaintiff must
show that: 1) at least one of the organization's members has
standing to sue in her own right; 2) the interests the organization
seeks to protect in its lawsuit are germane to the organization's
purpose; and 3) "neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Reno, 80 F.3d 477,
483 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Common Purpose's Complaint fails to identify a single member
whatsoever, and failed to allege facts that would establish that
any identifiable member has standing in her own right.
Accordingly, it cannot satisfy the first prong of Hunt, and lacks
associational standing.
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B. The Complaint Contains only Generalized Grievances that Do
Not Present any Case or Controversy
Common Purpose's Complaint contains a flaw more fundamental
than its inability to check one of these two doctrinal boxes. It
represents the kind of general complaint about the administration
of the law that the courts have long held to be inappropriate for
judicial resolution.
Article III standing requires a "concrete and
particularized injury." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S; 555,
560-61 (1992) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A
party challenging a governmental action must show that it has been
directly injured by the action; it is not enough for a party to
show an undifferentiated, "general interest common to all members
of the public." United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-
77 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937)).
Courts "have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only
a generally available grievance about government -- claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large -- does
not state an Article III case or controversy." Lance v. Coffman,
549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (internal quotations marks omitted).
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Common Purpose's Complaint is the quintessential generalized
grievance. It is devoid of any concrete allegations, such as
specific actions of the various Defendants or specific harms
suffered by Common Purpose or any one of its members. Instead,
the Constitutional Claims are simply a request that this Court, in
a factual vacuum, render an interpretation of various
Constitutional provisions. Similarly, the Preemption Claims do
not demonstrate that Common Purpose has any individualized
interest in this litigation other than a desire to see the District
of Columbia's concealed carry laws changed.
"The motion papers disclose no interest upon the part of the
petitioner other than that of a citizen That is
insufficient." Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 219-20 (1974) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted) . Accordingly, this lawsuit presents no case or
controversy within the meaning of Article III, and therefore this
Court lacks jurisdiction.3
3 As Common Purpose cannot establish Article III standing, it is
unnecessary to address its argument that it has third party, or
jus tetri, standing. See Sands v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 778, 784 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) ("[plaintiff] must show that he has standing under
Article III, and that he satisfies third party, or jus tertii,
standing requirements.").
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C. Remaining Arguments Unnecessary
As the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims,
it is unnecessary to address Defendants' argument that Common
Purpose has failed to state a claim and the District Defendants'
argument that it failed to properly serve them.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.
Date: Gladys sler
United States District Judge
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