Farzam v. Isaacson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
PARICHEHR FARZAM, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 12-35 (RMC)
)
WALTER ISAACSON, CHAIRMAN, )
THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF )
GOVERNORS )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Parichehr Farzam, an employee in the Voice of America’s Persian News
Network, accuses the Broadcasting Board of Governors of the following:
Count I- retaliation in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d);
Count II- retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;
Count III- breach of a 2008 settlement agreement that resolved an Equal Pay Act
and Title VII complaint before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
and
Count IV- continuing unequal pay.
The Board is sued in the name of its Chairman, Walter Isaacson, in his official capacity only.
The parties dispute which of Ms. Farzam’s claims are properly in district court and whether the
entire Complaint should be dismissed.
Ms. Farzam concedes that Count IV, claiming ongoing unequal pay, must be
transferred to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims because she seeks a remedy in excess of $10,000
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and therefore this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claim.1 Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2) (conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the district courts and the Court of Federal
Claims for certain claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1) (conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims for certain claims against
the United States without reference to an amount in controversy). The Court will transfer Count
IV to the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (authorizing transfer to cure a want of
jurisdiction “if it is in the interest of justice, . . . to any other such court in which the action or
appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed”).
Ms. Farzam also asks the Court to transfer Count III, her breach-of-contract claim
arising from the 2008 settlement agreement, to the Court of Federal Claims. However, she
distinguishes her claims of retaliation associated with the Chairman’s handling of the settlement
agreement from her breach-of-contract claim and urges this Court to retain the retaliation claims
here. Both parties recognize that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 precludes jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims for Count III if Ms. Farzam is pursuing the same claim or one in respect to the same
claim in district court. See United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1727
(2011) (“The [Court of Federal Claims] has no jurisdiction over a claim if the plaintiff has
another suit for or in respect to that claim pending against the United States or its agents.”).
“Two suits are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the [Court of Federal
Claims], if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief
sought in each suit.” Id. at 1731. Tohono O’Odham Nation makes clear that Ms. Farzam cannot
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The Chairman originally also moved to dismiss Count I, alleging retaliation in violation of the
Equal Pay Act, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but has now withdrawn that motion. Def.’s
Reply [Dkt. 25] at 2 n.1.
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pursue a breach-of-contract and a retaliation claim arising from the same settlement agreement in
two different courts.
Count III is fundamentally a breach-of-contract claim and will be transferred to
the Court of Federal Claims. See Hansson v. Norton, 411 F.3d 231, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“This
court generally treats settlement agreements as contracts subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Federal Claims.”). Due to this transfer, this Court will not consider facts concerning
the breach of the settlement agreement as a basis for retaliation because such facts are based on
“substantially the same operative facts” as the breach-of-contract claim. See Tohono O’Odham
Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 1731. Even so, as discussed below, the retaliation claims (Counts I and II)
remain pending here.
The Court next considers the Chairman’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II for
failure to state a claim.2 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (dismissal
proper when complaint fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009) (citing Twombly). The Court
disagrees with the Chairman’s claim that Ms. Farzam has failed to plead enough facts to survive
a motion to dismiss. Ms. Farzam has sufficiently pled facts to put the Chairman on notice of her
claims and their bases. This aspect of the Chairman’s motion will be denied without prejudice.
For Count II, the Chairman moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim all claims
of retaliation under Title VII prior to July 4, 2010. The Chairman asserts that Ms. Farzam
contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor in August 2010 and claims
older than 45 days before that contact are not actionable. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (“An
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The Court denies the Chairman’s motion to dismiss Count III for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies without prejudice as the count will be transferred to the Court of Federal
Claims.
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aggrieved person must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter
alleged to be discriminatory . . . .”); see also Mills v. Winter, 540 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184-85
(D.D.C. 2008) (describing the exhaustion requirement in Title VII cases). Ms. Farzam responds
that the acts alleged prior to July 4, 2010 are part of a continuing violation of her rights by a
course of retaliatory conduct and are thus not time-barred. The Court will deny this aspect of the
Chairman’s motion without prejudice because the record is insufficient at this time to determine
whether the alleged retaliatory actions the Chairman seeks to dismiss are time-barred.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme Court held that “a
Title VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts must file his charge
within the appropriate time period.” 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002). “An assertion that the discrete
acts constitute a ‘continuing violation’ or a series of related violations will not save a claim that
falls outside of the limitations period.” Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2005)
(citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114-15). After the Supreme Court decided Morgan, however, in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), it expanded the
scope for retaliation claims under Title VII. To prevail on a retaliation claim, the Court held that
“the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 57. In light of the
Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Burlington, the operative question now is the nature of
the alleged retaliation—“discrete acts” or otherwise—and, if the latter, when a reasonable person
would have been on notice that his employer engaged in acts of retaliation. See Hicks v. Baines,
593 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]n determining whether conduct amounts to an adverse
employment action, the alleged acts of retaliation need to be considered both separately and in
the aggregate, as even minor acts of retaliation can be sufficiently ‘substantial in gross’ as to be
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actionable.”). The Court cannot make this determination on the current record. Since Ms.
Farzam is entitled to resolution of all doubts in her favor, the Court will not dismiss her
complaint without discovery. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring a court to assume that
“all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)” when deciding a motion to
dismiss).
The Chairman also moves to dismiss Counts I and II, alleging retaliation under
the Equal Pay Act and retaliation under Title VII respectively, for failure to allege a causal
connection between Ms. Farzam’s protected activity and any retaliatory action. The Court will
deny this aspect of the defense motion. The Court reads the Complaint as making sufficient
allegations regarding causation to survive a motion to dismiss. See Am. Compl. [Dkt. 2] ¶¶ 10-
20, 46-57.
The Chairman moves in the alternative for summary judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(d). See Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 160-61 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(explaining that a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment when the
court considers “matters outside the pleading” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
Chairman argues that Ms. Farzam failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by timely
contacting an EEO counselor, failed to allege a materially adverse action associated with
retaliation, and failed to allege a causal connection between her prior protected activity and the
alleged retaliation. This motion will also be denied. The facts are too uncertain and disputed for
summary judgment without discovery.
In sum, Ms. Farzam’s motion to transfer Counts III and IV to the Court of Federal
Claims will be granted. The Chairman’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary
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judgment, on Counts I and II will be denied without prejudice. A memorializing Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: November 21, 2012 /s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge
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