Whiting v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PAULA V. WHITING,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 19-cv-2327 (TNM)
SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Over six years ago, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (“SunTrust”) successfully foreclosed
on Paula V. Whiting’s home in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland.
On July 12, 2019, Whiting, who is proceeding pro se, sued SunTrust in the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia to rescind the foreclosure and obtain money damages.
SunTrust removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and has moved
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1; Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 5. Whiting has filed an opposition. See Opp’n, ECF No. 8. For the
reasons explained below, the Court will grant SunTrust’s motion and dismiss the case.
I.
In a cryptically worded complaint, Whiting challenges the foreclosure of her former
home located at 5827 Barnes Drive in Clinton, Maryland. See Compl. 1, 1 ECF No. 1-2. Whiting
seems to ground her foreclosure challenge in the allegation that the Independent Foreclosure
Review “said that SunTrust Mortgage cause[d] Robo-signing and Fraud” in the sale of her house.
Id. To support this allegation, Whiting attached a letter dated August 8, 2016 that she received
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All page number citations refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF system.
from a paying agent retained by the Federal Reserve to administer payments to borrowers who
qualified for relief under the Federal Reserve’s Independent Foreclosure Review Payment
Agreement. See id. 2 The letter states that Whiting qualified for payment under the Federal
Reserve’s plan to redistribute remaining unclaimed Payment Agreement funds. See Compl. 4.
Along with the letter, Whiting also received a check for $124.30. Id. Whiting seeks “to have the
foreclosure rescinded” and the following monetary damages: $404,000 for “equity in the
house”; $1 million for “stolen property”; and $100 million “because I’m mad.”
II.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and it is
“presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a plaintiff must establish the
factual predicates of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Erby v. United States,
424 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
“When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must treat the complaint’s factual allegations
as true and afford the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Jeong Seon Han v. Lynch, 223 F. Supp. 3d 95, 103 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotations
omitted). In this context, courts may also “consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s
resolution of disputed facts.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). If the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, it must
dismiss the claim or action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).
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See also Federal Reserve, Independent Foreclosure Review Final Report (Aug. 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/independent-foreclosure-review-2019.pdf.
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III.
The Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine “prevents lower federal courts from hearing
cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court.” Gray v. Poole,
275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
482 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Only the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review final state-court judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Lance v. Dennis, 546
U.S. 459, 463 (2006).
This case “falls squarely within the confines of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” See
Barnes-Duncan v. Liebner & Potkin, LLC, No. CV 17-02818 (ABJ), 2018 WL 6200975, at *3
(D.D.C. Nov. 28, 2018). First, Whiting was “a party to the underlying state-court proceeding.”
Lance, 546 U.S. at 464. Second, Whiting’s claim against foreclosure is “inextricably intertwined
with the state-court judgment.” Id. at 462. SunTrust has shown that it pursued foreclosure
proceedings in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, and obtained a final
judgment on February 5, 2013. See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A (case docket for Geesing v. Whiting,
No. CAE12-25259 (Cir. Ct. Prince George’s Cnty. Feb. 5, 2013), ECF No. 5-2. Finally, this
lawsuit was filed after judgment was entered in the state-court action. See Exxon Mobil, 544
U.S. at 284. The Maryland court entered an Order of Judgment for Possession on June 17, 2013,
which Whiting did not appeal. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A at 2–3. In other words, this is a case
“brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[]
rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 281.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case. See
Gray, 275 F.3d at 1119 (citations omitted). Even if Whiting’s claim is based on information
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discovered after the Maryland court’s judgment, this Court still lacks jurisdiction to consider,
much less vacate, a state court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See
Salazar v. District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Rule 60(b)(6) relief is not a
substitute for appeal . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)); cf. United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp.
2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (a district court “generally lacks appellate jurisdiction over other
judicial bodies, and [it] cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”). Therefore, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, SunTrust’s motion to dismiss will be granted. A separate
order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
2019.12.02
13:38:01 -05'00'
Dated: December 2, 2019 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.
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