Hindu American Foundation v. Viswanath

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
HINDU AMERICAN FOUNDATION, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil No. 21-cv-01268 (APM)
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SUNITA VISWANATH, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises from two online articles published by aljazeera.com, an online news
platform operated by Al Jazeera Media Network. The articles concerned federal COVID-19 relief
payments and loans distributed to five U.S.-based groups allegedly linked to Hindu nationalist
organizations in India. Plaintiff Hindu American Foundation, one of the groups mentioned in the
articles, brings the instant defamation action not against the articles’ authors or Al Jazeera, but
against its critics who were quoted in the articles and published tweets concerning the articles.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sunita Viswanath, Raju Rajagopal, Rasheed Ahmed, Audrey
Truschke, and John Prabhudoss 1 conspired to publish these allegedly false and defamatory
statements and that the statements have caused substantial injury to Plaintiff, including lost
donations and reputational damage.
1
Plaintiff also brings suit against 20 unnamed Does but has not amended its Complaint to identify these additional
defendants.
Before the court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Def. Prabhudoss’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 34 [hereinafter Prabhudoss Mot.]; Defs. Viswanath & Rajagopal’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
35 [hereinafter Viswanath & Rajagopal Mot.]; Def. Truschke’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 36,
[hereinafter Truschke Mot.], Def. Truschke’s Mem. of P. & A., ECF No. 36-1 [hereinafter
Truschke Mem.]; Def. Ahmed’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 37 [hereinafter Ahmed Mot.] For the
reasons that follow, the motions are granted as to all Defendants. As to Defendants Viswanath,
Rajagopal, Truschke, and Ahmed, the court lacks personal jurisdiction and Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim. As to Defendant Prabhudoss, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Hindu American Foundation (“HAF”) is a non-profit organization whose mission
is “educating the public about Hindus and Hinduism” and serving Hindu Americans across all
Hindu religious traditions. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19. HAF supports the political party currently in power
in India, often labeled a “Hindu nationalist” party. Id. ¶ 4.
Defendants are political opponents of the current Indian government, taking issue
particularly with “its alleged treatment of Muslims and other religious minorities.” Id. Defendants
Viswanath and Rajagopal are co-founders and Board members of Hindus for Human Rights
(“HfHR”), id. ¶ 8–9; Defendant Ahmed is the Executive Director of the Indian American Muslim
Council (“IAMC”), id. ¶ 10; Defendant Prabhudoss is the Chairman of the Federation of Indian
American Christian Organizations (“FIACONA”), id. ¶ 11; and Defendant Truschke is a professor
of South Asian history at Rutgers University in New Jersey, id. ¶ 21.
2
A. First Story
On April 2, 2021, Al Jazeera published an article (the “First Story”) with the headline
“Hindu right-wing groups in US got $833,000 of federal COVID fund” and sub-headline “Five
groups linked to Hindu nationalist organisations in India received direct payments and loans in
federal relief fund.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Rasheed Ahmed’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 39
[hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed], Ex. 58, ECF No. 39-61 [hereinafter Ex. 58 2]. The article,
authored by Raqib Hameed Naik (“Hameed Naik”), concerned five organizations “with ties to
Hindu supremacist and religious groups [that] received COVID-19 relief funding amounting to
$833,000,” and noted that HAF received the “lion’s share” of the funds, with around $388,064 in
Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) advances.
Ex. 58 at 2, 7. The First Story described HAF as an advocacy group that “lobbies to deflect any
criticism of [the] Modi government’s policies on Capitol Hill” and “has open links with [Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh] (RSS) members.” Id. at 7. The article describes RSS as “a far-right Hindu
nationalist organization . . . which aims to create an ethnic Hindu-majority state in India,” “is the
ideological mentor of India’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)[,] and boasts of having Prime
Minister Narendra Modi among millions of its members in India.” Id. at 3.
Defendant Viswanath is quoted in the First Story, Compl. ¶ 25, and Defendant Truschke
republished a link to the First Story with a caption on her Twitter account, id. ¶ 26(b). Plaintiff
does not allege that Defendants were involved in drafting the First Story.
B. Second Story
On April 8, 2021, Al Jazeera published a second article (the “Second Story”) with the
headline “Call for US probe into Hindu right-wing groups getting COVID fund” and the sub-
2
The court uses PDF pagination for all exhibits.
3
headline “Following an Al Jazeera report, US-based Coalition to Stop Genocide in India demands
investigation into federal funds given to ‘sponsor hate.’” Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed, Ex. 59, ECF No.
39-62 [hereinafter Ex. 59]. The Second Story extensively quotes a statement issued by the
Coalition to Stop Genocide in India (“Coalition”), which claimed that the five Hindu organizations
listed in the article—including HAF—had “existential links” with RSS which, according to the
Coalition, is the “fountainhead of Hindu supremacist ideology.” Ex. 59 at 2. According to
Plaintiff, HfHR, IAMC, and FIACONA, organizations which Viswanath, Rajagopal, Ahmed, and
Prabhudoss lead, are “members that have a controlling interest” in the Coalition and “had approval
of the [Coalition’s] statements before publication.” Compl. ¶ 28.
In the Second Story, the Coalition described the five groups as “US-based front
organisations for Hindutva, the supremacist ideology that is the driving force behind much of the
persecution of Christians, Muslims, Dalits, and other minorities in India.” Ex. 59 at 3; Compl.
¶ 29(d)(ii). The Coalition further accused RSS of being “directly involved in orchestrating anti-
Christian and anti-Muslim pogroms and instigating terror attacks, as part of a relentless campaign
to subvert India’s secular moorings and turn it into a Hindu authoritarian state where minorities
are relegated to the status of second class citizens.” Ex. 59 at 4; Compl. ¶ 29(d)(iv). The Coalition
also stated that RSS’s “members and affiliated organisations have been implicated in countless
acts of massacres, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, forced-conversions and other forms of violence
against religious minorities in India.” Ex. 59 at 4; Compl. ¶ 29(d)(v). Defendants Ahmed,
Rajagopal, and Prabhudoss are quoted in the Second Story. Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiff does not allege
that Defendants were involved in drafting the Second Story.
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C. Defendants’ Allegedly Defamatory Statements in the Al Jazeera Articles
The individual Defendants are alleged to have made the following defamatory statements
in the two Al Jazeera articles.
Viswanath. Viswanath is quoted in the First Story as saying: (1) “All these organisations
are sympathetic to the Hindu supremacist ideology. Their parent organisations continue to spread
hatred in Hindu communities towards Muslims and Christians,” Ex. 58 at 9; Compl. ¶ 25(a)(ii);
and (2) “Any American non-profit that perpetuates Islamophobia and other forms of hate should
not receive federal relief funds in any form.” Ex. 58 at 9; Compl. ¶ 25(a)(iii). The article describes
Viswanath as expressing “concern that the US pandemic relief funds might end up furthering hate
campaign against Muslims and other minorities in India.” Ex. 58 at 9; Compl. ¶ 25(a)(i).
HAF alleges that Viswanath, along with Rajagopal, “caused” HfHR to post a link to the First Story
and Second Story on its Twitter account and website. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 31.
Rajagopal. Rajagopal made the following statement in the Second Story: “The rise of HAF
and other organisations linked with Hindutva has emboldened Hindu supremacist organizations in
India, while also stifling the moderate Hindu voices here in the US.” Ex. 59 at 4; Compl. ¶ 29(b).
HAF alleges that Rajagopal, along with Viswanath, “caused” HfHR to post a link to the First Story
and Second Story on its Twitter account and its website. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 31.
Ahmed. The Second Story reports Ahmed as having said: “US taxpayers’ money being
used to keep hate groups in business is absolutely unacceptable and should concern all who believe
in fairness, justice and government accountability.” Ex. 59 at 3; Compl. ¶ 29(a)(i). HAF alleges
that Ahmed “caused” IAMC to republish the First Story on its Twitter account and website with
the caption: “Experts have raised concerns that the US pandemic relief funds received by Hindu
rightwing groups might end up furthering hate campaign against Muslims and other minorities in
5
India.” Id. ¶ 26(a). HAF further alleges that Ahmed “caused” IAMC to republish a version of the
Second Story on its website as a “Press Release” attributed to the Coalition. Id. ¶ 30(a). The Press
Release stated that the Coalition was “committed to ensuring that American institutions and
discourse are safeguarded from the virulent Hindutva ideology” and “will continue to expose
Hindutva front organizations in the US and their role in normalizing the human rights abuses and
religious freedom violations in India.” Id.
Prabhudoss. Prabhudoss made the following statement in the Second Story: “Government
watchdog groups as well as human rights organisations need to take serious note of the
misappropriation of COVID funding by Hindu supremacist groups [in] the United States.” Ex. 59
at 5; Compl. ¶ 29(c). A few weeks after the Second Story was published, Prabhudoss tweeted:
“Recently realized that the @HinduAmerican just confirmed and acknowledged through its own
lawyers that they are a Hindu supremacist organization in the US operating as a charity. Wow!
Who would have thought that!!” Compl. ¶ 34.
Truschke. Defendant Truschke is not quoted in either article. However, Truschke did post
a link to the First Story on her Twitter account with the following allegedly defamatory caption:
“To add a personal note—Some of the groups mentioned here, especially HAF, have participated
in a recent coordinated effort attacking me. That effort has involved targeted harassment of me
and others and violent threats. This is a huge red flag for a US-based organization.” Id. ¶ 26(b)(i).
Five days after publication of the Second Story, Truschke issued three tweets concerning HAF that
accused it of promoting the Hindutva ideology in the U.S. and of “going after” Truschke due to
her activism. Id. ¶ 33. Truschke republished the First Story with commentary “numerous times”
6
and posted a link of the Second Story to her Twitter account with additional commentary. Id.
¶¶ 27, 31.
D. Conspiracy Among Defendants, Hameed Naik, and the Coalition
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants and their respective organizations have “substantial ties”
with Hameed Naik, the author of the First Story. Id. ¶ 22. Specifically, Defendant Ahmed
“arranged for Hameed Naik to appear at IAMC’s virtual strategic meeting of its Executive Team.”
Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants Viswanath, Rajagopal, Ahmed, and Prabhudoss
are leaders of organizations (HfHR, IAMC, and FIACONA) that “have a controlling interest” in
the Coalition and “had approval of [the Coalition’s] statements before publication.” Id. ¶ 28.
Plaintiff says that Defendants’ statements have “caused substantial damage[] to HAF’s
reputation and its ability to raise funds.” Id. ¶ 35.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on May 7, 2021, bringing defamation and civil
conspiracy claims against each Defendant. See Compl. ¶¶ 41–54. Defendants moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim.
See Prabhudoss Mot.; Viswanath & Rajagopal Mot.; Truschke Mot.; Ahmed Mot. In response to
Defendant Ahmed’s argument that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because HAF had
not met the amount-in-controversy requirement, see Ahmed Mot. at 13–15, this court stayed the
pending motions for a limited period of jurisdictional discovery. Order, ECF No. 48. The parties
filed supplemental briefs 3 and their motions are now ripe for consideration.
3
Defs.’ Consolidated Supp. Brief in Supp. of Mot., ECF No. 55-1 [hereinafter Defs.’ SMJ Mot.]; Pl.’s Supp. Mem. in
Opp’n to Mot., ECF No. 58 [hereinafter Pl.’s SMJ Opp’n]; Defs.’ Consolidated Reply Supp. Brief in Supp. of Mot.,
ECF No. 60 [hereinafter Defs.’ SMJ Reply].
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IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a
court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Jerome Stevens
Pharms., Inc. v. FDA., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, because the court has “an
affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority,” a
plaintiff’s factual allegations “will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in
resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police
v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the court may consider “such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate
to resolve the question of whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of
Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000). “[W]here necessary, the court may
consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record . . . plus the
court’s resolution of disputed facts.” See Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d
193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Personal Jurisdiction. “The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant,” Crane v. New York Zoological Soc., 894 F.2d
454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and to meet that burden, plaintiffs must allege “specific facts upon
which personal jurisdiction may be based,” Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C.
1998). Similar to a 12(b)(1) motion, “the Court need not treat all of a [plaintiff’s] allegations as
true when determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant.” Lewy v. S. Poverty
L. Ctr., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 116, 119 (D.D.C. 2010). However, any “factual discrepancies
appearing in the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” New York Zoological, 894 F.2d
at 456. A plaintiff “may rest their argument on their pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and
8
other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
Failure to State a Claim. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim “tests the legal
sufficiency of a claim.” Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC, 884 F.3d 338, 344 (D.C. Cir.
2018). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, if
accepted as true, that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is “plausible” if a plaintiff pleads facts which “allow[] the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
The court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff “the benefit
of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,
16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However, the court “need not accept inferences drawn by
plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint, nor must the
court accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d
471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court begins, as it must, with its jurisdiction to hear this matter. Plaintiff invokes the
court’s diversity jurisdiction. Compl. ¶ 16 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). It alleges that “Plaintiff
and Defendants are citizens of different states,” that Defendants’ conduct caused “substantial
injury” to “HAF’s reputation and ability to fundraise,” and that Plaintiff “suffered, or will suffer,
lost donations . . . which exceed $75,000.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 16, 49. Defendants dispute that Plaintiff can
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. With the benefit of jurisdictional discovery,
Defendants argue that HAF is “unable to identify any evidence of economic harm.” Defs.’
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Consolidated Supp. Brief in Supp. of Mot., ECF No. 55-1 [hereinafter Defs.’ SMJ Mot.], at 1.
“[N]ot a single existing or potential donor ever told HAF it was reducing, eliminating, or not
making initial contributions due to the challenged statements,” Defendants assert, making HAF’s
estimated amount in controversy “entirely speculative.” Id. at 1–2. HAF responds that it has
cleared “the low bar for a plaintiff to demonstrate the amount in controversy” and that Defendants’
argument “is essentially a summary judgment argument on causation,” which is improper at this
stage. Pl.’s Supp. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot., ECF No. 58 [hereinafter Pl.’s SMJ Opp’n], at 6–7. The
court agrees with Plaintiff.
To invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction, a party must establish both complete diversity
of parties and an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). While
plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing the amount in controversy,” Rosenboro v. Kim, 994
F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1993), they are not required to “provide an exact valuation or detailed
breakdown of damages at the outset of litigation” and the claimed amount controls if “made in
good faith,” Bronner ex rel. Am. Stud. Ass’n v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A court must be “very confident that a party cannot recover
the jurisdictional amount before dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.” Rosenboro, 994
F.2d at 17. “But it does not follow that any unsupported claim will suffice,” and dismissal is
warranted if a plaintiff submits “no evidence supporting [its] alleged injury.” Bronner, 962 F.3d
at 610 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Once the amount in controversy is
challenged, the party claiming jurisdiction “must produce evidence supporting a legal uncertainty
about whether [it] could prove” the amount asserted. Rosenboro, 994 F.2d at 18.
In their consolidated supplemental briefing, Defendants focus primarily on Plaintiff’s
alleged failure to establish causation between the challenged statements and the evidence it
10
presents of reduced donations and lost grant opportunities. 4 See Defs.’ SMJ Mot. at 2 (“HAF
postulates that every single donor who gave it money in 2020, but did not give or gave less in 2021
or 2022, must have made those choices because of the challenged statements—without evidence
that any particular donor even knew of the statements.”). Plaintiff responds that it has provided
adequate information regarding its damages, and that causation goes to the merits of its claims
rather than whether it has met the amount in controversy requirement. See Pl.’s SMJ Opp’n at 7
(“There is no basis under D.C. Circuit law for the Court to resolve the legal issue of causation
based only on limited discovery of the amount in controversy.”).
While the court is skeptical of Plaintiff’s ability to prove causation between the challenged
statements and the alleged damages—it has proffered little, if any, evidence of a causal
connection—the court’s skepticism is not sufficient at this stage to warrant dismissal of the
complaint. See Rosenboro, 994 F.2d at 17 (“[C]ourts [must] be very confident that a party cannot
recover the jurisdictional amount before dismissing.”); Kaplan v. Jewett, 229 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738
(N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Defendant devotes substantial energy to attacking the causation element of
Plaintiff’s case . . . . Defendant, however, confuses Plaintiff’s burden of proof at trial with her
burden in the face of an amount-in-controversy challenge.”) (emphasis in original). This court
finds that HAF has sufficiently placed into controversy whether over $75,000 in donations and
grant opportunities was lost due to Defendants allegedly defamatory statements. “[T]he law is
generous to plaintiffs on amounts in controversy,” and HAF has met the “low bar” that the law
4
While the court doubts whether staff time expended to mitigate the alleged harm and reputational damage can be
considered when determining the amount in controversy, it does not need to resolve the question because HAF meets
the $75,000 threshold without it. See Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(“[A] corporation suing for defamation . . . may only recover actual damages in the form of lost profits.”).
11
requires by specifying the value of donations and grant opportunities it allegedly has lost.
BYD Co. v. All. for Am. Mfg., 554 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2021).
B. Personal Jurisdiction
The court now turns to Defendants Viswanath, Rajagopal, Truschke, and Ahmed’s motions
to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. 5 See Viswanath &
Rajagopal Mot. at 12–16; Truschke Mem. at 13–20; Ahmed Mot. at 6–12; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
Personal jurisdiction is a threshold matter the court must resolve before reaching the merits of a
claim. See Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 510 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
The Supreme Court has recognized “two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’
(sometimes called ‘all-purpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’)
jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 137 S.
Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). Plaintiff alleges that Viswanath, Rajagopal, Truschke, and
Ahmed reside in New York, California, New Jersey, and Illinois, respectively. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 10,
12. None reside in the District of Columbia, so there is no general jurisdiction over any of them.
A court can exercise specific jurisdiction over “defendants less intimately connected with
[the forum state], but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). “In order to establish specific jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant in a diversity case such as this, [HAF] must plead facts that (1) bring the case
5
References to “Defendants” in Section V.B concerns Viswanath, Rajagopal, Truschke, and Ahmed. Defendant
Prabhudoss did not move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and has thus waived any objection to being sued
in this forum. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705 (1982) (“[T]he
failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction constitutes . . . a waiver of the objection.”).
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within the scope of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, D.C. CODE § 13–423(a), and
(2) satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.” Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F. Supp. 2d 76,
81 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
a. Long-Arm Statute
“The District’s long-arm statute states, in pertinent part, that courts may exercise
jurisdiction over any person who, acting directly or through an agent, engages in the following
conduct:
(1) transacts any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracts to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causes tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or
omission in the District of Columbia; or
(4) causes tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or
omission outside the District of Columbia if the person ‘regularly
does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.’”
Kopff, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 81–82 (quoting D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)). Plaintiff claims the court can
properly exercise jurisdiction over all Defendants under §§ 13–423(a)(1) and (a)(3), and over
Viswanath, Rajagopal, and Ahmed under § 13–423(a)(4). Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed at 15–26; Pl.’s
Opp’n to Mot. by Def. Viswanath & Rajagopal, ECF No. 40 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath
& Rajagopal], at 14–28; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Truschke’s Mot., ECF No. 41 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n
Truschke] at 15–21. The court addresses each in turn.
Section 13-423(a)(1). For cases under § 13–423(a)(1), the long-arm statute and due
process inquiry merge into one, because Ҥ 13-423(a)(1) provides jurisdiction to the full extent
allowed by the Due Process Clause.” Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 44 (internal quotations
omitted). As a threshold matter, the complaint is devoid of any facts alleging that the Defendants
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“transact[ed] any business in the District of Columbia.” Plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations rely
on contacts between Defendants’ employers and the District, not on contacts between Defendants
and the District. See e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed at 19 (“IAMC is organized under the laws of [the]
District and has thus necessarily availed itself of the privileges and responsibilities of doing
business here.”). For that reason alone, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over any Defendant
under § 13–423(a)(1).
Plaintiff nevertheless contends that Defendants Viswanath, Rajagopal, and Ahmed are
subject to this court’s jurisdiction under (a)(1) due to the “more than a mere employee” exception
to the fiduciary shield doctrine. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed at 16–21; Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath &
Rajagopal at 16–21. If a court has personal jurisdiction over a corporation, HAF argues, the court
can exercise jurisdiction over “individual corporate officers or employees, based on the company’s
activities” as long as they are “more than mere employees of the corporation.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed
at 17 (internal citation omitted); Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 17. But the D.C. Circuit
has held that “the fiduciary shield doctrine lacks any basis in either the Due Process Clause or the
transacting-business prong of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, D.C. CODE § 13-
423(a)(1).” Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 40. So, the “more than a mere employee” exception
cannot establish jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(1). Plaintiff must establish that Defendants
themselves transacted business in the District of Columbia; it has failed to do so.
Section 13-423(a)(3). Under § 13–423(a)(3), a court can exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who causes “tortious injury in the District of Columbia[] by an act or omission
in the District of Columbia.” § 13–423(a)(3). Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction is proper under
§ 13–423(a)(3) because Defendants are representatives of D.C.-based entities and caused injury to
D.C.-based HAF by making statements to a D.C. branch of Al Jazeera, which published stories
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that were eventually circulated in the District. See e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed at 25. Plaintiff’s
argument is inapposite, because § 13–423(a)(3) requires the tortious conduct to have occurred in
the District of Columbia. Plaintiff does not allege that the defamatory statements were made here.
Accordingly, this subsection is inapplicable.
Section 13-423(a)(4). Finally, HAF seeks jurisdiction over Defendants Viswanath,
Rajagopal, and Ahmed under § 13–423(a)(4) on the grounds that they regularly do or solicit
business in the District and engage in a “persistent course of conduct” in the District. 6 Pl.’s Opp’n
Ahmed at 24–25; Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 24–25. Defendants respond that HAF,
once again, fails to identify any contacts between the individual Defendants and the District,
pointing instead only to contacts HfHR and IAMC have with the District. See Reply Mem. of P.
and A. in Supp. of. Def. Rasheed Ahmed’s Mot., ECF No. 47, at 5–6 (“Plaintiff simply reiterates
that Ahmed is an officer of IAMC”); see also Reply Mem. of P. and A. in Supp. of Def. Viswanath
& Rajagopal Mot., ECF No. 44 [hereinafter Viswanath & Rajagopal Reply], at 7.
For a court to exercise jurisdiction under § 13–423(a)(4), a plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that (1) plaintiff suffered a tortious injury in the District of Columbia; (2) the injury
was caused by the defendant’s act or omission outside of the District of Columbia; and (3) the
defendant either “regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the
District of Columbia.” D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(4); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 53. Section 13–
423(a)(4) is “more restrictive than the Due Process Clause of the Constitution—meaning the
District government has made a deliberate decision not to allow access to D.C. courts to every
person who is injured here and otherwise could bring a claim for civil redress.” Kopff,
6
Plaintiff does not seek jurisdiction over Defendant Truschke under § 13-423(a)(4).
15
425 F. Supp. 2d at 82. It requires a “plus factor” that is “separate from and in addition to the in-
state injury,” showing that there is “some other reasonable connection between the state and the
defendant.” Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The purpose of the “plus factor”
is “to filter out cases in which the inforum impact is an isolated event and the defendant otherwise
has no, or scant, affiliations with the forum.” Id. at 763. “[T]he claim need not arise from the
‘plus factors’” and a “defendant’s contacts need not be great to satisfy subsection (a)(4).” Lewy,
723 F. Supp. 2d at 123–24. However, the contacts must “at least be continuing in character.”
Burman v. Phoenix Worldwide Indus., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 142, 153 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation
omitted).
Injury in the District. Plaintiff argues that its injury occurred in the District because “HAF
is domiciled and headquartered” in the District and its “reputation and ability to fundraise [has]
been injured” as a result of Defendants’ allegedly defamatory statements. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n
Ahmed at 23–24. The court agrees that HAF suffered tortious injury in the District caused by the
allegedly defamatory statements. See Carr, 814 F.2d at 760 (stating that defamation claims “are
the kind in which the injury, foreseeably, is felt with greatest force in the place where the plaintiff
lives”).
Conduct Outside the District. Defendant Ahmed argues that neither (a)(3) nor (a)(4) are
met because HAF does not plead where the allegedly defamatory statements were made. See
McIntosh v. Gilley, 753 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[T]he Complaint fails to meet either
(a)(3) or (a)(4) because the Complaint does not allege, inter alia, where [Defendants] created and
sent the email at issue. . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint does not allege specific
facts connecting [Defendants’] allegedly libelous email to the District.”). But when ruling on a
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court is not limited to arguments made in the pleadings and can
16
review “affidavits and other written materials” submitted by the parties. Mwani, 417 F.3d at 7.
The record shows that Viswanath and Rajagopal were in New York and California, respectively,
when communicating with the Al Jazeera reporter. See Viswanath & Rajagopal Mot., Decl. of
Sunita Viswanath, ECF No. 35-1 [hereinafter Viswanath Decl.] ¶ 5; Viswanath & Rajagopal Mot.,
Decl. of Raju Rajagopal, ECF No. 35-2 [hereinafter Rajagopal Decl.] ¶ 5. While the court is less
certain about Ahmed’s whereabouts when he made his allegedly defamatory statement, the record
shows that Ahmed’s last two visits to the District were in January 2020 and July 2021. Ahmed
Mot., Decl. of Def. Rasheed Ahmed in Supp. of Mot., ECF No. 37-1 [hereinafter Ahmed Decl.]
¶¶ 3, 4. Because both articles were published in April 2021, see Ex. 58, Ex. 59, it is reasonable to
assume that any statement Ahmed made would have been on or around April 2021, when he was
not in the District. See Ahmed Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4. Accordingly, the court finds Defendants’ allegedly
defamatory statements were made outside the District.
Persistent Code of Conduct/Regularly Do Business. Plaintiff argues that Defendants
Viswanath, Rajagopal, and Ahmed, as controlling officers of their respective D.C.-based entities,
“regularly do[] business” and engage in a “persistent course of conduct” in the District of
Columbia. Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed at 24; Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 24–25. Plaintiff rests
its arguments under subsection (a)(4) on “the same reasons and based upon the same voluntary,
deliberate, and regular contacts with this District specified under Subsection (a)(1).” Pl.’s Opp’n
Ahmed at 24; Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 24. In other words, Plaintiff relies on contacts
that HfHR and IAMC have with the District. Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed at 24 (“Ahmed—as a controlling
officer of D.C.-based IAMC—‘regularly does business’ and/or engages in a ‘persistent course of
conduct’ in this District.”) (cleaned up); Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 24–25 (“Viswanath
17
and Rajagopal—as controlling officers of D.C.-based HfHR—‘regularly do business’ and/or
engage in a ‘persistent course of conduct’ in this District.”) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s complaint and supporting materials are devoid of any facts establishing a “real
connection” between Defendants and the District. Lewy, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 124. There are neither
allegations nor factual support that they solicit business or engage in conduct that is “continuing
in character.” Burman, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 153. Plaintiff’s allegations are largely conclusory and
concern HfHR and IAMC, not the individual Defendants. Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at
24–25 (arguing that jurisdiction is proper because Defendants “have longstanding ties with this
District” as founders and controlling officers of entities organized under D.C. law); see also Pl.’s
Opp’n Ahmed at 24. Plaintiff’s argument fails because, as “a general rule, courts cannot exert
jurisdiction over individual corporate officers or employees ‘just because the court has jurisdiction
over the corporation.’” Lewy, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (citation omitted). Viswanath, Rajagopal,
and Ahmed’s contacts with the District are insufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 13-
423(a)(4). See id. (stating that “occasionally writ[ing] articles for national publications that are
distributed in the District” and “travel[ing] to the District four times” in eight years does not
amount to a “persistent” course of conduct).
b. Due Process Clause
Because HAF has not satisfied the D.C. long-arm statute, this court “need not reach the
constitutional portion of the analysis.” Bauman v. Butowsky, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2019);
Truschke Mem. at 18; Ahmed Mot. at 9. However, even if the long-arm statute were satisfied, the
case against Defendants could not stand because the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not
“comport with constitutional due process.” Id. Due process is satisfied when there are sufficient
“‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum such that the defendant ‘should
18
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 44.
“[M]inimum contacts exist where a defendant takes ‘intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions’
‘expressly aimed’ at a jurisdiction.” Id. at 48 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)).
Importantly, a plaintiff “cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it
is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State.” Walden
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
Plaintiff’s complaint contains one conclusory jurisdictional allegation: that
“Defendants . . . have minimum contacts with Washington, District of Columbia . . . includ[ing]
their purposeful conduct in making and conspiring to publish defamatory statements intended to
injure an organization located in the District of Columbia.” Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff’s oppositions
do not address whether Defendants have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the District. Pl.’s
Opp’n Ahmed at 15–26; Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 15–26; Pl.’s Opp’n Truschke at
15–20. Simply put, Plaintiff fails to plead facts or present evidence satisfying the constitutional
requirement of due process, requiring dismissal of the case against Defendants Viswanath,
Rajagopal, Ahmed, and Truschke.
c. Conspiracy Jurisdiction
Finally, HAF argues that conspiracy jurisdiction exists under § 13-423(a)(1). Under
HAF’s conspiracy jurisdiction theory, the court could exercise jurisdiction over Defendants as long
as the “conduct of their alleged co-conspirators . . . supplies the necessary contacts with the
District of Columbia.” EIG Energy Fund XIV, L.P. v. Petróleo Brasileiro S.A., 246 F. Supp. 3d
52, 90 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 894 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Defendants respond that “conspiracy
jurisdiction requires pleading with particularity the existence of a conspiracy, an overt act within
the forum, and the out-of-forum co-conspirators’ knowledge that that act would occur within the
19
forum, which Plaintiff has not done.” Viswanath & Rajagopal Reply at 7–8. The court agrees
with Defendants.
“[C]onspiracy jurisdiction . . . cannot exist unless the [complaint] actually states a
plausible claim of civil conspiracy,” and the D.C. Circuit requires a plaintiff to “‘plead with
particularity the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the
conspiracy’ in order to establish conspiracy jurisdiction over a defendant.” EIG Energy Fund, 246
F. Supp. 3d at 90 (quoting Companhia Brasileira Carbureto de Calicio v. Applied Industrial
Materials Corp., 640 F.3d 369, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (emphasis in the original)). “This
particularity requirement is strictly enforced,” and courts in this Circuit “have appl[ied] the test for
co-conspirator jurisdiction warily in order to prevent a broad extension of long-arm jurisdiction.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
Plaintiff’s pleading comes nowhere close to stating a sufficient claim of civil conspiracy
and does not satisfy “this Circuit’s rigorous conspiracy jurisdiction pleading requirement.” Id.HAF is required to plead with particularity both the existence of a conspiracy and “overt acts
within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Companhia Brasileira Carbureto, 640
F.3d at 372. HAF has done neither. HAF does not allege a single overt act by a co-conspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy that occurred in the District and it pleads no overt act with
particularity. For this reason alone, Plaintiff’s conspiracy jurisdiction theory fails. Additionally,
for the reasons stated in Section VI, HAF has not pleaded with particularity the existence of a civil
conspiracy. HAF’s complaint “falls well short of the particularized pleading requirements for
conspiracy jurisdiction demanded by the D.C. Circuit.” EIG Energy Fund, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 90.
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d. Jurisdictional Discovery
HAF seeks jurisdictional discovery to supplement its jurisdiction allegations. HAF’s
request is denied. Courts permit jurisdictional discovery when a plaintiff demonstrates that it can
cure jurisdiction deficiencies through discovery. GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,
199 F.3d 1343, 1351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A plaintiff’s request “cannot be based on mere
conjecture or speculation.” FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883 (D.C.
Cir. 2021). It “must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to show that
the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable &
Wireless P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
HAF’s requests for discovery concern Defendants’ roles and responsibilities within their
respective political organizations and Defendants’ relationships with each other. See e.g., Pl.’s
Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 27 (seeking documents regarding “Viswanath and Rajagopal’s
respective roles, duties, activities, authorities, and responsibilities with respect to HfHR . . . [and
their] respective contacts with D.C. in their roles and capacity as founders and officers of HfHR”).
It is hard to see how the requested information would cure Plaintiff’s jurisdiction deficiencies.
Even if there were a plausible conspiracy, additional discovery would not establish co-conspirator
jurisdiction because HAF has not pleaded that any overt act occurred in the District of Columbia.
The additional discovery would not support jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(1) because HAF does
not seek discovery related to any Defendant’s business transactions in the District, and it would
not support jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(3) because no tortious act is alleged to have occurred in
the District.
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Nor would the requested discovery support jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(4) or the Due
Process Clause. Defendants have submitted affidavits stating that they do not have regular contacts
with the District and were not in the District when they made the allegedly defamatory statements
at issue. See Viswanath Decl. ¶¶ 4–5; Rajagopal Decl. ¶¶ 4–5; Truschke Mot., Decl. of Audrey
Truschke, ECF No. 36-2, ¶¶ 14–15; Ahmed Decl. ¶¶ 3–7. Plaintiff makes no attempt to contest
these affidavits. HAF does not, for example, identify any contact with the District of Columbia
by any Defendant not already acknowledged by them. Plaintiff’s jurisdictional discovery request,
therefore, amounts to a fishing expedition, is speculative, and is not made in good faith. “In light
of [Defendants’] uncontested affidavit[s],” this court is “justified in denying further discovery.”
Caribbean Broad, 148 F.3d at 1090. 7
C. Defamation Claim Against Prabhudoss
That leaves Defendant Prabhudoss. Plaintiff argues that Prabhudoss made a defamatory
statement that was quoted in the Second Story and published a defamatory tweet. Compl. ¶¶ 29(c),
34. Prabhudoss responds that Plaintiff, as a public figure or limited purpose public figure, failed
to allege that Prabhudoss acted with actual malice and therefore fails to state a claim. Prabhudoss
Mot. at 20–27. Prabhudoss further argues that his quoted statement “is reasonably understood to
communicate a subjective value proposition” and “thus cannot be considered false for purposes of
a defamation claim,” and that his tweet amounts to “imaginative expression or rhetorical
hyperbole” and “cannot be libelous.” Prabhudoss Mot. at 11–12.
Under District of Columbia law, a defamation plaintiff must allege “(1) that the defendant
made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published
7
Even if jurisdictional discovery were warranted, for the reasons stated in Section V.C.a, HAF fails to plead actual
malice against Defendants Viswanath, Rajagopal, Ahmed, and Truschke and thus fails to state a claim for relief against
those defendants.
22
the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant’s fault in publishing the
statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a
matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm.”
Bauman, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 10. Public figures and limited purpose public figures must plausibly
plead actual malice, meaning that the defendant published the defamatory statement with
“knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Weyrich v.
New Republic, Inc., 235 F.3d 617, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2001). If a public figure fails to plead actual
malice, the defamation claim fails, even if the statement is verifiably false.
Prabhudoss argues that HAF is, at least, a limited purpose public figure. HAF does not
contend otherwise, and it assumes that it is a limited purpose public figure. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.
John Prabhudoss’s Mot., ECF No. 42 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n Prabhudoss], at 23. Accordingly,
in addition to the other elements of a defamation claim, Plaintiff also must plead sufficient facts
from which to infer that Prabhudoss acted with actual malice.
a. Actual Malice
Plaintiff argues that Prabhudoss acted with actual malice because publicly available tax
statements “show that HAF was not misusing taxpayer funds” and therefore there were “obvious
reasons” for Prabhudoss to doubt the truthfulness of his statements. Pl.’s Opp’n Prabhudoss at
22–23; Compl. ¶ 40 (“Because there were obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the Defamatory
Statements, Defendants had an obligation to verify the truth, which they failed to do, thereby
demonstrating that they published the Defamatory Statements with actual malice.”), ¶ 37 (“There
are extensive publicly available and readily accessible financials and other documents that directly
contradict the Defamatory Statements and establish that no funds were provided by HAF to any
alleged Indian nationalist or supremacist organizations.”). Prabhudoss responds that “HAF’s
23
argument boils down to an assertion that the mere existence of its financial statements . . . should
give rise to an inference of actual malice” and falls short of the requirement that “defamation
plaintiffs[] allege facts sufficient to infer that the defendant subjectively entertained doubts about
the truth of their statements prior to publication.” Reply Mem. of L. in Supp. of Def. Prabhudoss
Mot., ECF No. 45, at 13–14.
The “standard of actual malice is a daunting one.” McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1501, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A defendant acts with “actual malice” if he makes a
statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.” Jankovic v. International Crisis Group, 822 F.3d 576, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)). The actual malice test is subjective; a
defendant acts “recklessly” if “the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts” as to the truth of
the publication or acted “with a high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity.” St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Importantly, “it is not enough to show that defendant should
have known better”—the plaintiff “must offer evidence that the defendant in fact harbored
subjective doubt.” Jankovic, 822 F.3d at 589.
Here, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Prabhudoss entertained “serious doubts” as to
the truth of his statements or acted with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity.
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731. The Supreme Court has held, in the context of a news reporter, that
the “failure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have
done so, is not sufficient to establish [the] reckless disregard” required to prove actual malice.
Harte-Hanks Comms, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989). If the failure to investigate
does not constitute actual malice for journalists, such failure cannot make out actual malice against
a lay person. Plaintiff’s malice allegations ultimately amount to an argument that Prabhudoss
24
“should have known better.” Jankovic, 822 F.3d at 589. Pleading actual malice requires much
more, and Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations against Prabhudoss fall far short of the “daunting”
standard of actual malice. McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1515.
HAF also fails to plead actual malice against Defendants Viswanath, Rajagopal, Ahmed,
and Truschke. The court cannot plausibly infer that any of their statements were made with actual
malice. Again, the only allegation HAF points to in support of malice is the existence of publicly
available financial statements. For the reasons discussed, those allegations are not enough to
sustain a claim. See e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n Viswanath & Rajagopal at 37 (“HAF pleads that the co-
conspirators were aware of the public filings of HAF and thus knew that its claims of connections
to Indian groups and misuse of taxpayer funds were false.”); Pl.’s Opp’n Truschke at 24 (“[T]here
are extensive public records that were available to members of the conspiracy, including Truschke,
that establish the truth[.]”); Pl.’s Opp’n Ahmed at 43 (“Ahmed controls a non-profit that is required
to publicly report the same information that HAF contends he should have investigated prior to
publication.”).
Accordingly, this court finds that HAF fails to plead actual malice and thus fails to state a
claim of defamation against all Defendants.
b. Falsity
Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Prabhudoss fails for another reason—HAF does not
plausibly allege that Prabhudoss’s statements are verifiably false. Falsity is a distinct element of
defamation that must be separately pleaded. See Libre By Nexus v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
3d 149, 155 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[W]hen confronted with a motion to dismiss a defamation claim, a
court must determine not only whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning but also
whether the statement is plausibly false.”). “For a statement to be actionable under the First
25
Amendment, it must at a minimum express or imply a verifiably false fact.” Weyrich, 235 F.3d at
624.
Prabhudoss is quoted in the Second Story as stating: “Government watchdog groups as
well as human rights organisations need to take serious note of the misappropriation of COVID
funding by Hindu supremacist groups [in] the United States.” Ex. 59 at 5; Compl. ¶ 29(c).
Prabhudoss’s declaration is a statement of opinion—he is stating his view on how certain
organizations should respond to what he sees as a “misappropriation of COVID funding.” The
statement is not actionable as defamation because “expressions of a subjective view . . . are
not provably false and thus cannot undergird a claim of defamation.” Bauman, 377 F. Supp. 3d at
10–11.
Prabhudoss later tweeted: “Recently realized that the @HinduAmerican just confirmed and
acknowledged through its own lawyers that they are a Hindu supremacist organization in the US
operating as a charity. Wow! Who would have thought that!!” Compl. ¶ 34. Prabhudoss’s “tweet
was posted shortly after HAF issued cease-and-desist letters to Defendants after the publication of
the First and Second Stories demanding” that Defendants publish retractions and apologies on their
websites and social media accounts, and cease and desist from publishing further allegedly
defamatory statements about HAF. Prabhudoss Mot. at 8. The tweet amounts to “rhetorical
hyperbole”—in response to actions taken by HAF’s attorneys—which “cannot be libelous, as such
statements are used not to implicate underlying acts but merely in a loose, figurative sense to
demonstrate strong disagreement with another.” Bauman, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 11. For the stated
reasons, Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Defendant Prabhudoss fails to plausibly allege falsity.
Furthermore, the court has reviewed the allegedly defamatory statements attributed to
Defendants Viswanath, Rajagopal, Ahmed, and Truschke, and finds that HAF fails to plausibly
26
plead that any statement made by any defendant is verifiably false. Most of the statements are
clearly statements of opinion. For example, Defendant Viswanath is quoted in the First Story 8
stating: “Any American non-profit that perpetuates Islamophobia and other forms of hate should
not receive federal relief funds in any form.” Compl. ¶ 25(a)(iii); Ex. 58 at 9. This is a non-
actionable statement of opinion—Viswanath is expressing her view on what types of organizations
are deserving of federal relief funds. Bauman, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 10–11. Defendant Ahmed is
quoted in the Second Story stating: “US taxpayers’ money being used to keep hate groups in
business is absolutely unacceptable and should concern all who believe in fairness, justice and
government accountability.” Ex. 59 at 3; Compl. ¶ 29(a)(i). This is another clear statement of
opinion expressing a view on how government funding should be distributed, and which groups
are deserving of federal relief funds. See also Ex. 59 at 4 (Defendant Rajagopal stating: “The rise
of HAF and other organisations linked with Hindutva has emboldened Hindu supremacist
organizations in India, while also stifling the moderate Hindu voices here in the US.”); Compl.
¶ 31(a) (Defendant Truschke 9 tweeting: “As a scholar of South Asia, I can attest that some of these
groups spread hate & use intimidation tactics. These things are dangerous and unwelcome on US
soil”). For the stated reasons, HAF fails to plausibly plead that any statement made by any
defendant is verifiably false.
8
Defendant Viswanath is further quoted in the First Story stating: “All these organisations are sympathetic to the
Hindu Supremacist ideology. Their parent organisations continue to spread hatred in Hindu communities toward
Muslims and Christians.” Ex. 58 at 9; Compl. ¶ 25(a)(ii). The term “Hindu Supremacist ideology” is not actionable—
“because of the tremendous imprecision of the meaning and usage of [the] term[] in the realm of political debate,” it
“cannot be regarded as having been proved to be [a] statement[] of fact.” Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980–81
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). However, the court notes that Viswanath’s claim that HAF has “parent organisations” in
India is plausibly verifiably false—HAF’s complaint alleges that “HAF has no affiliation or ties to . . . any alleged
Hindu nationalist or supremacist group in India.” Compl. ¶ 36. Nevertheless, the plausible falsehood of this claim
does not save HAF’s defamation claim against Viswanath.
9
The court notes that some of Truschke’s statements are arguably verifiably false. See e.g., Compl. ¶ 33(c) (“Full
disclosure that the HAF Board member in question [Rajiv Pandit] has been going after me, along with a growing list
of people, in recent days.”). Nevertheless, even if proven false, HAF’s defamation claim fails because the statement
is not defamatory.
27
VI. CIVIL CONSPIRACY
Plaintiff alleges a common law civil conspiracy claim against all Defendants for conspiring
to “defame HAF” by “causing false and disparaging statements about HAF to be published in the
First and Second Stories.” Compl. ¶ 52. Civil conspiracy is not a standalone tort and “thus fails
unless the elements of the underlying tort are satisfied.” Nader v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 567
F.3d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Because the underlying defamation claim against Prabhudoss
fails, Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim fails.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Prabhudoss’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 34;
Defendants Viswanath & Rajagopal’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 35; Defendant Truschke’s
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36; and Defendant Ahmed’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 37, are
granted. A final, appealable order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: December 20, 2022 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge
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