Matthews v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALEXANDER OTIS MATTHEWS, as
Personal Representative for the Estate of
Ezana Alexander Matthews,
Plaintiff,
No. 18-cv-1190 (RDM)
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
“Nothing that [the Court] write[s], no matter how well reasoned or forcefully expressed,
can bring back the victim of [the] tragedy” at hand. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). In this case, as in all cases, the Court’s obligation remains to
apply the law. And, here, that obligation requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims on behalf of his
son, Ezana Matthews.
A full account of the tragic circumstances of Ezana Matthews’s death are recounted in
this Court’s prior opinion, Dkt. 23 at 1–4, but the following facts from the amended complaint
warrant repetition and are taken as true for purposes of the District’s motion to dismiss. See
Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014). Ezana was a 25-year-old Army veteran. Dkt. 25 at
2. Upon his honorable discharge from the Army, Ezana lived with his paternal grandmother in
Washington, D.C. Id. On May 4, 2017, Ezana’s 81-year-old grandmother came home and found
him hanging from a pull-up bar in a bedroom. Id. Unable to cut him down herself, as instructed
by the 911 operator, she “ran to a neighbor’s home” and found a group of men “who were able to
physically perform the task.” Id.When an officer from the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) arrived, that officer
allegedly “made no effort” to revive Ezana, such as by “attempt[ing] CPR,” “provid[ing]
oxygen,” or deploying a defibrillator. Id. That inaction, according to Plaintiff, violated “all
applicable laws, statutes, regulations [and] MPD special and general orders when encountering
unconscious persons.” Id. Plaintiff also contends that MPD officers and detectives were
“wholly negligent in their investigation of the circumstances surrounding [his son’s] death.” Id.Plaintiff’s original complaint asserted claims under the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and under D.C. tort law. See Dkt. 1. The District moved to
dismiss that complaint with respect to all claims, Dkt. 5, and the Court granted that motion while
granting Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. See Dkt. 23, Dkt. 24. In the memorandum
opinion granting that motion, the Court construed the Plaintiff’s due process claims as
substantive due process claims and dismissed them on the basis that “the Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary
to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual.” Dkt. 23 at 5 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 196 (1989)).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is itself ambiguous as to whether it asserts a common law
tort claim in addition to a procedural due process claim. See Dkt. 25 at 3. But, in his response to
the District’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff categorically states that he “argued no Common Law
Tort Claims in the amended complaint so the defendant’s opposition to these claims is
misplaced.” Dkt. 30 at 1. Thus, the Court is left only to consider Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s new procedural due process claim. That claim must be dismissed.
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The Supreme Court has held that the “Due Process clause . . . is not implicated by the
lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty or property.” Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986) (applying this rule to both procedural and substantive due
process claims). And, Plaintiff makes no allegations that the offending officer’s actions were
anything other than “negligent.” See Dkt. 25 at 2. More importantly, the “fundamental” interest
the Due Process clause protects is the “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner,’” when the government makes decisions that deprive individuals of life,
liberty, or property interests. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Because Plaintiff does not allege that he—or
his son—was denied an “opportunity to be heard,” or denied any other procedural protections,
the Court must dismiss his complaint for failure to plead facts sufficient to state a plausible claim
for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196;
Futch v. Fine, 342 Fed. App’x 638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming a dismissal for
failure to state a claim where a complaint “alleged a due process right to an investigation”).
The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss. A separate order
will issue.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: December 20, 2019
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