Levine v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LEAH LEVINE,
Plaintiff
v.
Civil Action No. 13-1696 (CKK)
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION,
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(February 18, 2015)
This action arises from Plaintiff Leah Levine’s experiences bringing her service dog on
Amtrak trains in the Northeast Corridor. Plaintiff brings claims on her own behalf and on behalf
of a putative class of certain other disabled passengers against Defendant National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) pursuant to Part A and Part B of Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797; and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (the
“DCHRA”), D.C. Code Ann. §§ 2-1401.01–2-1411.06. 1 Each claim relates to Amtrak’s alleged
practice of storing luggage in “mobility aid” seating areas of Amtrak trains. Plaintiff seeks a
declaratory judgment that Amtrak’s alleged conduct is discriminatory; money damages for past
occasions of the alleged discrimination; and injunctive relief with respect to Amtrak’s policies
and practices regarding the “mobility aid” seating areas. Before the Court is Defendant Amtrak’s
[19] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and/or Strike Plaintiff’s Rule 23
Class Allegations. Defendant argues that the First Amended Complaint must be dismissed
1
“Because the Rehabilitation Act and the DCHRA are ‘in pari materia’ with Title II of the ADA
and cases interpreting those laws are ‘interchangeable,’” the Court will focus on Title II of the
ADA. Equal Rights Ctr. v. D.C., 741 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Am. Council of
the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1262 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and Teru Chang v. Inst. for
Public–Private P’ship, 846 A.2d 318, 324 (D.C. 2004)).
1
because it fails to state a claim under the relevant statutes, because Plaintiff lacks Article III
Constitutional standing because she has not suffered an injury in fact, and because Plaintiff has
no prudential standing to pursue violations of the relevant statutes. In the alternative, Defendant
argues that the Amended Complaint’s class allegations should be stricken because Plaintiff has
failed to define an ascertainable class. Upon consideration of the pleadings, 2 the relevant legal
authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court GRANTS Amtrak’s [19] Motion to Dismiss on
the basis that Plaintiff has no standing to bring the claims in this action. Therefore, the Court
does not consider Defendant’s other arguments in favor of dismissal; nor does the Court consider
Defendant’s request, in the alternative, to strike the class allegations. Accordingly, the Court
DISMISSES all claims against Defendant Amtrak and dismisses this action in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 3 The Court does “not accept as true, however, the plaintiff’s
legal conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm.
on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court recites the facts pertaining
2
The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents:
• First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 14 (“Am. Compl.”);
• Def.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and/or to Strike Plaintiff’s
Rule 23 Class Allegations, ECF No. 19 (“Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss”);
• Pl.’s Mem. of Points and Authorities in Opp’n to Defendant’s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s First
Am. Compl. and/or to Strike Pl.’s Rule 23 Class Allegations, ECF No. 20 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”);
and
• Def.’s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Am. Compl. and/or Strike
Pl.’s Rule 23 Class Allegations, ECF No. 23 (“Def.’s Reply”).
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would
not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
3
By stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 24, 2014.
2
to the issues raised in the pending motion, focusing on those facts relevant to the standing
inquiry in which the Court engages.
Plaintiff suffers from severe physical disabilities because of multiple sclerosis. Am.
Compl. ¶ 15. Specifically, her condition inhibits her ability to balance and walk and causes visual
disruption and sensory confusion when she is in crowded spaces. Id. To assist her in coping with
the symptoms she experiences, Plaintiff uses a service dog, a golden retriever named Linus, who
accompanies her at all times. Id. ¶ 16. Among other tasks that Linus performs, he is trained to
walk slightly in front of Plaintiff to help her navigate crowds and crowded spaces. Id. ¶ 18.
Plaintiff frequently travels on Amtrak between Metropark, New Jersey, and Union
Station, in Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 22. When she travels on Amtrak, Plaintiff books mobility aid
seating, which features more open floor space in front of the seats than other seating on the train.
Id. ¶ 24. The mobility aid seating allows Linus to be at her feet and to move around
unobstructed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the mobility aid seating is the only seating that can
accommodate her disabilities. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the mobility aid seating areas are
consistently cluttered with luggage belonging to other passengers. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff also alleges
that she is consistently “confronted with objections, exasperation, rebukes, and outright hostility”
when she asks crew members to move such luggage. Id. ¶ 27. In addition to her general
allegations, Plaintiff describes five specific experiences regarding her ability to sit in mobility aid
seating; all pertain to travel between Metropark, N.J., and Union Station, in Washington, D.C. Id.
¶ 33. The Court reviews those five experiences here:
• March 1, 2013 – After boarding, Plaintiff approached a mobility aid seating area,
together with Linus, and discovered several large pieces of luggage occupying the
floor space in that area. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff feared that the bags would present a
dangerous obstacle for her and for Linus and asked a crew member to remove them.
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Id. After the crew member refused, Plaintiff complained to the conductor, who
apologized. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff does not allege where she ultimately sat. 4
• August 2, 2013 – Upon boarding, Plaintiff and Linus sat in a mobility aid seating
area. Id. ¶ 36. There were bags stacked in the mobility aid seating area across the aisle
from where she was sitting. Id. Because she was concerned that luggage would fall
over and present an obstacle for her and for Linus, Plaintiff asked a crew member to
move the bags or to ask the owners of those bags to move them. Id. ¶ 37. The crew
member refused, stating that the bags were far enough away from her. Id.Subsequently, one of the bags fell into the aisle, allegedly coming within inches of
hitting Linus and blocking the aisle. Id.¶ 38; see id., Ex. B (photograph of bag in
aisle). The crew member again refused to move the bags to a nearby luggage
compartment and instead restacked the bags in a different configuration. Id. ¶ 38; id.,Ex. C (photograph of restacked bags). 5 Plaintiff alleges that she remained agitated
and concerned for her safety for the remainder of that journey. Id. ¶ 39.
• November 1, 2013 – Upon boarding, Plaintiff asked a crew member for assistance in
finding mobility aid seating and was told she would have to walk along the train to
find a seat. Id. ¶ 40. She walked through two cars, which did not have any mobility
aid seating. Id. She passed another crew member who told her that she had to
continue walking. Id. Because she could no longer keep her footing as the train
moved, she stopped and requested additional assistance. Id. A third crew member then
helped her find a seat. Id. Plaintiff was humiliated and in tears. Id.• December 6, 2013 – During her train trip, Plaintiff walked to the café car to get
something to eat. Id. ¶ 41. There was mobility aid seating in that car but she could not
sit down because a garbage can and a storage crate were in the mobility aid seating
area. Id.; see id., Ex. D (close-up photograph of garbage can and storage crate).
• January 3, 2014 – After Plaintiff sat down in a vacant mobility aid seating area, a
crew member placed a large bag, tagged “heavy,” in the clear floor space in front of
her, standing upright. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff complained that, if the bag fell over, it would
present a dangerous obstacle to her and to Linus. Id. In response, the crew member
laid the bag on its back, such that it took up more floor space. Id. 6
4
The Court notes that, in her original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, on this occasion, the
conductor moved her to business class and brought her complimentary bottles of water. Original
Complaint, ECF No.1 (“Compl.”), ¶ 34.
5
Based on photographs of the bags that Plaintiff attached to her Amended Complaint, it appears
that the bags were restacked in a configuration that was more horizontal than the original
configuration and, accordingly, less prone to toppling over. Compare Am. Compl., Ex. A with id.,Ex. C.
6
The photograph of the bag on its back that Plaintiff submitted suggests that, while taking up
more floor space, the re-oriented bag was less likely to fall or otherwise shift during transit. See
4
In addition to these five specific experiences while traveling, Plaintiff alleges that, on various
occasions, she canceled trips to Washington, D.C., rather than experience the physical and
emotional strain of traveling by Amtrak. Id. ¶ 43. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on the first
weekend of June 2013, when hot and humid weather exacerbated her symptoms, she decided not
to make the trip from New Jersey to Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff alleges that she canceled
the trip because she was afraid that she would not be able to handle the usual routine of searching
for mobility aid seating and confronting crew members regarding the need to clear a seating area
for her. Id.II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, Defendant moves to dismiss this action on the
basis that this Court has no jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks standing. “Article III of the
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘actual cases or controversies between
proper litigants.’” Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Fla.
Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Because standing is a “threshold
jurisdictional requirement,” a court may not assume that Plaintiff has standing in order to
proceed to evaluate a case on the merits. Bauer v. Marmara, 774 F.3d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
A plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief
sought.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). “To establish constitutional
standing, plaintiffs ‘must have suffered or be imminently threatened with a concrete and
particularized injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1010 (quoting
Am. Compl., Ex. E. However, the photograph also shows that there was sufficient space for
Plaintiff and her service animal.
5
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). While the Court must assume that the
factual allegations in a complaint are true in resolving a motion to dismiss, see Holistic Candlers
and Consumers Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012), “a plaintiff’s factual
allegations ‘will bear closer scrutiny’ in resolving issues of standing, ‘than in resolving a 12(b)(6)
motion for failure to state a claim.’” Ryan, LLC v. Lew, 934 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.D.C. 2013)
(quoting Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13-14
(D.D.C. 2001)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed because
Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Specifically, Defendant argues that none of the events that the
Amended Complaint describes qualify as an “injury in fact” necessary to support standing for
Constitutional purposes. Plaintiff responds that she has standing because of five incidents in
which she experienced allegedly discriminatory conduct while traveling on Amtrak. The Court
first analyzes whether there is a legal basis for the alleged injuries to qualify as injuries-in-fact
for the purposes of standing. The Court then addresses each of the incidents on which Plaintiff
relies. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the invasion of a legally
protected interest, with respect to any of the enumerated incidents, as necessary to support
standing in this action. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged
facts supporting her standing in this action, the Court concludes that it has no jurisdiction over
this matter and does not address Defendant’s other arguments in favor of dismissal. 7
7
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the irreducible minimum of Article III
standing, the Court need not address Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has no prudential
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A. Plaintiff Does Not Have Protected Interest in Sitting in a Mobility Aid Seating Area
“Under Article III, a party who invokes the court’s authority ‘must have suffered an
injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Bauer, 774 F.3d 1026, 1032
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “A legally cognizable interest means an interest recognized at
common law or specifically recognized as such by the Congress.” Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d
1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578). A person cannot claim an injury on
behalf of another person. Sharp v. Capitol City Brewing Co., LLC, 680 F. Supp. 2d 51, 57
(D.D.C. 2010) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563). Although courts must generally assume, for the
purposes of evaluating standing, that a plaintiff states a valid legal claim, see Holistic Candlers,
664 F.3d at 943, when an alleged injury arises from a statute, as in this case, “questions
concerning standing and the availability of a private cause of action under the statute may be
intertwined,” and the Court must address standing with respect to that alleged injury before
addressing the merits. Bauer, 774 F.3d at 1029.
Amtrak is subject to Title II of the ADA. Disabled in Action of PA. v. Nat’l Passenger
R.R. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Part B of Title II pertains to transportation
entities such as Amtrak. Id. at 656. It details specific actions that are considered discriminatory
under section 12132 of that Title. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12162(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A)).
Relevant to the instant action, the statute requires that one passenger car per train be “readily
accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities” in accordance with the Part B regulations.
42 U.S.C. § 12162(a)(1). In turn, the regulations, promulgated by the Department of
Transportation, specify that vehicles are considered to meet this standard if they satisfy the
standing. See Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 202 n.10 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Grocery
Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
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requirements set forth in those regulations. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.7. Plaintiff argues that her service
dog is a “mobility aid” and therefore she is a beneficiary of the design requirements pertaining to
mobility aids. While neither the statute nor the regulations define mobility aid explicitly, the
language of the regulations requires the conclusion that a service dog is not a mobility aid. The
regulations describe the requirements for “spaces for persons who wish to remain in their
wheelchairs or mobility aids.” Id. § 38.125 (emphasis added). This description indicates that
“mobility aid” refers to a wheelchair-like mechanical device that a disabled person can enter and
exit. Such description does not encompass a service dog. Other provisions of the regulations
confirm this interpretation. See, e.g., id. § 38.115 (requiring sufficient turning and maneuvering
room); id. § 38.125(a)(1) (requiring level-change mechanisms to allow mobility aid users to
change seating levels); id. § 38.125(b)(5) (referring to wheeled features of mobility aids). In
addition, the regulations refer explicitly to service animals only once, in a section unrelated to
mobility aids, and do not refer to or describe service animals as mobility aids. See id. § 37.167(d)
(“The entity shall permit service animals to accompany individuals with disabilities in vehicles
and facilities.”). Because a service dog is not a mobility aid, none of the mobility aid provisions
in the regulations are applicable to Plaintiff’s circumstances. Cf. Sharp, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (no
standing for Plaintiff to raise ADA claims regarding restroom features that he was not capable of
accessing). In sum, these regulations and the statutory provision they implement do not create a
cognizable interest that could have been invaded in the incidents that Plaintiff allegedly
experienced. Nor do the other provisions of the statute or the implementing regulations create,
for Plaintiff, a cognizable interest that has been invaded.
The statute contains requirements for wheelchair parking and storage. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12162(a)(3)(A). Since Plaintiff does not use a wheelchair, this provision is not at issue and
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cannot be the source of an injury in fact. The statute also requires that table service be provided
to people in wheelchairs and that auxiliary aids and services be provided to insure equivalent
food service is available to people with disabilities. Id. § 12162(4). This provision is not at issue
in this litigation, and Plaintiff does not look to this provision for the source of her alleged injury.
Nor does Plaintiff allege violations of other provisions of the regulations. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R.
§ 37.167, entities must “permit service animals to accompany individuals with disabilities in
vehicles and facilities.” Plaintiff never alleges that she was ever prohibited from bringing her
service dog, Linus, with her. Nor does Plaintiff allege a violation of 49 C.F.R. § 37.5, which
prohibits, in general terms, discrimination against an individual in connection with the provision
of transportation service. In sum, Plaintiff cannot rely on Part B of Title II for her injury in fact.
It does not establish any legally protected interests with respect to mobility aid seating for people
with disabilities who use service animals.
Part A of Title II pertains to public entities generally. It provides that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits or the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Part A regulations, promulgated by
the Department of Justice as required by the statute, do not apply to transportation entities like
Amtrak. See Boose v. Tri–County Metro. Transp. District of Oregon, 587 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (9th
Cir. 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (“Regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall include
standards applicable to facilities and vehicles covered by this part, other than facilities, stations,
rail passenger cars, and vehicles covered by part B of this subchapter.”). Indeed, the DOJ
regulations themselves state that “[t]o the extent that public transportation services, programs,
and activities of public entities are covered by subtitle B of title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C.
9
§ 12142), they are not subject to the requirements of this part.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(b).
Accordingly, while the Part A regulations include a requirement that public entities make
reasonable modifications to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, see Disabled in
Action of P.A., 418 F. Supp. 2d at 656, Amtrak is not subject to such a requirement. For the
purposes of the standing analysis in which the Court must engage, Plaintiff has no right to seek a
modification beyond the specific requirements of Part B, discussed above. Accordingly, any
failure of Amtrak to implement such a modification does not constitute an injury to Plaintiff with
respect to a legally cognizable interest.
In sum, Title II of the ADA does not create a protected legal right for a disabled person
using a service animal to sit in a mobility aid seating area or to demand that those seating areas
be clear of baggage or other objects. “Because the Rehabilitation Act and the DCHRA are ‘in
pari materia’ with Title II of the ADA and cases interpreting those laws are ‘interchangeable,’”
the Court concludes that those sources of law also do not create cognizable interests applicable to
these circumstances. Equal Rights Ctr., 741 F. Supp. 2d at 273. The Court notes as well that
Plaintiff does not argue that the source of her injury is an interest created by Rehabilitation Act or
by the DCHRA separate and apart from Title II of the ADA.
B. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged an Invasion of a Protected Legal Right
Irrespective of the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to
raise her claims because she does not have a protected legal interest in sitting in a mobility aid
seating area, the Court further finds that Plaintiff does not have standing because she has not
alleged that she was unable to sit in mobility aid seating during any of the alleged incidents.
The Court first addresses the incident that occurred on December 6, 2013, involving
seating in the café car because that is the only incident in which Plaintiff alleges that she was
10
unable to sit down. See id. ¶ 41. Specifically, she alleges that she was unable to sit down in the
café car because of a garbage can and a storage crate located in the mobility aid seating idea. 8 Id.
However, the Court concludes that her inability to sit down in the mobility aid seating area of the
café car was not an invasion of a “legally protected interest.”
Plaintiff never claims that her inability to sit down violated an interest that would have
existed at common law. Nor is the Court aware of any such violation. Plaintiff does claim,
however, that the absence of compliance with the ADA in the five incidents she enumerates—
including this one—is enough to satisfy the Constitutional requirement of injury in fact.
However, the Court concludes, above, that the ADA does not create, for Plaintiff, a legal interest
in sitting in a mobility aid seating area or a legal interest in having those areas clear of baggage.
Therefore, none of the requirements of Title II of the ADA create any legally cognizable interests
that were invaded—for the purposes of establishing standing—when Plaintiff was unable to sit
down in the mobility aid seating area of the café car. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged facts
that would support her standing to pursue the claims in this action by virtue of the café car
incident.
The Court next addresses the four other incidents enumerated in the Amended Complaint,
which involved Plaintiff searching for a seat on the train and issues relating to the storage of
baggage near the mobility aid seating areas. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-40, 42. With respect to these
incidents, Plaintiff never alleges that she was unable to find a seat in a mobility aid seating area.
8
The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff never suggests that she was unable to sit for the
duration of that particular journey. She only alleges that she was unable to sit in the café car
when she visited it in the midst of her journey. Even construing the complaint in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must, the Court concludes that, given Plaintiff’s description of
this incident and her enumeration of other incidents in which she faced challenges with respect to
mobility aid seating, Plaintiff was able to sit for the remainder of this particular journey in a
mobility aid seating area in a passenger car.
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Regarding the March 1, 2013, incident, Plaintiff recounts how there was luggage in a mobility
aid seating area and how a crew member refused to move it. See id. ¶ 34-35. In the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff does not specify where she ultimately sat, but notably she does not allege
that she was unable to sit on that trip with space for her service dog. See id. Similarly, on August
2, 2013, Plaintiff sat in a mobility aid seating area where bags were stacked across the aisle from
her seating area. Id. ¶ 36-37. While Plaintiff asked crew members to move the bags that were
located across from her seat, she does not allege that she was unable to sit in a mobility aid
seating area. Third, on November 1, 2014, Plaintiff had difficulties finding a seat but was
ultimately able to find a seat in a mobility aid seating area with the assistance of a crew member.
Id. ¶ 40. Fourth, on January 3, 2014, Plaintiff asked a crew member to move a bag in the
mobility aid seating area in which she was already seated. Id. ¶ 42. In sum, Plaintiff never
alleges, with respect to these four incidents, that she was unable to sit with her service dog,
Linus, for the duration of the trip. Moreover, in reviewing the photographs attached as exhibits to
the Amended Complaint that show baggage in the area where she is seated with her service dog,
it is clear that there is sufficient room for the service animal. See Am. Compl., Exs. B, E.
The Court has concluded, above, that her failure to obtain a seat in the mobility aid
seating area of the café car did not constitute the invasion of a cognizable legal interest. The
same is true with respect to the four enumerated incidents regarding luggage in and around
mobility aid seating areas in passenger coach cars. Plaintiff never alleged that she was unable to
find a seat in a mobility aid seating area—irrespective of the Court’s conclusion that the statute
does not provide her a legal interest in sitting in those seating areas. For an injury to pass
Constitutional muster, Plaintiff must have experienced the injury herself. See Sharp, 680 F. Supp.
2d at 57. In all four of these incidents, she was able to find a seat with Linus. Merely observing
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luggage in various configurations around her is not enough to constitute an injury. Indeed, the
ADA regulations themselves only require the seating spaces to be clear when a wheelchair or
mobility aid user is using that space. See 49 C.F.R. § 38.127 (“Seating spaces may have fold-
down or removable seats to accommodate other passengers when a wheelchair or mobility aid
user is not occupying the area.”). Therefore, there can be no injury in fact as a result of storage of
luggage in portions of mobility aid seating areas that are not occupied by individuals with
disabilities who are legally entitled to use those seating areas.
Finally, the Court addresses whether any emotional distress resulting from these incidents
could create an injury in fact even if the underlying experiences themselves do not amount to
such an injury. Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint emotional distress from her
experiences searching for mobility aid seating and seeking to compel Amtrak crew members to
move luggage stored in proximity to those locations. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 40 (difficulty
finding seat left Plaintiff humiliated and in tears); id. ¶ 39 (Plaintiff agitated and concerned for
safety during trip); id. ¶ 43 (Plaintiff concerned about taking additional trip due to potential
emotional consequences). From the pleadings, it is unclear whether Plaintiff relies on these
experiences to support her argument that she has standing. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. Regardless,
“emotional harm—in and of itself—is not sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury in fact
requirement.” Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Humane Soc’y of
U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). “Instead, a plaintiff can only establish an Article
III injury in fact based on emotional harm if that alleged harm stems from the infringement of
some ‘legally protected’ or ‘judicially cognizable’ interest that is either ‘recognized at common
law or specifically recognized as such by the Congress.’” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560;
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997); and Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d at 1069). In order to
13
satisfy the requirements of standing, notwithstanding allegations of emotional harm, Plaintiff
must allege an injury resulting from the invasion of a legally protected interest. As stated above,
Plaintiff has not done so here.
In all, Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable injury in fact with respect to any of the
incidents on which she relies. Therefore, none of these incidents give her standing to pursue
either backward-looking monetary relief, seeking compensation for the harm she allegedly
experienced, or forward-looking injunctive relief, seeking to require Amtrak to change its
practices. Furthermore, since she does not have standing to pursue the claims pertaining to her
own experiences on Amtrak trains traveling between New Jersey and Washington, D.C., she
certainly does not have standing to pursue claims with regard to other Amtrak lines on which she
has never traveled.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Amtrak’s [19] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Specifically, the Court concludes that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claims in this action.
Because of the lack of standing of Plaintiff—the putative class representative—the Court need
not independently analyze whether the class allegations in the complaint should be stricken as
these claims are dismissed as well. Accordingly, all claims are dismissed, and this action is
dismissed in its entirety. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: February 18, 2015
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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