Eeon, Ronnie, and Sunshine Kahapea v. Federal Reserve Board

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
EEON, RONNIE, AND SUNSHINE )
KAHAPEA, et al., )
)
Petitioners, )
)
v. ) Miscellaneous Action 23-mc-00012 (TSC)
)
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, et al., )
)
)
Respondents. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Petitioner Brett Jones filed this miscellaneous action purportedly on
behalf of himself, seven additional named petitioners, and “other real parties in
interest,” against five named Respondents and “Doe Respondents 1 through 1000.” See
Pet. for Stay, ECF No. 1 at 1. For the reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss
this action sua sponte without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
The nature of Jones’ claims is unclear. The petition appears to assert that this
action involves, inter alia, “a foreclosure proceeding to evict a party,” as well as “[t]he
unlawful trading of mortgages and promissory notes on the financial markets.” ECF
No. 1 at 11–12. He asks that “the rules of the court” be “suspended throughout this
proceeding.” Id. at 14. The relief Jones seeks includes “[a] stay of the nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings and collections until this matter can be fully resolved,” “[a]n
enforcement of the administrative order requiring the Respondents to follow the laws
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and regulations governing the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act,” and “[a] referral to the
Attorney General’s office for investigation of any criminal conduct and/or war crimes
committed by the Respondents in relation to this matter.” Id. at 34. Jones did not
provide the court with an address for the petitioners, but contends that “this Court holds
jurisdiction to hear the present matter” because it “fall[s] under the regulatory purview
of the Federal Reserve, headquartered in Washington, D.C.” Id. at 19.
II. ANALYSIS
A district court “may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without notice
where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not possibly prevail based on the facts alleged
in the complaint.” Jafari v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 277, 279 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 621 F. App'x
676 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir.
2012)) (internal quotations and brackets removed). “The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s
complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell
v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Redwood v. Council of the District of
Columbia, 679 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)).
But this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not
want to assert.” Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239 (citations omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that complaints contain, inter alia, “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a). In other words, Rule 8(a) requires that the plaintiff “give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555–56 (2007) (holding that the complaint must contain enough “factual matter” to suggest
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liability) (citation and alterations omitted). In other words, a plaintiff must assert enough facts to
give the defendant “fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the [defendant] the
opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977)
(citation omitted).
Jones’ petition does not meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. His factual allegations are
unclear—as is the legal theory ostensibly providing the basis for the petition. Thus, he has not
given the Respondents “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Further, it is unclear that this court is the proper venue for this case. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b). 1 Jones named the Federal Reserve Board in his petition. However,
there is no indication that the other respondents are also located in the District of
Columbia or that any events occurred in the district.
Moreover, it appears that this case may have been improperly filed as a
miscellaneous case. Miscellaneous cases include “(a) actions to perpetuate testimony as in
Rule 27, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) actions to enforce administrative subpoenas and
summonses; (c) proceedings ancillary to an action pending in another district; (d) supplementary
proceedings brought in aid of execution; (e) motions for return of property in criminal
1
Section 1391(b) provides that
[a] civil action may be brought in . . . (1) a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction ....
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proceedings; and (f) requests for judicial assistance.” Matter of Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec.
Surveillance Applications & Ords., 300 F. Supp. 3d 61, 69, n.4 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing LCvRs
40.3(a)(1) n.1, 57.10(a)(1) n.3). Further, miscellaneous cases may “relate[] to a bankruptcy case
or proceeding,” id. (citing LCvR 403.3(c)(2)(iii)), may include a “motion or application filed in
connection with a grand jury subpoena or other matter occurring before a grand jury,” id. (citing
LCrR 6.1), and may include “[a]ny news organization or other interested person, other than a
party or a subpoenaed witness, who seeks relief relating to any aspect of the proceedings in a
criminal case.” Id. (citing LCrR 57.6). Assuming, arguendo, that Jones intended to address a
foreclosure proceeding, a miscellaneous action is not the proper judicial vehicle to resolve this
dispute.
Finally, while Jones may appear pro se, he is not authorized to seek relief on
behalf of other litigants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“[P]arties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel.”); Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (rejecting pro se party’s attempt to represent other parties).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this court will dismiss this action sua sponte
without prejudice.
Date: March 2, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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