Rodriguez v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FLORENTINO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF Civil Action No. 13-675 (GK)
AMERICA HOLDINGS, d/b/a
LabCorp,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Florentino Rodriguez (~Rodriguez" or "Plaintiff")
brings this action against Laboratory Corporation of America
Holdings ( "LabCorp" or "Defendant") for declaratory judgment,
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
This matter is before the Court on LabCorp' s Motion to
Dismiss [Dkt. No. 16]. Upon consideration of the Motion,
Opposition [Dkt. No. 17], and Reply [Dkt. No. 19], the entire
record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Defendant's
Motion is granted.
I . BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
Rodriguez was employed by the District of Columbia as an
Urban Park Ranger. FAC ~ 6. During his eleven years of
employment in this capacity, he had "an exemplary record with no
history of disciplinary problems or personal involvement with
illegal drugs." FAC ~~ 6, 7.
In or about April 2010, Rodriguez was randomly selected to
submit a urine sample for drug testing pursuant to the District
of Columbia's Mandatory Drug and Alcohol Testing Program for
Safety-Sensitive Positions ("Drug Testing Program") . FAC ~ 8;
see 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3901 et seq. Rodriguez's test results were
positive for the presence of marijuana metabolites, and he was
subsequently terminated from his employment. FAC ~~ 21, 23.
Rodriguez does not allege that his test results were
inaccurate, or that he had not used marijuana prior to providing
his urine sample. Instead, he alleges that LabCorp, who tested
his urine and reported the result, failed to follow government-
mandated procedures in doing so, thereby improperly causing his
positive result to be reported to his employer. Id. ~~ 9-23.
Rodriguez relies on certain provisions in Title 6 of the
District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, and the United
1
Except where otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are
taken from the First Amended Complaint ( "FAC") [Dkt. No. 15] and
accepted as true.
-2-
States Department of Transportation regulations incorporated
therein, which the District of Columbia has adopted in
connection with its Drug Testing Program (collectively,
"regulations" or "quality control regulations"). See 6-B
D.C. M. R. § 3 9 01 et seq. ; 4 9 C. F. R. Part 4 0. The regulations
require a testing laboratory to conduct both an initial screen
and a confirmatory test before reporting a drug test as
positive. 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906.4; see also 49 C.F.R. § 40.87.
To conduct the initial screen, the laboratory must use an
enzyme-multiplied immunoassay technique ("EMIT") test. 6-B
D.C.M.R. § 3906.4. If the initial screen is positive, the
laboratory must then use a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry
("GCMS") test to confirm the positive result and quantify the
precise concentration of drug metabolites. Id.
The regulations set "cutoff concentrations," which
determine whether the initial screen and confirmatory test
should be reported as positive. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.87(a). If a
test result is below the cutoff, the laboratory must report it
as negative. Id. § 40.87(b)-(c). If a test result is at or
above the cutoff concentration, the laboratory must report it as
positive. Id. § 40.87(b)-(c). In the case of a marijuana test,
the relevant cutoff concentrations are 50 ng/mL for the initial
screen and 15 ng/mL for the confirmatory test. Id. § 40.87 (a).
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Rodriguez contends that "there is absolutely no evidence or
information in the report provided to the District of Columbia
indicating that he had a positive initial urine screen, i.e.
over 50 ng/mL." FAC ~ 12. Therefore, he argues LabCorp was not
legally permitted to conduct a confirmatory test, or to report
his test results as positive to the District of Columbia's Human
Resources Department. FAC ~~ 13, 14, 21. 2 Rodriguez also claims
that LabCorp performed the wrong type of testing because it
administered a "qualitative test," and not the test specified in
6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906. FAC ~~ 15-16. On these grounds, Rodriguez
maintains that he "was denied a fair test in compliance with
District of Columbia government procedures." FAC ~ 17.
B. Procedural Background
On April 19, 2 013, Rodriguez filed his original Complaint
in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, bringing
claims against LabCorp for negligence, gross negligence, and
breach of contract. On May 10, 2013, LabCorp removed the case
to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446.
2
LabCorp did not report Rodriguez's result directly to the
District of Columbia's Human Resources Department. Instead, it
first forwarded the results to Dr. Charles Moorefield, a Medical
Review Officer ( "MRO"), whose responsibility it was to "verify
that the testing procedure was conducted properly." FAC ~ 20;
see also 49 C.F.R. § 40.123. Rodriguez alleges that Dr.
Moorefield failed to properly review LabCorp's testing
procedures. FAC ~ 21. However, he has not named Dr. Moorefield
as a defendant in the case.
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[Dkt . No . 1] . LabCorp then moved to dismiss Rodriguez's
Complaint [Dkt. No. 9] , but subsequently withdrew its motion
after the parties stipulated to permit Rodriguez to file an
amended complaint. [Dkt. No. 13].
On August 2, 2013, Rodriguez filed his FAC, asserting
claims against LabCorp for declaratory judgment, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
See generally FAC [Dkt. No. 15]. The FAC also includes claims
against "John Doe" Defendants for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage and intentional interference with
business relations. FAC ~~ 64-85. 3
On August 23, 2013, LabCorp moved to dismiss the FAC
pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. [Dkt . No. 16] . On September 5, 2 013, Plaintiff
filed his Opposition. [Dkt. No. 17] . On September 24, 2013,
LabCorp filed its Reply. [Dkt. No. 19].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
3
The "John Does" are described as employees of LabCorp who were
involved in the testing and reporting of Rodriguez's drug test
results. See FAC ~ 5. Although Rodriguez identifies one of
these individuals in his Opposition as Kamlesh Patel, Pl.'s
Opp'n at 3, there is no indication that Rodriguez has attempted
to serve Mr. Patel, or any person other than LabCorp, with his
complaint.
-5-
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 u.s. 544, 570 (2007)). "The plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
A pleading that offers mere "labels and conclusions" or a
"formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will
not suffice; nor will "naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)
(internal punctuation omitted). The factual allegations "must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and to permit the Court "to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
"In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the
court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents
attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which
it may take judicial notice." Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471
F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A court may
also consider documents of undisputed authenticity that "are
referred to in the complaint and are integral to" the
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plaintiff's claims. Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
The court is required to accept the complaint's factual
allegations as true and give a plaintiff "the benefit of all
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from such allegations."
Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963 (citation omitted). However, the court
need not accept plaintiff's legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Jacobs v. Vrobel, 724 F.3d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir.
2013). Nor must it accept "inferences drawn by plaintiffs if
such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the
complaint," or by other documents properly considered in
connection with the motion to dismiss. Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963
(citations omitted) .
III. ANALYSIS
A. Materials Considered in This Motion to Dismiss
In support of its Motion, LabCorp has submitted excerpts of
the Report it prepared in connection with Rodriguez's test.
These excerpts, the authenticity of which Rodriguez does not
dispute, include pages labeled "Specimen Test Results,"
"Specimen Summary," "Initial Test Data Section," and
"Confirmation Test Data Section." See Decl. of Robert I.
Steiner in Support of LabCorp' s Reply ("Steiner Decl. ") , Ex. A
[Dkt. No. 19-1]. Rodriguez refers to these pages repeatedly in
his FAC; indeed, they provide the sole factual underpinning for
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his contention that LabCorp failed to comply with the quality
control regulations. See FAC ~~ 12, 15, 16, 18 & n.1.
Accordingly, they are both incorporated by reference in the FAC
and central to Rodriguez's claims. The Court may therefore
consider them in deciding the Motion.
B. Declaratory Judgment
In Count 1, Rodriguez asks the Court to enter a
"declaratory judgment that defendant LabCorp was under a duty
and obligation to fully comply with federal and District of
Columbia government drug testing procedures pursuant to its
contract with [the] District of Columbia government and failed
to do so." FAC ~ 35.
LabCorp seeks to dismiss this claim on the grounds that it
is duplicative of Rodriguez's other claims. Def.'s Mot. at 8-9.
Rodriguez contends that dismissal is improper because the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "permit[] parties to 'set forth
two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically,' and to 'state as many separate claims or
defenses as the party has regardless of consistency. '" Pl. Is
Opp'n at 14-15 (citing Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526
U.S. 795, 805 (1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2))).
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 2 8 U.S. C. § 2 2 01, provides
that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
-8-
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (a). This language "has long been understood 'to confer
on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding
whether to declare the rights of litigants.'" Medimmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) (quoting Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)); see also Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72 (1985) ("[T]he declaratory judgment
statute is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the
courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.")
(citation omitted) .
Although Rodriguez is correct that he is allowed to plead
in the alternative, he has not articulated any reason to
maintain the declaratory judgment claim as a separate cause of
action. The claim does not present any legal or factual
theories that are not already subsumed in his other claims. See
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007) ("To the
extent [plaintiff] seeks a declaration of defendants' liability
for damages sought for his other causes of action, the claim is
merely duplicative and was properly dismissed.") Further,
Rodriguez does not identify any way in which his future actions
are likely to be affected by the declaratory relief he seeks.
See Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 35 F.3d 799, 812
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(3d Cir. 1994) ("Even if a declaratory judgment would clarify
the parties' legal rights, it should ordinarily not be granted
unless 'the parties' plans of actions are likely to be affected
by a declaratory judgment. 11
) • Accordingly, Count 1 shall be
dismissed.
C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In Count 2, Rodriguez brings a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation. To plead a prima facie claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege " ( 1) a false
representation (2) in reference to a material fact, (3) made
with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with intent to deceive, and
(5) action taken in reliance upon the representation. 11
Atraqchi v. GUMC Unified Billing Servs., 788 A.2d 559, 563 (D.C.
2002) . 4 A false representation "is an assertion that is not in
accord with the facts. 11
Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64
A.3d 428, 438-39 (D.C. 2013) (citations and internal punctuation
marks omitted) .
Because fraud claims are subject to a heightened pleading
standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a plaintiff "must state the time, place and content
of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and
4
The parties agree that District of Columbia substantive law
applies to Plaintiff's claims. See Def.'s Mot. at 10 (citing
District of Columbia law as source of applicable standard);
Pl.'s Opp'n at 5 (same).
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what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the fraud."
United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385
(D.C. Cir. 1981). However, "intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Rodriguez's fraud claim is deficient in several respects.
First, he fails to identify any particular misrepresentation by
LabCorp. His sole allegation pertaining to this element is that
LabCorp's employees "failed to disclose accurate information and
made false representations to the District of Columbia and the
plaintiff regarding results and procedures used in [his] drug
test." FAC ~ 39. This allegation is too generalized and
conclusory to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading
requirement. It fails to specify the time, place, or content of
LabCorp's employees' misrepresentations. As previously noted,
Rodriguez does not allege that his test results were factually
inaccurate. 5 Instead, his theory is that LabCorp used improper
testing procedures. However, as discussed below, this
contention is premised entirely on LabCorp's own Report.
5
In its Motion to Dismiss Rodriguez's original Complaint,
LabCorp pointed out that "Plaintiff does not allege that his
test results were inaccurate or that he had not engaged in
marijuana use prior to providing his urine sample; he simply
claims that LabCorp should not have performed the confirmatory
test arid then reported the results to the MRO." See Def.'s Mot.
to Dismiss [Original Compl.] at 2 [Dkt. No. 9]. Rodriguez had
the opportunity to address this point in his FAC, but did not do
so.
-11-
Accordingly, it is entirely unclear what specific statement or
other communication by LabCorp was false or misleading.
Second, " [a] plaintiff may recover for a defendant's
fraudulent statement only if the plaintiff took some action in
reliance on that statement." Aktieselskabet AF 21. November
2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(citing Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Grp. Hosp. & Med.
Servs., Inc., 878 A.2d 1226, 1237-38 (D.C. 2005)). Rodriguez
does not claim that he himself relied on LabCorp's Report.
Instead, he contends that he may recover for fraud based on the
District of Columbia's reliance. However, he cites no District
of Columbia case to support this contention, and our Court of
Appeals has rejected the argument that a third party's reliance
satisfies the reliance element of common-law fraud. See id. at
23 (affirming dismissal of common-law fraud claim because
"[r] ather than suggesting its own reliance, [plaintiff] says the
PTO relied on [defendant's] alleged misrepresentation")
The~efore, Rodriguez has not made out the element of reliance. 6
6
Plaintiff cites Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S.
639, 655-57 (2008) for the proposition that third-party reliance
satisfies the reliance element of fraud. Pl.'s Opp'n at 17-18.
In Bridge, the Supreme Court considered third-party reliance in
the context of a civil RICO claim premised on violations of the
federal mail fraud statute. The Court observed that "it may be
that first-party reliance is an element of a common-law fraud
claim," but emphasized that the case before it concerned a
"statutory offense that is distinct from common-law fraud." Id.
at 656 (both emphases added) . Since Rodriguez brings a claim
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Third, beyond a formulaic recitation of the elements of
fraud, Rodriguez has not alleged any facts suggesting that
LabCorp or any of its employees knew or believed the Report was
inaccurate, or intended to deceive Rodriguez, or anyone else, by
providing false information.
For each of these reasons, Rodriguez fails to state a claim
for fraudulent misrepresentation. Count 2 shall be dismissed.
D. Negligent Misrepresentation
In Count 3, Rodriguez brings a claim for negligent
misrepresentation. The elements of negligent misrepresentation
are similar to the elements of fraud, but do not include the
element of fraudulent intent. Thus, "[t] o establish negligent
misrepresentation by a defendant, a plaintiff must show that:
1. The defendant negligently communicated false
information [,]
2. The defendant intended or should have recognized that
the plaintiff would likely be imperiled by action
taken in reliance upon [the] misrepresentation[,]
[and]
3. The plaintiff reasonably relied upon the false
information to his [or her] detriment.
Hall v. Ford Enters., Ltd., 445 A.2d 610, 612 (D.C. 1982)
(citing Restatement of Torts 2d § 311 (1965); W. Prosser, Torts,
§ 107, at 704-10 (4th ed. 1971)).
for common law fraud under District of Columbia law, not a claim
under the civil RICO provisions, Bridge is inapposite.
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Rodriguez fails to make out the elements of negligent
misrepresentation for largely the same reasons that he fails to
state a claim for fraud, namely, that he has not identified any
false information communicated by LabCorp, and does not claim
that he himself relied on such information. Therefore, Count 3
shall be dismissed.
E. Negligence
In Count 4, Rodriguez brings a claim for negligence. The
elements of negligence are the existence of "a duty of care,
breach of that duty, and injury proximately caused by that
breach." Odemns v. Dist. of Columbia, 930 A.2d 137, 143 (D.C.
2007) (citation and quotations marks omitted) .
The parties address a significant portion of their papers
to the issue of whether LabCorp owed Rodriguez a duty of care.
See Def.'s Mem. at 12-14; Pl.'s Opp'n at 6-14; Def.'s Reply at
3-7. Whether a defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care is a
question of law to be decided by the court, with an eye to
whether "injury to [the plaintiff] was reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant" at the time of the accident. Haynesworth v. D.H.
Stevens Co., 645 A.2d 1095, 1098 (D.C. 1994). The court must
also consider whether any applicable statutes or regulations
create such a duty. Odemns, 930 A.2d at 143 (citing Jarrett v.
Woodward Bros., Inc., 751 A.2d 972, 980 (D.C. 2000)).
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Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not
addressed whether a commercial laboratory owes a duty of care to
drug-testing subjects, many other courts have recognized the
existence of such a duty. See, e.g., Cooper v. Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings, Inc., 150 F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The
overall trend is for courts to recognize the existence of a
limited duty on the part of the laboratory to employees who are
the subject of the tests.") ; Quisenberry v. Compass Vision,
Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ("To [decline
to recognize such a duty] would mean to deprive thousands of
individuals from an opportunity to challenge or receive any
recourse for the repercussions they may suffer due to
negligently performed laboratory tests producing erroneous or
inaccurate test results."); Chapman v. LabOne, 460 F. Supp. 2d
989, 1001 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (finding a duty because defendant
laboratory "was aware it was testing employee samples, and
accordingly, could anticipate that harm could come to the
employee as a result of [its] negligent behavior in processing
the sample").
In fact, although LabCorp contends that it did not owe
Rodriguez a duty of care, .at least two of the cases it cites to
support its position hold that drug testing laboratories do owe
such a duty. See Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 915, 918 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (sustaining negligence claim of terminated employee
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against laboratory); Elliott v. Lab. Specialists, Inc., 588 So.
2d 175, 176 (La. Ct. App. 1991) ("The risk of harm in our
society to an individual because of a false-positive dr:ug test
is so significant that any individual wrongfully accused of drug
usage by his employer is within the scope of protection under
the law."), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (La. 1992).
As these cases have recognized, it is entirely foreseeable
that an employee who submits a specimen for drug testing will
suffer adverse effects to his or her employment if the
laboratory erroneously reports a positive result. The District
of Columbia's regulations expressly provide for termination of
employment following a positive drug test. See 6- B D. C. M. R. §
3907.1 ("The following shall be grounds for termination of
employment . (a) A confirmed positive drug test result .
. ") . Moreover, the District of Columbia and the United States
Department of Transportation have both enacted regulations
requiring drug testing laboratories to implement quality control
procedures, presumably to protect against the danger of a false
positive. See 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3901 et seq.; 49 C.F.R. Part 40,
Subpart F. Thus, it is fully consistent with general tort
principles and the tendency of the courts to hold, and this
Court does hold, that commercial laboratories, such as LabCorp,
owe a duty of care to drug testing subjects, such as Rodriguez.
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However, as discussed, Rodriguez has not alleged that his
test results were inaccurate, only that LabCorp' s violation of
certain procedural requirements caused the results to be
erroneously reported to his employer. Whether LabCorp's duty to
Rodriguez included strict compliance with these procedural
requirements, and whether a plaintiff, such as Rodriguez, can
demonstrate proximate causation where he does not allege that
his test results were inaccurate, are open questions. 7 However,
the Court need not reach these questions because there is a more
fundamental problem with Rodriguez's negligence claim, namely
that the FAC does not support the "reasonable inference," Iqbal,
556 u.s. at 678, that LabCorp violated any procedural
requirement.
As previously discussed, Rodriguez alleges that LabCorp
breached its duty to comply with the quality control regulations
in two respects, first, by not obtaining a positive initial
screen prior to conducting a confirmatory test, and second, by
not using the immunoassay methodology required by 6-B D.C.M.R. §
3906. With respect to the first theory, the sole factual
7
The Court notes that the quality control regulations require a
laboratory to store a urine specimen, and if the specimen is
confirmed positive, to notify the employee of his or her right
to send the stored sample to another certified laboratory for
confirmation of the positive result. See 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906.5.
There is no evidence Rodriguez ever availed himself of this
right.
-17-
allegat.ion to support it is in paragraph 12 of the FAC, which
contends:
[T] here is absolutely . no evidence or information in
the report provided to the District of Columbia
indicating that [Rodriguez] had a positive initial
screen, i.e., over 50 ng/mL. No where [sic] in the
report from LabCorp is it indicated that the initial
test met or exceeded the 50 ng/mL cutoff level.
FAC ~ 12.
However, the Report states in two separate places that
LabCorp did conduct an initial screen of Rodriguez's specimen,
and that such screen exceeded the concentration cutoff of 50
ng/mL. First, on a page titled "Specimen Test Results," the
Report lists both a "screening" and a "confirm" test, defines
the "Screening Cutoff" as 50 ng/mL, and indicates that the
collective results of the "screening" and "confirm" tests
conducted on Rodriguez's specimen were "POSITIVE." See Steiner
Decl., Ex. A at 6. Second, on a page titled "Specimen Summary,"
the Report states:
Initial Test Results (Immunoassay) Presumptive
positive for Cannabinoid
Confirmation Test Results (GC/MS) Positive for
Marijuana Metabolite: 48 ng/ml
Id. at 1.
In short, Rodriguez's contention that "[t]here is
absolutely no evidence or information in the report" that his
specimen had a positive initial screen is squarely contradicted
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by the Report itself. Consequently, the Court cannot accept the
allegations in Paragraph 12 of the FAC as true.
With respect to Rodriguez's second theory as to how LabCorp
breached its duty of care, he contends:
It is clear that LabCorp performed the wrong
kind of test, i.e., it did not administer the enzyme
multiple immunoassay technique (EMIT) test as required
by D.C. municipal regulation 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906. The
test administered by LabCorp, in its own words, was a
'qualitative' test which 'should not be used to
determine the concentration of drug or drug metabolite
present in specimens.'
FAC ~ 16. Rodriguez quotes directly from the "Initial test Data
Section" of the Report to support this allegation. See FAC ~
16, n.l.
Again, Rodriguez's allegations about the Report are
directly contradicted by the Report itself. The Report states
in at least three different places that LabCorp first used an
immunoassay test, which is a qualitative test, to conduct the
initial screen, and then used a GCMS test, which is a
quantit'ative test, to confirm the positive result and measure
the precise concentration of drug metabolites present in
Rodriguez's sample. See Steiner Decl., Ex. A at 1, 2, 7, 16.
This is what the regulations require. See 6-B D.C.M.R. 3906.4
("[T]he vendor shall split each sample and perform enzyme-
multiplied immunossay [sic] (EMIT) testing A positive
EMIT test shall be confirmed using the gas
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chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) methodology."); see also
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 610 (1989)
("While drug screens may be conducted by immunoassays
positive drug findings are confirmed by gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry. These tests, if properly conducted, identify the
presence of drugs in the biological samples tested with
great accuracy.") (quoting United States Dep' t of Transp. Field
Manual: Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations
B-12 (1986) (quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Customs Serv., 27 F.3d 623, 625
(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The laboratory to which specimens are sent
will first employ an immunoassay test; any sample identified as
positive will then be tested using gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry (GC/MS) techniques.") (citation omitted) . 8
While the Court would ordinarily be required to accept
Plaintiff's factual allegations as true at this stage of the
proceedings, his allegations rely on a document that expressly
contradicts the conclusions he draws from it. Therefore, the
Court is not required to accept such allegations as true. See
Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963 (citing Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726,
730 (4th Cir. 2002)). Further, without any other factual
8
The Report does not specify that LabCorp used an "enzyme-
multiplied" immunoassay technique, as opposed to a different
type of immunoassay. However, Rodriguez does not allege that
LabCorp performed the wrong type of immunoassay test, and the
Report does not suggest as much.
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allegations to support his claim that LabCorp breached its duty
of care, or any contention that the test result was erroneous or
inaccurate, Rodriguez's negligence claim does not satisfy the
plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal. Accordingly, Count
4 shall be dismissed.
F. Intentional Interference Claims
In Counts Five and Six, Rodriguez brings claims for
intentional interference with prospective advantage and
intentional interference with business relations.
LabCorp did not address these claims in its moving papers,
and Rodriguez contends, therefore, that such claims may not be
dismissed. P l . ' s Opp' n at 5-6 . LabCorp counters in its Reply
brief that it was not required to seek dismissal of Counts 5 and
6 because the FAC brings them against the "John Doe" Defendants
only, and not against LabCorp. Def. 's Reply at 12. LabCorp
further argues that even if it was named as a defendant in
Counts 5 and 6, the claims should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. Id. at 13-15. The Court agrees.
LabCorp is correct that the intentional interference claims
state that they are brought against the "John Does" and do not
mention LabCorp. Rodriguez now contends (in his Opposition to
LabCorp' s Motion) that LabCorp is vicariously liable for the
conduct of the John Does, none of whom have been served with the
FAC. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5-6. The FAC does not assert this theory
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in Counts 5 and 6, and therefore LabCorp was not required to
address those counts in its moving papers.
Even if Rodriguez had named LabCorp as a defendant in
Counts 5 and 6, he has not stated a cause of action for
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage or
intentional interference with business relations. To establish
either claim, a plaintiff must allege facts setting forth: (1)
the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy;
(2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship or expectancy;
( 3) the defendant's intentional interference with the
relationship or expectancy; and (4) resulting damages. See
NCRIC, Inc. v. Columbia Hosp. for Women Med. Ctr., Inc., 957
A.2d 890, 900 & n.l8 (D.C. 2008); Casco Marina Dev., L.L.C. v.
D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 834 A.2d 77, 84 (D.C. 2003).
There is not a single factual allegation in the FAC
plausibly suggesting that LabCorp (or anyone else) intended to
interfere with Rodriguez's employment relationship with the
District of Columbia. The mere awareness that Rodriguez could
be adversely affected by a positive test result is insufficient.
As our Court of Appeals has observed:
As its name would suggest; intentional interference
requires an element of intent. [A] general
intent to interfere or knowledge that conduct will
injure the plaintiff's business dealings is
insufficient to impose liability.
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Bennett Enterprises, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 493,
499 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (citation and
quotation marks omitted) . Because there are no facts suggesting
that LabCorp, or any of its employees, acted with a desire or
purpose to interfere with Rodriguez,s employment, the Court
shall dismiss the intentional interference claims at Counts 5
and 6. 9
G. Breach of Contract
In Count 7, Rodriguez brings a claim for breach of
contract. A claim for breach of contract includes four
elements: "(1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an
obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of
that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach. 11
Tsinolas Realty
Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009) (citation omitted).
Rodriguez contends that LabCorp s contract with the District of
1
Columbia required compliance with the quality control
regulations. He further claims that he has standing as a third-
party beneficiary to enforce this aspect of the contract, which
LabCorp disputes. See Def. s Mot. at 14-17; Pl. s Opp n at 20-
1 1 1
22.
9
Having so concluded, the Court does not reach LabCorp,s
alternate contention that an "at-will employment contract, such
11
as the one between Rodriguez and the District of Columbia,
cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the first element of an
intentional interference claim. Def., s Reply at 14 (citing
Zelaya v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 277, 286-87 (D.D.C.
2008)) .
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Whatever the merits of Rodriguez's third-party beneficiary
theory, his breach of contract claim, like his other claims, is
predicated on the contention that LabCorp violated the quality
control regulations. As already noted, he pleads no facts
plausibly suggesting LabCorp violated any of these provisions.
Accordingly, even assuming that the contract between LabCorp and
the District of Columbia required compliance with the
regulations, and that a drug testing subject has standing to
enforce this requirement, Rodriguez still would not state a
claim for breach of contract. Therefore, Count 7 shall be
dismissed.
H. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Finally, at Count 8, Rodriguez brings a claim for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "Under District of
Columbia law, every contract contains within it an implied
covenant of both parties to act in good faith and damages may be
recovered for its breach as part of a contract action."
Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 1087
(D.C. 2008) (citation omitted) . This covenant means that
"neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to_ receive
the fruits of the contract." Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d
194, 201 (D.C. 2006) (citations omitted). "To state a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a
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plaintiff must allege either bad faith or conduct that is
arbitrary and capricious." Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749,
754 (D.C. 2013)
Rodriguez was not a party to the contract between the
District of Columbia and LabCorp. The mere fact that he may
have been one of thousands of beneficiaries of a specific
quality control provision contained in that contract does not
mean that LabCorp generally owed him a contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Further, there are no facts in the FAC
suggesting that LabCorp or any of its employees operated in bad
faith or in an arbitrary and capricious manner at any time.
Accordingly, Count 8 shall be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is granted,
and the FAC shall be dismissed. An Order shall accompany this
Memorandum Opinion.
February 4, 2014
United States District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
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