Reiver v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
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ROBERT E. REIVER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-1527 (ABJ)
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In September 2010, plaintiff Robert E. Reiver brought an action against the District of
Columbia, the Metropolitan Police Department, Officer Lauren Griffin, Officer Ricardo
Edwards, and Lieutenant John Hedgecock, asserting claims arising out of his arrest for driving
under the influence and operating while impaired. The counts that remain are the claims
against the individual police officers for unlawful arrest and unlawful imprisonment under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and the officers have moved for summary judgment. Since the Court finds that
the police conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate plaintiff’s clearly established
rights, the officers are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and the motion will be
granted.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the officers had probable cause to charge plaintiff
with DUI/OWI when they stopped him on Massachusetts Avenue. Plaintiff ultimately passed the
breathalyzer test administered at the station, and the Court recognizes that he may justly feel
indignant and frustrated about the fact that he was charged anyway. But the question before the
Court is not whether it would have been an appropriate course – or even the better course – to
conclude the matter there and release the plaintiff. The issue to be decided is whether it was
objectively unreasonable for the officers to believe it was lawful to proceed, and the Court finds
that it was not.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of an October 15, 2009 traffic stop and arrest in the District of
Columbia. Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 15 to Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.
[Dkt. # 46-15] (“Pl.’s SMF”) ¶¶ 1, 22. The arrest took place on a rainy night at 11:30 p.m. Pl.’s
Answers to Interrogs., Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp.”) [Dkt. # 46-
1] at 2. Plaintiff was at the wheel of his wife’s Mercedes, proceeding outbound on
Massachusetts Avenue with his headlights off, and defendant Griffin attempted to conduct a
traffic stop. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 5–6; Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 2. But plaintiff continued to pilot
the car for six more blocks with the officer’s police cruiser behind him – its lights and sirens
activated – before he pulled the car to the side of the road. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 6. When Officer Griffin
approached plaintiff’s car, she asked him whether he was aware that his headlights were off, and
whether he had had anything to drink. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 2. Plaintiff replied that he
was not aware that his headlights were off, and that he had consumed part of a beer earlier that
evening. Id. According to Officer Edwards, plaintiff also mentioned that he had taken pain
medication for a back condition. Def. Ricardo Edwards Dep., Ex. 6 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
[Dkt. # 45-6] (“Edwards Dep.”) at 27:9–11. In response to Officer Griffin’s request for
plaintiff’s registration and proof of insurance, plaintiff initially presented an expired insurance
card, but he eventually provided the correct card. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 2.
2
Following this exchange, Officer Griffin administered two field sobriety tests: a
horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and a “walk and turn” test. 1 Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 2;
Def. Lauren Griffin Answers to Interrogs., Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 45-2]
(“Griffin’s Answers to Interrogs.”) at 5. During the nystagmus test, Officer Griffin observed a
“lack of smooth pursuit” as plaintiff’s eyes moved from side to side. Griffin’s Answers to
Interrogs. at 8. Plaintiff does not dispute this observation, but he contends that the fact that he
was positioned so that he was facing traffic lights at a nearby busy intersection may have
impacted his performance. 2 Pl.’s Opp. at 10; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 15.
For the walk and turn test, Officer Griffin instructed plaintiff to walk in a straight line
nine paces forward heel to toe and then nine paces backward heel to toe. Reiver Aff., Ex. 6 to
Pl.’s Opp. [Dkt. # 46-6] ¶ 8. Plaintiff failed to follow the instructions by: (1) stepping out of the
straight line after his fifth step; and (2) continuing to walk forward for an extra six paces after the
completion of nine paces. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 2–3. Plaintiff maintains that the weather
conditions affected his ability to complete the heel to toe walking. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at
1 The ‘horizontal gaze nystagmus test’ measures the extent to which a
person’s eyes jerk as they follow an object moving from one side of the person’s
field of vision to the other. The test is premised on the understanding that,
whereas everyone’s eyes exhibit some jerking while turning to the side, when the
subject is intoxicated ‘the onset of the jerking occurs after fewer degrees of
turning, and the jerking at more extreme angles becomes more distinct.’ . . . The
‘walk and turn test’ requires the subject to walk heel to toe along a straight line
for nine paces, pivot, and then walk back heel to toe along a straight line for
another nine paces. The subject is required to count each pace aloud from one to
nine.”
Karamychev v. District of Columbia, 772 A.2d 806, 808 n.3 (D.C. 2001), quoting Pennsylvania
v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 585 n.1 (1990) (plurality opinion).
2 While plaintiff attributes any difficulties in the nystagmus test to the lights in the vicinity,
he also maintains in his complaint that his imperfect performance on the heel to toe exercise
should be excused because it was conducted “at night with limited lighting.” Compl. ¶ 22.
3
2–3. At that point, Officer Griffin ended the field sobriety test and arrested plaintiff for Driving
Under the Influence (“DUI”) and/or Operating While Impaired (“OWI”). Griffin’s Answers to
Pl.’s Interrogs. at 8–9; Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 8 to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.
[Dkt. # 45-8] (“Defs.’ SMF”) ¶ 24; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 22.
Officer Edwards – a new officer, seeking experience – processed the arrest. Edwards
Dep., Ex. 6 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 45-6] at 30:15–19. Edwards arrived with
plaintiff at the Second District police station at approximately midnight. Pl.’s Answers to
Interrogs. at 3. By 1:00 a.m., Officer Carter, who is not a defendant in this action, administered a
breathalyzer test. Id. It returned a blood alcohol level of .00. Id. Officer Carter next requested
a urine sample for testing, which plaintiff voluntarily provided. Id.In light of the .00 result, plaintiff requested that Lieutenant Hedgecock, the Watch
Commander on duty, immediately release him and make an entry in the detention journal instead
of continuing to process the arrest. 3 Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 4–5. Lieutenant Hedgecock,
however, informed plaintiff that sufficient probable cause existed to continue the arrest, and he
refused to utilize the detention journal or release plaintiff from custody. Id. Plaintiff was instead
transferred to the Central District for processing. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 5–7. He was
later returned to the Second District and was released from custody at 9:00 a.m. Id. at 6–7.
Plaintiff was named as a defendant in a case brought by the District of Columbia in D.C.
Superior Court. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 8–9. He was charged with DUI and OWI. Id.Both charges were disposed of by a nolle prosequi on March 1, 2010. Id.3 To make an entry in the detention journal at a police facility means that the Watch
Commander determines that an arrestee should be released without charge, fills out PD Forms
728 and 731, and immediately releases the arrestee. Use of the Detention Journal, GO-PCA-
502.05 (effective Nov. 22, 2002), replaced by GO-PCA-502.05 (Aug. 26, 2010).
4
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on September 9, 2010. For the reasons stated on
the record at the June 16, 2011 hearing, and in the Order dated June 17, 2011, [Dkt. # 19], the
Court dismissed all counts against the Metropolitan Police Department with prejudice, and
dismissed the District of Columbia from Counts I and II without prejudice. On August 4, 2011,
the Court granted defendant District of Columbia’s motion to dismiss it from Count III, and also
dismissed the remainder of Count III sua sponte. [Dkt. # 27]. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint on June 24, 2011. [Dkt. # 19]. The Court denied the motion on August 10, 2011,
finding that plaintiff’s proposed amendments were futile. [Dkt. # 28].
The officers filed the instant motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims on
April 13, 2012. [Dkt. # 45]. Of the remaining claims, Count I alleges that the arrest by Officers
Griffin and Edwards on the street violated the common law and the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 53–67. Count II also invokes the common law
and the Fourth Amendment, charging Officer Edwards and Lieutenant Hedgecock with false
imprisonment for their failure to release the plaintiff after receiving the breathalyzer results.
Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 68–80. Both counts arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl. ¶ 1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat
summary judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts showing there is a
5
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual
dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the
non-moving party; a fact is only “material” if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the
litigation. Id. at 248; Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In
assessing a party’s motion, “[a]ll underlying facts and inferences are analyzed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, 709 F. Supp. 2d
57, 65 (D.D.C. 2010), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
ANALYSIS
Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is “an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227
(1991), quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). Since the
immunity exists to shield properly-acting government officials from the rigors of suit, it should
be granted or denied as early as the factual record allows. Id. at 227 (emphasizing the
significance “of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation”).
Accordingly, it is appropriate to terminate actions on the basis of immunity “on a properly
supported motion for summary judgment.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978). Since
the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact in this case, summary judgment is
the appropriate forum to resolve defendants’ qualified immunity defense as a matter of law. See
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(“Once a defendant pleads a defense of qualified immunity, ‘[o]n summary judgment, the judge
appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was
clearly established at the time an action occurred.’”).
6
I. The Standard for Qualified Immunity
The defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving the defense of qualified
immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials
from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011), citing
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. In each case, the court may decide which prong to address first.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009), quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The analysis “turns on the ‘objective legal
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at
the time it was taken.’” Id. at 244, quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). This
standard, “[w]hen properly applied . . . , protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085, quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986).
The complaint appears to allege false arrest and false imprisonment claims under both the
common law and the Fourth Amendment. 4 In general, “the details of constitutional tort actions
4 While plaintiff claims that jurisdiction over this case arises in part from the Fourteenth
Amendment, Compl. ¶ 3, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . applies only to
the states.”). See also Ennis v. Lott, 589 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35 n.2 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia.”). Nonetheless, the other bases for
jurisdiction that plaintiff invokes, including Section 1983, provide this Court with subject matter
jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
7
should be shaped by reference to the parallel common law.” Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167,
175 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Accordingly, “the elements of a constitutional claim for false arrest are
substantially identical to the elements of a common-law false arrest claim” because for either
type, “the focal point of the action is the question whether the arresting officer was justified in
ordering the arrest of the plaintiff[.]” Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753–54 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
In addition, “[t]here is ‘no real difference as a practical matter between false arrest and
false imprisonment[.]’” Barnhardt v. District of Columbia, 723 F. Supp. 2d 197, 214 (D.D.C.
2010), quoting Shaw v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 268 A.2d 607, 609 n.2 (D.C. 1970); see also
Gabrou v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 462 A.2d 1102, 1104 (D.C. 1983) (“In this jurisdiction, the
gravamen of a suit for false arrest or false imprisonment is an unlawful detention.”). A
defendant can defeat a common law false arrest claim if “the arresting officer had probable cause
to believe that the arrestee committed a crime.” Scott, 101 F.3d at 754. Similarly, common law
false imprisonment is “the unlawful detention of a person without a warrant or for any length of
time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty or freedom of locomotion[.]” Bernhardt, 723
F. Supp. 2d at 214, quoting Tocker v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 190 A.2d 822, 824 (D.C. 1963).
To succeed under a claim for common law false imprisonment, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that
the police acted without probable cause, in an objective constitutional sense, to effectuate his
arrest.” Id. And under the Fourth Amendment, “[a]n arrest based on probable cause cannot
constitute an unreasonable . . . seizure.” Carr v. District of Columbia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99
(D.D.C. 2008), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996), rev’d on other grounds
by 587 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
8
Accordingly, the Court will analyze plaintiff’s remaining claims together. The key
question is whether, at the time of the detention, a reasonable person would have known that
under clearly established law there was no probable cause to arrest and detain plaintiff. “An
officer retains qualified immunity from suit if he had an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest were sufficient to establish
probable cause.” Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1993), citing Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Thus, even if there was not sufficient probable cause,
defendants will still be immune from suit if reasonable officers in their positions “could have
believed that probable cause existed to arrest [plaintiff].” Hunter v Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228–
29 (1991).
II. Defendant Officers Griffin and Edwards will be Granted Qualified Immunity
for the Claims Arising from Plaintiff’s Initial Arrest.
The Court is satisfied that a reasonable officer could have believed that there was
probable cause to support the initial arrest.
In the common law context, “probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances
within the arresting officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable
belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” In re T.H., 898 A.2d 908, 912 (D.C.
2006). Under the Fourth Amendment, “[p]robable cause exists when ‘facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” Marcus v. District of
Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 58, 61 (D.D.C. 2009), quoting United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541,
545 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). Thus, under either standard, the arrest is lawful when
the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant an
objectively reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
9
A. Officer Griffin
At the time of the initial arrest, Officer Griffin had a reasonable basis to believe that
plaintiff had committed the offenses of DUI or OWI. 5 D.C. Code § 50-2201.05(b)(1)(A)(i)(II)
(DUI) provides that “[n]o person shall operate or be in physical control of any vehicle in the
District . . . [w]hile under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or any combination
thereof.” D.C. Official Code § 50-2201.05(b)(2)(A) (OWI) provides that “[n]o person shall,
while the person’s ability to operate a vehicle is impaired by the consumption of intoxicating
liquor, operate or be in physical control of any vehicle in the District.” “[T]he alcohol-
impairment threshold is the same for DUI and OWI.” Taylor v. District of Columbia, 49 A.3d
1259, 1266 (D.C. 2012).
There can be little doubt that the circumstances leading to the arrest warranted a
reasonable belief that plaintiff had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, a drug, or some combination of the two. In Poulnot v. District of Columbia,
608 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1992), the D.C. Court of Appeals quoted from an opinion by the Supreme
Court of New Mexico in State v. Deming, 66 N.M. 175, 180 (N.M. 1959), that “a person is guilty
of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor if he or she is to the slightest degree . .
5 Since plaintiff does not argue that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the
traffic stop, the Court will not address that question.
Plaintiff does, however, appear to reassert an argument that this Court has already
rejected: that Officer Griffin’s administration of the field sobriety test was unlawful. See Pl.’s
Opp. at 8–10 (“[T]here was nothing in Plaintiff’s actions after he was stopped tending to
establish probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was driving under the influence of alcohol at the
time of his stop sufficient to support the administration of a field sobriety test.”). As the Court
already explained in its Order of August 10, 2011, “there is no legal requirement that there be
probable cause before an officer can administer a field sobriety test.” Order [Dkt. # 28] at 14,
citing Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And the Court is
satisfied that Officer Griffin met the lower standard of “reasonable suspicion” to perform the
field sobriety test since plaintiff had been driving at night without headlights, failed to pull to the
side of the road immediately upon the officer’s instructions, and admitted to having drunk
alcohol that night. Id. at 14–15 & n.3.
10
. less able, either mentally or physically or both, to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand
necessary to handle as powerful and dangerous a mechanism as a modern automobile with safety
to himself or the public.” 608 A.2d at 137. The court went on to remark that “[a]lthough
‘appreciable is, in our view, a more appropriate word than ‘slightest,’ . . . we generally agree
with the quoted definition of the Supreme Court of New Mexico of the [DUI] offense here at
issue.” Poulnot, 608 A.2d at 137. Moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals has stated that “it is not
necessary to be drunk in order to violate the DUI statute”; to prove that a defendant is guilty of
DUI, ‘the prosecution need not prove any specific degree of intoxication.’” Anand v. District of
Columbia, 801 A.2d 951, 957 (D.C. 2002), quoting Poulnot, 608 A.2d at 138.
Plaintiff was operating his vehicle without lights, in the rain, at 11:30 p.m. After the
police vehicle signaled for him to pull his car to the side of the road, he proceeded to drive six
more blocks before pulling over, while the police car – sirens activated – followed behind.
During the field sobriety tests, which are “designed to determine whether the motorist’s physical
coordination has been affected by the consumption of intoxicating liquor,” Karamychev, 772
A.2d at 808, Officer Griffin observed erratic eye movements, plaintiff failed to walk in a straight
line, and he disobeyed the officer’s instructions. None of these facts are in dispute and, taken
together, they provide a sufficient basis for an officer to reasonably believe that plaintiff was to
some appreciable degree less able to exercise the mental and/or physical judgment necessary to
safely handle an automobile. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff admitted to having consumed
alcohol in any amount provided a sufficient basis for Officer Griffin to believe that the lack of
11
complete judgment was due to the influence of alcohol. 6 The Court, therefore, cannot find that it
was unreasonable for Officer Griffin, under those circumstances, to believe that she had probable
cause to arrest plaintiff for DUI/OWI.
Plaintiff contends that Officer Griffin lacked probable cause for the arrest because his
driving showed no signs of impairment other than the failure to turn on his headlights. Pl.’s Opp.
at 7. (“[I]t stands to reason that the officer would have to have something more than simply not
having headlights on to consider whether a subject is driving under the influence.” ). This
argument overlooks plaintiff’s failure to heed the directive to pull over.
Moreover, the case law makes clear that an officer need not observe lack of control over
the vehicle in order to have probable cause for a DUI or OWI arrest. See Stevenson, 562 A.2d
622, 624 (D.C. 1989) (“Proof of impairment, however, need not be based upon the manner in
which the vehicle was actually operated.”). The two failed sobriety tests were strong evidence of
impairment. In addition, characteristics such as impaired judgment may demonstrate a sufficient
level of impairment. See Anand, 801 A.2d at 957. In fact “judgment problems” is one of the
major categories of “visual cues” for impairment identified in the Metropolitan Police
Department’s DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Student Training Manual
(“Field Sobriety Testing Training Manual”). Ex. 3 to Pl.’s Opp. at V-6. Driving without
headlights at night in the rain, and failing to obey officers certainly show impaired judgment.
Plaintiff also argues that the officers should have considered that he did not demonstrate
many of the signs of intoxication identified in the Field Sobriety Testing Training Manual. Pl.’s
6 Officer Edwards also stated in his deposition that plaintiff had mentioned taking pain
medication, Edwards Dep. at 27:9–11, so there may have been some basis for Officer Griffin to
believe that the lack of judgment was due to drugs or to a combination of alcohol and drugs.
However, this factor is not necessary for the Court’s determination that Officer Griffin is
protected by qualified immunity.
12
Opp. at 7–8. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff claims, the few characteristics
of impairment that he showed do not add up to probable cause for the arrest. Id. But nothing in
the manual indicates that a person must demonstrate all, or even most, of the listed visual cues in
order to satisfy the DUI or OWI standards. See generally Ex. 3 to Pl.’s Opp. And plaintiff has
pointed to no precedent that clearly establishes that any particular number of visual cues must be
observed. The Court is satisfied that the quantity and quality of the visual cues that Officer
Griffin observed, as well as the results of the field sobriety tests, were sufficient to support a
probable cause determination – or, at least, the officer’s reasonable belief that she had probable
cause.
Finally, plaintiff argues that Officer Griffin improperly administered the field sobriety
tests, and he points to the testimony he elicited from another police officer with many years of
experience administering the tests himself. Pl.’s Opp. at 10; Carter Dep., Ex. 7 to Pl.’s Opp.
[Dkt. # 46-7]. Defendants argue that this evidence does not defeat summary judgment because
any challenge to the way in which an officer administers a field sobriety test or interprets the
results must be based upon expert testimony. According to defendants, since plaintiff has not
designated an expert witness to testify on this matter, he cannot succeed in challenging Officer
Griffin’s administration of the tests as a matter of law. 7 Mem. of Points & Authorities in
Support of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 45] (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 10–11; Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s
Opp. to their Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 49] (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 5–6. Plaintiff does not directly
address this argument, but instead asserts that expert testimony is not necessary to show
7 The docket reflects that plaintiff withdrew his designation of Mr. Richard Rutledge, a
former police officer, as an expert witness. Pl.’s Withdrawal of Expert Designation of Richard
Rutledge (Feb. 2, 2012) [Dkt. # 44]; see also Pl.’s Designation of Expert Witnesses [Dkt. # 32] at
1.
13
“whether probable cause existed at the time of an arrest,” which is a different and much broader
inquiry. Pl.’s Opp. at 5.
Expert testimony is required when the subject matter is “beyond the ken of the average
layperson.” Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009). And as defendants point
out, that is the case here. See Defs.’ Mem. at 11. “There is no doubt that the administration of
the [nystalgmus] test and the interpretation of the results are subjects ‘beyond the ken’ of a lay
juror.” Karamychev, 772 A.2d at 811–12. Thus, plaintiff has not supplied the evidence
necessary to succeed in challenging Officer Griffin’s administration of that test.
Plaintiff also argues that Officer Griffin did not administer the walk and turn test properly
because she did not give the correct instructions. For similar reasons, the administration and
interpretation of this test fall beyond the ken of the average lay person. An average person does
not have knowledge of the purpose for each component of the test or of the implications of
different ways that a subject might respond to the test. See Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d
1, 6 (D.C. 1988), quoting District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1273 (D.C. 1987) (“[A]
plaintiff is required to put on expert testimony where the subject presented is ‘so distinctly
related to some science, profession, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average
layperson.”). But even if plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Officer
Griffin administered the walk and turn test incorrectly, that evidence does not give rise to a
dispute of material fact that undermines the Court’s conclusion. Plaintiff does not contest the
fact that he could not complete the heel to toe walk forward and that he failed to follow the
instructions that Officer Griffin gave him. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 2–3. So even if the
instructions Officer Griffin gave did not comport with official protocol, the fact that plaintiff
failed to follow them as given is itself evidence that he might have been impaired. See Field
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Sobriety Testing Training Manual at VI-6 (“Be alert to the driver who . . . cannot follow
instructions.”). Looking at the totality of the circumstances presented to the officer at the time,
then, the Court concludes that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that she had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for driving under the influence.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Officer Griffin’s conduct in ordering the arrest is
protected by qualified immunity.
B. Officer Edwards
The Court also finds that Officer Edwards, who completed the paperwork for the arrest, is
protected by qualified immunity. Although Officer Edwards did not have firsthand knowledge
of all of the circumstances justifying the arrest, 8 it was nonetheless reasonable for him to believe
that he had probable cause under the doctrine of collective knowledge. Under the collective
knowledge doctrine, “[t]here is no requirement that the arresting officer have sufficient firsthand
knowledge to constitute probable cause. It is enough that the police officer initiating the chain of
communication . . . had firsthand knowledge[.]” Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d 359, 361
(D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Barham v. Salazar, 556 F.3d 844, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Henderson, J.,
concurring) (“An officer may rely on another officer’s determination of probable cause to make
an arrest[.]”). Here, Officer Edwards processed the arrest on Officer Griffin’s instructions,
Griffin’s Answers to Pl.’s Interrogs. at 8–9, and Officer Griffin had firsthand knowledge of the
justifications for the arrest. Accordingly, the Court finds that Officer Edwards is properly
protected by qualified immunity.
8 In his deposition, Officer Edwards stated he arrived at the traffic stop while plaintiff was
still in his car, but stood about fifteen feet from the scene, attending to general roadside safety for
all involved and then turned his attention toward processing plaintiff’s papers. Edwards Dep. at
21:15–22:12, 25:13–26:13, 28:16–29:9. According to Officer Edwards, in this role he heard and
observed parts of the traffic stop, but his attention was mostly on the road and on processing
plaintiff’s identification. Id.at 22:13–21, 25:8–30:7.
15
Plaintiff argues that “there was little or no effort to share collective knowledge among the
various officers who interacted with the plaintiff,” Pl.’s Opp. at 8; however, the substance of the
processing papers makes clear that Griffin relayed her observations to Edwards and Edwards
processed the arrest on that basis. Prosecution Report, Ex. 4 to Pl.’s Opp. at 2; Def. Lauren
Griffin Witness Statement, Ex. 5 to Pl.’s Opp. To Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 46-5] at 1;
Gerstein Aff. Officer Edwards, Ex. 14 to Pl.’s Opp. [Dkt. # 46-14] at 1. Plaintiff believes that
Griffin should have shared, and Edwards should have considered, that some signs of intoxication
were not observed. Pl.’s Opp. at 11–13. He also argues that Officer Edwards should have
credited his “own observation (as well as the objective evidence) that Plaintiff was not in any
way impaired[.]” Pl.’s Opp. at 12–13. However, as the Court has already discussed, Officer
Griffin’s observations were sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that probable cause
existed for the arrest, even under the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, the knowledge
that Officer Griffin shared with Officer Edwards was sufficient to establish probable cause for
the arrest, or at least for a reasonable person in Officer Edwards’s position to believe that
probable cause existed. Therefore, Officer Edwards is entitled to qualified immunity for his role
in the arrest.
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III. Defendant Officers Edwards and Hedgecock will be Granted Qualified
Immunity For the Claims Arising from Plaintiff’s Continued Detention after
Receiving a .00 Breathalyzer Result. 9
The next question before the Court is whether the officers are entitled to qualified
immunity for the claim that it was unlawful to arrest the plaintiff after his breathalyzer test
returned a blood alcohol level of .00. While there may have been other equally reasonable paths
to take at that juncture, the law does not invite the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the
officers. Applying the appropriate objective standard, then, the Court finds that it was
reasonable for the officers to conclude that the circumstances remained sufficient to warrant a
reasonable belief that plaintiff had committed a DUI offense, whether those circumstances
actually rose to the level of probable cause or not.
First, the .00 breathalyzer result must be considered together with the facts that led
Officers Griffin and Edwards to arrest plaintiff in the first place. While the breathalyzer test
result is one factor to be added into the probable cause analysis, it did not wipe the slate clean of
the prior information. Gabrou, 462 A.2d at 1104 (“Probable cause for an arrest and detention
constitutes a valid defense to a claim of false imprisonment.”).
So was it unreasonable for the officers to choose not to let the plaintiff go and to continue
their investigation further? At the time of this arrest, the police were operating under a valid
Metropolitan Police General Order that provides that if a roadside breath test returns a reading
lower than .05 and no medical condition exists, “the officer may still make the determination to
9 Plaintiff alleges that Officer Griffin also had no probable cause to continue to detain him
after the return of the breathalyzer result. Pl.’s Opp. at 3. However, since plaintiff has not put
forth any evidence that Griffin was at the station during the breathalyzer test or at the time the
results were returned, plaintiff has provided no basis on which the Court could find that she was
liable for the continued detention. Cf. Pl.’s Opp. at 13, citing Griffin Dep. at 59–60 (“Officer
Griffin testified that after Plaintiff was transported to the Second District Station, she had no
further contact with him and very limited contact with Edwards or Carter, and none with
Hedgecock.”)
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charge the individual with DUI . . . . Such determination is made on the basis of whether or not
the subject’s faculties are so impaired as to prevent the safe operation of a motor vehicle. This
may be determined by the conducting of DUI Psychomotor Tests.” General Order 502-2
(September 25, 1982), Ex. 11 to Pl.’s Opp. [Dkt. # 46-11] at 6. 10 Despite some evidence that
plaintiff did not appear impaired at the time that the breathalyzer results were returned, plaintiff
had already failed the walk and turn test as well as the nystagmus test, he had admitted to
drinking a beer, he had been driving without headlights, and he had driven six blocks followed
by a police car that had lights and sirens activated before pulling to the side of the road. In
addition, the police officers did not simply ignore the .00 result, but rather – as plaintiff himself
acknowledges – they proceeded to administer a urine test. Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs. at 3.
Moreover, plaintiff points to no law indicating that a .00 breathalyzer result is an absolute bar to
a finding of probable cause to detain for DUI.
Accordingly, the Court cannot find that clearly established law existed such that a
reasonable person would have known that there was no probable cause for the officers to
continue processing the arrest. Therefore, whether or not the Court agrees with their decision to
maintain plaintiff under arrest after the breathalyzer test returned a blood alcohol level of .00, the
Court finds that Officer Edwards and Lieutenant Hedgecock are protected by qualified
immunity.
10 In this case the breathalyzer test was not administered until plaintiff had already been
booked, but there is no reason to expect the officers to treat the results any differently than they
would treat a breathalyzer test administered roadside.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that defendants Griffin, Edwards, and
Hedgecock are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will
grant the motion for summary judgment. A separate order will issue.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge
DATE: February 22, 2013
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