Tea Party Leadership Fund v. Federal Election Commission

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
TEA PARTY LEADERSHIP FUND, )
et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 12-1707 (RWR)
)
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
On October 18, 2012, the Tea Party Leadership Fund, an
organization that registered with the Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”) as a political committee on May 9, 2012, Sean Bielat, a
2012 candidate for the United States House of Representatives
from Massachusetts’s 4th Congressional district, and John Raese,
a 2012 candidate for the United States Senate from West Virginia,
brought suit against the FEC alleging that the requirement under
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4),
that a newly registered political committee wait six months
before it can contribute $5,000 per candidate instead of only
$2,500 per candidate violates the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the FEC from enforcing 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a) against the Tea Party Leadership Fund to allow the
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political committee to contribute $5,000 per candidate before the
November 6, 2012 general election.
On October 22, 2012, the parties were ordered to show cause
why the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction should
not be consolidated with a hearing on the merits under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). Rule 65 provides that
“[b]efore . . . the hearing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction, the court may advance the trial on the merits and
consolidate it with the hearing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
This procedural device is designed to conserve judicial resources
and avoid duplicative proceedings. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 747
F. Supp. 760, 768 (D.D.C. 1990), modified, 816 F. Supp. 729(D.D.C. 1993). If the hearings are consolidated, then the trial
on the merits is accelerated given the exigency of the
preliminary injunction. But a court’s “power [to consolidate
hearings] must be tempered by the due process principle that fair
notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given the litigants
before the disposition of a case on the merits.” 11A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2950 (2d ed. 1995).
The plaintiffs oppose consolidating the hearings. They
argue that consolidation “would leave insufficient time” between
the deadline for filing dispositive motions and the general
election on November 6 “to grant adequate relief to Plaintiffs.”
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Pls.’ Resp. to Order to Show Cause at 2. The plaintiffs urge
that time is of the essence because “[i]f this Court does not
make a preliminary ruling on plaintiffs’ claims by November 5,
the opportunity to support [Mr. Bielat, Mr. Raese, and other
candidates], and the ability of these candidates to deploy that
support, will be lost.” Id. at 1–2. The FEC supports
consolidation because it would promote judicial efficiency. Def.
FEC’s Resp. to Ct.’s Order to Show Cause at 2. The FEC also
notes that the plaintiffs “waited more than five months to seek
judicial relief, which they could have sought as early as May
2012” -- when the Tea Party Leadership Fund registered with the
FEC as a political committee -- and filed the instant action just
nineteen days before the general election. Id. at 1 (emphasis in
original). The FEC argues that “[g]iven plaintiffs’ unjustified
delay in filing suit, it is highly unlikely that plaintiffs would
receive meaningful preliminary relief within their desired
timeframe.” Id. at 2.
The plaintiffs’ delay in filing their motion suggests that
they could not realistically have expected relief during this
election cycle. Cf. Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 724-25 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (“[U]ntimely filings may support a conclusion that the
plaintiff cannot satisfy the irreparable harm prong.”) The local
civil rules do not even contemplate that a hearing on a motion
for a preliminary injunction need occur sooner than 21 days after
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the motion is filed. LCvR 65.1(d).1 Since the plaintiffs filed
their motion for preliminary injunction on October 18, 2012, a
hearing could have been held as late as November 8, 2012. Given
that consolidation is in the interests of judicial economy, the
hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction
will be consolidated with a hearing on the merits, and the FEC’s
proposed briefing schedule will be adopted. Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion [1] for a preliminary
injunction be, and hereby is, CONSOLIDATED with a hearing on the
merits under Rule 65(a)(2). It is further
ORDERED that this case shall proceed with the following
deadlines, supplanting the current schedule to complete briefing
on the pending motion for a preliminary injunction:
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion January 11, 2013
Defendant’s opposition and cross-motion February 15, 2013
Plaintiffs’ reply and opposition March 8, 2013
Defendant’s reply March 29, 2013
SIGNED this 2nd day of November, 2012.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge
1
“[A] hearing on an application for preliminary injunction shall
be set by the court no later than 21 days after its filing,
unless the court earlier decides the motion on the papers or
makes a finding that a later hearing date will not prejudice the
parties.” LCvR 65.1(d).