Reed v. Islamic Replublic of Iran

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAREK A. REED, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 03-2657 (RMU)
:
v. : Re Document. No.: 41
:
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff in this matter is Tarek Reed, whose father was abducted, held and tortured
by Lebanese terrorists over the course of three years. The plaintiff brings suit against the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Iran’s Ministry of Information and Security for their support of Hezbollah,
the terrorist group that committed these acts. This matter now comes before the court on the
plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Because the
plaintiff has shown that he is entitled to relief under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the
court grants in part the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Because the plaintiff is not
entitled to relief under state law or international law, however, the court denies in part the
plaintiff’s motion.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In the fall of 1986, Frank Reed was abducted in broad daylight.1 Pl.’s Proposed Findings
of Fact at 2. At the time, he lived in Beirut, a city that – despite its moniker as the Paris of the
Middle East – had already known a decade of civil war. See id. While driving on a public
thoroughfare to see his wife, Reed’s path was cut off by three gunmen. Id. at 5. The gunmen
abducted Reed and threw him into the back of a car, where he was driven to a hideout and
subsequently held in captivity for the next several years. Id.
Immediately after his abduction, Reed’s captors repeatedly interrogated and beat him,
demanding to know if he was an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. at 5. During the
following 1,330 days, Reed was subjected to routine torture. Id. at 6-7. Reed was kept in
shackles and confined in a cell that was so small that he could not stand upright. Id. at 6. His
health deteriorated, in part because his captors prevented him from receiving medical attention.
Id. at 7. Reed was forced to wear a blindfold for so long that he suffered numerous eye
infections. Id. He was subjected to electrocution, arsenic poisoning and countless beatings. Id.
Nevertheless, Reed’s greatest dread – in his words, “the worst thing that could happen to a man”
– was the fear of dying alone. Id., Ex. B. at 113.
Reed’s ultimate fear never came to pass. He was eventually released to a hospital, where
he remained for several months. Id. at 6-7. By the time he was released, it was clear that he was
a changed man. Id. The color had leached from his hair and his meager diet had caused his body
to atrophy. Id. Reed’s doctors were never able to determine whether it was the beatings or the
1
The factual background of Frank Reed’s kidnapping has been recounted by the court in a number
of previous Memorandum Opinions. See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62(D.D.C. 1998); see also Mem. Op. (July 17, 2006); Mem. Op. (Apr. 30, 2007).
2
poisoning that rendered him impotent. Id., Ex. B, at 117. To this day, Reed cannot walk. Id. at
7-8. The repercussions of Reed’s captivity have endured far beyond his release, as he has been
repeatedly re-hospitalized for severe depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome. Id.
The plaintiff was only six years old when his father was kidnapped. Id., Ex. C at 6.
Throughout the years of Reed’s detention, the plaintiff’s mother never told the plaintiff that his
father was kidnapped. Id. In 1989, three years after Frank Reed was abducted, the plaintiff and
his mother left Beirut and resettled in in Malden, Massachusetts. Id. at 13.
When Frank Reed was released from captivity, he promptly returned to the United States
to rejoin his family. Id. at 8. His behavior had changed drastically following his return,
however. Id. at 8-10. He started drinking excessively and rarely left his house. Id. at 14. He
could not walk, run or dance – activities he regularly enjoyed prior to his abduction. Id. at 16.
The plaintiff claims that he was deeply affected by his father’s actions. Id. at 15. Fellow
students in school would taunt him for his father’s increasingly erratic behavior. Id., Ex. L at 7.
The plaintiff suffers from chronic feelings of anger and frustration because of his father’s
condition. Id. at 16. In addition, the plaintiff’s academics were adversely affected by his father’s
return. Id., Ex. M at 3. According to the plaintiff, these academic difficulties affected him
professionally and have limited his career choices. Id. at 9. The plaintiff consumed significant
amounts of alcohol and marijuana while a junior and senior in high school, a time period that
coincided with many of his father’s most severe psychiatric difficulties. Id. at 6. The plaintiff
attended a college part-time, but he dropped out due to chronic depression. Id., Ex. M at 9. The
plaintiff states he continues to hold chronic feelings of helplessness and anger regarding his
father’s situation. Id. at 10.
3
B. Procedural Background
The plaintiff initially filed suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran’s Ministry of
Information and Security (“MOIS”), the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corporation and several
high-ranking Iranian officials in December 2003. See generally Compl. In June 2005, the
plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corporation
and the individual Iranian officials. See generally Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (June 13,
2005).
After the defendants failed to appear or otherwise respond to the plaintiff’s complaint, the
Clerk of the Court entered default in July 2004. See generally Entry of Default (July 15, 2004).
In January 2009, the court granted the plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to bring
his claim under the recently enacted “state-sponsored terrorism” exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.2 See generally 2d Am. Compl. The
Clerk of the Court entered default against the remaining defendants as to the second amended
complaint on April 20, 2010. See generally Notice of Default (Apr. 20, 2010). The plaintiff then
filed a motion for default judgment, seeking judgment against Iran and MOIS for his claims
under federal law, Massachusetts law and international law. See generally Pl.’s Mot. for Default
Judgment (“Pl.’s Mot.”). With that motion ripe for consideration, the court now turns to the
relevant legal standards and the parties’ arguments.
2
The state-sponsored terrorism exception was previously codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). This
provision was repealed and replaced with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A in 2008. Belkin v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18 (D.D.C. 2009).
4
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act presents the exclusive legal vehicle by which a
plaintiff may bring suit against a foreign state. MacArthur Citizens Ass’n v. Republic of Peru,
809 F.2d 918, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The FSIA “envisions a process for litigating against foreign
powers that respects the independence and dignity of every foreign state as a matter of
international law while providing a forum for legitimate grievances.” Murphy v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 778 F. Supp. 2d 70, 71 (D.D.C. 2011). Among other things, the FSIA imposes
numerous procedural hurdles to ensure that domestic courts will not harm foreign interests by
failing to protect the foreign party against the swift entry of default judgments. See Sealift
Bulkers, Inc. v. Republic of Armenia, 965 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D.D.C. 1997). Before addressing the
merits of a plaintiff’s claim, however, the court must first establish that it has personal
jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (2005). The
court therefore turns to the necessary jurisdictional analysis.
1. Personal Jurisdiction
In cases involving default judgment under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists if
effective service of process has been made. 28 U.S.C. 1330(b); Price v. Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002). It is now clear that a plaintiff may
effectively serve Iran in a default judgment case under the procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
1608(a)(4). Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 69-70 (D.D.C. 2010).
Section 1608(a)(4) requires plaintiffs to request that the clerk of the court dispatch two copies of
the summons, complaint and notice of suit (together with a translation of each into the foreign
state’s official language) to the Secretary of State, who then “shall transmit one copy of the
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papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a
certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1608(a)(4); Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52 n.12 (D.D.C. 2008).
Here, the plaintiff has satisfied these requirements by requesting that the clerk of the
court dispatch two copies of the summons, complaint and notice of suit (translated into Farsi) to
the Secretary of State. See generally Certificate of Mailing (Oct. 9, 2009). The clerk of the court
subsequently dispatched these documents to the Department of State, and the Secretary of State
transmitted one copy of the documents to Iran via a diplomatic note through the Embassy of the
Swiss Confederation while returning the other copy to the clerk of the court. See generally
Return of Service & Aff. (April 1, 2010). The court therefore concludes that the plaintiff has
properly served the defendants under § 1608(a)(4), and personal jurisdiction therefore exists.
Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70.
2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The FSIA confers subject-matter jurisdiction against foreign states only in certain limited
circumstances. More precisely, the FSIA grants United States district courts subject-matter
jurisdiction over (1) nonjury civil actions (2) against a foreign state . . . (3) as to any claim for
relief in personam, (4) provided that the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.3 28 U.S.C. §
1330(a); Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
3
In addition, a court only has subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that involve certain types of
acts, including torture, extrajudicial killing, and hostage taking. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii);
id. § 1605A(a)(1). Because the plaintiff’s injury stems from a hostage taking, this matter falls
squarely within the bounds of § 1605A(a)(1).
6
The court is satisfied that the first three prerequisites have been met in the present case.
First, a default judgment proceeding under the FSIA is a nonjury civil action. Croesus EMTR
Master Fund L.P. v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 212 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2002).
Second, Iran is a foreign state. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 64. With regard to defendant
MOIS, the FSIA defines a foreign state to include “a political subdivision . . . or agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). MOIS is a political subdivision of Iran,
and it may be treated as a state for the purpose of liability under the FSIA. See Oveissi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2010); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 61 (D.D.C. 2003).
Third, as discussed supra Part III.A., the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant as legal persons. Therefore, this is an action in personam, rather than in rem.
Peterson, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70. The fourth element requires further discussion, which is
provided below.
Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine which generally dictates that foreign
states may not be sued in U.S. courts. See Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction
over Foreign States: The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in
Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 377 (2001); Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 133-35 (1812). The contours and scope of this common-law doctrine have been
statutorily codified by the FSIA. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278, 2284 (2010). Under the FSIA’s conception of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a
foreign state is “presumptively immune” from suit. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355
(1993); see 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
7
The FSIA nevertheless contains certain enumerated provisions that strip foreign states of
this immunity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607. Relevant here is the “state-sponsored terrorism”
exception, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Under this provision, sovereign immunity is
waived only if: (1) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism both at the
time of the act and the time when the claim is filed; (2) the claimant is a national of the United
States; and (3) the claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate
the claim, provided that the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim is brought.
Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
The plaintiff’s claim satisfies each of these conditions. First, the FSIA defines a “state
sponsor of terrorism” as “a country the government of which the Secretary of State has
determined . . . is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.” Id. § 1605A(h)(6). Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since
1983. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 2836 (Jan. 23, 1984)). Iran still holds
this designation. 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d).
Second, the plaintiff was a national of the United States at all times relevant to this
action. The prerequisites to United States citizenship are laid forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1401. The
plaintiff is the child of one United States citizen and one alien. Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact
at 13. To be considered a United States national in these circumstances, the plaintiff must first
be physically present in the United States for a period of five years, with at least two years after
he attained the age of fourteen. Id. § 1401(g). The plaintiff was born in Beirut in 1980; he
moved to Massachusetts in 1989, where he has lived ever since. Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact
at 13. Because the plaintiff has been physically present in the United States for more than
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twenty-two years, (seventeen of which elapsed after he reached the age of fourteen), the court is
satisfied that plaintiff is a national of the United States.
Third, the plaintiff is not required to afford the defendants an opportunity to arbitrate his
claim. The FSIA requires that a claimant extend the foreign state an opportunity to arbitrate his
or her claim, but this is only true if the defendant’s acts occurred in the foreign state against
which the claim is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). Here, the plaintiff’s father was
taken hostage in Lebanon, not Iran. Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact, Ex. B at 5-6. Because the
offending act did not occur in the foreign state against which the claim is brought, the plaintiff is
not required to afford the defendants an opportunity to arbitrate his claim. See Valore, 700 F.
Supp. 2d at 68 (holding that the FSIA’s third element was satisfied because the plaintiff was
harmed in an attack that occurred in Lebanon, not Iran).
Because all three conditions have been met, the court determines that sovereign immunity
poses no bar to the plaintiff’s claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). Accordingly, the
court concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim.
B. The Court Grants in Part and Denies in Part the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Default Judgment
1. Legal Standard for Default Judgment Under the FSIA
Under the FSIA, a court cannot simply enter default judgment; rather, out of respect for
the principle of sovereign immunity, it must ensure that the plaintiffs have established their claim
or right relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e); Taylor v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 2011 WL 3796156, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2011). Courts are therefore bound
by a duty to scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations, and courts may not unquestioningly accept a
complaint’s unsupported allegations as true. Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d
9163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010). In FSIA default judgment proceedings, the plaintiff may establish proof
by affidavit. Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2002).
2. The Court Grants in Part the Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Because the
Defendants’ Acts Would Trigger Liability for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress
The plaintiff argues that he is entitled to default judgment against the defendants because
their acts would give rise to liability for the common-law tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”). Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact at 22.
The FSIA created a uniform standard of liability by “distilling general principles of
common law liability and infusing them into a comprehensive federal cause of action.” Beer v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 2010 WL 5105175, at *12 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2010). Accordingly, a
plaintiff proceeding under the FSIA must show that the defendants’ acts would give to liability if
viewed through the lens of tort law. Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
An act that would otherwise constitute IIED gives rise to liability under the FSIA. See
Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 774 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2010). The defendants’
acts would give rise to an IIED claim if it (1) engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (2)
which was directed at persons other than plaintiffs (3) which intentionally or recklessly caused
severe emotional distress, but not necessarily bodily harm, (4) to such persons’ immediate family
members. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.4
4
Courts assessing the extent of liability under the FSIA generally turn to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts as an interpretive aide. See Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26
(D.D.C. 2009) (“Heiser II”); see also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 78-80 (D.D.C. 2010). The
Restatement also indicates that a plaintiff may not recover for IIED if they were not physically
present to witness the harm done; nevertheless, other members of this court have concluded that
this requirement is inapplicable for the purposes of the FSIA. Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27;
Valencia, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 14. This is because “the function of the presence requirement – to
ensure that a plaintiff actually suffered a high degree of emotional distress – is, in state-sponsored
10
The court is satisfied that the plaintiff has established each of the necessary elements of
an IIED claim. First, an act of terrorism, such as the kidnapping and torture of Frank Reed, is by
its very nature considered extreme and outrageous conduct. Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Acts of terrorism are by their very definition extreme and
outrageous . . . .”). Indeed, terrorism’s very raison d’etre is its “intent to create maximum
emotional impact,” particularly on third parties. Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000).
Second, this act was directed at the plaintiff’s father. Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact at
23. Because the act was directed at someone other than the plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover
for IIED. Heiser II, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
Third, the court concludes that Iran and MOIS intentionally caused the terrorist act by
giving material support and resources to Hezbollah for the kidnapping of Frank Reed. In
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a member of this court concluded that Iran caused the
terrorist attack at issue here by supplying Hezbollah with resources and material
support. 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68 (D.D.C. 1998). This court takes judicial notice of the
factual findings in Cicippio and reaches the same conclusion. See Taylor, 2011 WL
3796156, at *11 (observing that courts may take judicial notice of factual conclusions that are
reached in related cases).
Fourth, the plaintiff meets the immediate family requirement because he is the son of
Frank Reed. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (concluding that one’s “immediate family” includes
one’s spouse, parents, siblings and children). The court therefore concludes that the defendants’
terrorism cases, fulfilled by the horrific and terrifying nature of terrorism itself . . . .” Valencia,
774 F. Supp. 2d at 14. The court is inclined to agree and thus concludes that the Restatement’s
“presence requirement” need not be met in this case.
11
acts would give rise to tort liability for IIED. Because the defendants’ acts would give rise to
tort liability, the court concludes that Iran and MOIS must be held liable for the plaintiff’s injury
under the FSIA. Valencia, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14.
3. The Court Grants the Plaintiff Compensatory Damages for His Economic Damages,
Solatium and Pain and Suffering
The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, economic damages and prejudgment interest.5
See generally Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact at 26-30. The FSIA allows a plaintiff to recover
“economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” § 1605A(c); Valore,
700 F. Supp. 2d at 83. To obtain damages, the plaintiff must prove that the consequences of the
defendants’ acts were reasonably certain to occur, and they must prove the amount of damages
by a reasonable estimate. Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also
Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 83. For the reasons discussed above, the court readily concludes that
emotional distress was reasonably certain to occur to the plaintiff when his father was abducted
and tortured during his formative years. The court thus turns its attention to the plaintiff’s
estimate of his entitlement to damages.
5
The plaintiff also asserts that the FSIA recognizes or incorporates a separate cause of action for
solatium. Pl.’s Mot. at 23-24. Solatium is defined as “the mental anguish, bereavement and grief
that those with a close personal relationship to a decedent experience . . . as well as the harm
caused by the loss of the decedent[’s] society and comfort.” Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 78. The
FSIA defines solatium as a measure of damages, however, not as an independent cause of action.
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c); see also Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d
27, 37 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that § 1605A “clearly contemplates solatium recovery as a measure
of damages, not as an independent cause of action”). The court therefore elects to recognize the
plaintiff’s solatium claim as a component of the defendants’ damages. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at
85; Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 27 n.4.
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i. The Plaintiff Is Entitled to $2.5 Million in Compensatory Damages for Solatium and for
Pain and Suffering
The plaintiff argues that a child whose parent has been abducted is entitled to an award of
$1 million for each year that the parent was held hostage. Id. Because the plaintiff’s father was
held hostage for 1,330 days (approximately 3.65 years), the plaintiff seeks compensatory
damages of $3.65 million for solatium and pain and suffering. Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact at
27.
The court is faced with an undeniable difficulty when asked to quantify the distress that
results when a loved one is taken away. The court does not write on a blank slate, however;
several other members of this court have faced this daunting task, and their efforts have
established a framework to assist in the adjudication of these and similar claims. See Heiser v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 271-359 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Heiser”). Under the
Heiser framework, a spouse, child, or sibling may receive $4 million, $2.5 million and $1.25
million, respectively, for valid claims in which the family member survived the terrorist act. Id.The framework has gained strong precedential support as other members of this court have
repeatedly continued to follow it in FSIA cases. See, e.g., Brewer, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58;
Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 27 n.4; Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107,
113 (D.D.C. 2000); Eisenfeld, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11; Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999
F. Supp. 1, 29-32 (D.D.C. 1998).
Because the court is cognizant of the fact that it must “take pains to ensure that
individuals with similar injuries receive similar awards,” Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
515 F. Supp. 2d 24, 54 (D.D.C. 2007), the court elects to adopt the Heiser framework. Under
this framework, the plaintiff, a child of the victim, is entitled to $2.5 million in compensatory
13
damages. See Heiser, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 356-57. Accordingly, the court concludes that the
plaintiff is entitled to $2.5 million in compensatory damages.
ii. The Plaintiff Is Entitled to $2,035,000 in Economic Damages
The plaintiff also seeks $2,035,000 in economic damages to account for the plaintiff’s
diminished earning capacity. Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact at 28. The plaintiff has submitted
expert testimony from Steven A. Wolf, a forensic economist, who calculated the plaintiff’s total
lifetime lost wages and benefits to be approximately $2,035,000 in its present-day value. See
generally id., Ex. M (“Wolf Report”). The plaintiff puts forth evidence to show that these lost
wages and benefits are a result of his emotional distress, his chronic depression and the self-
destructive behavior that was triggered by his father’s kidnapping and subsequent behavior. See
id. at 28-29.
The report of a forensic economist may provide a reasonable basis for determining the
amount of economic damages in an FSIA case. See Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (following a
forensic economic expert’s report in awarding $376,848 in economic damages). In this case, the
Wolf Report bases its damages calculations on reasonable and well-founded assumptions,
factoring in reasonable wages and benefits that the plaintiff might have earned over the course of
his lifetime. Wolf Report at 9-10. The court therefore concludes that the plaintiff has proven to
a reasonable certainty that he is entitled to $2,035,000 in economic damages.
iii. The Plaintiff is Entitled to an Award of Prejudgment Interest
The plaintiff also seeks an award of prejudgment interest on his compensatory damages
award. Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact at 29-30. “[C]ourts in this Circuit have awarded
14
prejudgment interest in cases where plaintiffs were delayed in recovering compensation for their
injuries – including, specifically, where such injuries were the result of targeted attacks
perpetrated by foreign defendants.” Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 530 F.
Supp. 2d 216, 263 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 24; cf. Oveissi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30 n.12 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying prejudgment interest in
light of an award that exceeded the Heiser framework’s valuation). It has taken the plaintiff
nearly a decade to pursue this suit against those who perpetrated his father’s abduction. Because
of the nature of the plaintiff’s loss and the considerable delay that is necessary to secure
judgment, the court concludes that prejudgment interest is appropriate in this case. See Pugh,
530 F. Supp. 2d at 263. The prejudgment interest will be computed at a rate of six percent per
annum on a simple interest basis from the date of the kidnapping (September 9, 1986) to the
present. See Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
4. The Court Denies the Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Inasmuch as It Seeks
Relief Under State Law and International Law
The plaintiff also seeks default judgment for causes of action arising under state law and
international law. See Pl.’s Mot. at 21. Prior to its amendment in 2008, the FSIA merely acted
as a federal conduit for a plaintiff’s state law or foreign law claims. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at
57. Stated otherwise, the FSIA previously conferred federal jurisdiction over claims that a
plaintiff had shown to be meritorious under state law or foreign law. Id. Congress amended the
FSIA to provide “a uniform federal standard designed to hold rogue nations accountable for their
promotion of terrorist acts.” In re Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 85; see also Belkin, 667 F.
Supp. 2d at 21. Since then, § 1605A provides an exclusive cause of action under federal law.
Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58. By enacting this provision, Congress intended to preempt
15
other channels for relief and to displace the varied and inconsistent causes of action that were
previously cognizable under state and foreign law. Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (“By providing
for a private right of action and by precisely enumerating the types of damages recoverable,
Congress has eliminated the inconsistencies that arise in these cases when they are decided under
state law.” (quoting Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65-66 (D.D.C. 2008))).
In following the intent of Congress, therefore, the plaintiff’s state law and international
law claims must be dismissed. See Beer, 2010 WL 5105174, at *9 (“Permitting FSIA plaintiffs
to bring state law causes of action under § 1605A would nullify Congress’ expressed purpose
and largely undermine the sea-change effected by the enactment of [§ 1605A]. Plaintiffs thus
may not proceed with their state law claims in this action.”). Accordingly, the court denies in
part the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment inasmuch as it seeks relief under state and
international law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiff’s motion
for default judgment. In sum, the court awards the plaintiff $4,535,000, plus prejudgment
interest of six percent annually. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is
separately and contemporaneously issued this 28th day of February, 2012.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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