Daigle v. Karnes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RALPH LEO DAIGLE,
Petitioner,
v. Civil Action No. 10-1264 (HHK)
JAMES A. KARNES,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on initial consideration of petitioner’s pro se Amended
Petition for Emergency Writ of Habeas Corpus. The petition will be denied.
Petitioner alleges that, “[o]n or about June 1, 2010, James Thomas McBride[’s] liberties
commenced to be restrained and is on going to this day[] by RESPONDENT, who is or
represents a ‘CORPORATION for Profit”, holding a natural man . . . against His will, over His
objection, and without His consent[.]” Pet. ¶ 2 (capitalization in original). Petitioner demands
Mr. McBride’s immediate release from custody. See id. at 4.
“Three inter-related judicial doctrines – standing, mootness, and ripeness, ensure that
federal courts assert jurisdiction only over ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Worth v. Jackson, 451
F.3d 854, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A party has standing if his claims “spring from an ‘injury in
fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest that is ‘concrete and particularized,’ ‘actual or
imminent’ and ‘fairly traceable’ to the challenged act of the defendant, and likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision in the federal court.” Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998
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(D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). “[T]he injury
alleged cannot be conjectural or hypothetical, remote, speculative, or abstract.” Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Here, petitioner articulates no legally protected interest of his own;
rather, he purports to bring this action on Mr. McBride’s behalf. Although he may represent
himself as a pro se litigant, petitioner is a lay person who is not qualified to appear in this Court
on behalf of another person. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d
831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Standing may be denied where, as here, this pro se litigant seeks to
assert the rights of a third party. See Navegar, Inc., 103 F.3d at 998.
Even if petitioner had standing to bring this action, this Court cannot entertain a
challenge to the legality of Mr. McBride’s custody. Habeas actions are subject to jurisdictional
and statutory limitations. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). The
proper respondent in a habeas corpus action is the warden. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,
434-35 (2004); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Chatman-Bey v.
Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1988)), who is identified as Sheriff Karnes of
Columbus, Ohio. “[A] district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving present
physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction.” Stokes v.
U.S. Parole Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
HENRY H. KENNEDY, JR.
United States District Judge
DATE: August 21, 2010
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