Robertson v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TRACIE ROBERTSON, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 09-1188 (RMU)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 8
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
amended complaint. The plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the estate of an individual who
committed suicide while in the custody of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department (“MPD”). The plaintiff has asserted § 1983 claims against the District of Columbia
(“the District”) and MPD Chief Cathy Lanier based on alleged violations of the decedent’s Fifth
and Eighth Amendment rights, as well as common law claims against these defendants for
wrongful death and negligence. The defendants assert that the plaintiff has failed to state a §
1983 claim against them because the plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the District or
Chief Lanier acted with deliberate indifference to the decedent’s constitutional rights. The
defendants further contend that absent these § 1983 claims, the court should decline to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. For the reasons discussed
below, the court grants the defendants’ motion, dismissing certain claims with prejudice and
other claims without prejudice.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On May 5, 2008, Shantee Parker (“the decedent”) was arrested and taken to the MPD’s
Fourth District Precinct. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. While in custody, the decedent was placed alone in a
cell without a working camera where she committed suicide by hanging herself. Id. ¶ 12. The
plaintiff alleges that even though the decedent “exhibited many signs of distress, disorientation
and confusion” at the time she was brought into custody, “none of the personnel at the 4th
Precinct[] properly monitored [the] decedent or assured that she was not placed in an
environment where instruments that could be used in a suicide attempt were [] available.” Id. ¶
8. The plaintiff also alleges that “the defendants had previously encountered [the] decedent and
were well aware of the decedent’s mental health frailties, including suicidal tendencies, long
before May 5, 2008.” Id. ¶ 6.
The plaintiff commenced this action on behalf of the decedent’s estate in the Superior
Court for the District of Columbia. See generally Compl. On June 29, 2009, the defendants
removed the case to this court, and on September 8, 2009, the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint. See generally id.; Am. Compl. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff asserts claims
against the District and against Chief Lanier in her official and individual capacities. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 4-5. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants deprived the decedent of her Fifth and
Eighth Amendment rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by failing to provide detainees like
the decedent with necessary protection and treatment and by failing to properly train and
supervise MPD personnel. Id. ¶¶ 23-32. In addition, the plaintiff asserts common law wrongful
death and negligence claims against the defendants. Id. ¶¶ 18-22, 33-36. On September 18,
1
Because this matter is before the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must treat the
complaint’s factual allegations, including mixed questions of law and fact, as true and draw all
reasonable inference therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor. Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36,
39 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
2
2009, the defendants filed this motion to dismiss the amended complaint. See generally Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss. The defendants contend that the amended complaint fails to state a claim for
relief under § 1983, and that without those claims, the court lacks an independent basis for
exercising jurisdiction over the remaining common law claims. Id. at 1-2. With the defendants’
motion now ripe for adjudication, the court turns to the applicable legal standards and the parties’
arguments.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Dismisses the Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Under Rule 12(b)(6)
1. Legal Standard for Dismissal Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The complaint need only set forth a short and plain
statement of the claim, giving the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which
it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Such simplified notice
pleading is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48(internal quotation marks omitted). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of
his prima facie case in the complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002),
or “plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory,” Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d
134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3
Yet, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 562 (2007) (abrogating the oft-quoted language from Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, instructing
courts not to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that “no set of
facts in support of his claim [ ] would entitle him to relief”). A claim is facially plausible when
the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must treat the complaint’s factual
allegations – including mixed questions of law and fact – as true and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. While many well-pleaded
complaints are conclusory, the court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by facts set
out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Warren v. Dist. of
Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
2. Legal Standard for Claims Under § 1983
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
4
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim “must allege both (1) that he was deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the defendant
acted ‘under color of’ the law of a state, territory or the District of Columbia.” Hoai v. Vo, 935
F.2d 308, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).
3. The Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Premised on the Eighth Amendment
The defendants contend that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims premised on violations of the
decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights must be dismissed because the Eighth Amendment does
not apply to pretrial detainees like the decedent. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 6. The defendants are
correct. The Eighth Amendment applies only to individuals who are being punished, and thus
does not protect those against whom the government has not “secured a formal adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). Thus,
“the [Eighth] Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees.” Powers-Bunce v. Dist. of
Columbia, 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 536 n.16
(1979)); accord Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1992) (observing that “[a]
pretrial detainee does not enjoy protection of the Eighth Amendment”). Accordingly, the court
dismisses with prejudice the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims based on alleged violations of the
decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights.
4. The Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Premised on the Fifth Amendment
The defendants assert that the plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim for a Fifth
Amendment violation against the defendants. Defs.’ Mot to Dismiss at 5-13. First, the
defendants assert that insofar as the plaintiff has sued Chief Lanier in her official capacity, such
claims must be dismissed because they duplicate the claims asserted against the District. Id. at
5
18. Furthermore, the defendants argue that the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against Chief
Lanier and the District must be dismissed because the plaintiff has failed to adequately allege
that either defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” as necessary to state a claim under §
1983.2 Id. at 6-7. The plaintiff responds that by alleging that the defendants were aware of the
decedent’s suicidal tendencies, that the decedent exhibited signs of potential suicide that would
have been apparent to a properly trained officer and that the defendants acted “with deliberate
indifference,” the amended complaint satisfies the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Pl.’s Opp’n
at 3-7. The plaintiff also maintains that Chief Lanier may be sued in her official capacity. Id. at
8.
a. The Plaintiff’s Claims Against Chief Lanier in Her Official Capacity
The plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against Chief Lanier in her official capacity
require little discussion. “A § 1983 suit for damages against municipal officials in their official
capacities is . . . equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself.” Atchinson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,
733 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that official capacity claims against officials allegedly responsible
2
The defendants also argue that even if the plaintiff had stated a § 1983 claim against Chief Lanier,
that claim would be barred because Chief Lanier would enjoy qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss at 13-17. Although qualified immunity should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage
in litigation,” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001), as discussed below, the court
dismisses with prejudice the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against Chief Lanier in her
official capacity and dismisses without prejudice the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against
Chief Lanier in her individual capacity for failure to state a claim. See infra Part III.A.4.a-b.
Although the plaintiff may seek to revive her individual capacity claims against Chief Lanier by
remedying the deficiencies in her pleading, at present, the factual averments underlying any such
claim are too unformed for the court to conduct a qualified immunity analysis. See Powers-
Bunce v. Dist. of Columbia, 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 158 (D.D.C. 2007) (concluding that the
plaintiff’s factual averments were too vague and conclusory for the court to conduct a meaningful
analysis of the individual defendants’ qualified immunity and directing the plaintiff to provide a
more definite statement of her claim); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (observing that the
qualified immunity inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as
a broad general proposition”). Accordingly, the court does not reach the issue of qualified
immunity and grants the defendants leave to renew their motion to dismiss on this grounds if the
plaintiff seeks to revive her individual capacity claims against Chief Lanier.
6
for an inmate’s suicide could not be sustained under § 1983); Hardy v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 F.
Supp. 2d 182, 191 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing claims brought against government employees in
their “official capacities” as redundant to those brought against the District of Columbia);
Powers-Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (stating that Ҥ 1983 claims against municipal officers in
their official capacities are equivalent to suits against the municipality itself and are typically
dismissed as repetitive”). Because the District of Columbia is already a party to this suit, the
plaintiff’s claims against Chief Lanier in her official capacity are redundant to the claims against
the District. Accordingly, the court dismisses those claims with prejudice.
b. The Plaintiff’s Claims Against Chief Lanier in Her Individual Capacity
Although the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, those detainees are
subject to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against punishment “without due process of law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 536 n.16. Courts have held that this Fifth
Amendment protection is “at least as great as” that afforded prisoners under the Eighth
Amendment, and thus, they generally analyze Fifth Amendment claims brought by pretrial
detainees under the same standards governing Eighth Amendment claims brought by prison
inmates. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that
“when the § 1983 claim is based on a jail suicide, the degree of protection accorded a detainee is
the same that an inmate receives when raising an inadequate medical attention claim under the
Eighth Amendment”); Barber, 953 F.2d at 235 (noting that “the Eighth Amendment rights of
prisoners are analogous to pretrial detainees’ [due process rights]”); see also Powers-Bunce, 479
F. Supp. 2d at 153 (employing an Eighth Amendment analysis to assess the plaintiff’s Fifth
Amendment claim that officials’ denial of medical care to a pretrial detainee who committed
suicide violated the decedent’s constitutional rights).
7
In cases involving the denial of medical care or the failure to prevent harm, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits officials from acting with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or
safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); accord Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976). For a plaintiff to state a claim that an individual acted with deliberate indifference to
the rights of a pretrial detainee, the plaintiff must “allege that officials had subjective knowledge
of [a] serious medical need and recklessly disregarded the excessive risk to inmate health or
safety from that risk.” Baker v. Dist. of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
“[B]ecause deliberate indifference requires the official to have subjective knowledge of the
substantial risk of harm, the D.C. Circuit has held that supervisory liability cannot be applied
‘absent any allegation that the supervisor in question had actual or constructive knowledge of
past transgressions or that the supervisors were aware of clearly deficient training.’” Hardy, 601
F. Supp. 2d at 191 (citing Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F. 2d 1245, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see
also Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that “[a]
supervisor who merely fails to detect and prevent a subordinate’s misconduct . . . cannot be
liable for that misconduct” because to be liable, “the supervisor[] must know about the
conduct”).
Although the amended complaint states that Chief Lanier was “responsible for the day to
day operations of the [MPD] and assuring that [MPD] police officers were properly trained,”
Am. Compl. ¶ 11, it contains no allegation that Chief Lanier was aware of any deficiencies in the
training or supervision of MPD personnel, much less any deficiencies in training with respect to
suicidal or mentally ill detainees, see generally id. Nor does the complaint contain any
allegation that Chief Lanier knew that MPD personnel were failing to take the precautions
necessary to ensure the safety of such detainees. See generally id.8
Indeed, the only allegations in the complaint that even remotely touch upon Chief
Lanier’s subjective knowledge are the allegations (1) that staffing and equipment deficiencies at
the Fourth District Precinct “that placed both detainees and police officers in immediate danger
. . . had been brought to the attention of the defendants,” id. ¶ 7, and (2) that “the defendants had
previously encountered [the] decedent and were well aware of the decedent’s mental health
frailties, including suicidal tendencies,” id. ¶ 6. Yet even if Chief Lanier had been aware of
staffing and equipment deficiencies at the Fourth District Precinct, there is nothing in the
complaint to suggest that she knew that these deficiencies posed a substantial risk of harm to
potentially suicidal detainees like the decedent. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (stating that for an
official to act with deliberate indifference “the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
that inference”). Furthermore, even if Chief Lanier was subjectively aware of the decedent’s
suicidal tendencies, the plaintiff’s claims against Chief Lanier are premised not on her direct
involvement in the decedent’s detention, but rather on her purported failure to train and supervise
MPD personnel and to ensure that potentially suicidal detainees receive adequate care and
protection. See generally id. The allegation that Chief Lanier was subjectively aware of the
decedent’s mental illness and suicidal tendencies would not establish that she was aware of any
deficiencies in training, supervision or procedures that endangered potentially suicidal detainees.
In sum, absent any allegation that the Chief Lanier was subjectively aware of any
deficiencies in training, supervision or measures to ensure the safety of detainees like the
decedent, the complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against Chief Lanier for a Fifth Amendment
violation. Cf. Hardy, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against officials within the D.C. Department of Corrections because the
9
complaint contained allegations indicating that these individuals were aware of the substantial
and unreasonable risk to detainee and inmate safety at the D.C. Jail). Because, however, the
plaintiff may be able to remedy the deficiencies in this claim with additional factual allegations,
the court dismisses the claim without prejudice.3 See Jarrell v. U.S. Postal Serv., 753 F.2d 1088,
1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (observing that “dismissal with prejudice should be granted only when a
trial court determines that ‘the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading
could not possibly cure the deficiency’” (quoting Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320, 322 (9th
Cir. 1962))).
c. The Plaintiff’s Claims Against the District of Columbia
A municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only if the municipality “itself is
responsible for an unconstitutional deprivation of rights.” Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 420 (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). Thus, in
considering whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, “the
district court must conduct a two-step inquiry.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. “The court must
determine [1] whether the complaint states a claim for a predicate constitutional violation,” and
if so, “the court must determine [2] whether the complaint states a claim that a custom or policy
of the municipality caused the violation.” Id.; accord Warren, 353 F.3d at 38 (noting that
“[r]espondeat superior does not apply” to claims of constitutional violations asserted against
municipalities). Causation may be established by showing that “the municipality or one of its
policymakers explicitly adopted the policy that was ‘the moving force of the constitutional
violation.’” Warren, 353 F.3d at 39 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Or the municipality
3
In attempting to revive her claims against Chief Lanier, however, the plaintiff must bear in mind
that although she need not provide detailed factual allegations, her complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10
may not have responded to a need . . . in such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to
the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations.” Id. (quoting Baker,
326 F.3d at 1306) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiff identifies two policies or customs that allegedly support the District’s
municipal liability under § 1983. First, the plaintiff asserts that the District maintained a policy
or custom of failing to train correctional officers to provide detainees such as the decedent with
adequate mental health screening and evaluation. Am. Compl. ¶ 25. Second, the plaintiff alleges
broadly that the District maintained a policy or custom of failing to provide detainees like the
decedent with protection and treatment. Id. ¶¶ 25, 30.
Turning first to the plaintiff’s failure to train claim against the District, the court notes
that “a city’s inaction, including its failure to train or supervise its employees adequately,
constitutes a ‘policy or custom’ under Monell when it can be said that the failure amounts to
‘deliberate indifference’ towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain.” Daskalea v.
Dist. of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388-89 & n.7 (1989)); accord Powers-Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (citing Dorman v.
Dist. of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). “Deliberate indifference is determined
by analyzing whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional
violations, but did not act.” Warren, 353 F.3d at 39 (quoting Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This standard “involves more than mere negligence,” and “it does not
require the city to take reasonable care to discover and prevent constitutional violations. It
simply means that, faced with actual or constructive knowledge that its agents will probably
violate constitutional rights, the city may not adopt a policy of inaction.” Id.11
This Circuit discussed the pleading standards applicable to a § 1983 claim against a
municipality for inadequate training in Atchinson v. District of Columbia. See Atchinson, 73
F.3d at 422-23. The plaintiff in Atchinson had asserted a § 1983 claim against the District after
an MPD officer shot him in broad daylight moments after the officer had ordered the plaintiff to
freeze. Id. at 419. The District’s purported liability rested on its failure to properly train the
officer in the use of deadly force. Id. at 422. The Circuit first concluded that the plaintiff had
adequately alleged the existence of a municipal policy or custom “by alleging both a failure to
train and an unusually serious instance of misconduct that, on its face, raises doubts about a
municipality’s training policies.” Id. at 422-23. The Circuit then held that the complaint
adequately pleaded deliberate indifference on the part of the District, stating that “the
complaint’s use of the phrase ‘deliberate indifference’ without ‘any facts, or even generalized
factual allegations’ regarding such alleged indifference” did not render the complaint inadequate
because Rule 8 “permit[s] a plaintiff simply to allege a state of mind without providing any
factual basis for that allegation.” Id. at 423; accord Warren, 353 F.3d at 39-40 (concluding that
conclusory allegations of actual or constructive knowledge were sufficient to state a § 1983
claim against the District).
Relying on Atchinson, the plaintiff asserts that she has stated a § 1983 claim against the
District, noting that she has alleged an instance of misconduct, inadequate training and
“deliberate indifference” on the part of the District. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-7. Yet the portion of
Atchinson holding that a plaintiff adequately pleads “deliberate indifference” simply by invoking
the phrase in his or her complaint appears to have been superseded by the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The plaintiff in Iqbal was a Pakistani citizen detained as a person of
interest following the September 11 terrorist attacks. 129 S. Ct. at 1943. He asserted a Bivens
12
claims4 against the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, alleging that they had violated his First and Fifth Amendments by adopting
detention policies that discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of his race, religion or
national origin. Id. at 1944. The Supreme Court noted that to succeed on his claim, the plaintiff
was required to plead and prove that the defendants acted “with discriminatory purpose.” Id. at
1948. Furthermore, the Court noted that to state a claim against the defendants, that “the
complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of
classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of the race, religion, or
national origin.” Id. at 1953 (emphasis added). Because the complaint was devoid of facts
suggesting that the defendants implemented the detention policies at issue based on an
impermissible motive, the Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief
could be granted. Id. at 1953-54 (observing that allegations of mental state cannot be alleged as
a conclusion but must be supported by sufficient factual content).
Although the plaintiff in this case alleges that the District acted with deliberate
indifference in failing to train its officers, the complaint contains no facts suggesting that the
District knew or should have known of any deficiencies in the training of its officers with respect
to potentially suicidal detainees. See generally Am. Compl. Accordingly, the complaint fails to
state a § 1983 claim against the District based on improper training of MPD officers.
The plaintiff’s more general claim that the District maintained a policy or custom of
failing to provide adequate care to potentially suicidal detainees suffers from the same defect.
As with the failure to train claim, the complaint contains no facts indicating that the District
knew or should have known of any deficiencies in the treatment or care provided to potentially
4
As the Iqbal Court noted, Bivens actions are the “federal analog” to suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
13
suicidal detainees like the decedent. See generally Am. Compl. These deficiencies require
dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the District. See Ibrahim v. Dist. of Columbia,
357 F. Supp. 2d 187, 195-96 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the
District under Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiff failed to allege that District officials knew or
should have known of the risk that his constitutional rights would be violated); see also Warren
v. Dist. of Columbia, 2006 WL 2568014, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2006) (granting summary
judgment to the District because the plaintiff had failed to “set forth any facts from which a
reasonable juror could find that the District of Columbia knew or should known about the
alleged . . . violations”); cf. Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 514 F. 3d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(holding that the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to hold the District liable under § 1983 because
he claimed that he filed numerous grievances and that “the District of Columbia sat idly by while
the plaintiff[’s] serious medical needs were ignored after plaintiff had informed them of his
medical needs”); Smith v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 674 F. Supp. 2d 201, 207 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding
that the plaintiff properly pleaded that a corporate detention facility knew or should have known
of the risk that he would be provided inadequate medical care through factual allegations
concerning complaints and grievances about such medical care that the court could reasonably
infer were passed on to the corporation); Brown v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 603 F. Supp. 2d 73, 80-81
(D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the District knew or should
have known of sexual harassment at a D.C. detention facility because she alleged that such
harassment was commonplace and that the district court had previously found that sexual
harassment was the “standard operating procedure” at the Department of Corrections).
Accordingly, the court dismisses the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the District without
prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
14
B. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the Plaintiff’s Common
Law Wrongful Death and Negligence Claims
The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s remaining common law claims for wrongful
death and negligence should be dismissed because absent the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the court
lacks an independent basis for exercising jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Defs.’ Mot. at
19-20. The plaintiff does not contest this argument. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court that has original jurisdiction in a civil action
“shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). A district court has the discretionary authority, however, to decline to exercise
jurisdiction over supplemental claims when it has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3). In determining whether to retain or dismiss supplemental state
law claims, “the district court is to be ‘guided by consideration of the factors enumerated in 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c).’” Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 424 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing
Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Assoc., 48 F.3d 1260, 1266 (D.C. Cir.1 995)).
Furthermore, district courts are to consider the § 1367(c) factors within the framework of
“judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Edmondson & Gallagher, 48 F.3d at
1266. “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are dismissed before trial, the balance
of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine – judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity – will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.” Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 423-24 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)).
In light of the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims under § 1983, the plaintiff’s amended
complaint contains no further federal causes of action over which this court has original subject
matter jurisdiction. See generally Am. Compl. Further, the court concludes that the balance of
15
the factors under § 1367(c) weighs in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s state law claims. First, because the court has yet to invest substantial time and
resources on the state law claim, judicial economy does not favor retaining jurisdiction over
these common law claims. See Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 423-24. Moreover, there are no reasons
apparent to the court that dismissal will inhibit or prejudice the plaintiff’s ability to re-file the
state law claim in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia because the statute of
limitations for supplemental state law claims is tolled “while the claim is pending and for a
period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d). Thus, the court dismisses without prejudice the plaintiff’s wrongful death and
negligence claims. See Kingman Park Civic Assoc. v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of pendent state law claims after the federal claims
were resolved in favor of the defendant).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismisses certain of the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and
dismisses the remainder of the plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. An Order consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 16th day of August,
2010.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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