Hunt v. Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
MARLA HUNT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 03-900 (RWR)
)
DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Marla Hunt sued DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.
(“DePuy”), manufacturer of her prosthetic hip, for breach of
implied warranties, breach of express warranty, and replevin.
DePuy filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted with
respect to all of Hunt’s claims except for replevin, and now
moves again for summary judgment on the replevin claim. Because
Hunt’s abandonment of the prosthetic hip components is a complete
defense to her replevin claim, DePuy’s motion for summary
judgment will be granted.
BACKGROUND
The background of this case is discussed fully in Hunt v.
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2009).
Briefly, Hunt had hip replacement surgery in 1994 and required
repairs to the prosthetic hip, manufactured by DePuy, five years
later. Id. at 24-25. The surgeon who repaired Hunt’s hip in
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1999, Dr. Paul Manner, gave the defective hip prosthesis
components to a DePuy sales representative to take back to the
company and informed Hunt after the surgery that DePuy was in
possession of the components. (Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp.
of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. as to Pl.’s Replevin Claim (“Def.’s
Mem.”), Ex. A, Hunt Dep. at 149:1-5; Ex. B. at 6.) After four
years elapsed, Hunt requested the return of the hip components by
filing this claim for replevin. Hunt, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
DePuy has filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
hip is valueless and that Hunt abandoned the hip. (Def.’s Mem.
at 1-2.)
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment may be granted when “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66
(D.C. Cir. 2009). A court considering a motion for summary
judgment must draw all “justifiable inferences” from the evidence
in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The nonmoving party, however, must do more
than simply “show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the nonmovant
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must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks
and emphasis omitted). In the end, “the plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Replevin is an action “brought to recover personal property
to which the plaintiff is entitled, that is alleged to have been
wrongfully taken or to be in the possession of and wrongfully
detained by the defendant[.]” D.C. Code § 16-3701. While the
D.C. Court of Appeals has never held explicitly that abandonment
of personal property is a defense to a replevin action, it has
held that “[a]bandonment of personal property is a complete
defense to an action for conversion.” Block v. Fisher, 103 A.2d
575, 576 (D.C. 1954). The “essence” of both a replevin action
and a conversion action is the “wrongful withholding of the
property in question.” Mac’Avoy v. Smithsonian Inst., 757 F.
Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C. 1991). Because a defendant cannot
wrongfully withhold property that the plaintiff has abandoned,
abandonment must also serve as a complete defense to a replevin
action. Accord Graff v. Triple B Dev. Corp., 622 S.W.2d 755, 756
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(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (“Abandonment, if proved, is a complete
defense to an action for replevin and precludes recovery.”).
To prove abandonment, a party must demonstrate both an
intent to abandon and an act or omission that effectuates the
intention. Block, 103 A.2d at 576. Determining the intent to
abandon is a fact-intensive inquiry. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA,
216 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
Here, Dr. Manner turned over the defective prosthetic hip
components to a DePuy sales representative after Hunt’s surgery.
Hunt argues in her brief that “[a]s a practical matter the
defendant would have seemed to have been a safe repository for
the appliance and plaintiff had no reason to request its return
until such time as she sought redress from the defendant for its
promotion and sale of the defective component[.]” (Pl.’s Opp’n
at 5.) However, she presents no discovery materials, affidavits,
or declarations reflecting specific facts showing her intent that
DePuy hold the components for safekeeping until she requested
their return in 2003. The facts in the record show the opposite.
Hunt knew right after her surgery that DePuy had taken possession
of the components. She neither voiced any objection nor asked
for the return of the components nor asked that DePuy’s
possession be temporary. During the four years that went by
after DePuy took possession of the components, Hunt never asked
for them back, and there is no evidence that she sought assurance
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of their safekeeping. The facts support only the inference that
Hunt abandoned the property. See Block, 103 A.2d at 576 (finding
that appellant abandoned property he left in appellees’ yard for
eight months). DePuy is therefore entitled to summary judgment
on the replevin claim.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed material facts demonstrate that Hunt
abandoned the components. That provides a complete defense
against her replevin claim, and entitles DePuy to judgment as a
matter of law. Accordingly, DePuy’s motion [58] for summary
judgment will be granted. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SIGNED this 4th day of August, 2010.
__________/s/_______________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge