Smith v. Cafe Asia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
ANDREI SMITH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 07-0621 (RWR)
)
CAFÉ ASIA, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Andrei Smith brings this action against his former
employer, defendant Café Asia, for sexual harassment and
discrimination based on sexual orientation in violation of the
D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), and for assault and battery.
Smith has moved to amend his complaint by adding several
defendants and counts of sex discrimination and negligent
supervision, and to extend and enlarge discovery. Because Smith
has shown good cause to amend, and defendant has not shown that
Smith’s amended complaint is futile, but not all of the discovery
sought is warranted, Smith’s motion will be granted in part and
denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Smith filed this action against Café Asia, his previous
employer, alleging claims of sexual orientation discrimination in
violation of the DCHRA and assault and battery. (Compl. at
¶¶ 28-35.) Smith’s allegations were based upon incidents that
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occurred during his employment as a host and waiter with Café
Asia between September 18, 2005 and the end of 2006. (Id. at
¶¶ 5-6.) Smith alleged that he has been subjected to verbal and
physical assaults by other employees, that Case Asia’s management
was made aware of the assaults, and that Café Asia’s management
did not remedy the situation. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-27.)
Smith has moved to add six individual defendants, to add the
corporate defendant that operates through the trade name Café
Asia, and to add two additional counts: one count of sex
discrimination in violation of the DCHRA against each defendant,
and one count of negligent supervision. He also seeks to extend
the discovery period and to be allowed to take 13 more
depositions, including those of the seven added defendants. Café
Asia opposes Smith’s motion, arguing among other things1 that
1
The defendant argues that Smith failed to comply with
Local Civil Rule 7(m) which provides, in relevant part:
Before filing any nondispositive motion in a civil
action, counsel shall discuss the anticipated motion
with opposing counsel, either in person or by
telephone, in a good faith effort to determine whether
there is any opposition to the relief sought, and, if
there is opposition, to narrow the areas of
disagreement. . . . A party shall include in its
motion a statement that the required discussion
occurred, and a statement as to whether the motion is
opposed.
The purpose of Rule 7(m) is to promote the resolution of as
many litigation disputes as possible without court intervention,
or at least to create an opportunity for the parties to narrow
the disputed issues that must be brought to the court. U.S. ex
rel. Ellipso v. Mann, 460 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2006).
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Smith’s proposed amendment is futile, and that Smith’s motion to
file an amended complaint was untimely and that it would
unjustifiably delay discovery and trial.
DISCUSSION
A plaintiff is allowed to amend his complaint after an
answer has been filed “only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “If the
underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may
be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an
opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Undue delay, undue prejudice to the
defendant, or futility of the proposed amendment(s) are factors
that may warrant denying leave to amend. Atchinson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The defendant has
the burden of showing why leave to file an amended complaint
should not be granted. LaPrade v. Abramson, Civil Action No.
97-10 (RWR), 2006 WL 3469532, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2006).
Courts generally consider the relation of the proposed amended
According to Café Asia’s counsel, the parties’ “entire ‘meet and
confer’ [regarding this motion] is contained in the e-mails”
attached to Café Asia’s opposition. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 1.)
However, Smith’s counsel asserts that she “had a full
conversation” about this motion with one of Café Asia’s
attorneys, demonstrating that she complied with Rule 7(m) and
that the parties had an opportunity to narrow the remaining areas
of dispute. (Pl.’s Reply at 1.)
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complaint to the original complaint, favoring proposed complaints
that do not “radically alter the scope and nature of the case.”
Miss. Ass’n of Coops. v. Farmers Home Admin., 139 F.R.D. 542, 544
(D.D.C. 1991); see also Childers v. Mineta, 205 F.R.D. 29, 32-33
(D.D.C. 2001).
I. FUTILITY
Defendant argues that Smith’s proposed amended complaint
would be futile because the individual defendants cannot be held
liable for discrimination under the DCHRA.2 An amendment is
futile “if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to
dismiss.” James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.
Cir. 1996). A claim will not survive a motion to dismiss if it
fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1965 (2007). A complaint must contain factual allegations
that “‘possess enough heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled
to relief.’” Amore v. Accor. N. Am., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 85,
94-95 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966). In
addition, the court does not have to accept asserted inferences
or conclusory allegations that are unsupported by the facts set
2
While defendant also argues that Smith failed to allege
that any of the additional defendants committed assault or
battery against Smith, the proposed amended complaint clearly
alleges that defendant Abu Bakar and “many members of the kitchen
staff” committed multiple batteries against Smith (see Am. Compl.
at ¶¶ 16, 18), and brings the claim of assault and battery
against only the corporate defendants and Bakar.
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forth in the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994). The decision to grant or deny leave to amend
is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; James Madison, 82 F.3d at 1099.
The DCHRA provides, in relevant part:
(a) General. -- It shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice to do any of the following
acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason
based upon the actual or perceived . . . sex [or]
sexual orientation . . . of any individual:
(1) By an employer. -- To . . . discriminate against
any individual, with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . .[.]
D.C. Code § 2-1402.11. The DCHRA defines “employer” as “any
person who, for compensation, employs an individual . . . [and]
any person acting in the interest of such employer, directly or
indirectly . . . .” D.C. Code § 2-1401.02.
Liability under the DCHRA may be imposed against individuals
in certain circumstances when they meet the definition of
“employer.” Purcell v. Thomas, 928 A.2d 699 (D.C. 2007) held
that the “text and purpose of the DCHRA” and case precedent do
not “preclude a claim against individual and supervisory
employees involved in committing the allegedly discriminatory
conduct[.]” Id. at 715 (citing Wallace v. Skadden Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998); Mitchell v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 213, 241 (D.D.C. 2005); and
Macintosh v. Bldg. Owners & Mgrs.’ Ass’n, 355 F. Supp. 2d 223-6-
(D.D.C. 2005)). Although defendant argues that none of the
additional defendants Smith seeks to add can be classified as
employers, the amended complaint alleges that the additional
individual defendants were managers who perpetrated, who
witnessed and failed to stop, or to whom Smith complained without
success about, the discriminatory acts. Smith argues moreover
that the facts alleged regarding these supervisory management
employees reflect that they acted in the interest of their
employer and that they could be individually liable under the
DCHRA definition of employer. (Pl.’s Reply at 6-8.) Whether the
disputed facts will or will not show that the individual
employees fit that definition is not to be resolved at this
stage, and the defendant has not shown that the amendment to the
complaint would be futile.
II. PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT
Defendant also argues that allowing Smith to amend the
complaint would result in prejudice to the defendant by extending
discovery and prolonging the case. A motion to amend may be
denied where a defendant would have to conduct additional
discovery and a plaintiff has filed an untimely motion to amend
without demonstrating a good reason for the delay.
Hollinger-Haye v. Harrison Western/Franki-Denys, 130 F.R.D. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1990). To determine if the threat of prejudice to the
opposing party is great enough to warrant denying leave to amend,
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courts consider “‘the hardship to the moving party if leave to
amend is denied, the reasons for the moving party failing to
include the material to be added in the original pleading, and
the injustice resulting to the party opposing the motion should
it be granted.’” Childers, 205 F.R.D. at 32 (internal citations
omitted).
Here, Smith asserts that he failed to include the additional
claims in his original complaint because the law regarding
personal liability under the DCHRA was unclear before the opinion
was issued in Purcell,3 and the evidence involving the
allegations regarding “disparate treatment as to the handling of
complaints on the basis of sex” was not discovered until after
the original complaint was filed. (Pl.’s Reply at 5-6.) Smith
also would bear significant hardship if his motion to file an
amended complaint were denied because the statute of limitations
would preclude Smith from bringing the claims of sex
discrimination in a subsequent action. See D.C. Code
§ 2-1403.04(a) (one year limitation period for claims of
discrimination under the DCHRA). Smith’s motion appears to be
made in good faith, and the hardship that Smith would bear if
amendment is denied outweighs the burden that defendant would
suffer if amendment is granted. However, Smith’s request to take
3
The original complaint was filed on February 21, 2007,
while Purcell was decided on July 26, 2007.
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13 additional depositions is unsubstantiated. Smith fails to
identify who the six additional non-defendant witnesses are, why
he needs to depose them, and why he did not do so before. Nor
has he justified his failure to depose the bulk of the new
individual defendants before now, most of whom were known to him
and named in the original complaint, or the new corporate
defendant whose identity was revealed as soon as the defendant
removed this case from the Superior Court. See Notice of Removal
at 1. He does not rebut defendant’s assertion that instead, he
used most of his allotted depositions to depose tangential staff
who did not even witness the acts complained of. (See Def.’s
Opp’n at 7-8.) The discovery deadline will be extended, and
Smith may propound written discovery to the new defendants, but
he will be allowed to take only two additional depositions.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because the defendant has not shown why leave to amend
should not be granted, Smith will be allowed to amend his
complaint and conduct limited additional discovery. Accordingly,
it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion [48] for leave to file an
amended complaint and to modify the scheduling order be, and
hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Leave is granted
to amend. The Clerk shall file the Amended Complaint [#48-2]
nunc pro tunc to February 21, 2007. It is further
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ORDERED that the deadline for all discovery closing is
extended to April 22, 2009. The number of additional depositions
to which plaintiff shall be limited is two. The post-discovery
status conference shall be held on April 24, 2009 at 9:45 a.m.
SIGNED this 20th day of February, 2009.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge