Diggs v. Potter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
KEITH B. DIGGS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 05-1112 (EGS)
v. )
)
JOHN E. POTTER, )
POSTMASTER GENERAL )
)
Defendant. )
)
_______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Keith B. Diggs is an African-American male
formerly employed by the United States Postal Service (“the
Postal Service,” “USPS,” or “the agency”). He claims that his
employer discriminated against him on the basis of his race,
gender, age, and disability, retaliated against him for
complaining about that discrimination, and subjected him to a
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”).
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s
claims. Upon consideration of the motion, the response and reply
thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, the Court
GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff began working for the Postal Service on February
14, 1987. He was working as a Tractor-Trailer Operator, Full
Time, Motor Vehicle Craft before he sustained an occupational
injury that rendered him incapable of performing the duties of
that position. From May 20, 1997 until April 20, 1998, plaintiff
was on leave due to this injury, and he received workers’
compensation through the U.S. Department of Labor Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”). (Pl. Opposing Facts
[“Pl. Facts”] at 3.) In March, 2008, he provided USPS with
documentation from his health care provider that he could return
to work subject to certain limitations. As a result, on April
17, 1998 the USPS offered plaintiff a limited duty rehabilitation
1
Unless otherwise noted, these facts are drawn from
defendant’s statement of material facts and were not disputed by
plaintiff. The Court notes that plaintiff has not complied with
Local Civil Rule 7(h). While plaintiff provides a few record
citations in his statement of material facts, he overwhelmingly
fails to include “references to the parts of the record relied on
to support the statement” as required by Rule 7(h). See generally
Pl. Opposing Facts [Doc. 56-2]. A district court “is under no
obligation to sift through the record . . . in order to evaluate
the merits of [a] party's case.” Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson,
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Rather, consistent with Rule 7(h), a court determining whether to
grant summary judgment may rely on the parties’ separate
statements of material facts and the record material they
reference, and may “treat as admitted all facts not controverted”
by competent evidence in the statement of genuine issues filed in
opposition to the motion. See Waterhouse v. District of Columbia,
298 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
2
job offer.2 (Pl. Att. 1, Ex. 7 (Memo from K. McGovern to K.
Diggs.))
Plaintiff accepted the rehabilitation job offer. He
returned to work on April 25, 1998 in the position of full-time
Modified Mail Processor at the Curseen-Morris Processing and
Distribution Facility (“P&DC”) in Washington, D.C..
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges multiple claims
arising from eight years of alleged discrimination and harassment
by his superiors from 1998, when he returned to work at the
Postal Service, until his employment was terminated in 2006.
Pending before the Court are the events underlying five separate
administrative complaints, two decisions from an EEO
Administrative Judge, and three decisions from the EEO’s Office
of Federal Operations. This opinion considers, and resolves, all
of plaintiff’s underlying claims.
A. Plaintiff’s Medical Conditions
As set forth above, plaintiff suffered an occupational
injury in May 1997 that rendered him incapable of performing his
2
As this Court has explained, “for workplace injuries, the
Postal Service offers ‘limited duty’ assignments . . . because
the Federal Employees Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8101et seq., requires that federal employees injured on the job be
compensated for their injuries, and the Secretary of Labor
requires that the Postal Service make special efforts to employ
those injured employees, who will otherwise be compensated for
doing nothing. The [OWCP] administers the FECA and is required
to provide for limited duty jobs to accommodate employees with
compensable job-related injuries.” Franklin v. Potter, 600
F.Supp.2d 38, 58 n.7 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
3
duties as a motor vehicle operator. On March 13, 1998,
plaintiff submitted to USPS a Duty Status Report (Form CA-17).
This form is used by OWCP “to assess whether an employee who has
suffered a work-related injury can be accommodated with limited
duties that do not interfere with the employee’s medical
restrictions.” Smith v. U.S. Postal Service, 36 Fed. Appx. 440,
444 (Fed. Cir. 2002). On or about March 27, 1998, he submitted a
Work Restriction Evaluation Form (Form OWCP-5). Both forms were
signed by Barbara A. Shaver, CRNP (Certified Registered Nurse
Practitioner). Nurse Shaver diagnosed plaintiff with a herniated
disc. (Pl. Att. 1, Ex. 19d (CA-17, Mar. 11, 1998).) She
described her clinical findings as “pain in back radiating to
right leg.” (Id.) Nurse Shaver also diagnosed plaintiff with
degenerative joint disease in his right knee. (Id.) She stated
that plaintiff had been totally disabled until March 16, 1998,
and that he was able to resume work, but would have a partial
disability from March 16, 1998 to September 16, 1998. Nurse
Shaver further determined that plaintiff could resume work for
eight hours per day subject to, inter alia, the following work
restrictions: intermittently sit and walk eight hours, squat,
kneel and stand four hours, lift up to 20 pounds, climb and twist
two hours, push and pull up to 30 pounds. Nurse Shaver concluded
that plaintiff was permanently unable to drive a tractor trailer.
4
(Pl. Att. 1, Exs. 19d and 19o (Shaver Evals. Mar. 11, 1998 and
Mar. 27, 1998).)
As a result of his workplace injury and the documentation
plaintiff presented, the Postal Service offered plaintiff a
limited duty assignment. Specifically, on April 17, 1998, the
USPS extended plaintiff a Rehabilitation Job Offer with the
following duties: “employee will be required to start equipment,
clear jams that don’t require hand tool, and notify maintenance
of machinery malfunction. Employee will clear mail from bins,
and place in trays, and load letter mail onto ledge to be
processed through machinery.” (Pl’s Att. 1, Ex. 7.) This job
offer was determined to be “within the following medical
limitations: Employee is able to intermittently sit and walk
eight hours, squat, kneel and stand four hours. Employee is able
to lift up to 20 pounds, climb and twist two hours.” (Id.)
Later in 1998, Dr. Steven Taub evaluated plaintiff following
a flare-up of symptoms after he stooped to light fireworks on
July 4, 1998. (1998 Report on Investigation (“1998 ROI”) Exs.
19A-C (Taub Consult Oct. 6, 1998).)3 He diagnosed plaintiff
“with known . . . disc disease causing low back problems,” and
advised that “bending, stooping, lifting, twisting, and excessive
3
The record in this case contains three EEO Reports on
Investigation (“ROI”): 1998, 2000 and 2006. The ROIs contain the
EEO’s case files for plaintiff’s EEO complaints. They are
referenced throughout as “1998 ROI”, “2000 ROI”, and “2006 ROI”.
5
sitting can exacerbate the condition.” (Id.) Dr. Taub advised
plaintiff to “try to change his posture frequently with sitting
no longer than 15 minutes at a time and no excessive bending,
twisting or lifting.” (Id.) Dr. Taub did not evaluate plaintiff
for specific functional capabilities. (Id.)
Plaintiff submitted a Duty Status Report (CA-17) to the USPS
EEO Office in May 2003. (Pl. Att. 4, Ex. 6 (Form CA-17, Exam
Date Mar. 25, 2003, signed May 20, 2003).) He was specifically
evaluated for his ability to perform the qualifications of
Automation Mail Processor. Form CA-17 lists the usual work
requirements for the position, and requires the employee’s
medical provider to state whether the employee can perform these
duties. Plaintiff could perform most, but not all, of the usual
work requirements for Automation Mail Processor. He could (1)
lift 20 pounds intermittently for eight hours; (2) stand
intermittently for four hours; (3) walk intermittently for four
hours; (4) perform simple grasping continuously for eight hours;
and (5) perform fine manipulation, including keyboard skills, as
required by the position. (Id.) He could only sit
intermittently for four hours, however, while the position calls
for eight, and he could not perform any above-the-shoulder work
while the position calls for four hours of intermittent reaching
above the shoulder. (Id.)
6
The 2003 CA-17 form also indicated that plaintiff could
perform a number of tasks in addition to those required for the
Automation Mail Processor position. Specifically, plaintiff
could climb, kneel, bend/stoop, twist, pull/push, drive a
vehicle, operate machinery, work in temperature extremes and high
humidity, and work with chemicals, solvents, fumes, dust, and
noise for some or all hours during the workday. (Id.)
Plaintiff submitted one additional Form CA-17 to USPS on
December 1, 2005. (Pl. Att. 3, Aff A. p. 27 of 39 (Duty Status
Report, signed Nov. 21, 2005, date-stamped Dec. 1, 2005).) The
2005 CA-17 indicates that plaintiff could return to work as of
May 20, 2003. (Id.) The 2005 CA-17 also cleared plaintiff to lift
20 pounds intermittently for eight hours per day, to climb,
perform simple grasping, fine manipulation, driving a vehicle,
operate machinery, work in temperature extremes and high
humidity, and work with chemicals, solvents, fumes, dust, and
noise. (Id.) The form contains no information regarding
plaintiff’s ability to, inter alia, stand, sit, walk, kneel,
twist, push, or pull.4 (Id.)
4
The only other evidence in the record regarding
plaintiff’s medical condition appears in plaintiff’s EEO
Investigative Affidavit dated June 27, 2006. The plaintiff
describes his physical condition as of June 2006 (after the
events at issue in his Complaint) as follows:
My disabilities are two permanent partial impairments
Left Foot Great Toe, Right Knee [...] severe arthritic
condition, same as toe left foot, which affects my
7
B. Plaintiff’s Workplace Complaints
1. Events of 1998: Sick leave or Leave Without Pay,
the Snow Arbitration Award.
From approximately April through December 1998, plaintiff
was assigned to the position of a Modified Mail Processor at the
PD&C. Plaintiff did not, however, work this entire time; he was
absent from work from June 30 through July 20, 1998. During that
time he received payment of $1,448.83 for work related injuries
from OWCP. These payments were intended to cover plaintiff’s
entire absence in June and July. Both USPS and OWCP prohibit
employees from receiving sick leave payments from the Postal
Service while accepting payments from OWCP.
Plaintiff contacted USPS on at least two occasions during
this period to notify the Agency he would be absent from work.
On July 5, 1998, plaintiff called in and requested 40 hours of
leave for the week of July 5 - 11, 2008. Plaintiff states that
he requested leave without pay (“LWOP”) for the week, however his
request was noted as “sick leave” on the leave slip the Postal
Service generated for his absence. (Pl. Att. 1, Ex. 1 (Form
walking, running . . . I cannot work above my head and
shoulders, walking, running I can’t run anymore, I
can’t lift any weight greater than at least 25 pounds.
Nor can I play Football, Basketball, swing baseball
bats because of injuries. Walking and sitting are my
major problems, for any extended time.
(Pl. Att. 4 (Aff. A pp. 11-12 of 39.))
8
3971, Request for or Notification of Absence, Jul. 5-11, 1998).)
Several USPS employees signed the request and John Grier, an
Attendance Control Supervisor at the P&DC, ultimately approved
it. (1998 ROI p. 17, Aff. of John Grier.) Grier did not
personally take plaintiff’s July 5, 1998 phone call. (Id.) He
believed that plaintiff had requested sick leave, and approved
the request, “based on the information given on the Form 3971,
leave slip, that was taken when [plaintiff] called in.” (Id.)
Plaintiff contacted USPS again to request 48 hours of leave
without pay for the following week -- July 12 - July 19, 1998.
(Pl’s. Att. 1. Ex. 1 (Form 3971 Jul. 12-19, 1998).) This time,
because the USPS recorded his request as LWOP, it was routed to
the Postal Service’s Injury Compensation office instead of
Attendance Control.5 Injury Compensation Specialist Toni Grier
approved plaintiff’s July 12 - 19 application for LWOP. (Id.;
see also 1998 ROI, p. 14, Aff. of Toni Grier.) Toni Grier has
handled all of plaintiff’s OWCP claims since 1997. (Pl. Facts at
4.)
Plaintiff returned to work on July 22, 1998. (Pl. Facts at
3.) Upon his return, plaintiff “saw the [July 5] slip[] was
5
Sick and annual leave is based on approval from a
supervisor, whereas leave for a work-related injury “has to be
either leave without pay, IOD [injured on duty] or COP
[continuation of pay]. Those are the only . . . forms of leave
that the injury compensation office handles.” (Def. Deposition
Excerpts (“Def. Deps.”) Toni Grier Dep. 43-44, Mar. 28, 2008.)
9
wrong, [and] indicated in his own handwriting ‘comp injury’ on
the leave slip for July 5, 1998.” (Id.) He did not, however,
change the two instances on his Form 3971 which indicated that he
had taken sick leave for that week. (Pl. Ex. 1 (Form 3971 Jul.
5-11, 1998).) Plaintiff signed the July 5 leave slip on July 22,
1998, and was paid for 40 hours of sick leave for that week. On
December 10, 1998, the OWCP notified plaintiff that he had been
overpaid because he had been compensated for sick leave during
the week of July 5, 1998 while he was also being compensated by
OWCP. (1998 ROI, Ex. 2, p. 26.) Accordingly OWCP sought return
of its money.
Two days after returning to work, on July 24, 1998, USPS
changed plaintiff’s job status from full-time regular to part-
time flexible, with an effective date retroactive to April 25,
1998. This change in status was the result of the settlement of
an arbitration decision (the “Snow Arbitration Award”) between
the American Postal Workers Union (“APWU”) and USPS management.
The settlement agreement, dated July 18, 1998, provided that all
employees who were reassigned when they were partially recovered
from an on-the-job injury after 1994 would be converted to part-
time flexible employees. Therefore, on July 24, 1998,
plaintiff’s status was changed to part-time flexible along with
all other employees in this group.
10
A few months later, the APWU and the Postal Service agreed
to amend their settlement agreement and remove the requirement
converting full time employees to part-time flexible status.
Accordingly, on December 1, 1998, plaintiff was returned to full-
time status retroactive to April 25, 1998. Plaintiff was
credited for any salary and leave diminutions while he was in
part-time status.
Plaintiff requested EEO counseling on August 31, 1998. He
alleged that the agency placed him on sick leave instead of LWOP
from July 5 - 11, 1998 and changed his status from full-time to
part-time flexible based on race, sex, age, retaliation, and
disability discrimination.6 He filed a formal EEO complaint on
November 2, 1999. (1998 ROI p. 90 (Partial Acceptance/Partial
Dismissal of a Formal Complaint, Mar. 28, 2000).)
2. The Events of 1999: Disputes over Sick Leave and
Limited Duty Status.
Plaintiff continued to work in a “limited duty” assignment
in 1999, however, he was reassigned to work as a Mail Processor
in the V Street Annex, Return to Sender Unit (a different
facility than the P&DC). Plaintiff’s new duties were described
6
Plaintiff previously filed several discrimination claims
against the Postal Service regarding events not encompassed in
this case. (Pl. Facts at 3.) Toni Grier knew about plaintiff’s
prior complaints because he told her about them in a meeting on
April 20, 1998. (Id.) Grier was not involved in plaintiff’s
leave request for the week of July 5, 1998, however, nor was she
involved in changing his job status from full-time regular to
part-time flexible. (1998 ROI p. 14 (Aff. of T. Grier).)
11
as manual distribution of letters within restrictions, including:
“no bending, twisting or stooping, no sitting longer than 15
minutes. Needs to sit at a low case.” (2000 ROI p. 11 (Aff. of
Deborah Boston (“Boston Aff.”)).)
Plaintiff’s limited duty assignment stemmed from his on-the-
job injury in 1997, which, as discussed above, was approved by
OWCP and the USPS and assigned claim number XX-XXXXXXX. In
August 1998, plaintiff filed an additional claim with OWCP
seeking a determination that he sustained another compensable on-
the-job injury: a mental and emotional injury caused by stress
due to harassment at work. (1998 ROI, Ex. 12 p. 53 (Jun. 10,
1999 letter from OWCP to plaintiff.)) This claim was assigned
number 25-50529977.
On June 10, 1999, the Department of Labor issued a ruling
denying plaintiff’s stress and harassment claim - number 25-
50529977. (Id.) The USPS Injury Compensation office received a
copy of OWCP’s denial and, as it does with all denied claims,
informed the appropriate operations managers of the denial.
Specifically, on July 13, 1999, Senior Injury Compensation
Specialist Natalia Goddard sent a memo to Operations Managers
Darryl Martin and Edgar Gramblin entitled “Denied Claim by the
Department of Labor”. (Pl. Att. 11 (Jul. 13, 1999 Memorandum to
D. Martin and E. Gramblin from N. Goddard.)) Goddard’s
memorandum stated “the attached ruling from the Department of
12
Labor is provided for your information and or action . . . The
following actions may be necessary: [...] Ensure that employee is
not on limited duty. . . . If you have any questions please
contact Toni Grier.” (Id. (emphasis in original)) The
memorandum contained no mention of plaintiff’s existing worker’s
compensation claim for his back injury, claim number XX-XXXXXXX.
Upon notification that plaintiff’s OWCP claim had been
denied, Operations Manager Gramlin believed that plaintiff was
able to perform his regular clerk duties and no longer needed
limited duty assignment. (Pl. Att. 1, Aff. D (Aff. of Edgar
Gramblin, Oct. 31, 2000 (“Gramblin Aff.”)).) Gramblin did not
know that plaintiff had more than one OWCP claim and plaintiff
did not immediately inform him otherwise. Indeed, at that time
Gramblin did not know plaintiff, nor was he aware of his previous
EEO activity. (Id.)
Believing plaintiff was no longer eligible for limited duty,
Gramblin reassigned plaintiff from his limited duty position at
the V Street Annex to a regular duty assignment at the P&DC.
(Id.) Plaintiff refused to perform his regular duty assignment.
As a result, he was suspended and advised he could provide
information to request a light duty assignment, which employees
may receive for non-workplace injuries. (Id.) After
approximately two days, plaintiff returned with documentation to
show he had two OWCP claims, only one of which had been denied.
13
He was immediately returned to his limited duty job. Plaintiff
filed a grievance with his union over his suspension. He
prevailed in his grievance, and about a month after his
suspension, the Agency paid him for the 19.42 hours he had been
suspended.
Notwithstanding OWCP’s June 10, 1999 denial of plaintiff’s
on-the-job injury related to stress (claim number 25-50529977),
in August 1999 plaintiff submitted three requests for LWOP
because of stress and cited the already-denied claim number –
25-50529977. (Pl. Att. 1, Exs. 14, 15a, 15b (Forms 3971, Aug.
11, Aug. 12 and Aug. 13, 1999).) None of these requests were
approved. (Id.)
On September 9, 1999, plaintiff submitted a request for
three hours of sick leave (not LWOP, as he had in August) and
cited his other OWCP claim number - XX-XXXXXXX - which related to
his back injury and had been approved in 1997. This leave
request form was initially received, as all leave slips are, by
the USPS office of absence control. (Pl. Att. 10 (T. Grier Dep.
at 31.)) The absence control office routed the leave slip to the
injury compensation office where it was handled by Toni Grier,
who handles all injury compensation claims for employees whose
last names begin with D through I. (Id.) Grier checked the
“disapproved” box on the leave request, and wrote “no meds on
file.” (Pl. Att. 1, Ex. 15e (Form 3971, Sept. 12, 1999).)
14
However, because plaintiff requested sick leave, the Injury
Compensation Office should not have processed the leave request
in the first instance. “To request sick leave, an employee
merely had to have the leave available and make the request on
the appropriate form . . . . There is no requirement that any
employee have any medical information on file in order to qualify
for or request sick leave.” (Pl. Opp. at 20.) Grier admitted
her error, explaining: “I should never have signed the sick
leave slip. Sick leave . . . should be approved or disapproved
by the supervisor, not by injury comp . . . leave for an injury
has to be either leave without pay, IOD, or COP. Those are the
only [] forms of leave that the injury compensation office
handles.” (Def. Deps., T. Grier Dep. at 43-44; see also Pl. Ex.
1, p. 14 (T. Grier Aff. Oct. 11, 2000) (“I do not normally take
action on leave requests of this nature; it was an oversight that
I did in this instance.”).)
Once Grier had processed her “batch” of leave slips,
including the slip for plaintiff, she “put them back in the
envelope and sent them to Time and Attendance [or] absence
control. And then . . . someone else would disburse them to the
supervisors.” (Pl. Ex. 10, (Grier Dep. at 31-32).) Because
Grier denied plaintiff’s request for sick leave, the agency
treated it as a request for annual leave. Plaintiff did not
have any annual leave accrued, thus, the Agency placed him in
15
LWOP status for three hours. As a result, he lost three hours’
pay.
Plaintiff requested EEO counseling on September 28, 1999,
alleging that both the two-day suspension in July and the sick
leave denial in September constituted unlawful discrimination
based on retaliation for his prior EEO activity and disability.
He filed a formal complaint on December 14, 1999. (1998 ROI p.
96 (Partial Acceptance/Partial Dismissal of a Formal Complaint,
Feb. 22, 2000).)
On June 3, 2003, the EEO consolidated plaintiff’s two claims
regarding the events of 1998, as set forth in Section A above,
with his two claims regarding the events of 1999. On March 31,
2004, an EEO Administrative Judge (“AJ”) granted the Agency’s
motion for summary judgment on all four of the claims, finding
that plaintiff “failed to adduce any evidence that the conduct
complained of was based on . . . his race, sex, age, disability
or prior protected activity.” (Def. Att. 2a.) The AJ further
found that “the Agency articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its action[s],” which plaintiff “failed
to rebut [or] . . . proffer any evidence of pretext.” (Id.)
USPS issued its final agency decision on May 25, 2004
implementing the decision of the A. (Def. Att. 2b.) Plaintiff
appealed to the EEO Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”). On
December 5, 2005, the OFO issued a decision affirming the
16
Agency’s final action. The OFO found that no “reasonable fact
finder could draw an inference of race, sex, age and disability
determination or reprisal regarding the actions of the agency,”
and that plaintiff “failed to present evidence that any of the
agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus toward
[plaintiff’s] protected classes.” (Def. Att. 3, p. 6.)
3. The Events of 2000: May 3, 2000 Overtime Dispute.
Plaintiff’s complaint contains one allegation of unlawful
treatment in 2000: denial of an overtime opportunity on May 3,
2000.
The Postal Service awards overtime “when employees are
needed to work before or after their work schedule and also when
employees are needed to work on the[ir] non-schedule[d] workdays
based on the mail volume.” (Pl. Att. 2, Aff. C (Aff. of William
Darryl Martin (“Martin Aff.”).) Employees desiring to work
overtime put their names on a voluntary ‘overtime desired’ list.
(Id.) When overtime is necessary, management reviews the
overtime desired list and schedules overtime “among qualified
employees doing similar work in the work location where the
employees normally work.” (2000 ROI Ex. 7b, p. 41 (Collective
Bargaining Agreement Between the USPS and the American Postal
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Article 8.5).) In the Washington, D.C.
area, employees may sign an overtime desired list to work on
their non-scheduled workdays as well as their scheduled workdays.
17
(Martin Aff.; see also Pl. Att. 6 (Local Mem. of Understanding
Between the Washington, D.C. Post Office, Air Mail Center, and
American Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO).) However, “those absent
or on leave shall be passed over.” (2000 ROI Ex. 7b, p. 41.)
Limited duty employees such as plaintiff are not precluded
from working overtime. (Martin Aff.) However, in order to be
“qualified” to perform the overtime as set forth in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, “the employee must be able to
perform the duties in the operation where the overtime is
required. If the limited duty employee can work in automation he
will be allowed to work any overtime called in automation . . .
if he is on the overtime desired list for automation but he/she
is physically unable to perform the duties on automation he would
not be selected for overtime in automation.” (Id.)
In the spring of 2000, plaintiff was still working in the
return-to-sender unit under the direct supervision of Deborah
Boston. William Darryl Martin was the Senior Manager for
Distribution Operations. Plaintiff put his name on overtime
desired lists for both his scheduled and non-scheduled days, to
perform any work for which he was qualified in his location.
(Def. Deps., Keith Diggs Dep. at 55.)
The return-to-sender unit moved from the V Street Annex to
the P&DC during the first week in May, 2000. (2000 ROI Aff B.
(Boston Aff.).) On Wednesday, May 3, 2000 plaintiff worked from
18
4:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. He took annual leave for the hours he
did not work. Wednesdays were one of plaintiff’s regularly
scheduled workdays; his regularly scheduled hours were 4:00 p.m.
to midnight. (2000 ROI Ex. 3, p. 19 (Limited Duty Job Offer Dec.
19, 1998); Ex. 1, p. 17 (Time Summary).) Plaintiff was not
offered overtime on May 3, 2000, nor was overtime awarded in the
return-to-sender unit on that day.
Plaintiff sought EEO counseling to complain that he was
unlawfully denied overtime based on race and disability. (ROI
2000 p. 55 (EEO Counselor’s Report Jun. 13, 2000).) He filed a
formal complaint alleging race and disability discrimination on
October 3, 2000 (2000 ROI p. 52 (EEO Complaint of Discrimination
in the Postal Service, Oct. 3, 2000).) In the investigative
affidavit he provided to the EEO, plaintiff alleges employees in
Operations 030, 040 and 150 at the P&DC – only 100 feet from his
work location once the return-to-sender unit moved to the P&DC
facility – performed overtime work that “was within [his]
physical restrictions . . . [he] could have performed the work in
overtime status.”7 (2000 ROI Aff A., p. 8, (Diggs Aff. Mar. 1,
2001).) In response, manager Boston explained to the EEO
Counselor that during the approximately five years she supervised
7
The numbers 030, 040 and 150 refer to pay locations.
Plaintiff worked in pay location 396. The parties point to no
evidence in the record, and this Court is unable to find any,
specifying the type of work performed at pay locations 030, 040
and 150.
19
the return-to-sender unit, “there was no overtime given to the
employees [in the return to sender unit] . . . because of the low
priority of the mail that was being worked . . . It did not
warrant paying employees premium overtime pay to process it.”
(Boston Aff.) She also asserted that plaintiff would not have
been able to work overtime outside the return to sender unit
because “his physical limitations would not allow him to work in
other sections.” (Id.)
An EEO AJ heard plaintiff’s formal complaint. She found
that no discrimination occurred, and dismissed the claim on
September 3, 2003. (Def. Att. 4.) On September 17, 2003, the
Postal Service issued a final order implementing the AJ’s
decision, which plaintiff appealed to the EEO’s OFO. (Def. Att.
5.) The OFO issued a decision on March 3, 2005, which found that
there was no “overtime available within [plaintiff’s] pay
location” on May 3, 2000, and that “even if there was overtime
available on the day in question, [plaintiff] was on annual
leave, and therefore ineligible for overtime.” (Id.) The OFO
upheld the A’s decision and the Postal Service’s final order that
“construing the evidence to be most favorable to [plaintiff] . .
. [plaintiff] failed to present evidence” that his failure to
receive overtime was “motivated by discriminatory animus toward
[his] protected classes.” (Id.)
20
4. The Events of January 2002 - February 2006:
Plaintiff’s Departure and Ultimate Removal from
the Postal Service.
In 2001, the P&DC (also known as “Brentwood”) was targeted
in an anthrax terrorist attack. As a result, the Post Office
closed the P&DC in October 2001, and its employees were
transferred to other postal facilities. (Pl. Att. 10, Grier Dep.
83.) Plaintiff was reassigned to the Calvert Development and
Design Center for a short time following the anthrax attack.
(Id. at 84.) There was no work, however, for plaintiff to
perform. Plaintiff and at least 30 other relocated employees
“sat in a room . . . [doing] nothing.” (Id. 83-84.) In January
2002, Postal Service management decided that plaintiff and these
other employees for whom the Agency had no work should be sent
home.
On January 23, 2002, Julie E. Szarek, USPS Human Resources
Manager, sent plaintiff a letter stating, in relevant part:
Due to the closure of the Brentwood facility and its
relocation to other offices, Plant Operations has
indicated it is no longer able to accommodate your
restrictions. Effective Friday, January 25, 2002, you
should no longer report to the Calvert worksite.
Since the agency cannot provide suitable duties within
your restrictions, the injury compensation office is
issuing CA-7 forms for your use. This form should be
completed and submitted to this office to ensure that
you are compensated through the Department of Labor,
Office of Worker’s Compensation Programs.
If you have further concerns please contact Toni Grier,
Manager, Injury Compensation, at [phone number].
21
(Pl. Att. 3, p. 4 (Letter from J. Szarek to K. Diggs, Jan. 23,
2002).) As indicated by Szarek’s letter, the CA-7 form is used
by the Department of Labor OWCP to process Claims for
Compensation due to, in this case, medical restrictions that
precluded the USPS from finding suitable work for plaintiff.
Plaintiff was among a group of “30 people or more . . . who were
sent home and given CA-7s to complete and be compensated through
the [OWCP] until the agency was able to provide them with work.”
(Pl. Att. 10 (Grier Dep. 83-84).) The letter instructs plaintiff
to file his CA-7 forms with “this office” – the injury
compensation office. (Id. at 91-93.)
The record contains no Form CA-7s for plaintiff between
January 2002 and May 2003. Plaintiff “turned in the CA-7s –
which [USPS] say[s] they never received – to get paid. I didn’t
get paid.” (Diggs Dep. 64.) The Injury Compensation office did
not receive any CA-7s from plaintiff. (Pl. Att. 10 (Grier Dep.
91).)
On January 23, 2003, Helen T. Jackson, Attendance Control
Supervisor for Tour 3,8 sent plaintiff a memorandum via certified
mail. The memorandum states, in relevant part:
8
“Tour” is another word for shift. At all times relevant
in this action, plaintiff was assigned to Tour 3 (sometimes
referred to as Tour III), which is 4:00 p.m. to midnight. (2000
ROI Exs. 3-4, pp. 19-20 (Limited Duty Job Offers Apr. and Dec.
1998).)
22
A review of your record reflects an unsubstantiated
absence from duty. Therefore, you are instructed to
submit the following documents within five calendar
days of the receipt of this letter:
• PS Form 3971 (Request for or Notification of
Absence) and
• Medical Certificate covering your absence from
the beginning through the present.
The Medical Certificate must provide an explanation
of the nature of your illness sufficient to indicate
you have been, or will be, unable to perform your
normal duties for the time period of your absence . . .
In addition, you are instructed to submit a PS Form
3971 and a Medical Certificate every thirty days that
you are absent thereafter to your supervisor at the
address listed below:
Southern Maryland Processing & Dist. Ctr.
Deborah I. Boston, ACS, Tour 3
[Address]
If you fail to provide the required documentation
and/or fail to respond to this notice as outlined
above within five calendar[] days, the absence will
be charged to AWOL. AWOL MAY RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY
ACTION, UP TO AND INCLUDING REMOVAL FROM THE POSTAL
SERVICE.
(Pl. Att. 3 (Jan. 27, 2003 letter from H. Jackson to K.
Diggs)(emphasis in original).)
Plaintiff did not provide his supervisor with the
information requested in the January 23, 2003 letter. Instead,
he sought EEO counseling on January 29, 2003. Plaintiff claimed
that he “was the only person from [the] Tour 3 injured section to
receive such a letter,” and accused the Postal Service of
retaliation based on his prior EEO activity. (Def. Att. 12
(Information for Pre-Complaint Counseling).) Plaintiff and the
23
Postal Service entered into a settlement on March 7, 2003,
resolving his claim. The settlement states, in relevant part:
(1) [Plaintiff] shall provide to Injury Compensation
[address], to the attention of Ms. Toni Grier,
copies of documentation relating to the CA-7's
filed following January 25, 2002, the date he was
sent home following the unavailability of work. . .
(2) [Plaintiff] shall also provide written notice to
Ms. Grier of his doctor’s appointment to have his
medical restrictions updated.
(3) Ms. Grier shall contact [plaintiff’s] assigned
office to have a CA-17 sent to him for submission to
the medical provider at the scheduled appointment.
(4) Items 1-3 shall be completed by March 14, 2003.
(5) [Plaintiff] shall provide Ms. Grier with an updated CA-
17 following his doctor’s appointment. This letter
shall be accompanied by a letter of job
responsibilities that he feels he can perform in
accordance with his restrictions.
(Pl. Att. 3, p. 9-11 (Settlement Agreement Mar. 7, 2003).)
Plaintiff failed to meet the March 14, 2003 deadline. He
“attempted to confer with [] Grier . . . to inform [her] that he
could not meet the provisions of . . . the Agreement on time, but
he could not reach her.” (Pl. Facts at 2.) Plaintiff eventually
submitted a Form CA-17 dated May 20, 2003 to the EEOC office, but
not to Grier or the Injury Compensation Office as required by
paragraph (5) of the settlement agreement. He also failed to
submit copies of the CA-7s to either the EEOC office or the
Injury Compensation Office, as required by paragraph (1).
24
On April 17, 2003, plaintiff filed a timely EEO Complaint
alleging that the Agency breached paragraph (3) of the settlement
agreement by not contacting him before March 14, 2003. The
Agency issued a final decision denying the breach-of-contract
claim on October 29, 2004. (Def. Att. 6.) Plaintiff appealed
the final agency decision to EEO’s OFO, which issued its decision
on April 27, 2005. The EEO found that the Postal Service “had
not breached the agreement because its own actions were
contingent on [plaintiff] first taking certain actions of his
own,” namely, sending CA-7s to Grier as required by paragraph (1)
of the settlement agreement, and providing Grier with written
notice of his doctor’s appointment as required by paragraph (2).
(Def. Att. 7.) The EEO further found that plaintiff breached
paragraph (5) of the agreement by sending his CA-17 to the EEO
office, not “to the Injury Compensation office, as explicitly
stated in the settlement agreement.” (Id.)
The next correspondence between plaintiff and the Postal
Service did not occur until September 27, 2004. During that
time, following the expiration of his state unemployment benefits
in early 2003, plaintiff had obtained employment as a delivery
driver for “My Florist, Exclusively Roses,” and delivered floral
arrangements. At some point thereafter, plaintiff left the
florist position for a “better job” working for “Liberty
Transportation Incorporated” as a “yard jockey” and remained
25
there until May 31, 2007 when the company relocated.9 (Diggs
Dep. 71-72.)
On September 27, 2004, Helen Jackson-Baker (formerly Helen
Jackson), the attendance control supervisor for Tour 3, sent
plaintiff another letter. She acknowledged that plaintiff had
been sent home on January 23, 2002, and that the Agency’s action
was the genesis of his absence from work. (Pl. Att. 3, p. 6
(Sept. 27, 2004 Letter from H. Jackson-Baker to Plaintiff).) The
letter explained:
Since the agency could not provide suitable duties
within your restrictions, the Injury Compensation
Office issued CA-7 forms for your use. The form
should have been completed and submitted to that
office to insure that you were compensated through
the Department of Labor, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs.
The Injury Compensation Office indicated that you
currently do not have an active open claim. There
are no records indicating that you requested
compensation from the Department of Labor. All of
the employees who submitted claims for compensation
due to ‘no available work’ were compensated through
the Department of Labor.
You have an obligation to notify your employer of your
status. Failure to do so puts you in AWOL status.
It is incumbent upon you to submit acceptable evidence
to cover your absence from January 25, 2002 through
your return to duty . . . [Y]ou are to submit supporting
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE showing why you are unable to
9
Plaintiff explains that: “[a] yard jockey is the tractor
[that] hooks up to loaded trailers, puts them to the dock, and
then they unload them. Then he comes back, gets the unloaded
trailer, puts it back in the lot. That’s what I did all day
long. I was moving trailers back and forth.” (Id.)
26
report, within five (5) calendar days from the date of
receipt of this letter, and for every thirty (30) days
thereafter that you are absent from duty.
HELEN JACKSON-BAKER, ACS, Tour 3
[Address]
Acceptable evidence for medical reasons is defined as
medical documentation signed and furnished by your
attending physician or other attending practitioner.
The documentation must provide an explanation of the
nature of the illness or injury causing your absence
from work . . .
Should you fail to comply with these instructions, you
will be considered in an Absence Without Official Leave
Status since January 25, 2002 and action may be taken
to remove you from the United States Postal Service.
(Id. (emphasis in original).)
By letter dated October 7, 2004, plaintiff responded to
Jackson-Baker, stating that “my absence from the Postal Service
is not directly related to Illness or Injury, my absence is
directly related to Toni Grier, Compensation Unit. Ms. Grier has
not abided by the [settlement] agreement.” (2006 ROI (Pl. Aff.
A, p. 31 of 39 (emphasis in original)).) Plaintiff attached a
copy of the January 25, 2002 letter from the Postal Service and a
copy of the March 7, 2003 settlement agreement to his letter.
(Pl. Att. 4, (Pl. Aff. A., p. 9 of 39).) He did not send medical
documentation. (Id.)
Jackson-Baker replied to plaintiff on October 20, 2004. She
wrote:
You have not been to work since January 23, 2002
nor have you sent any documentation to substantiate
27
your absence. You are required to submit acceptable
documentation immediately and every thirty (30) days
until your return to duty.
If documentation is not sent by October 27, 2004 and
you do not respond to the letter sent to you, the next
step may be taken to remove you from the Postal Service.
This letter is being sent to you to afford you the
opportunity to come in for a Pre-Disciplinary Interview.
This interview gives you the chance to tell ‘your side
of the story’.
The interview is being set up for October 29, 2004 at
the [...] P&DC.
(2006 ROI Aff. A, p. 32 of 39 (Oct. 20, 2004 Letter from H.
Jackson-Baker to plaintiff).)
Plaintiff met with Jackson-Baker at the P&DC. He “went over
verbally with [] Baker all of the evidence [he] submitted,”
namely, the January 25, 2002 letter and the 2003 mediation
agreement. (Pl. Att. 4 (Aff. A., p. 9 of 39).) Plaintiff
“awaited further response,” but “received no further input about
this matter.” (Id.)
In May 2005, the Post Office again requested that plaintiff
provide medical documentation addressing his ability to work
between 2002 and “the present”. (2006 ROI, Ex. 7 (Letter to
plaintiff from F. Mitchell, absence control office supervisor,
Tour 3 dated May 19, 2005.)) Like the previous letters from
Baker-Jackson, the May 2005 letter from Mitchell requested past
and present medical information and updates every 30 days
thereafter, and closed with the warning that if plaintiff did not
28
promptly respond, “the absence will be charged to AWOL. AWOL MAY
RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTION, UP TO AND INCLUDING REMOVAL FROM
THE POSTAL SERVICE.” (Id.) (emphasis in original.)
Hearing no response from plaintiff, Mitchell (sometimes
referred to as “Bears-Mitchell”) sent plaintiff a notice of
another pre-disciplinary interview. (2006 ROI Ex. 8 (Letter to
plaintiff from F. Bears-Mitchell dated June 16, 2005.))
Mitchell’s letter states in relevant part: “Discipline is being
considered. However, during the interview, you will be given the
opportunity to tell your side of the story relative to why you
did not respond to my notice for you to support your absence with
documentation and any other information you wish to share that
might prevent disciplinary action.” (Id.) Bears-Mitchell,
plaintiff, and plaintiff’s union shop steward met for the pre-
disciplinary interview on June 24, 2005. During the interview,
plaintiff told Bears-Mitchell about his prior EEO activity. (Pl.
Att. 4 (Aff. A. p. 10 of 39).) He also discussed his then-
current employment driving a tractor-trailer for Liberty
Transportation. (Id.) Plaintiff did not provide documentation
regarding his medical restrictions during the period of May 20,
2003 to June 2005 at or prior to the interview. He told Bears-
Mitchell that he “is ready to come back to work,” asked “what
medical document is needed to return to work,” requested that the
Postal Service “mail it” to him, and stated that he “is working
29
now.” (2006 ROI Ex. 9 (Mitchell’s notes of Pre-Disciplinary
Interview Jun. 24, 2005).)
Bears-Mitchell did not receive the requested medical
documentation from plaintiff. (Def. Deps. (Bears-Mitchell Dep.
116).) On October 25, 2005, she wrote to plaintiff again,
explaining “our records do not indicate that you are unable to
perform work. Therefore you are instructed to report for duty as
scheduled or provide acceptable medical evidence that denotes
your inability to work . . . You are being allotted five (5) days
from the receipt of this letter to respond. Failure to [respond]
will result in corrective action up to and including removal from
the Postal Service.” (2006 ROI Ex. 10 (Oct. 25, 2005 Letter from
Bears-Mitchell to Plaintiff).) Plaintiff did not respond to the
letter. Instead, he wrote a letter dated November 9, 2009 to his
shop steward, acknowledging receipt of the October 25, 2005
letter and advising that he was filing a grievance with his
union. (2006 ROI (Aff. A., p. 39 of 39).)
On December 1, 2005, plaintiff delivered one Form CA-17 to
the USPS’ Medical Unit. (Pl’s. Att. 3 (Aff. A. 15 of 39 and 27
of 39).) The CA-17 form, dated November 21, 2005, indicates that
plaintiff’s health practitioner advised him to return to work,
with restrictions, as of May 20, 2003. (Id.)
By letter dated January 12, 2006, Mitchell advised plaintiff
she was “in the process of determining what, if any,
30
administrative action shall be taken in regard to your current
work status.” (2006 ROI Ex. 12.) Mitchell directed plaintiff to
report for a pre-disciplinary interview on January 18, 2006, and
advised plaintiff that his “failure to report . . . will result
in [Mitchell] making a decision without any input [plaintiff] may
have to offer for [] consideration.” (Id.)
Plaintiff, his union shop steward and Mitchell met for the
pre-disciplinary interview as scheduled. In her notes of the
meeting, Mitchell listed among the “Nature of Infractions” to be
discussed as “(1) unacceptable medical documentation; (2) where
have you been since 2003". (2006 ROI Ex. 13 (F. Mitchell’s Pre-
Disciplinary Interview notes, Jan. 18, 2006).) Mitchell’s notes
also recount plaintiff’s answers. In response to question (1)
plaintiff stated “every time he goes to the doctor there’s a co-
payment,” and he “did not know” the USPS wanted documentation of
his “diagnosis and prognosis.”10 (Id.) In response to question
(2), he “was sent home because there was no work for him” in
2002, and he never received “anything in writing telling him to
come back to work.” (Id.) Plaintiff also “explained in detail
about [his] EEO cases . . . and also the fact of [his] employment
elsewhere.” (Pl. Att. 4, (Aff. A. p. 10 of 39).) Plaintiff did
10
Mitchell explains “prognosis and diagnosis . . . might
state that Mitchell was seen in my office on so and so date for a
broken leg; therefore, her expected return time to work might be
three months . . . It might say anything like that. It’s just a
prescription pad.” (Pl. Att. 9 (Mitchell Dep. p. 147).)
31
not, however, provide any medical documentation at the Pre-
Disciplinary Interview.
Mitchell recommended plaintiff’s removal from the Postal
Service in a letter to Labor Relations dated February 1, 2006.
(ROI 2006, Aff. C p. 9 of 9.) Mitchell advised removal “for the
following reason.” (Id.) Her letter goes on:
Mr. Diggs was absent without approved leave (AWOL)
from May 20, 2003 until June 24, 2005. He has not
provided us with acceptable medical documentation.
He was given a Pre-Disciplinary Interview on January
18, 2006, [during] which [Mitchell] informed him of
his unacceptable medical documentation. To this date
[Mitchell has received] no response.
(Id.) John W. Cooke, Distribution Operations Manager, concurred
with Mitchell’s recommendation. (Id.)
The Postal Service issued plaintiff a Notice of Removal
based on the “charge” of “absence without leave” dated February
21, 2006. He was terminated effective March 31, 2006. The
Notice of Removal states, in relevant part, “a review of your
attendance record from May 20, 2003 through June 24, 2005
reflects your unscheduled absence from work and failure to
provide acceptable documentation to justify your absence.
Accordingly, you have been charged with Absence Without Official
Leave (AWOL).” (2006 ROI Ex. 14.)
On May 19, 2006, plaintiff filed an EEO complaint alleging
that his January 18, 2006 pre-disciplinary interview and
subsequent removal constituted discrimination based on sex, age,
32
physical disability, and retaliation. (Compl. ¶ 10a.) Plaintiff
had originally requested that an AJ hear his formal EEO
complaint, but on March 7, 2007, he chose instead to add the
allegations in his 2006 EEO complaint to the instant case, which
was already pending before this Court. (Def. Att. 9 (Amended
Notice of Intention to File Suit).) The following week, on March
14, 2007, the EEO dismissed his complaint and remanded it to the
Postal Service for the issuance of a final agency decision. (Def.
Att. 8a.) On April 1, 2007, the agency issued its final agency
decision, which found that plaintiff “failed to establish that
[he was] subjected to sex, age, disability or retaliation
discrimination,” that “the Agency met its burden of demonstrating
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the actions it took,”
and that plaintiff “failed to show these reasons were pretext for
intentional discrimination.” (Id.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a motion for
summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246 (1986). To be
material, the factual assertion must be capable of affecting the
outcome of the litigation; to be genuine, the issue must be
33
supported by sufficient admissible evidence that a reasonable
fact finder could find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248; see also Lanningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236,
1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, the Court must view all facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1996). The non-moving
party’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere
unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by
affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine, material issue for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
In his second amended complaint, plaintiff claims he
suffered eight adverse actions which he presented in his
underlying EEO complaints. (See generally Second Amended
Complaint “Compl.”) Plaintiff alleges that the Postal Service
discriminated against him based on race, age, sex, disability,
and/or retaliated against him by:
(1) changing plaintiff’s request for leave without pay to sick
leave (Compl. ¶ 17);
34
(2) changing plaintiff’s job duty status from full-time regular
to part-time flexible (id. ¶ 18);
(3) denying plaintiff’s request for sick leave, resulting in
plaintiff taking leave without pay (id. ¶ 19);
(4) denying plaintiff a limited duty assignment, which caused
him to be suspended for 19.42 hours (id. ¶¶ 22-23);
(5) denying plaintiff overtime (id. ¶¶ 24-26);
(6) denying plaintiff discovery in his administrative complaints
(id. ¶ 10);
(7) conducting a pre-disciplinary interview of plaintiff in June
2005 (id. ¶ 31); and,
(8) removing plaintiff from the Postal Service. (id. ¶ 39.)
Defendant argues that some of these actions were not
adverse, and also offers legitimate, non-retaliatory explanations
for its actions. The Court finds that some of the challenged
actions were not adverse or materially adverse, and further finds
that plaintiff failed to show defendant’s explanations for its
adverse actions were pretexts for discrimination or retaliation.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for the defendant
based on plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims.
1. Governing Law
Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act, the
two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (I) the
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of
the plaintiff's race, sex, age, or disability. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(a); 29 U.S.C.§§ 621 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.;
Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir.
35
2008); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493
(D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 455
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (race discrimination under Title VII); Barnette
v. Chertoff, 453 F.3d 513, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (age
discrimination under the ADEA); Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282
F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (disability discrimination under
the Rehabilitation Act). “A plaintiff must prove both elements
to sustain a discrimination claim.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550
F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008). To prove retaliation under
these statutes, the plaintiff generally must establish that he
suffered (I) a materially adverse action (ii) because he or she
had brought or threatened to bring a discrimination claim. See
id. at 1198 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et
seq.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). Although the tests for
proving discrimination and retaliation both contain the term
‘adverse action,’ “the concept [] in the retaliation context is
broader than in the discrimination context, and can encompass
harms unrelated to employment or the workplace ‘so long as a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse.’” Franklin, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (citing
Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198 n.4).
Traditionally, courts have analyzed discrimination and
retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
36
Rehabilitation Act using the three-step burden shifting framework
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973). However, where an employer has asserted legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for the actions being challenged,
the district court need not – and should not – decide
whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie
case under McDonnell Douglas. Rather, in considering
an employer’s motion for summary judgment . . . the
district court must resolve one central question: Has
the employee produced sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted
non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and
that the employer intentionally discriminated against
the employee on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin?
Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
This framework applies to discrimination claims under Title VII,
the ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act.11 See, e.g., Baloch, 550
F.3d at 1197 n.2, 1200 (applying Brady principle to Title VII and
ADEA discrimination claims); Kersey, 586 F.3d at 17 n.1-2 (Brady
analysis applies to discrimination claims under the
11
In its motion for summary judgement Defendant argues that
plaintiff does not have a disability as defined by the
Rehabilitation Act. (Def. Mem. at 18-22.) Defendant further
argues that the Court should apply the standard for determining
disability as it existed before the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
(Id.) The Court concludes that it need not consider these issues
in this case. As this Circuit recently explained, once the
defendant has proffered a nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory
rationale “it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff
has actually made out the elements of a prima facie case” of
discrimination or retaliation based on disability. Kersey v.
Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 586 F.3d 13, 17 n.1-2 (D.C. Cir.
2009). As discussed throughout, the Postal Service has proffered
these rationales; accordingly, the Court need not consider
whether plaintiff is, in fact, disabled.
37
Rehabilitation Act.) The Brady framework also applies to
retaliation claims under these statutes. Baloch, 550 F.3d at1197 n.2, 1200; Kersey, 586 F.3d at 17, n.1-2. Thus, where the
employer has proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for a
materially adverse action, the Court makes the same functional
inquiry as it does in a discrimination claim: “whether plaintiff
has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find
that the employer’s asserted non-retaliatory reason was merely a
pretext for retaliating against the employee for his prior
opposition to an unlawful employment action.” Franklin, 660 F.
Supp. 2d at 66.
2. The Challenged Actions
(I) Leave Request for the Week of July 5,
1998
Plaintiff contends that the Postal Service discriminated
against him on the basis of race, sex, age, and disability, when
“his request for sick leave was changed to LWOP for the week of
July 5-12, 1998.”12 (Pl. Opp. at 19.) Defendant has proffered a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action
12
In his complaint, plaintiff appeared to allege that the
Agency’s designation of his leave request as sick leave was also
retaliatory. (Compl. ¶ 17.) However, in his opposition, he
fails to respond to defendant’s argument as to this issue. (See
Pl. Opp. at 1-2, 19.) It is therefore proper to treat
defendant’s argument as conceded. See Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.
Supp. 2d 126, 136 n.5 (citations omitted), aff’d Slip Copy, No.
08-5079, 2009 WL 585660 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 2009).
38
and disputes “both the existence of an adverse action and whether
the action occurred because of discrimination.” Franklin, 600 F.
Supp. 2d at 63 (emphasis in original). “In such instances,
courts may first determine the existence of an adverse action.”
Id. (citing Baloch, 550 F.3d. at 1196-97).
An “employment decision does not rise to the level of an
actionable adverse action” sufficient to sustain a discrimination
claim “unless there is a tangible change in the duties or working
conditions constituting a material employment disadvantage.”
Stewart v. Lewis, 275 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(internal
citations omitted). Defendant argues that plaintiff was
initially paid twice for his week of leave from July 5 - 12,
1998: once by the USPS for 40 hours of sick leave and once by
OWCP for disability leave during the same time period. (Def.
Mem. at 9-10.) Thus, the Agency argues, plaintiff “initially
received a windfall” by getting two paychecks for the same time
period. (Id.; see also Def. Reply at 10.) Eventually OWCP sent
him a notice of overpayment and he was required to return the
money he received from OWCP; however, he kept his paycheck from
USPS. Because Plaintiff received full pay for the week of leave,
the Agency argues, he did not suffer an adverse action.
Plaintiff concedes that he did not lose pay for the week, but
argues that his “leave balance was affected as a result of the
39
[Agency’s] conduct,” and the impact on his leave balance
“constitutes an adverse action.” (Pl. Opp. at 19.)
The Court is not persuaded that plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action. Plaintiff cites no case law, and the
Court is not aware of any, that processing an employee’s leave
request where the only consequence was that he had to take sick
leave instead of workers compensation leave, constitutes an
adverse employment action. But cf. Kline v. Springer, 602 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 243 (D.D.C. 2009) (changes to leave balance not
adverse action “where the only consequence was that plaintiff had
to use annual leave instead of sick leave on, at most, two
occasions”).
Even assuming the existence of an adverse action, plaintiff
has not “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason” for
treating plaintiff’s leave request as one for sick leave “was not
the actual reason and that the employer intentionally
discriminated against” him. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. The
plaintiff theorizes that John Grier or Toni Grier deliberately
tampered with his leave request for the week of July 5-12, 1998,
changing it from a request for LWOP to a request for sick leave.
(Compl. ¶ 17; Pl. Facts at 3.) Toni Grier, however, denies any
involvement in receiving, processing or approving his claim for
that week. (Pl. Att. 1, p. 14 (T. Grier Aff.).) John Grier also
40
denies that he was responsible for any changes to plaintiff’s
leave request. He states that he did not take plaintiff’s
telephone call in which he requested leave for the week of July
5; another employee in the absence control unit took the call and
recorded plaintiff’s request as one for sick leave. (Pl’s Att.
1, p. 17 (John Grier Aff.).) Grier’s “approval of the request
was based on the information given on the Form 3971, leave slip,
that was taken when he called in.” (Id.) John Grier also points
out that plaintiff signed the leave slip, which clearly stated
that he had been approved for 40 hours of sick leave. (Id.) In
other words, the USPS asserts that it processed plaintiff’s leave
request as a request for sick leave because its manager believed
plaintiff asked to be granted sick leave, and because plaintiff
did nothing to disabuse him of that belief.
Plaintiff has provided no evidence that either John Grier or
Toni Grier was responsible for any unauthorized change to his
July 5 - 12 leave request. The evidence is uncontroverted that
he signed the slip without changing the leave designation, nor
did he “bring any discrepancy on the Form 3971 to his
supervisor’s attention prior to signing the document.” (Def.
Mem. at 29; see also Def. Mem. at 9, Def. Reply at 10.) He also
concedes that both John and Toni Grier were involved with the
accurate processing of his leave request for LWOP the following
week. (See Pl. Opp. at 19.) In short, plaintiff “has produced no
41
direct evidence of discriminatory animus by the decision maker
and failed to produce any other evidence that discredits the
underlying reason for” the Agency’s treatment of his leave
request as a request for sick leave. Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198.
“Therefore, even assuming [plaintiff] had suffered an adverse
employment action, he did not produce evidence sufficient to
overcome summary judgment on the question whether he suffered
impermissible discrimination.” Id.(ii) Change in Status from Full-Time Regular
to Part-Time Flexible
In the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment,
defendant argues that plaintiff’s change in status from full-time
regular to part-time flexible was neither an adverse action nor
was it discriminatory/retaliatory. (Def. Mem. At 10, 38-39, 42.)
Plaintiff failed to respond to either of these arguments. His
opposition to the motion for summary judgment contains no
argument or any reference to record evidence regarding his change
in status. Given plaintiff’s utter disregard for his own claim,
it is proper to treat defendant’s argument as conceded. See
Lytes v. D.C. Water and Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 943 (D.C. Cir.
2009).13
13
Even if plaintiff had responded to defendant’s argument -
which he did not - the Court finds it unlikely that plaintiff
would be able to succeed on the merits of this claim.
Specifically, defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that
the USPS returned plaintiff to full time regular status
retroactive to April 25, 1998, the first day his status was
42
(iii) Denial of Request for Sick Leave
In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that “on several
occasions in 1999 his request for sick leave was disapproved and
changed to leave without pay.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) However, his
argument in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment
is limited to a single date: he contends that the Postal Service
discriminated against him based on his disability and retaliated
against him when it denied his request for three hours of sick
leave on September 9, 1999. (Pl. Opp. at 7-8, 19-20.) This
action, which resulted in plaintiff losing three hours of pay,
may well constitute an adverse or materially adverse action. See
Franklin, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (being sent home without pay
satisfies prima facie case for a materially adverse action)
(citations omitted).
The defendant has consistently explained that plaintiff was
denied leave in error. (Def. Mem. at 23-34, 38; Def. Reply at
11.) Plaintiff’s sick leave request was mistakenly routed to the
injury compensation office, which does not handle sick leave.
Injury compensation specialist Toni Grier told the EEO office as
changed, and credited him for any salary and leave adjustments.
Accordingly, no adverse action occurred. (Def. Mem. at 11; Def.
Facts at ¶ 32.) Defendant also presented uncontradicted evidence
that as a result of the Snow Arbitration Award and Settlement,
many employees’ job status changed at precisely the same time and
in precisely the same way as plaintiff’s did. Defendant thus
presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action,
which plaintiff has failed to rebut.
43
far back as 2000 that she does “not normally take action on
[sick] leave requests . . . it was an oversight that I did in
this instance.” (Pl. Att. 1, p.14 (T. Grier Aff. Oct. 11,
2000).) In her deposition in 2008, nearly eight years after her
initial affidavit, Grier offered the same explanation of mistake.
She explained that she “should never signed the sick leave slip.
Sick leave . . . should be approved by the supervisor, not by
injury comp . . . leave for an injury has to be either leave
without pay, IOD or COP. Those are the only [] forms of leave
that the injury compensation office handles.” (Def. Deps., T.
Grier Dep. at 43-44.) While plaintiff claims Grier’s action “was
not error or mis-communication but purposeful,” (Pl. Opp. at 7,)
he offers no evidence to support this accusation, or to refute
the Postal Service’s assertion of error. On the contrary,
plaintiff provides additional support for USPS’ claim of mistake
by his assertion that Grier “mixed claim numbers and injuries.”
(Pl’s Att. 1 p. 11, (Aff. A, Dated Jul. 6, 2000).)14 This
evidence further supports defendant’s argument that Grier
14
As set forth more fully in Section I.B.2 above, plaintiff
had filed a second workers compensation claim, which was assigned
a different claim number and alleged different injuries than his
original claim. The OWCP found no compensable injury and denied
the second claim in July 1999; nevertheless, plaintiff continued
to submit requests for leave without pay based on the invalid
workers’ compensation claim after it had been denied. Indeed, in
August 1999, plaintiff submitted three improper leave requests
based on the already-denied workers’ compensation claim, none of
which were granted. (Pl’s Ex. 1, Form 3971 dated 8/11/99,
8/12/99, 8/13/99; Def. Mem. at 23-24, 38; Def. Reply at 11.)
44
mistakenly construed his valid sick leave request as an improper
request for leave without pay.
As this Circuit has held, once the employer has articulated
a non-discriminatory explanation for its action, as the Postal
Service did here,
the issue is not the correctness or desirability
of [the] reasons offered, but whether the employer
honestly believes in [the] reasons it offers . . .
It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that a
reason given for a job action is not just, or fair,
or sensible. He must show that the explanation given
is a phony reason.
Fishbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr’s, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (internal quotations omitted); see also George v. Leavitt,
407 F.3d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]n employer’s action may
be justified by a reasonable belief in the validity of the reason
given even though that reason may turn out to be false.”); Oates
v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(“[A]n
ill-informed motivation, or even an illegal motivation, is not
necessarily a discriminatory one.”).
The Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to present the
evidence necessary to rebut defendant’s explanation that Grier
made an administrative error by denying plaintiff’s sick leave
request. Plaintiff himself acknowledged in his EEO affidavit
that such a mistake may have occurred. More important, he has
not produced any evidence to show that the Agency’s actions were
dishonest or otherwise a pretext for discrimination or
45
retaliation. The Court therefore grants summary judgment for
defendant on this claim.
(iv) Suspension
During the summer of 1999, the Postal Service suspended
plaintiff for approximately two or two and one-half days based on
an incorrect determination that he was not eligible for limited
duty. As set forth more fully in section I.B.2 above, this error
arose out of OWCP’s rejection of plaintiff’s second workers’
compensation claim; specifically, when plaintiff’s operations
manager received notice of the rejection, he believed,
incorrectly, that plaintiff was no longer entitled to limited
duty status. This error was corrected later the same summer when
plaintiff prevailed in a grievance his union filed on his behalf
and the Postal Service paid him for 19.42 hours of pay he lost as
a result of the suspension.15 (1998 ROI Ex. 16, 17, 18, pp. 61-
63, and p. 133 (Info. for Precomplaint Counseling).) Plaintiff
argues that these circumstances amount to illegal disability
discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The
15
Plaintiff claims, without support, that he received 19.41
hours of pay when the grievance settled. (Pl. Facts at 4.)
Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations are insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322 (non-moving party’s opposition must consist of more
than mere unsupported allegations or denials). Even assuming
that plaintiff only received 19.41 hours’ pay, plaintiff provides
no evidence that his suspension lasted longer than 19.41 hours.
Accordingly, the Court finds the one one-hundredth of an hour
dispute between the parties irrelevant to plaintiff’s claim.
46
Postal Service responds that plaintiff did not suffer an adverse
employment action or a materially adverse action. The Court
agrees with defendant.
It is well settled in this Circuit that “absent some
consequential harm or injury, a delay does not affect the terms,
conditions or privileges of employment and does not constitute an
adverse employment action.” West v. Potter, 540 F. Supp. 2d 91,
95 (D.D.C. 2008)(citations omitted); see also Runkle v. Gonzales,
391 F. Supp. 2d 210, 224-25 (D.D.C. 2005) (delay does not
constitute materially adverse action for purposes of retaliation
claim). Plaintiff does not deny that when he prevailed in his
grievance, he was paid for the entire length of his suspension.
Because plaintiff does not show that he suffered any
consequential harm from the delay in paying him for approximately
two and one-half days of lost time, he fails to show he was
subject to an adverse or materially adverse action. Accordingly,
the Court will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
plaintiff’s claim.
(v) May 3, 2000 Denial of Overtime
Although the complaint alleges that plaintiff was unlawfully
denied overtime throughout 1999 and 2000, (Compl. ¶¶ 24-26),
plaintiff’s sole contention now is that he was discriminated
against on the basis of race and disability when he was denied
voluntary overtime on single occasion - May 3, 2000. (Pl. Opp.
47
20-22.) Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for why plaintiff did not get overtime: he was ineligible
for overtime on May 3, 2000 because he took two hours of annual
leave during his regular shift that day.16 (2000 ROI, Ex. 1,
p.17; Def. Mem. at 24, Def. Reply at 14; Def. Facts ¶¶ 40, 42.)
Plaintiff does not dispute the factual basis for defendant’s
denial of overtime: he did not work all of his regularly
scheduled shift on May 3, 2000 because he elected to take annual
leave. Nor does he dispute that he is covered by the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the Postal Service and the American
Postal Workers Union, which provides, in relevant part, “those
16
Defendant proffered two other non-discriminatory reasons
for the overtime denial: (1) plaintiff was ineligible for
overtime at the P&DC facility because he worked at the V Street
Annex at the time, and overtime is only offered to employees who
regularly work at the same location the overtime is offered; and
(2) plaintiff’s physical limitations made him ineligible to
perform the overtime offered at the P&DC that day. The Court
finds defendant has not met its burden of production for either
of these asserted reasons. With respect to the first reason,
plaintiff argues that the return to sender unit moved to the P&DC
the first week in May 2000, and plaintiff’s supervisor Deborah
Boston admits in her affidavit that the unit may have moved to
the P&DC by May 3. (2000 ROI p. 11, Boston Aff. Mar. 19, 2001.)
With respect to the second reason, plaintiff asserts that the
overtime work offered “was casing mail. The work that was
performed by Plaintiff [sic] at his pay location was casing
mail.” (Pl. Opp. at 21.) While the Postal Service claims
plaintiff’s physical limitations precluded him from performing
the overtime, the Agency has provided no evidence showing either
the nature of the overtime work performed or how that work fit
within plaintiff’s restrictions. Accordingly, defendant has
failed to satisfy its burden of production to “offer admissible
evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude,” that
plaintiff was denied overtime for these reasons. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).
48
absent or on leave shall be passed over,” for overtime work.
(2000 ROI Ex. 7b.) His sole response to this argument is that
the collective bargaining agreement permits individuals to work
overtime on their non-scheduled days. (Pl’s. Facts p. 2.) This
provision, however, is inapposite here. Plaintiff does not claim
the Postal Service denied him overtime on one of his non-
scheduled workdays, which are Mondays and Tuesdays. (2000 ROI
Exs. 1, 3, and 4, pp. 17, 19, 20.) Rather, he claims defendant
refused to allow him overtime on a Wednesday, when the evidence
shows that he took annual leave during part of his regularly
scheduled shift. The CBA prohibits the award of voluntary
overtime under these circumstances.17 Accordingly, the Court
finds that the Postal Service has met its burden and proffered a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision not to offer
plaintiff voluntary overtime. The Court further finds that
plaintiff has “failed to introduce any evidence that would permit
17
This provision dovetails with the general policy goals of
awarding voluntary overtime work. There is “clearly a tangible
monetary advantage to those who are assigned overtime work.”
Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F.Supp.2d 78, 97 (D.D.C. 2005). The Fair
Labor Standards Act, which covers eligible USPS employees,
requires employers to pay overtime compensation for employees
working more than 40 hours per week “at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). In
other words, premium overtime pay is intended to compensate
employees for working hours in addition to those regularly
assigned. It is not intended to reward employees who take
vacation time during their regularly scheduled working hours, and
who then seek to avail themselves of significantly higher
overtime rates by pursuing voluntary overtime opportunities.
49
a trier of fact to believe that defendant’s proffered rationale
for its decision . . . was pretextual or that its decision was
motivated by a retaliatory animus.” Franklin, 600 F. Supp. 2d at
71 (citations omitted).
(vi) Lack of Opportunity for Discovery in
Administrative Proceedings
Plaintiff’s fifth EEO complaint alleges that the Agency
breached the settlement agreement it entered into with plaintiff
in 2003. (Def. Atts. 6-7.) However, his complaint before this
Court does not contain a breach of contract claim or a
discrimination or retaliation claim relating to the breach of
contract. The sole allegation in the complaint which mentions
the settlement reads, in relevant part:
In January 2003, plaintiff filed a final [sic]
complaint with the USPS EEO Office alleging
retaliation based on the USPS’ decision to
terminate plaintiff. The parties entered into
a settlement agreement. When the USPS did not
meet the terms of the settlement agreement,
plaintiff filed an appeal with the EEOC Office
of Federal Operations . . . Throughout the admini-
strative process involving the complaints filed
in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2003, the Plaintiff was
not allowed to engage in any discovery.
(Compl. ¶ 10.) The defendant correctly points out that “there is
no cause of action” for federal employees to bring retaliation or
discrimination claims based on “complaints of delay or
interference in the investigative process.” (Def. Mem. at 15
(quoting Keeley, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 45).) Rather, plaintiff’s
50
“sole remedy for complaints about the administrative
investigative process is to bring a de novo action in federal
court” against the party allegedly engaged in the underlying
discrimination, and to seek discovery relating to his claims in
court. (Id. (quoting Keeley, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 45).) Plaintiff
does not dispute defendant’s arguments, nor does his opposition
brief contain any argument with respect to the settlement, its
alleged breach, or his opportunity to take discovery in the
administrative proceedings. It is therefore proper to treat
defendant’s argument as conceded, although, as just described, it
succeeds on its merits in any event. See Lytes, 572 F.3d at 943.
(vii) Pre-Disciplinary Interview on January
18, 2006
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant argues that
plaintiff’s pre-disciplinary interview was neither an adverse
action nor was it discriminatory/retaliatory. (Def. Mem. at 16,
25-29, 41-44.) The Court agrees. See, e.g., Franklin, 600 F.
Supp. 2d at 68-69 (holding plaintiff’s pre-disciplinary interview
for poor attendance not an adverse action) (citing McDaniel v.
Potter, Nos. 06-CV-0803 & 06-CV-1371, 2007 WL 3165807, *6, *8-9
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2007) (same)).
As set forth above, the Court finds that defendant’s
argument regarding the pre-disciplinary interview succeeds on its
merits. In addition, plaintiff failed to respond to defendant’s
arguments. His opposition to the motion for summary judgment
51
contains no argument or record evidence that the pre-disciplinary
interview constitutes adverse action. Accordingly, the Court may
also treat claim seven as conceded. See Lytes, 572 F.3d at 943.
(viii) Removal from Postal Service
The Court now turns to plaintiff’s most significant claim:
his removal from the Postal Service in 2006. At the outset, the
Court notes that the Agency’s actions toward the plaintiff during
the four years from when he was initially sent home, in 2002, to
his ultimate removal in 2006, were far from unassailable.
Indeed, the Postal Service took positions during that time which,
in this Court’s view, were both confusing and contradictory.
However, the relevant inquiry is not whether the Postal Service
treated plaintiff justly, fairly, or sensibly. It is whether the
Agency asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
termination, and if so, whether plaintiff has shown that the
employer’s reason was not the actual reason, but was pretext for
discrimination or retaliation. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494;
Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1197 n.2; Kersey, 586 F.3d at 17 n.1-2. For
the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that plaintiff has
not met his burden.
Defendant argues that “plaintiff’s employment was terminated
because he failed to report to work as directed, and he failed to
provide updated medical documentation showing either an inability
to work or an ability to work with certain restrictions.” (Def.
52
Mem. at 35.) These two reasons are factually inseparable.
Defendant sent plaintiff home in the first instance because it
could not provide him with work assignments consistent with his
medical restrictions. (2006 ROI, Aff. A. p. 33 of 39(Jan. 23,
2002 letter from J. Szarek to plaintiff); p. 35 of 39 (Sept. 27,
2004 letter from H. Jackson-Baker to plaintiff).) Accordingly,
in the view of Agency management, plaintiff had the
responsibility to provide the Postal Service with updated
documentation of his restrictions, so the Agency could make an
informed decision about whether, and in what capacity, he could
return to duty.18 (Def. Facts ¶¶ 47-57; Def. Reply at 15-16; Def.
Deps., Bears-Mitchell Dep. 50, 114-116.)
As Defendant correctly notes in its motion for summary
judgment, “the record is replete with examples of plaintiff’s
failure to provide requested documentation, and in those
instances when he did provide such information, he did not
provide it to the appropriate person.” (Def. Mem. at 35.)
Specifically, the USPS clearly requested or demanded plaintiff to
provide updated medical documentation on at least eight separate
occasions:
18
This position is generally consistent with federal law
and policy. As explained supra at footnote 2, the Federal
Employees Compensation Act requires that federal employees
injured on the job be compensated for their injuries, and the
Secretary of Labor requires that the Postal Service make special
efforts to employ those injured employees, who will otherwise be
eligible for compensation for doing nothing.
53
• January 23, 2003 letter from Helen Jackson, (Pl’s Att. 3.);
• March 7, 2003 settlement agreement between plaintiff and
Injury Compensation Office, (Pl’s Att. 3.);
• September 27, 2004 letter from Helen Jackson-Baker to
plaintiff, (Pl’s Att. 3.);
• October 20, 2004 letter from Jackson-Baker to plaintiff, (P.
Att. 4.);
• May 19, 2005 letter from Fannie Bears-Mitchell, (2006 ROI
Ex. 7.);
• June 16, 2005 notice of pre-disciplinary interview from
Bears-Mitchell to plaintiff, (id., Ex. 8.);
• October 25, 2005 letter from Bears-Mitchell to plaintiff,
(id., Ex. 10.); and
• January 18, 2006 pre-disciplinary interview with Bears-
Mitchell, plaintiff, and plaintiff’s shop steward. (id., Ex.
13.)
The record is undisputed that plaintiff failed to comply
with six of these requests altogether, and that his response to
the other two fell far short of the Postal Service’s requests.
As set forth in more detail in Sections I.A and I.B.4 above,
although he provided one CA-17 form in response to the March 2003
settlement agreement, he produced it two months after it was due,
and to the wrong office at the Agency. And while he provided one
additional CA-17 form, dated November 21, 2005, to the Agency,
54
this belated and minimal documentation was an obviously deficient
response to the Agency’s multiple requests that he provide
immediate evidence, updated every 30 days, regarding his medical
restrictions.
Plaintiff provides no evidence that he responded to the
Postal Service’s repeated requests for medical documentation
beyond these two isolated instances. Rather, he argues that the
requests themselves were absurd because he was sent home by the
Postal Service in 2002 and was never recalled to duty. (Pl. Opp.
9-10.) Plaintiff’s anger is clear. In response to defendant’s
January 2003 letter demanding documentation of his medical
restrictions, plaintiff declines to provide documentation as
requested, then states that the documents he “will provide along
with this cover letter, will no doubt explain” his
“unsubstantiated absence.” He continues, “[t]hese documents will
also demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt, the stupidity,
Incompetance, [sic] and illogical reasons for [the] request”
because on January 23, 2002 he received a letter from the Postal
Service telling him not to report for duty. (Pl. Att. 3, p. 5
(Jan. 29, 2003 Letter from Plaintiff to USPS).)
While plaintiff’s subsequent reactions to the defendant’s
request for documentation are marked by less colorful language,
his disdain for the Postal Service’s position remains evident.
After receiving defendant’s third request for documentation in
55
September 2004, plaintiff responded, not by providing the
requested information, but by stating “my absence from the Postal
Service is not directly related to Illness or Injury, my absence
is directly related to Toni Grier, Compensation Unit. Ms. Grier
has not abided by the [settlement] agreement . . . I’m quite sure
these documents will answer your questions.” (2006 ROI, Aff. A.
P. 31 of 39 (Oct. 7, 2004 letter from Plaintiff to Jackson).) By
“these documents,” plaintiff refers to the January 2002 letter
sending him home and the March 7, 2003 Settlement Agreement,
which itself required plaintiff to update his medical
restrictions and with which plaintiff did not comply. Plaintiff
did not provide any documentation updating his medical
restrictions with his October 2004 submission to the Postal
Service.
Plaintiff continued to refuse to provide updated medical
documentation throughout the balance of 2004 and nearly all of
2005. He attended pre-disciplinary meetings, produced other
documents, and even filed a grievance with his union, but did not
provide a single piece of evidence relating to his work
restrictions until December 2005.
Finally, on February 1, 2006, Bears-Mitchell drafted a
recommendation for removing plaintiff from the Postal Service.
The recommendation states that plaintiff was “AWOL from May 20,
2003 to June 24, 2005. He has not provided us with acceptable
56
medical documentation. He was given a pre-disciplinary interview
on January 18, 2006, [at] which I informed him of his
unacceptable medical documentation. To date I have had no
response.” (2006 ROI, Aff. C p. 9 of 9.) Plaintiff was
terminated effective March 31, 2006.
The Court is not unsympathetic to plaintiff’s position. It
is seemingly illogical that the Postal Service, which sent
Plaintiff home in the first instance, would demand continuing
justification from Plaintiff to remain involuntarily out of work,
and would judge him “absent without leave” without ever summoning
him to return to duty. However, plaintiff’s claims do not rise
and fall on the logic of the employer’s action. “The question is
never whether the employer was mistaken, cruel, unethical, out of
his head, or downright irrational in taking the action for the
stated reason, but simply whether the stated reason was his
reason: not a good reason, but the true reason.” Forrester v.
Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 2006). The
record evidence in this case demonstrates that over a period of
three years, the Postal Service repeatedly, consistently and
clearly told plaintiff to provide updated medical documentation
and warned him that failure to do so could result in discipline
up to and including termination. Plaintiff failed to comply with
these requests. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Postal
Service has carried its burden by demonstrating that it
57
terminated plaintiff for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason:
failing to provide updated medical documentation.
Plaintiff makes several arguments that the Agency’s reason
for terminating him was pretextual. He argues that (1) the
notice of removal listed other reasons for his termination, which
are illegitimate; (2) the Postal Service advanced yet another
illegitimate reason for termination - plaintiff’s refusal to
accept a job offer from the Agency; and (3) plaintiff was treated
less favorably than a similarly-situated woman. After careful
consideration, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court
finds that none of plaintiff’s arguments discredits defendant’s
asserted non-discriminatory reason for his termination.
In his Opposition, plaintiff states: “the Postal Service put
forth two reasons for terminating [him]: 1) being AWOL from May
20, 2003 to June 24, 2005; 2) failure to provide a document to
support his statement that he was sent home on January 25, 2002.
The Plaintiff can rebut both these reasons.” (Pl. Opp. at 13,
(citing Notice of Removal).) The Court agrees that plaintiff has
rebutted the second reason; however, he has failed to rebut the
first.
Plaintiff clearly demonstrates that he repeatedly documented
the Postal Service’s decision to send him home, and that the
Agency knew it. He correctly points out that in both 2003 and
2004 he provided the Agency with copies of its own letter of
58
January 23, 2002, which states, in relevant part, “due to the
closure of the Brentwood facility . . . Plant Operations has
indicated it is no longer able to accommodate your restrictions.
Effective Friday, January 25, you should no longer report” for
work. (Pl. Att. 3, Jan 23, 2002 Letter.) Moreover, he correctly
notes that in 2004 the Postal Service acknowledged, in writing,
that it had sent him home in 2002. (Pl. Opp. at 13-14, (citing
Sept. 27, 2004 Letter from H. Jackson-Baker to Plaintiff).)
Defendant provided no evidence to counter plaintiff’s clear
and convincing evidence that the Postal Service instructed him to
go home in 2002, and that he repeatedly documented that fact to
the Postal Service. Indeed, defendant did not even mention this
“reason” for his termination in its motion for summary judgment.
The Court thus has no trouble concluding that any alleged doubts
defendant had about the circumstances of plaintiff being sent
home in 2002 were not a true reason for his termination.
However, the Court cannot find that the plaintiff has
rebutted the other reason for removal stated in his Notice of
Termination: the fact that he was AWOL. In his opposition,
plaintiff argues that he did not go to work because he “was told
not to report to work, effective January 25, 2002. He never
received a call nor letter to return to work,” accordingly, he
could not have been AWOL. (Pl. Opp. at 14.) This argument misses
the mark. As set forth above, the issues of plaintiff’s failure
to report to work and his failure to provide medical
59
documentation are in fact one and the same. Defendant sent
plaintiff home in 2002 because it could not provide him with work
consistent with his medical restrictions. The Postal Service
took the position that from that point on, it was plaintiff’s
burden to regularly update his medical documentation. Without
such continuing documentation, Agency managers claimed, they had
no way to know whether plaintiff had any restrictions and no way
to assess whether and in what capacity plaintiff could return to
work. And the Agency further took the position – clearly,
repeatedly, and often in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS, that without
medical evidence demonstrating that plaintiff did have
restrictions, the Agency would assume that he had none, and
accordingly, was AWOL. The record demonstrates that Postal
Service management clearly and consistently communicated its
position to plaintiff, who chose to provide little to no
information responsive to its requests. Plaintiff offers no
evidence that the USPS selectively enforced the medical
documentation requirements against males, African-Americans,
employees with disabilities or plaintiff in particular. Rather,
as already described, plaintiff takes the position that the
Agency’s demands for continuous medical updates were foolish and
unnecessary. The Court does not necessarily disagree with the
substance of that position. However, this Court does not sit as
a “super-personnel department that [re]examines an entity’s
60
business decisions”, even in termination cases. Kelly v. Mills,
–- F.Supp.2d –-, 2010 WL 22669, *18 (D.D.C. Jan. 6,
2010)(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds
that “plaintiff’s disagreement with USPS policy on [the need to
submit updated] medical documentation would not cause a
reasonable jury to find that defendant’s stated reason for
plaintiff’s” termination – failure to submit the required
documents - “is a pretext for . . . discrimination.” Franklin,
600 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (quoting Lawson v. Potter, 463 F.Supp.2d
1270, 1286 (D. Kan. 2006)).
Plaintiff next argues that his termination is unlawful
because he can rebut yet another reason proffered by the Postal
Service for termination: its claim that the Agency offered him a
job in 2003 and/or 2005, which he turned down. (Pl. Opp. at 15-
16.) Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has rebutted this reason,
the Court’s analysis does not change; as discussed above, the
Court has already found that defendant has proffered one
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating plaintiff, and
plaintiff has failed to show that reason is pretext for
discrimination or retaliation. As plaintiff concedes in his
opposition brief, the employer only needs one good reason to
succeed on summary judgment. (Pl. Opp. at 6, citing Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d. 1284, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“if
the only explanations set forth in the record have been rebutted,
61
the jury is permitted to search for others, and may, in
appropriate circumstances draw an inference of discrimination.”))
See also Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)
(It is only when “all legitimate reasons for [an adverse action]
have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s
actions” that the fact finder can infer that “the employer, who
[the fact finder] generally assume[s] acts only with some reason,
based [its] decision on an impermissible consideration.”)
(emphasis in original).
Finally, plaintiff’s evidence regarding a purportedly
similarly situated female co-worker is insufficient to show that
defendant’s termination of plaintiff was merely a pretext for
gender based determination. To show that employees are similarly
situated, “plaintiff . . . must demonstrate that all of the
relevant aspects of [his] employment situation were ‘nearly
identical’ to those of [his comparables].” Bolden v. Winter, 602
F. Supp. 2d 130, 140 (D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. In his opposition,
plaintiff states that Ms. Thomas was injured on the job, laid off
in January 2002, and called back to work at the P&DC in 2004.
(Pl. Opp. at 18.) He then declares, without any evidentiary
support or citation to the record, that “Ms. Thomas was never
judged AWOL and she was never subjected to any pre-disciplinary
hearings or asked for additional medical information or subject
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to removal.” (Id.)
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving
party’s opposition must consist of more than mere unsupported
allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits or
other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Plaintiff’s allegations are
wholly without support, and are thus insufficient to establish a
genuine issue of material fact and defeat defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff argues that he “has made out a claim for hostile
work environment based on race and retaliation.” (Pl. Opp. at
22.) He does not specify what alleged conduct he bases his claim
upon, but states generally that “the conduct of which the
plaintiff complains were [sic] not so isolated or discrete but
consisted of several actions which were ongoing at the same
time.” (Opp. at 23.) In the absence of any other indication from
the plaintiff, the Court infers from this statement that
plaintiff bases his hostile work environment claim on the same
acts upon which he bases his discrimination/retaliation claims.
Plaintiff cannot rely on the discrete acts upon which he
bases his claims of discrimination and retaliation claims to
establish he was subject to a hostile work environment. To
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prevail on a hostile work environment claim, “a plaintiff must
show that his employer subjected him to discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201(citations omitted.) Another judge on this Court has
persuasively explained the distinction between disparate
treatment and hostile work environment claims, in addition to the
perils of permitting plaintiff to conflate the two:
The dangers of allowing standard disparate treatment
claims to be converted into a contemporaneous hostile
work environment claim are apparent. Such an action
would significantly blur the distinctions between both
the elements that underpin each cause of action and
the kinds of harm each cause of action was designed to
address. A hostile work environment [claim]. . . must
be based on one unlawful employment practice of
pervasive, insulting, discriminatory conduct that makes
the plaintiff's day-to-day work environment severely
abusive. Therefore, cobbling together a number of
distinct, disparate acts will not create a hostile work
environment. For example, if an employee is discrimin-
atorily denied ten promotions over a period of time, that
pattern of conduct may give rise to ten separate claims
under Title VII, but it would not create a hostile work
environment claim based on pervasive intimidation,
insult and ridicule.
Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 82 (D.D.C. 2007)
(alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted)
(Huvelle, J.).
The Rattigan court’s reasoning applies with equal force in
this case, and clearly demonstrates why plaintiff's attempt to
raise a hostile work environment claim is unavailing. Plaintiff
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has done nothing more than reassert his disparate treatment and
retaliation claims - all of which are discrete employment actions
– and baldly claim that these same actions constitute a hostile
work environment. The conclusory invocation of the term “hostile
work environment” is insufficient to transform the nature of his
claims. See Rattigan, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (“Plaintiff should
not be permitted to ‘bootstrap’ his alleged discrete acts of
discrimination and retaliation into a broader hostile work
environment claim.” (quoting Keeley, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 51;
Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 31-33 (D.D.C. 2003)
(rejecting the plaintiff's argument that “the specific alleged
incidents of discrimination she has raised collectively
constitutes a hostile work environment”; noting that “it is not
at all clear that mere reference to alleged disparate acts of
discrimination against plaintiff can ever be transformed, without
more, into a hostile work environment claim.”)).
Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff could “simply
regurgitate his disparate treatment claims in an effort to flesh
out a hostile work environment claim,” his effort fails given the
facts of this case. Smith v. Jackson, 539 F. Supp. 2d 116, 138
(D.D.C. 2008). Plaintiff’s claims in this case constitute eight
discrete instances of alleged discrimination/retaliation over a
period of eight years. Some of the acts alleged are as
temporally minute as missing three hours’ sick leave or losing an
overtime opportunity on a single day. The alleged conduct simply
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does not translate into “pervasive, insulting, discriminatory
conduct that makes the plaintiff's day-to-day work environment
severely abusive,” which is the standard he must meet to sustain
a hostile work environment claim. Rattigan, 503 F. Supp. 2d at
82 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
117 (2002); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S.
75, 81 (1998).) Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment
on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary
judgment [Doc. No. 52] is GRANTED. An appropriate order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 31, 2010
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