Estate of Marani Awanis Manook v. Unity Resources Group

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ESTATE OF MARANI AWANIS MANOOK ) Civil Action No. 1:08-0096-JDS
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION
vs. ) AND ORDER
)
RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, )
INTERNATIONAL and UNITY RESOURCES )
GROUP, L.L.C., )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
JALAL ASKANDER ANTRANICK ) Civil Action No. 1:08-0595-JDS
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, )
INTERNATIONAL and UNITY RESOURCES )
GROUP, L.L.C., )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
Presently before the Court are pending Motions to Dismiss by Defendants Research
Triangle Institute (“RTI”) and Unity Resources Group (“Unity”) in the separate cases of
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Plaintiffs Marani Awanis Manook and Jalal Askander Antranick. Because the factual and legal
issues in both cases are similar, the Parties have agreed to consolidate their respective cases for
the purposes of this Order.
In Plaintiff Manook’s case, Defendant RTI’s Motion seek (1) to dismiss Plaintiff
Manook’s First Amended Complaint; (2) for a More Definite Statement with respect to Counts
IV-XVI; and (3) to transfer any remaining claims to the U.S. District for the Eastern District of
North Carolina.
In Plaintiff Antranick’s case, Defendant RTI’s Motion seeks to (1) dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint; (2) to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief; and
(3) to transfer any remaining claims to the U.S. District of North Carolina.
In both Plaintiffs Manook and Antranick’s cases, Defendant Unity’s Motion seeks to
dismiss for (1) lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) failure of service of process. A hearing has
been held on these motions and the Court is prepared to render a ruling at this time.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Research Triangle Institute is under contract with the United States Agency
for International Development (“USAID”) to provide governmental development and support to
the Iraqi government. Defendant Unity Resources Group is a private security contractor
employed by Defendant RTI to provide protection to RTI employees and staff while they are in
Iraq.
The Complaints allege that on October 9, 2007, Plaintiff Marani Awanis Manook was
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driving on Karrada Street in Baghdad, Iraq. Genevia Jalal Antranick, named Plaintiff Jalal
Askander Antranick’s daughter, was a passenger in Manook’s vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant Unity personnel, while in the course of their service to Defendant RTI, shot and killed
Marani Manook and Genevia Antranick without cause. Plaintiffs allege other incidents wherein
other Iraqi citizens were killed by Defendant Unity.
Plaintiffs bring claims for (1) war crime violations of the Alien Tort Statute; (2) Aiding
and Abetting under the Alien Tort Statute; (3) violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act;
(4) Assault and Battery; (5) Wrongful Death; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7)
Negligence; (8) Negligence in failing to rescue; and (9) Negligent Hiring, Training and
Supervision.
Given that the issues in both cases are very similar, the pending motions shall be
consolidated and analyzed together.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleadings under
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules is essentially the same as that for motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). See Schuchart v. La Taberna Del Alabardero, Inc., 365 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C.Cir.2004);
Ramirez v. Dep't of Corrections, 222 F.3d 1238, 1240-41 (10th Cir.2000); Haynesworth v.
Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1254 (D.C.Cir.1987). On either motion, the Court may not rely on facts
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outside the pleadings and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C.Cir.1994). As with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may grant judgment on
the pleadings only if the facts alleged in the complaint do not “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), or fail to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127
S.Ct. 1955; see also Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund v. Disa, 583 F.Supp.2d 95, 99 (D.D.C.2008)
(dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(c) “if the plaintiff fails to plead ‘enough facts to state a
claim [to] relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955)).
DISCUSSION
1. Defendant Unity Resources Group’s Motions to Dismiss
In bringing the present motion, Defendant Unity contends that (1) it has not been
properly served and (2) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Unity.
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS - relates solely to Plaintiff Manook’s case
Regarding the issue of proper service of process, Unity contends that it is a corporation
organized under the laws of the country of Singapore with its principal base of business in
Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. Unity contends that Plaintiff Manook provided “Notice of
Service” to Unity on March 4, 2008 by sending a package of documents, including the summons,
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original complaint to Unity’s offices in Dubai by DHL and Federal Express.1 Defendant
contends that Plaintiff Manook’s “Notice of Service” stated that it served Unity pursuant to Rule
4(f)(2)(C)(ii) which allows service in a foreign country to be done by use of “any form of mail
that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt . . .” Id.Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 directs service of process in civil suits. Rule 4(h)(2) directs service of a
corporation in a place “not within any judicial district of the United States” to be done in a
manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an individual, “except personal delivery under
(f)(2)(C)(i). Id.Defendant Unity contends that Plaintiff Manook’s service of process is defective on the
grounds that (1) the DHL package was not addressed to Unity’s current address and as such was
not properly addressed to Defendant as required by Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii); (2) the clerk’s prepared
package was delivered to DHL by Plaintiff’s counsel, a non-neutral party; (3) Plaintiff’s manner
in which it performed the service of process was not only contrary to the Federal Rules, it
conflicts with how the U.S. District of Columbia’s Clerks Office performs delivery; (4) the
record reflects no evidence that the Clerk’s Office effectuated service on Defendant Unity; and
(5) a private courier, like the one Plaintiff Manook used, is not considered “mail” for purposes of
Rule 4.
In response, Plaintiff Manook states that the Clerk’s office was very much involved in
the service of the necessary documents on Defendant Unity. Specifically, Manook contends that
the Clerk’s Office addressed and sealed the document package and made two attempts to use a
1
DEFENDANT UNITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Doc. #15), Butler Declaration, Exhibit D, ¶ 4.
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commercial messenger service but to no avail.2 Consequently Plaintiff’s Attorney then acted as
the courier to DHL and did nothing more than deliver the document package.
This Court finds that the Clerk’s Office was in fact engaged in the process serving and
that good faith efforts were made to serve via commercial messenger service and therefore that is
sufficient for this Court to conclude that Plaintiff’s conduct did not invalidate service.
Moreover, Defendant Unity has failed to show evidence of malfeasance or some prejudice (aside
from being sued of course) by Plaintiff in her efforts to effectuate proper service.
Regarding Unity’s claim that delivery to an incorrect address negates proper service,
Plaintiff Manook states that the delivered address (although ultimately incorrect) was published
on Unity’s website as its business address. Further Unity admits that this address was its prior
business address and remains the address of an affiliated business. Defendant Unity cites to a
number of cases wherein private courier is insufficient to establish proper service.
However, this issue is rendered moot because this Court concludes that Unity has since
been properly served via the Mayor of the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C. Code § 29-
101.108(b). That statute authorizes service upon the mayor when, among other reasons, the
registered agent cannot be found with reasonable diligence and does not require a plaintiff to
deliver a copy of the process paperwork to the defendant's corporate address. Id. The statute
contemplates that after the mayor is served, it is “the [m]ayor [who] shall immediately cause one
of the copies to be forwarded by registered or certified mail to the corporation at its principal
office ....” D.C. CODE § 29-101.108(b). Moreover, Plaintiff has since discovered Unity’s
2
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO UNITY RESOURCE GROUP’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(Doc. # 22), O’Neil Declaration ¶¶ 3-9.
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business office here in the District and has served the summons and Complaint onto Defendant
Unity pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that Plaintiff Manook’s efforts are
sufficient for purposes of Rule 4 regarding service of process and that Defendant Unity’s Motion
to Dismiss on improper service shall be DENIED.
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION - relates to both cases
Defendant Unity contends that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this District in
either the Manook or the Antranick case. Specifically, Unity contends that it is a non-resident
defendant that has neither an enduring relationship nor is doing business in the District of
Columbia as to justify a finding of personal jurisdiction.
Where an issue of personal jurisdiction is raised, “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to
establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants and allege specific facts upon
which personal jurisdiction may be based.” Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 53
(D.D.C.1998). The D.C. Court of Appeals has set forth a two-part inquiry for establishing
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. First, a court must “examine whether
jurisdiction is applicable under the state's long-arm statute,” and second, “determine whether a
finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process.” GTE New Media
Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C.Cir.2000).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court may obtain personal jurisdiction over Unity on the basis of
either the D.C. long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423, for transacting business in the District of
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Columbia, or the District of Columbia's general jurisdiction statute, D.C.Code § 13-334.
1. Specific Jurisdiction
A finding of specific jurisdiction within the District is dictated by D.C.Code Ann §
13-423(a)(1). That statute states that “[A] District of Columbia court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” Plaintiffs’
claims sound in tort and arise from events alleged to constitute negligence which did not take
place in the District of Columbia. The Court is urged to assume jurisdiction under D.C.Code
Ann. § 13-423(a)(1), the "transacting business" provision of the long-arm statute.
Due Process requires that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Health Communications, Inc. v. Mariner Corp., 860 F.2d 460, 462
(D.C.Cir.1988) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists when “the defendant purposefully avails [himself]
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). While “[e]ven a small
amount of in-jurisdiction business activity is generally enough to permit the conclusion that a
nonresident defendant has transacted business here,” Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746
A.2d 320, 331 (D.C. 2000), it is important to remember that “[t]he Court must resolve personal
jurisdiction issues ‘on a case-by-case basis.’ ” Cellutech, Inc. v. Centennial Cellular Corp., 871
F.Supp. 46, 49 (D.D.C.1994) (quoting Envtl. Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs,
Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 811 (D.C.1976)).
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More importantly, any claim for relief under the D.C. long-arm statute must “aris[e]
from” the act or acts conferring jurisdiction over the defendant. D.C.Code § 13-423(b). This
limitation is intended to exclude all claims “that do not bear some relationship to the acts in the
forum state relied upon to confer jurisdiction.” Jackson v. Loews Washington Cinemas, Inc., 944
A.2d 1088, 1092 (D.C. 2008) (citing Cohane v. Arpeja-California, Inc., 385 A.2d 153, 158 (D.C.
1978)).
Here, the undisputed record reflects that the Defendant Unity Resources is a Singaporean
corporation that is headquartered in Dubai. Further the tortious acts alleged in both Plaintiffs’
Complaints occurred in Iraq. Plaintiffs have alleged no legitimate and substantial connection
between the acts that occurred in Iraq and this District to form a basis for jurisdiction. Gonzalez
v. Internacional De Elevadores, S.A., 891 A.2d 227, 234 (D.C. 2006). Consequently, nothing on
the face of these facts lead this Court to conclude that there is a “discernible relationship”
between the Plaintiffs’ claims raised and the business transacted in the District. Shoppers Food
Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335 (D.C.2000).
To the extent Plaintiffs rely on contract theory to establish specific jurisdiction, this
Court finds that argument to be without merit. Plaintiffs contend that specific jurisdiction exists
over Defendant Unity because Unity had a contract with Defendant RTI who also had a contract
with USAID which is based within the District. Further Plaintiffs argue that said contract
contains a clause that is binding on all of RTI’s subcontractors (i.e. Unity) and therefore personal
jurisdiction exist over Unity.
First, it is undisputed that the contract with Unity and RTI was executed in Dubai and not
in the District. Gowens v. Dyncorp, 132 F.Supp.2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2001). Second, Unity’s
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contacts with RTI within the United States occurred in North Carolina and not within the
District. Lastly, this Court concludes that to rely on a subcontractor clause found in a contract
between RTI and USAID to obtain personal jurisdiction over Unity is too tenuous a connection
as to establish a jurisdictional basis and further is unsupported by case law. For the foregoing
reasons, this Court concludes that there is no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Unity under the long-arm statute, D.C.Code Ann § 13-423(a)(1).
2. General Jurisdiction
Presently Defendant Unity seeks dismissal on the grounds that this Court may not
exercise general jurisdiction over it. Specifically, Unity contends that it’s business contacts
within the District are not continuous, systematic and substantial. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). In response, Plaintiffs contend that they have
presented prima facie evidence of general jurisdiction that at the very least would allow for
limited discovery on the issue of jurisdictional facts. On the matter of personal jurisdiction,
federal courts are to look to the state law. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
D.C. Code § 13-422 provides that
A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person
domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place
of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim or relief. Id.D.C. Code § 13-334 provides for personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when
said corporation is (1) served with process within the District of Columbia and (2) is doing
business in the District. Id.; Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
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Unity contends that because it was served outside the District and is domiciled, organized
and maintains operations outside of the District of Columbia, under § 13-422, this Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over it. Further, Unity argues that even if it was served within the District,
it would still not be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court because its business contacts with the
District are not “substantial” nor “continuous and systematic.” Gorman, 293 F.3d at 510.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant has “purposely established minimum contacts with the
forum State,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d
528 (1985), “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.
95 (1945) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These minimum contacts must be
grounded in “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities with the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. “This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or
attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id., 471 U.S.
at 475.
In the instant case, Defendant Unity is a foreign based corporation that was providing
services in Iraq where the events of the present case arose. The crux of the issue is whether
Unity’s “conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [it] should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there. ” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
297, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
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The contacts that Plaintiffs Manook and Antranick allege establish personal jurisdiction
within the District are (1) the presence of Defendant Unity’s office at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue
within the District that is staffed by an independent contractor; (2) the contract between
Defendant RTI and USAID wherein Defendant Unity is a subcontracting party; (3) a Unity
employee Mike Fiacco as Defendant’s point of contact within the District; and(4) Defendant
Unity’s website.
In considering general jurisdiction, courts recognize the distinction between cases in
which the cause of action arises in the forum and those which it does not. For those which do
not arise in the forum, courts have made clear that “ the defendant’s activities must be not only
continuous but also ‘substantial.’” Hughes v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., 490 A.2d 1140, 1149
(1985). The weight accorded to these contacts varies greatly with the circumstances of each
case, Hughes v. A.H. Robins, at 1146.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs have requested limited jurisdictional discovery. As yet, no
discovery has been allowed. It is evident that Defendant Unity has a presence in the District.
The main question is whether that presence is sufficiently “substantial” that it could expect to be
“haled into Court.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp, 444 U.S. at 297. Further, “[A] plaintiff
faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is entitled to reasonable
discovery, lest the defendant defeat the jurisdiction of a federal court by withholding information
on its contacts with the forum.” El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir.
1996). From this Court’s review, given the existing record, it is unclear how substantial
Defendant Unity’s connections are with this District. Therefore, this Court shall GRANT
Plaintiffs’ requests for limited jurisdictional discovery.
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3. Jurisdictional Discovery
Jurisdictional discovery “is appropriate when the existing record is ‘inadequate’ to
support personal jurisdiction and a party demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional
allegations through discovery. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Prod., Inc., 395 F.3d
1275, 1283 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199
F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (D.C.Cir.2000) ) (emphasis added).
Here, it is evident that jurisdictional discovery is needed. However, that discovery shall
be limited to the Defendant Unity’s financial and business presence solely within the District.
Further, the Court shall allow the Plaintiffs until March 26, 2010 complete their jurisdictional
discovery as to Defendant Unity. The Parties shall then submit simultaneous briefing regarding
Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by April 16, 2010.
4. Conspiracy Jurisdiction
Lastly, Plaintiff Antranick, in order to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction in
the District, asks this Court to rely on the theory of conspiracy jurisdiction. Specifically,
Plaintiff Antranick alleges that Defendant Unity has conspired with Defendant RTI, who has
substantial contacts within the District, to create and maintain policies which resulted in the
death of Plaintiff Antranick’s daughter as well as the deaths of other innocent people in Iraq.
For “conspiracy” jurisdiction within the District, the plaintiff must allege “(1) the
existence of a civil conspiracy ..., (2) the defendant's participation in the conspiracy, and (3) an
overt act by a co-conspirator within the forum, subject to the long-arm statute, and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.” Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F.Supp.2d. 76, 81 n. 4 (D.D.C.2006); see also
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Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C.Cir.1991). More
importantly, “[A] plaintiff seeking to meet its burden of demonstrating that a court may
exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants under a conspiracy theory must present a
particularized pleading of the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” AGS Intern. Services S.A. v. Newmont USA Ltd., 346 F.Supp.2d
64, 88 (D.D.C. 2004).
Plaintiff Antranick’s Complaint discusses civil conspiracy in ¶¶ 55 - 56. A reading of
those paragraphs make the most general of allegations regarding civil conspiracy and fall short
of the particularized pleadings required to establish such jurisdiction. There is “no concrete
evidence in the record indicating that there was a common plan.” First Chicago Int’l v. United
Exch. Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Consequently, the Court concludes
that these bare allegations are insufficient to establish conspiracy jurisdiction.
5. Conclusion
Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss for having been improperly served is DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is RESERVED pending
additional discovery. The Parties shall have until March 26, 2010 to complete limited
jurisdictional discovery as to Defendant Unity’s financial and business activities solely within
the District. The Parties shall then submit simultaneous briefing regarding Defendant Unity’s
Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by April 16, 2010.
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2. Defendant RTI’s Motions to Dismiss
In bringing its Motions to Dismiss, RTI requests the following relief from the Court:
1. dismissal of the Plaintiffs Manook and Antranick’s Complaints in their entirety
because no one is authorized at this time, under governing Iraqi law and the law
of this judicial district, to assert Plaintiff Manook's Claims
2. dismissal of Plaintiffs Manook and Antranick’s claims under the Alien Tort
Statute because these claims, even taken as true, do not constitute war crimes;
3. dismissal of Plaintiff Antranick’s claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act
because Plaintiff Antranick cannot establish that Defendants acted under color of
state law;
4. dismissal of Plaintiff Antranick’s claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress for failure to state a claim;
5. an order directing Plaintiff Manook to provide a more definite statement on
Counts IV-XVI, identifying both the statutes and governing law under which
Plaintiff seeks relief;
6. a transfer of any remaining claims to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina on the basis that there is little relationship between the
District of Columbia and this dispute.
A. ESTATE REQUIREMENTS - relates to both cases
RTI contends that dismissal of the complaint is appropriate because this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Looking first at Plaintiff Manook, RTI
contends that the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff Manook has
failed to name an authorized representative. Specifically, RTI contends that the Estate is not a
proper plaintiff.
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As a general rule, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a), the estate cannot be a plaintiff in a lawsuit.
In addition, claims under the wrongful death statute requires that the action be brought by the
representative of the decedent. D.C. Code section 16-2702 (2001); Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc.,
558 F.Supp. 1233, 1234 (D.D.C. 1983). Similarly, claims brought under a survival statute also
require that the action be brought by a legal representative of the deceased. D.C. Code § 12-101.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17, the capacity to represent the estate of a foreign
decedent is governed by the law of the state in which the district court is held. In the District of
Columbia, a foreign personal representative “[U]pon the filing of a copy of the appointment as
personal representative in another jurisdiction” may exercise "all the powers of such office and
may sue and be sued in the District of Columbia." In re Estate of Monge, 841 A.2d 769, 774
(D.C. 2004) (citing D.C. Code §§ 20-341 and 20-342). The District of Columbia Wrongful
Death Statute provides that: "[a]n action pursuant to this chapter shall be brought by and in the
name of the personal representative of the deceased person..." D.C. Code § 16-2702 (2001). A
personal representative under D.C. law is defined as "officially appointed executors or
administrators." Saunders, 558 F. Supp. at 1235. The right to bring a wrongful death action is
conferred upon only one person, the personal representative, to the exclusion of all others. See
Group Health Ass'n. Inc. v. Gatlin, 463 A.2d 700, 701 (D.C. 1983); Cole. Raywid & Braverman
v. Quadrangle, 444 A.2d 969, 971 (D.C. 1982). The term personal representative is strictly
construed under D.C. law to mean only the decedent's executor or administrator. Saunders, 558
F. Supp. at 1235.
In Saunders, the widow of the decedent, the personal representative, brought an action
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which she subsequently settled. 558 F. Supp. at 1234. The decedent's parents thereafter brought
their own action. The court dismissed the action of the parents because neither had been the duly
appointed personal representative of the estate. That concluded that the term "personal
representative" as used in this section is limited to officially appointed executors and
administrators.558 F. Supp. at 1235.
However, under Iraqi law, heirs of the decedent may apply to the responsible court and
submit certain documents to obtain a "Qassam Sharie." Upon receipt of a court-issued Qassam
Sharie, the duly-appointed heir may act as the decedent's personal representative in a legal
action.
Here, Plaintiff Manook states that the Estate has the Qassam Sharie documents and will
provide them during the course of discovery. As to the registration requirement, Plaintiff
contends that since it has no property within the District, the Estate need not file with the
Register.
The Court concludes that the fact that Plaintiff Manook has obtained the Qassam Sharie
is sufficient to establish the existence of a personal representative. However, Plaintiff’s present
action can be considered a form of property. Bullard v. Curry-Cloonan, 367 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.
1976). Therefore, Plaintiff Manook's failure to file the Qassam Sharie documents with the
Register prevents the Estate from bringing suit. However, this Court concludes that this
procedural oversight is curable and directs Plaintiff to file the Qassam Sharie documents with the
Register within 14 days of the issuance of this Order.
As to Plaintiff Genevia Antranick, Jalal Askander Antranick contends that as her father, he
is the only surviving relative to his daughter and since she has no property in the District of
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Columbia, there is no requirement that he open a probate proceeding and be named legal
representative. Further, he contends that he should be able to bring suit in his own name for
wrongful death. The Court notes that unlike Plaintiff Manook, Plaintiff Jalal Antranick has not
claimed that he has the Qassam Sharie documents.
Further, the record reflects and Plaintiff Jalal Antranick admits that he has not proceeded
through the probate system under D.C. law in order to be named the personal representative.
However, like Plaintiff Manook, if Plaintiff Jalal is able to provide the Qassam Sharie documents
within 14 days of the issuance of this Order, this Court will recognize those documents to establish
his right to proceed as Plaintiff Genevia Askander’s personal representative.
In the event that Plaintiff Antranick does not have the Qassam Sharie documents, he will so
notify the Court and shall inform the Court of the anticipated time needed to obtain said documents
or his intent to proceed through the District’s probate system.
B. DISMISSAL OF COUNTS UNDER ALIEN TORT STATUTE
- relates to both cases
Plaintiff Antranick’s First Cause of Action brings a claim against Defendant RTI under the
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) alleging that Defendants’ conduct constitutes war crimes in violation
of the law of nations. Plaintiff Manook also brings Claims under the ATS in Counts I, II and III.
Defendant RTI seeks dismissal of Manook’s Counts I-III and Antranick’s First Cause of
Action on the grounds that, because RTI is a non-governmental organization, the Alien Tort Statute
does not apply to it.
The ATS provides that “[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
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United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The ATS confers federal subject matter jurisdiction when three
independent conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty ratified by the United States. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
887-88 (2d Cir.1980).
Further, the ATS may be used against corporations acting under “color of [state] law,” or for
a handful of private acts, such as piracy and slave trading. Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F.Supp.2d 221, 227
(D.D.C. 2007); Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1301 (S.D.Fla.2003);
Nat'l Coal. Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D.Cal.1997) (citing
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring));
see generally Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96CIV8386, 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb.28, 2002).
However, Courts have limited a corporation’s liability exposure under the ATS for
violations of the law of nations to apply only to state actors and then only in very narrow
circumstances that are not presented here. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F.Supp.2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005);
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This notion has been reinforced
in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Doe I) wherein the Court held that "only states, and not corporations
or individuals, may be liable for international law violations." 393 F.Supp. 2d 20,26 (D.D.C. 2005)
(citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,542 U.S. 692, 733 n.20 (2004)
In support of their argument that Defendants have committed war crimes, Plaintiffs rely on
customary norms regarding the treatment of civilians. Specifically, they cite to the War Crimes
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1)(3) (1996). That statute defines a “war crime” to be conduct that is
“defined as a grave breach of any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August
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1949." Id. Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War defines “grave breaches” to include “willful killing . . . of a protected
person.” From a facial review of the Geneva Convention and “War Crime” statute and balancing
that against the factual allegations in the Complaints, it appears that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient
facts to establish that Defendants have allegedly committed war crimes and thus met their burden
in order to survive a motion to dismiss.
Further Plaintiffs allege that Defendant RTI is a state actors and thus subject to ATS liability
for violations of the law of nations because RTI contracted with the USAID to engage in the
development of better governmental infrastructures in Iraq. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that they cannot
bring suit in Iraq because Defendants were working under contract with the United States, and are
therefore immune to the Iraqi legal process.3 As a result, Plaintiffs contend that this Court is the
only venue available for any redress.
RTI responds arguing that because it is a non-governmental organization, it cannot be held
liable for its own alleged violations of the law of nations much less the alleged violations of
Defendant Unity. In support, RTI goes on to cite a line of cases wherein Courts have been
disinclined to extend liability under the law of nations to private non-state conduct. Further, in
Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards, in his concurrence, identified a handful of crimes to which the law
attributes personal responsibility, including slavery and piracy, however, he cautioned against
extending the definition of the law of nations absent direction from the Supreme Court. Id. at 792.
Here, it is undisputed that Defendant RTI was a private contractor for USAID. However,
the subject of the contract, i.e. rebuilding of governmental infrastructure, is not what gave rise to the
3
Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 at Sec. 1(11)-(15), Sec. 4(3).
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deaths of Ms. Manook and Ms. Antranick. Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants willfully
participated “in joint activity with the State or its agents” to kill either women. Arias, 517
F.Supp.2d at 228 (citing Brentwood Acad. V. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,
296 (2001)); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir.1995) (“The ‘color of law’ jurisprudence
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official action for
purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act.”) Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
Defendant RTI’s actions which allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ deaths were cloaked in the authority of
the USAID.4 Arias, 517 F.Supp.2d at 228 ( citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S.Ct. 473,
5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)). Consequently, this Court concludes that Defendants RTI and Unity were
private actors and not state actors when the deaths occurred.
It appears that, at least for purposes of surviving a Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to establish that Defendants have allegedly committed war crimes in violation of the
law of nations. Nevertheless, because this Court concludes that Defendant RTI is not a state actor,
Plaintiff Manook’s claims in Counts I, II and III and Plaintiff Antranick’s claim in her First Cause
of Action alleging violations of the law of nations under the ATS is not actionable. Defendants
were private, rather than official actors and therefore were not acting under the color of state law
when they allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ deaths. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F.Supp.2d 55, 57 (D.D.C.
2006) (affirmed 2009 WL 2902081 (C.A.D.C.)). For the foregoing reasons, Defendant RTI’s
Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II and III of Plaintiff Manook’s Complaint and the First Cause of
4
Unlike our present case, in Arias, defendants contracted with the U.S. State Department
to engage in aerial spraying of cocaine and heroin fields in Colombia. Id., 517 F.Supp.2d at 228.
The Arias plaintiffs alleged injuries arose from defendants performance of the contract and thus
the Arias Court found sufficient alleged facts to establish state action. Here, the purpose for
which the Defendant RTI contracted with U.S.A.I.D. does not give rise to Plaintiffs’ injuries.
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Action of Plaintiff Antranick’s Complaint is GRANTED.
C. DISMISSAL OF TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT
- relates solely to Plaintiff Antranick’s case
Defendant RTI seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Antranick’s Second Cause of Action relating to
the Torture Victim Protection Act. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350, establishes a civil action against an “individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation” subjects another to “torture” or “extrajudicial killing.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350.
Like the ATS, the analysis here turns on whether Defendant RTI was acting under the color
of state law when the incidents involving Plaintiffs occurred. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 2002 WL 319887, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.28, 2002). In Wiwa, defendants were found to be
acting under color of law in the perpetration of torture and extrajudicial killings. Id. at *14-15.
Here, Defendants were not acting under color of law.
As noted above, the subject of the contract between RTI and USAID, i.e. rebuilding of
governmental infrastructure, was not what gave rise to the deaths of Ms. Manook and Ms. Askander.
Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants willfully participated “in joint activity with the State or
its agents” to kill either women. Arias, 517 F.Supp.2d at 228 (citing Brentwood Acad. V. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d
Cir.1995). Moreover, Plaintiff Antranick has failed to establish that Defendants’ actions which
allegedly caused Plaintiff Genevia Antranick’s death was cloaked in the authority of the USAID.5
5
Unlike our present case, in Arias, defendants contracted with the U.S. State Department
to engage in aerial spraying of cocaine and heroin fields in Colombia. Id., 517 F.Supp.2d at 228.
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Arias, 517 F.Supp.2d at 228 ( citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492(1961)).
Lastly, as discussed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Saleh v. Titan Corp, with
regards to the TVPA, Congress “provided a cause of action whereby U.S. residents could sue foreign
states for torture, but did not - and we must assume that was a deliberate decision - include as
possible defendants either american government officers or private U.S. persons whether or not
acting in concert with government employees.” Id., 2009 WL 2902081 at 14.
Relying on the Saleh Court’s reading of the TVPA, this Court can conclude that Defendant
R.T.I is a private U.S. person for purposes of the TVPA and therefore not subject to liability under
that statute. Moreover, since a prerequisite to TVPA liability is that the individual be acting under
color of state law, this Court concludes that finding liability for private actors like RTI that were not
acting under color of law would be inconsistent with the statute. Defendant R.T.I.’s motion to
dismiss on this ground is GRANTED.
D. RTI’S LIABILITY FOR UNITY’S ACTIONS - relates to both cases
Defendant RTI contends that it should not be held liable for Defendant Unity’s actions.
Specifically, RTI contends that it was not even present at the time of the alleged incident. As such,
RTI contends that all of Plaintiffs’ claims that seek to tie Defendant Unity’s conduct to RTI should
be dismissed (i.e. aiding and abetting, agency theory, joint and several liability, joint venture and
The Arias plaintiffs alleged injuries arose from defendants performance of the contract and thus
the Arias Court found sufficient alleged facts to establish state action. Here, the purpose for
which the Defendant RTI contracted with U.S.A.I.D. does not give rise to Plaintiffs’ injuries.
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conspiracy). However, Plaintiffs’ Complaints allege causes of actions including civil conspiracy
and negligent hiring, training and supervision. Consequently, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as
true, this Court concludes these claims are sufficient, for the present at least, to survive Defendant
RTI’s Motion to Dismiss. Defendant RTI’s Motion to dismiss these claims is DENIED.
D. DISMISSAL OF I.I.E.D CLAIM - relates solely to Plaintiff Antranick’s case
Defendant RTI seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Antranick’s Seventh Cause of Action relating to
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). In the District of Columbia, the elements for
an IIED claim are (1) that plaintiff was present in the zone of physical danger, which was (2) created
by defendant’s negligence and (3) that plaintiff feared for his own safety. Wright v. United States,
963 F.Supp. 7, 18 (D.D.C. 1997). Further, a plaintiff must present prima facie evidence that his
emotional distress was “serious and verifiable.” Jones v. Howard Univ. Inc., 589 A.2d 419, 424
(D.C. 1991).
In the instant case, Plaintiff Jalal Askander Antranick was not present at the time of his
daughter’s shooting. Further the Complaint fails to allege “serious and verifiable” emotional
distress. Even applying the law of the State of Colorado where Plaintiff Antranick resides, which
are similar to the District of Columbia, Plaintiff cannot establish an IIED claim. Scharrel v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89, 93 (Colo. CT. App. 1997). For the foregoing reasons, Defendant
RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
is GRANTED.
E. DISMISSAL OF REQUEST OF DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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- relates solely as to Plaintiff Antranick’s case
Defendant RTI seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Antranick’s request for declaratiory and
injunctive relief. In seeking declaratory relief, Defendant contends that although declaratory relief
is proper in determining the existence of a legal right or relationships, that relief is not appropriate
for determining whether a right has been violated absent evidence of an ongoing case or controversy.
Further RTI contends that injunctive relief is inappropriate as well because Plaintiff lacks standing
to raise the claims of “other inhabitants of Baghdad.”
The Court is in agreement with Defendant RTI. Regarding declaratory relief, that type of
relief is inappropriate for the types of causes of action that Plaintiff Antranick is alleging because
there is not a continuing violation of Plaintiff’s rights or any possible threat of future violations.
Green v.Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985). Regarding the injunctive relief as to “other inhabitants of
Baghdad,” that is also inappropriate because Plaintiff does not have standing to seek relief for parties
other than himself. Walden v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s request
for declaratory and injunctive relief are GRANTED.
F. MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT - relates solely to Plaintiff Manook’s case
Regarding remaining Counts IV-XVI of Plaintiff Manook’s First Amended Complaint,
Defendant RTI asks this Court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, to order Plaintiffs to provide a more
definite statement. RTI contends that the First Amended Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)
because it does not identify the governing law or statutes under which Plaintiff seeks relief.
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Defendant asks this Court direct Plaintiff to identify the relevant jurisdiction for the claims
and compel her to provide a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). In the alternative, RTI
requests that the Court order briefing on the proposed choice of substantive law with respect to the
aforementioned counts.
After having reviewed Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and applied it to Plaintiff Manook’s First Amended
Complaint, this Court concludes that she has sufficiently met her obligation to notify RTI of the
claims and the proposed relief to an adequate degree such that Defendant is able to formulate its
responses. Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005). Therefore, for
purposes of this early stage of the legal proceedings, Defendant RTI’s Motion for a Definite
Statement is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant RTI may re-raise this issue at a later
stage if they so choose.
G. MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE - relates to both cases
Regarding any claims that survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, RTI moves this Court to
transfer both cases to the United States Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), for convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court “may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.” Id. The moving party bears the burden of establishing that the transfer of this action is
proper. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 944 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C.,1996) (citing
Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, 672 F.Supp. 525, 526 (D.D.C.1987)). Section 1404(a)
vests “discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to transfer according to individualized,
case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
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487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). Further, a court
must consider “whether the action could have been brought in the proposed transferee district.
Gemological Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Thi-Dai Phan, 145 F.Supp.2d 68, 71 (D.D.C. 2001). However, in
“assessing the convenience to the parties [in the context] of the two potentially proper venues, the
court recognizes that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is usually accorded substantial deference in the
venue analysis.” Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 104 F.Supp.2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2000).
In considering which venue is proper, courts have balanced the private interests of the
parties and the public interests of the court. Jumara v. State Farm Insurance Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879
(3rd Cir.1995); see also Heller Financial, Inc. v. Riverdale Auto Parts, Inc., 713 F.Supp. 1125, 1129
(N.D.Ill.1989). The private interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum, unless
the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants; (2) the defendants' choice of
forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the
convenience of the witnesses of the plaintiff and defendant, but only to the extent that the witnesses
may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.
Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp at 16.
The public interest considerations include: (1) the transferee's familiarity with the governing
laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts;
and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Id.The record reflects that (1) RTI is subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina; (2) the
District of Columbia has no meaningful ties to the controversy; (3) the District of Columbia is not
Plaintiffs’ home forum; (4) North Carolina is RTI’s place of incorporation and principal place of
business; (5) the Unity/RTI contract was negotiated and is presently administered in North Carolina;
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and (6) the overwhelming witnesses involved in both cases that are found in the United States are
located in North Carolina.
Plaintiffs’ sole response in opposition to transfer to North Carolina is that Unity and RTI
have offices in the District of Columbia and it would not be inconvenient for witnesses to come up
to the District.
This controversy arises from a contract formed in North Carolina that involves a sole U.S.
resident Defendant whose home forum is North Carolina. Further, the events that gave rise to these
actions did not occur in the District. As a result, after having weighed the Trout Unlimited factors,
it is evident that both cases are better served if they were transferred to the Eastern District of North
Carolina. Plaintiffs have no real ties to the District and the cases could have been brought in North
Carolina. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant RTI’s Motion to Transfer both cases to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina is GRANTED.
This Court’s grant of Defendant RTI’s Motion to Transfer does not affect the Court’s ruling
allowing limited jurisdictional discovery regarding Defendant Unity. Plaintiffs must still establish
that the Defendant Unity is subject to the transferor court’s personal jurisdiction even after the case
has been transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Klayman v. Barmak, 634 F.Supp.2d 56, 61 (D.D.C.
2009). Further, if the transferor court has not determined whether personal jurisdiction was proper,
the transferee court must make this determination as the transferor court would have done. Id. (citing
Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F.Supp. 1082, 1086-88 (S.D.N.Y.1984)).
CONCLUSION
Regarding Plaintiff Marani Manook’s case (CV 08-0096-JDS), for the foregoing reasons,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that,
1. Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 15) is DENIED
IN PART and RESERVED IN PART. Specifically,
(a) Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss for improper service of process is DENIED;
(b) Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
RESERVED pending additional jurisdictional discovery;
( c) The Parties shall have until March 26, 2010 to complete limited jurisdictional
discovery as to Defendant Unity’s financial and business activities solely within the
District. The Parties shall then submit simultaneous additional briefing regarding
Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by April 16,
2010.
2. Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, or Alternatively, Motion for
Definite Statement and to Transfer Any Remaining Claims (Doc. # 14) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically,
(a) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Manook’s First Amended Complaint
for failure to name an authorized representative is DENIED;
(b) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Manook’s Counts I, II and III relating
to the Alien Tort Statute is GRANTED;
( c) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Manook’s claims that it should not be
liable for Defendant Unity’s actions is DENIED;
(d) Defendant RTI’s Motion for a More Definite Statement on Counts IV-XVI of
Plaintiff Manook’s First Amended Complaint is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
(e) Defendant RTI’s Motion for Transfer of Venue to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina is GRANTED.
3. All remaining claims contained in Defendants RTI and Unity’s Motions that are not
discussed herein are DENIED.
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina.
******************************************************************************
Regarding Plaintiff Jalal Askander Antranick’s case (CV 08-0595-JDS), for the foregoing
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reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that,
1. Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. # 13) is
RESERVED pending additional jurisdictional discovery. Specifically,
(a) The Parties shall have until March 26, 2010 to complete limited jurisdictional
discovery as to Defendant Unity’s financial and business activities solely within the
District. The Parties shall then submit simultaneous additional briefing regarding
Defendant Unity’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by April 16,
2010.
2. Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Motion to Transfer Any Remaining Claims
(Doc. # 11) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically,
(a) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s Complaint for failure to
name an authorized representative is DENIED;
(b) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s First Cause of Action
relating to the Alien Tort Statute is GRANTED;
( c) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s Second Cause of Action
relating to the Torture Victim Protection Act is GRANTED;
(d) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s claims that it should not
be liable for Defendant Unity’s actions is DENIED;
(e) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s Seventh Cause of Action
relating to his Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is GRANTED;
(f) Defendant RTI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Antranick’s request of declaratory and
injunctive relief is GRANTED
(g) Defendant RTI’s Motion for Transfer of Venue to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina is GRANTED.
3. All remaining claims contained in Defendants RTI and Unity’s Motions that are not
discussed herein are DENIED.
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina.
The Clerk of Court shall notify the Parties of the making of this Order.
DATED this 5th day of February, 2010.
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/s/
JACK D. SHANSTROM
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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