Hume v. Watson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_____________________________
)
TERRY L. HUME, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 07-1742 (RWR)
)
SHAWN WATSON et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Terry Hume sued defendants Shawn Watson and
Kraftwerks, Inc. in part for taking advance payment from her on
home improvement work they were unlicensed to perform, in
violation of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection
Procedures Act (“DCCPPA”) (D.C. Code § 28-3904(dd)), and the
District of Columbia Municipal Regulations. Hume moves for
partial summary judgment on Count II of the complaint against
Watson in light of his guilty plea stemming from his conduct with
Hume. Because there is no issue of fact remaining regarding the
defendant’s liability on Count II of the amended complaint and
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
liability, Hume’s motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Hume alleges that defendants Watson and Kraftwerks, Inc.
fraudulently induced her to enter into a contract to buy a copper
roof, and then installed it improperly in breach of the contract
- 2 -
specifications. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-34.) Count II of the amended
complaint alleges that the defendants committed an unfair trade
practice in violation of the DCCPPA “[b]ecause Defendants were
not licensed by the District of Columbia to perform home
improvement work,” as Title 16, § 800.1 of the District of
Columbia Municipal Regulations required them to be.1 (Am. Compl.
¶ 37.) Watson pled guilty in the Superior Court for the District
of Columbia to one count of accepting payment for a home
improvement contract in advance of completion while not being
licensed as a home improvement contractor, one count of engaging
in a home improvement business without a valid license, and one
count of engaging in home improvement work without a basic
business license, all in connection with the contract with Hume.
(Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. A (“Plea
Tr.”) at 7, 22.) Watson admitted that on behalf of defendant
1
D.C. Municipal Regulation, Title 16, § 800.1 provides:
No person shall require or accept any payment for a
home improvement contract in advance of the full
completion of all work required to be performed under
the contract unless that person is licensed as a home
improvement contractor or as a licensed salesperson
employed by a licensed contractor in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.
D.C. MUN. REG. tit. XVI, § 800.1. “[V]iolation of this
regulation . . . requires disgorgement of any payments received.”
Luna v. A.E. Eng'g Servs., LLC, 938 A.2d 744, 750 n.20 (D.C.
2007) (citing Cevern, Inc. v. Ferbish, 666 A.2d 17, 20 (D.C.
1995).
- 3 -
Kraftwerks, Inc., he contracted with Hume to install a copper
roof on her house and he accepted payment for that work before
the work was completed, even though Kraftwerks was not licensed
to do business in the District of Columbia and Watson was not
licensed to do home improvement work in the District of Columbia.
(Plea Tr. 21-22.) Watson was sentenced to 270 days in jail and
ordered to pay restitution to Hume in the amount of $16,922.50.
The jail sentence was suspended pending payment of restitution.
(Plea Tr. 44-47.)
The defendants argue that partial summary judgment is
inappropriate because a guilty plea is not conclusive evidence of
a civil claim, and because Watson should not be held liable in
his individual capacity for a violation of municipal regulation
§ 16-800.1.2 (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial
Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 3, 5.)
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment may be appropriately granted when the
moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “In considering a
2
Defendants argue unpersuasively that under D.C. Code § 28-
3905(k)(1), an action seeking damages under D.C. Code § 28-3904may be brought only in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 6.) However, the language of § 28-
3905(k)(1) states merely that an action for a violation of § 28-
3904 may be brought in Superior Court, not that such an action
must be brought in Superior Court.
- 4 -
motion for summary judgment, [a court is to draw] all
‘justifiable inferences’ from the evidence . . . in favor of the
nonmovant.” Cruz-Packer v. Dist. of Columbia, 539 F. Supp. 2d
181, 189 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, a non-moving
party cannot defeat summary judgment by “simply show[ing] that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586). “Briefs containing mere
allegations or merely denying the movant's pleading are not
enough to prevent summary judgment; instead, a non-movant must go
beyond the pleadings to proffer specific facts rebutting the
movant's assertions.” Graham v. Holder, Civil Action No. 03-1951
(RWR), 2009 WL 3088816, at *3 (D.D.C. September 29, 2009) (citing
Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and Burke
v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). “The relevant
inquiry ‘is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
a need for a trial - - whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor
of either party.’” Single Stick, Inc. v. Johanns, 601 F. Supp.
2d 307, 312 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). A
genuine issue is present in a case where the “evidence is such
- 5 -
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party,” in contrast to a case where the evidence is “so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248, 252.
To successfully establish a claim for a violation of D.C.
Code § 28-3904(dd) predicated on a violation of Municipal
Regulation § 16-800.1, Hume must show: “(1) that a home
improvement contract for a residential property existed . . . ;
(2) the contract was for at least $300.00; (3) [under] the
contract, defendant[s] required or accepted payment in advance of
the full completion of all work required” to be performed under
the contract; and (4) defendants were not licensed in the
District of Columbia as home improvement contractors. Djourabchi
v. Self, 571 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Carlson
Constr. Co, Inc. v. Dupont W. Condo., Inc., 932 A.2d 1132,
1134-1135 (D.C. 2007) and Nixon v. Hansford, 584 A.2d 597, 598-99
(D.C. 1991)); see also Cevern, Inc. v. Ferbish, 666 A.2d 17, 19
n.1 (D.C. 1995).
Defendants argue that Watson’s guilty plea, while an
admission, is not conclusive evidence that he violated Municipal
Regulation § 16-800.1, and that there is a genuine issue of fact
as to whether a contract existed between Hume and Watson
personally, as opposed to between Hume and Kraftwerks. “Courts
have often held that issues determined in connection with a
- 6 -
criminal conviction may be preclusively established in later
civil trials.” Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F. Supp. 2d 54, 77
(D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Otherson v. Dep't of Justice, 711 F.2d
267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). While issue preclusion is generally
unavailable when the parties in the initial action are different
than the parties in the current action, “district courts in this
Circuit have routinely treated criminal convictions -- including
those based on guilty pleas -- [a]s conclusive proof of the facts
supporting the conviction, and have thus given them preclusive
effect in subsequent civil actions.” Miller, 563 F. Supp. 2d at
77 (internal quotations omitted); see also Hinton v. Shaw Pittman
Potts & Trowbridge, 257 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (D.D.C. 2003)
(“A criminal conviction is conclusive proof and operates as an
estoppel on the defendants as to the facts supporting the
conviction in a subsequent civil action.”) Defendants cite Crane
v. Dunn, 854 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Md. 2004), for the proposition that
“a plea of guilty . . . may be introduced in a subsequent civil
proceeding, [but] the guilty plea may be rebutted or explained in
the subsequent proceeding.” Id. However, even if Watson’s
conviction were treated as less than conclusive evidence of
liability, the defendants have come forth with absolutely nothing
to rebut Hume’s assertions establishing all four elements of a
violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904(dd) predicated on a violation of
Municipal Regulation § 16-800.1. Watson’s conviction by guilty
- 7 -
plea established that the contract for Hume’s roof repair was
valued at more than $300, that Hume paid in advance of full
completion of all work, and that Watson and Kraftwerks were not
licensed in the District of Columbia as home improvement
contractors. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 15, 32-33; Plea Tr. 21-22.)
While Watson argues that there remains a genuine issue of
fact as to whether he was individually liable on the contract for
the repair of Hume’s roof, a plain reading of the regulation at
issue does not require Watson to be a contracting party for
liability to be imposed on him. Municipal Regulation § 16-800.1
provides in part that “[n]o person shall require or accept any
payment for a home improvement contract[.]” As the defendants
even note in their opposition, Watson admitted in his plea
hearing that he accepted payment for the contract to install
Hume’s roof. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2; Plea Tr. 22.) The defendants
provide no support for their assertion that, despite the fact
that Watson accepted payment for the home improvement contract,
he cannot be liable for violating the municipal regulation if the
contract was made between Hume and Kraftwerks. The defendants
have provided nothing but speculation to rebut the evidence Hume
provided supporting liability on Count II of the amended
complaint. Therefore, Hume’s motion for partial summary judgment
will be granted on the issue of liability.
- 8 -
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because Hume has shown that there is no genuine issue of
fact necessitating a trial regarding liability on Count II, it is
hereby
ORDERED that Hume’s motion [41] for summary judgment on
Count II of the amended complaint be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and
judgment is entered against Watson on the issue of liability on
Count II of the amended complaint. It is further
ORDERED that the parties be, and hereby are, DIRECTED to
file a joint status report and proposed order by February 4,
2010, proposing a schedule upon which this case should proceed.
SIGNED this 14th day of January, 2010.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge