Hodge v. United Airlines

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MALIK HODGE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 07-1527 (CKK)
v.
UNITED AIRLINES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(October 26, 2009)
This is an employment discrimination case alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Family Medical
Leave Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611 et seq. (“FMLA”). Currently before the Court are the
merits of Defendant’s [4] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court previously
granted Defendant’s motion as conceded due to Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely response and
dismissed the case without prejudice. See [5] Order (Jan. 4, 2008). The Court denied Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration of that decision. See [8] Order (Jan. 18, 2008). Plaintiff appealed,
and the Court of Appeals, on its own motion, remanded the case to allow this Court to determine
whether it wished to reconsider its decision in light of statute of limitations problems that might
prevent Plaintiff from refiling his Title VII claims. See [12] Order (Aug. 1, 2008). Accordingly,
this Court vacated its prior order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and ordered that Plaintiff
respond to Defendant’s pending motion to dismiss. See [13] Order (Aug. 7, 2008). The Court
now addresses the merits of Defendant’s motion.
Defendant’s motion raises three primary arguments. First, Defendant contends that
Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are time-barred because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies
by filing a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Second,
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim was never raised with the
EEOC and thus cannot be a part of this suit. Third, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s FMLA
claim is time-barred because it was not filed within the two-year statute of limitations for
ordinary violations. In response, Plaintiff argues that he did timely file a charge with the EEOC,
that his hostile work environment claim was included in that charge, and that his FMLA claim
alleges a willful violation of the statute to which a three-year statute of limitations applies.
Defendant styled its motion as one to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Alternatively,
Defendant asks this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) because of Plaintiff’s alleged failure to timely exhaust
administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Def.’s Mem. P. &. A. Supp. Mot. Dismiss
(“Def.’s Mem.”) at 4. However, although exhaustion is required by the statute at issue, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), the statute does not clearly indicate that exhaustion is a jurisdictional
prerequisite as opposed to merely a required element of the claim. Federal courts must “presume
exhaustion is non-jurisdictional unless Congress states in clear, unequivocal terms that the
judiciary is barred from hearing an action until the administrative agency has come to a
decision.” Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that “filing a
timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in
federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel,
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and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Thus, the
Court cannot review Defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
This distinction is important because both parties have attached exhibits to their briefs so
as to provide the Court with additional documents pertaining to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims and
filings with the EEOC. “Generally, when a court relies upon matters outside the pleadings, a
motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)] must be treated as one for summary judgment.”
Solomon v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 539 F. Supp. 2d 347, 349-50 (D.D.C. 2008);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Therefore, the Court must either disregard the parties’ exhibits or convert
Defendant’s motion into one for summary judgment. Because the Court finds that the exhibits
attached are integral to the parties’ arguments regarding Plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the Court shall treat Defendant’s motion as one for summary judgment with respect to
the Title VII claims.1 With respect to the FMLA claim, the Court shall rule on Defendant’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
For the reasons expressed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff did timely exhaust his Title
VII claims for discrimination and retaliation but did not exhaust any claims for hostile work
environment. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has alleged a willful violation of the FMLA
subject to the three-year statute of limitations. The Court shall therefore deny Defendant’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims as untimely, grant Defendant’s motion as to any
hostile work environment claims, and deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FMLA
1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) requires the Court to give all parties “a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Because both parties
voluntarily attached exhibits to their briefs on the issue of exhaustion and no discovery should be
necessary to uncover relevant information, the Court finds that the parties have been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present all the relevant materials to the Court.
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claim as time-barred.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Malik Hodge worked as a flight attendant for Defendant United Airlines
(“United”) from February 26, 1995 until he was terminated on March 10, 2005. Compl. ¶ 5.
Hodge claims that during the last three years of his employment, he was subjected to harassment
based on his race (African American) and ethnic appearance. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. In his Complaint,
Hodge describes several instances in which his supervisors and co-workers criticized his ethnic
hairstyles and hair coverings. Id. ¶¶ 6-9. On October 20, 2004, Hodge was injured in an
automobile accident in the District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 10. He began receiving physical therapy
shortly thereafter and informed United of his need for continued medical care. Id. Hodge
returned to work in December 2004, requiring him to decrease his physical therapy. Id. ¶ 11. On
December 23, 2004, he suffered a recurrence of the injury to his back, leaving him in a
debilitated state, and his doctors restricted him from work activities. Id.
While Hodge was out of work with the injury and awaiting treatment, one of his
supervisors sent him an email indicating that she had made several unsuccessful attempts to
reach him and that she needed him to provide medical documentation for his absence by no later
than January 7, 2005. Compl. ¶ 12. However, the supervisor’s phone calls were directed to
Hodge’s residence in Hong Kong, not Washington, D.C., where Hodge was staying, and Hodge
did not receive her email immediately because he was unable to check his email on a regular
basis. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Hodge first became aware that his supervisor was trying to reach him on or
about January 11, 2005, when his father notified him that he had received a package from United
containing a letter of charge. Id. ¶ 13. Hodge faxed the requested medical documentation to
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United on January 12 and 18, 2005. Id.
In February 2005, Hodge filed an internal complaint of discrimination against United.
Compl. ¶ 13. United’s management conducted a hearing, charged Hodge with unauthorized
absence from work, invalid sick leave, and failure to comply with a written directive. Id. ¶ 14.
Hodge was terminated on March 10, 2005. Id. Hodge claims that he was treated differently than
a similarly situated white employee, who was also absent from work without leave but was given
an opportunity to resolve his situation before proceeding to hearing. Id.
On November 23, 2005, Hodge submitted a “Charge Questionnaire” (Form 283) with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission indicating that United had discriminated against
him on the basis of race, color, disability and “other.” See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
(“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Ex. A (Charge Questionnaire) at 2-3.2 The Charge Questionnaire cited Hodge’s
discharge on March 10, 2005, and in response to the question “Explain why you feel the action
taken against you was discriminatory,” Hodge wrote “someone (white male) in similar
circumstances wasn’t terminated.” Id. at 3. When asked to state the disability for which he felt
he was being discriminated, Hodge wrote “I had back problems that prevented me from
working.” Id. Hodge further explained in response to a question asking if any actions were
retaliatory: “I wrote a letter of harrassment [sic] to headquarters in Chicago and a month later I
2
The opposition brief filed by Plaintiff in this case references two exhibits—a “charge of
discrimination filed with the EEOC” (Ex. A) and a “finding of probable cause” issued by the
EEOC (Ex. B). See Opp’n at 4. The Court notes that Plaintiff did not attach these exhibits to his
opposition in this case, but he did attach them to his nearly identical opposition brief in the
related case, Hodge v. United Airlines, Civ. Action No. 08-232 (Hodge II), also before this Court.
See Hodge II, Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 11), Exs. A, B. Because Plaintiff
clearly intended to incorporate the same exhibits in his opposition in Hodge I as he did in Hodge
II, the Court shall treat Plaintiff’s opposition as if the referenced exhibits were in fact attached.
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was fired!” Id.3
On January 12, 2006, the EEOC’s Chicago District Office received a formal Charge of
Discrimination (Form 5) from Hodge. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1 (Charge of
Discrimination). The charge indicated that Hodge had been discriminated based on race and
retaliation and explained as follows:
I was hired by Respondent in or around February 1995. On or about October 20,
2004 I was involved in a car accident which caused me to be placed on pain
medication. I called in and placed myself on the company sick list on or about
December 23, 2004. On or about January 3, 2005, I was falsely accused by
Respondent. Subsequently, I complained of racial discrimination regarding the
charges against me to Human Resources on or about February 3, 2005. On March
10, 2005 I was discharged. I believe I have been subjected to retaliation for
complaining of discrimination against because of my race, Black, in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Id. The charge was signed by Hodge on January 6, 2006. Id. On May 29, 2007, the EEOC
issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter to Hodge. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 2 (Notice of
Right to Sue).
Hodge filed this action (Hodge I) on August 27, 2007. Following this Court’s first order
dismissing his Complaint without prejudice, Hodge filed a second action (Hodge II) raising the
same claims and adding claims for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981. See Complaint, Hodge v. United Airlines, Civ. Action No. 08-232 (filed Feb. 12,
3
Plaintiff’s Exhibit A appears to be a faxed copy of his Charge Questionnaire, along with
three pages of handwritten notes dated December 7, 2005. Two of these pages appear to be a
detailed chronology of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s discharge from United. See Pl.’s
Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A at 5-6. Although more detailed, the substance of this
chronology is essentially identical to the facts alleged in the Complaint. It is not clear whether
these handwritten pages were ever submitted to the EEOC, although their later date makes it
highly improbable that they were submitted along with the Charge Questionnaire on November
23, 2005. Ultimately, however, the Court need not make a factual determination with regard to
these handwritten pages.
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2008). On August 25, 2008, this Court stayed Hodge II so that it could first address the issues
raised in Hodge I.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be granted when it appears that, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). A defendant may raise the affirmative
defense of statute of limitations in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the facts that give rise to the
defense are clear from the face of the complaint. See Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155
F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The court should grant a motion to dismiss only if the complaint
on its face is conclusively time-barred. Id.; Doe v. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party is entitled to summary judgment
“if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” To determine which facts are “material,” a court must look to the substantive law
on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As with
a motion to dismiss, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true.
Id. at 255.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. The Timeliness of Hodge’s Charge Filed with the EEOC
United argues that Hodge’s Title VII claims should be dismissed because he did not file a
formal charge with the EEOC within 300 days of his allegedly wrongful discharge.4 A plaintiff
challenging an employment practice under Title VII must first file a charge with the EEOC, and
the charge “must be filed within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days, depending on the
State) after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 623-24 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)), superseded by
statute, Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). “[I]f the
employee does not submit a timely EEOC charge, the employee may not challenge that practice
in court.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). Here, there is no dispute that the challenged
employment practice occurred on March 10, 2005, the date that Hodge was discharged by
United. Moreover, the parties appear to agree that Hodge had 300 days in which to file his
charge with the EEOC.5 The dispute revolves around whether Hodge’s filing of a “Charge
4
United also claims that Hodge’s Title VII claims should be dismissed because Hodge
failed to allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Def.’s Mem. at 5. However,
exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense for which the Defendant, not the
Plaintiff, bears the burdens of pleading and proof. Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 68 (D.D.C. 2007). Accordingly,
Hodge’s failure to allege in his Complaint that he exhausted administrative remedies is not a
ground for dismissing his claims.
5
United initially suggests in its opening brief that a 180-day limitations period is
applicable, see Def.’s Mem. at 6, but backs off this argument in its reply brief, claiming only that
Hodge failed to timely file within 300 days of his termination. See Def.’s Reply Mem. Supp.
Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Reply”). The 300-day window applies when the aggrieved person
first filed a complaint with a state or local agency with the authority to grant relief. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Although Hodge did not file with a state or local agency first, employees
are entitled to a 300-day window when a “worksharing agreement” exists between the EEOC and
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Questionnaire” with the EEOC on November 23, 2005 constitutes a valid charge, or whether
Hodge cannot be considered to have filed until the EEOC received his formal “Charge of
Discrimination” form on January 12, 2006, which was more than 300 days after his termination.
The Supreme Court was faced with a nearly identical question in Federal Express Corp.
v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008). In Holowecki, the plaintiff had filed an “Intake
Questionnaire” with the EEOC along with a signed affidavit describing the alleged
discriminatory employment practices in greater detail. See 128 S. Ct. at 1154. The Supreme
Court upheld the EEOC’s conclusion that these documents could constitute a “charge” for
purposes of the filing requirements in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id.
at 1155-58. In doing so, the Court held that “[i]n addition to the information required by the
regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a
charge it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to
protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the
employee.” Id. at 1157-58. “[T]he filing must be examined from the standpoint of an objective
observer to determine whether, by a reasonable construction of its terms, the filer requests the
agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes.” Id. at 1158. Although the Court noted
that the Intake Questionnaire itself was merely aimed at facilitating “pre-charge filing
counseling,” the fact that the plaintiff had attached a detailed affidavit asking the EEOC to take
action against her employer indicated that her filing could be considered a charge within the
a local fair employment practices office. Akonji v. Unity Healthcare, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91
(D.D.C. 2007) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A)). Illinois, the state where Hodge filed his
charge with the EEOC, has such an agreement, so the 300-day window is appropriate. See
Russell v. Declo Remy Div. of Gen. Motors, 51 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1995).
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meaning of the statute. Id. at 1159-60.
The Court in Holowecki cautioned that because the EEOC’s enforcement mechanisms for
ADEA claims differ slightly from those pertaining to Title VII, courts should be careful “not to
apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical
examination.” 128 S. Ct. at 1153. However, one court within this District has already held that
Holowecki applies to a Charge Questionnaire filed by a Title VII plaintiff. See Beckham v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008). As in this case, the plaintiff in
Beckham did not file her formal “Charge of Discrimination” (EEOC Form 5) until after the 300-
day window, but she timely filed a “Charge Questionnaire” (EEOC Form 283). See 590 F. Supp.
2d at 85. Judge Rosemary M. Collyer determined that the Intake Questionnaire discussed in
Holowecki was the predecessor to the Charge Questionnaire filed by Beckham, and there were
several significant differences between the forms. Id. at 86. For example, the Charge
Questionnaire explicitly states that “[w]hen this form constitutes the only timely written
statement of allegations of employment discrimination, the Commission will . . . consider it to be
a sufficient charge of discrimination under the relevant statute(s).” Id.; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A
(Charge Questionnaire) at 3 n.3. The Charge Questionnaire states that its purpose “is to solicit
information in an acceptable form consistent with statutory requirements to enable the
Commission to act on matters within its jurisdiction.” 590 F. Supp. 2d at 87; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A
at 3 n.3. Given the Holowecki Court’s guidance that a charge must be a request that the
Commission take remedial action, Judge Collyer deemed these differences in the forms to be
legally significant. 590 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
This Court agrees with Judge Collyer’s analysis. Hodge’s filing of the Charge
10
Questionnaire contained all the legally required elements of a charge: it named his employer
(United) and his direct supervisor, listed the approximate number of employees for United, and
provided a concise statement of the facts, including dates, of the alleged discriminatory practices.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (describing the required contents of a charge). Moreover, EEOC’s
regulations state that “a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person
making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe
generally the action or practices complained of.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). Hodge’s Charge
Questionnaire satisfies this standard. Because that Charge Questionnaire was filed within 300
days of his termination, the Court shall deny United’s motion to dismiss Hodge’s Title VII claims
as untimely.
B. Hodge’s Hostile Work Environment Claim
United next argues that Hodge’s hostile work environment claim should be dismissed
because it was never raised with the EEOC, and thus he did not exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to that claim. The Court begins by noting that Hodge’s complaint does not
identify discrete claims under Title VII, although it appears that he intended to enumerate three
separate counts of violations because the next heading following his Title VII claims is titled
“Count IV.” See Compl. at 5, 7. United reads Hodge’s Complaint as alleging three separate
Title VII claims: discriminatory discharge, retaliatory discharge, and hostile work environment.
See Def.’s Mem. at 3 n.1. Hodge does not appear to challenge this reading of his complaint,
although his only response to United’s argument on this ground is “Mr. Hodge is not pursuing a
separate hostile work environment claim.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.
Paragraph 17 of the Complaint alleges that
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Defendant, and through its agents knowingly and intentionally engaged in unlawful
discrimination and retaliation, based on Hodge’s race by subjecting Hodge to
disparate treatment and a hostile work environment, including but not limited to
subjecting Mr. Hodge to a harassment and a hostile work environment based on his
race as detailed above, issuing Mr. Hodge unwarranted discipline, and terminating
his employment after he filed a complaint of discrimination. . . .
The Court agrees with United that Hodge’s Complaint appears to state three separate claims
under Title VII. It is not clear from Hodge’s statement in his opposition whether he is not
pursuing any hostile work environment claim or whether he is not simply not pursuing one that
involves events separate from those alleged in his Complaint. The Court shall presume in favor
of Hodge that he intends to preserve some form of hostile work environment claim.
The question, then, is whether Hodge has properly exhausted any such claim by including
it in his charge filed with the EEOC. The lawsuit following a charge is “limited in scope to
claims that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such
allegations.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “At a minimum, the Title VII claims must arise from the
administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of
discrimination.” Id. In this case, the information described in both the Charge Questionnaire and
the formal Charge of Discrimination relates only to Hodge’s sick leave, retaliation, and
termination. The only possible reference to a hostile work environment could be Hodge’s
indication that he “wrote a letter of harrassment” [sic] to headquarters, but this information is not
specific or elaborate enough to allow the EEOC to infer the existence of a hostile work
environment. Indeed, the crux of Hodge’s discrimination charge with the EEOC seems to be that
a white male in similar circumstances was not terminated. The EEOC’s administrative
12
investigation could not be reasonably expected to uncover the allegations of hostile work
environment contained in Hodge’s complaint. Therefore, the Court finds that Hodge has
exhausted only those Title VII claims directly relating to his termination on March 10, 2005.6
Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss Hodge’s hostile work environment claim, to the extent he
has pled one.
C. Hodge’s FMLA Claim
United contends that Hodge’s FMLA claim is time-barred because it was filed more than
two years after the alleged violation. Def.’s Mem. at 10-11. The FMLA provides that actions
must be brought “not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged
violation for which the action is brought,” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1), except that “in the case of
such action brought for a willful violation of [29 U.S.C. §] 2615 . . ., such action may be brought
within 3 years . . . .” Id. § 2617(c)(2). Hodge contends that he is alleging a willful violation and
that it is timely because it was filed within three years of United’s failure to provide him with
medical leave. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.
The three-year statute of limitations for willful violations does not apply unless the
complaint contains some express or implied allegation of willful conduct. Sampson v. Citibank,
F.S.B., 53 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 1999). In the context of the FMLA, willful conduct is
generally viewed as “an employer that knows its conduct to be wrong or has shown reckless
disregard for the matter in light of the statute.” Id.; see McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486
6
Moreover, unless Hodge’s hostile work environment claim is connected to his allegedly
discriminatory or retaliatory termination, his claim may be time-barred. See Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 118 (2002) (holding that employees cannot recover
for acts creating a hostile work environment outside the limitations period unless they are related
to acts within the limitations period).
13
U.S. 128, (1988) (adopting “knowing or reckless disregard” standard in the analogous Fair Labor
Standards Act context); Bass v. Potter, 522 F.3d 1098, 1103-04 (10th Cir. 2008) (following
decisions of the First, Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in applying the McLaughlin standard to
the FMLA). In paragraph 24 of the Complaint, Hodge alleges, “[i]n violation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, Defendant knowingly and intentionally rejected or refused to accept a
request for leave for medical attention, and ultimately terminated Mr. Hodge’s employment.”
Compl. ¶ 24.
While Hodge does not use the magic word “willful” in his complaint, his allegations of
knowledge and intentionality are sufficient to indicate that he believes United’s violation of the
statute was willful. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of
a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”) At this early stage in the litigation, those allegations
are sufficient. See Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Because a plaintiff’s
factual allegations must be taken as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff may
survive merely by having alleged that the FMLA violation was willful.”) Accordingly, the Court
finds that Hodge’s FMLA is not time-barred to the extent it claims a willful violation of the
statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall DENY Defendant’s motion with respect to the
timeliness of Plaintiff’s exhaustion of his Title VII claims, GRANT Defendant’s motion with
respect to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, and DENY Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s FMLA claim. In light of this ruling, the Court shall order the parties to file a joint
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status report as to how they propose to proceed with this litigation and Hodge II.
Date: October 26, 2009
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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