Reed v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________
)
ROBERT ANDREW REED, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-0530 (BAH)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., )
)
)
Respondents. )
__________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Robert Andrew Reed has filed a “Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ
of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody,” ECF No. 1. He challenges his conviction
entered by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in March 2010 on the ground that
the prosecuting attorney withheld exculpatory evidence during his jury trial. See Pet.,
ECF pp. 1, 5, 9. For the following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear
the petition and, thus, will dismiss the case.
Unlike prisoners convicted in state courts or those convicted in a United States
District Court, "a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum
unless [he shows that] the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.@ Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993(1986) (internal footnote and quotation marks omitted); see Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d
34, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("In order to collaterally attack his sentence in an Article III court a
District of Columbia prisoner faces a hurdle that a federal prisoner does not."). It is
1
established that challenges to a Superior Court judgment of conviction must be pursued in
that court under D.C. Code ' 23-110. See Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). Under the local statute, a District of Columbia prisoner may move to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence on grounds, among others, that A(1) the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution . . . .@ D.C. Code ' 23-110(a). The statute further
provides that
[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be
entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that the Superior Court
has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
D.C. Code ' 23-110(g). ASection 23-110(g)'s plain language makes clear that it only
divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners who could have
raised viable claims pursuant to section 23-110(a).@ Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995,
998 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see id. at 999 (concluding that this Court could review a Afederal
habeas petition asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel after [the petitioner
has] moved to recall the mandate in the D.C. Court of Appeals@ because such a claim is not
available via a ' 23-110 motion); see accord Sanders v. Caraway, 859 F. Supp. 2d 78, 80-81
(D.D.C. 2012).
The government’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence at trial is a viable due
process claim under D.C. Code § 23-110(a). See Coleman v. Ives, 841 F. Supp. 2d 333, 335
(D.D.C. 2012) (finding “claims arising from errors that occurred during [] trial . . . foreclosed
from federal court review by § 23-110”); Wright v. Stansberry, 677 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288
(D.D.C. 2010), citing Wright v. U.S., 979 A.2d 26 (D.C. 2009)(discussing D.C. Court of
Appeals’ treatment of § 23-110 motion raising violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 832
(1963)). Petitioner has not shown that his local remedy is ineffective or inadequate, and
an unsuccessful appeal or collateral proceeding does not otherwise suffice to overcome the
jurisdictional hurdle. See Garris, 794 F.2d at 727 (A[M]ere lack of success on [direct]
appeal does not pave the way for collateral attack.@) (footnote and citations omitted);
accord Bruton v. Ashcroft, 48 Fed. Appx. 336 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (AThe [28 U.S.C.] ' 2255
remedy is not inadequate or ineffective simply because ' 2255 relief has already been
denied.@) (citing Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases));
Wilson v. Off. of the Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995) (AA petitioner may not
complain that the remedies provided him by D.C. Code ' 23-110 are inadequate merely
because he was unsuccessful when he invoked them.@).
For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. A
separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ Beryl A. Howell
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATE: April 7, 2014
3